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Abstract 
This thesis deals with the issue of what would be the best rules and procedures that 
Korea could adopt in respect of the private enforcement of competition law, in particular 
in respect of actions for damages. Its central objective is to analyze how private 
enforcement could achieve the objectives of competition law such as ensuring 
competition and protecting consumer interests effectively. In achieving objectives of 
competition law, optimal enforcement through effective and efficient combination of 
private and public enforcement is important because it could ensure the most effective 
distribution of resources between private and public enforcement. 
In respect of private competition enforcement, Korea wishes to encourage and 
facilitate private enforcement. However, there is a high possibility that many problems 
arise over the private enforcement of competition law. The problems include the issues 
of standing; criteria and measurement of damage; passing on defense; indirect purchaser 
actions; class and representative actions; and the possible impact of private actions on 
public enforcement. 
This thesis explores the issue of the best solution to some of the most important of 
these issues for Korea in the context of four pervasive themes i) the objectives of 
competition law ii) the legal and competition law culture of Korea, iii) the relationship 
between public and private enforcement and iv) the experience of certain other 
jurisdictions (the US, the EU, and the UK). The analysis takes into account these three 
comparator jurisdictions for the following reasons. The US has the most mature and 
long-established system of competition law in the world. The EU is at a particularly 
interesting stage as regards private enforcement as the European Commission is actively 
seeking to promote it. The UK is a Member State of the EU and it is therefore useful to 
look at the UK as a jurisdiction in which the EU rules are actually applied. The final 
conclusion reached by the analysis of these three jurisdictions. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Introduction to the Thesis 
1.1.1 General Explanation of this Thesis 
This thesis addresses the research question of what would be the best rules 
and procedures that Korea could adopt on certain major issues in respect of the 
private enforcement of competition law, in particular actions for damages. 
The thesis explores this question in the context of the approach to these issues 
in three jurisdictions in which private damages actions are well-established or have 
been the subject of recent discussion and proposals for reform, in order to see what 
lessons and insights can be derived from them. The issues are considered in the 
light of four pervasive themes i) the objectives of competition law ii) the legal and 
competition law culture of Korea iii) the relationship between public and private 
enforcement and iv) the experience of certain other jurisdictions (the US, the EU, 
and the UK). 
1.1.1.1 What is the present position as regards damages actions in Korea? 
Until now the enforcement of competition law in Korea has been heavily 
concentrated on `public enforcement' that is, enforcement by an agency of the state. 
In this, Korea is similar to the great majority of jurisdictions throughout the world, 
with the noted exception of the US. Although the methods of the public 
enforcement of competition law vary considerably between jurisdictions, it 
generally features monetary penalties that take the form of fines that go to the 
public purse rather than to parties that have suffered damage as a result of an 
infringement, and is characterized by a lack of control of the proceedings by private 
parties such as competitors and customers. In contrast, private enforcement can 
basically be described as litigation initiated by a private party. 1 Private 
enforcement has hitherto been limited in Korea, with 90% of competition 
1 This could include taking a matter to arbitration as well as court proceedings. 
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enforcement being public enforcement. There are two major reasons for this. First, 
Korea is not a litigious society and the business culture militates against private 
litigation, as explained in Chapter 2. Second, the Korean legal system lacks many 
of the devices which provide strong incentives for plaintiffs to bring actions, such 
as multiple damages, 2 one-way costs rules, 3 contingency fees4, broad discovery 
procedures5 and opt-out class actions. 6 These incentives can encourage private 
enforcement although, as is seen in this thesis, they can also cause problems. This is 
shown by the position in the US, where plaintiff incentives have led to abuse of 
litigation, as explained later in this thesis. However, Korea has recently been 
encouraging and facilitating the private enforcement of competition law particularly 
actions for damages, and one question to consider is whether certain US procedures 
could be transplanted to Korea without the problems experienced in the US 
occurring. It is possible that features of Korean culture might prevent problems 
such as abuse of litigation. On the other hand it may be that these strong incentives 
are not be consistent with Korean legal tradition so that transplantation is not 
feasible. 
1.1.1.2. Why should private enforcement be encouraged? 
In trying to encourage damages actions Korea is like many other jurisdictions 
such as the EU where, although the competition law regime is set up primarily as a 
system of public enforcement, a great deal of attention is currently being paid to 
private enforcement, particularly actions for damages. The issue of why states? 
wish to encourage and facilitate private enforcement is one of the matters discussed 
in this thesis. It can be said by way of introduction, however, that it is closely bound 
up with the reasons for which states adopt competition laws and with the objectives 
2 Treble damages, for example, allow the plaintiff to recover three times the amount of damags actually 
suffered as a result of the anticompetitive conduct, see further Chapter 3. 3 The one-way cost rule is that plaintiffs can get their costs if they win the action but are not required to 
pay the defendants' cost if the action is successfully defended. 
Contigency fee means that winning plaintiffs' lawyer has an entitlement to fees which are calculated in 
relation to the size of the award. s Under the law of the United States, for example, civil discovery is wide-ranging and can involve any 
material which is relevant to the case except information which is privileged. 6 Opt-out class actions means the class member is bound by the resolution of the class actions unless the 
class member chooses to opt out of the class, see further Chapter 6. 7 In this thesis, unless the context otherwise requires `state' includes the EU. 
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of those laws such as consumer welfare. This means that the enforcement of 
competition law is concerned with public goals and not only, or even mainly, with 
private rights. Private enforcement can therefore serve two ends. First, it can 
support, complement and supplement public enforcement by providing extra 
deterrence to infringements of the competition rules and can help to remedy the 
inability of public enforcement agencies to pursue all infringements, because of 
lack of resources for example. Secondly, it can uphold the private rights protected 
by competition law. Damages actions are important in this regard because 
individuals can get compensation only through litigation. Fines imposed by public 
enforcers do not compensate the victims of infringers. For instance, there can be 
damages claims by a direct or indirect purchaser from a member of a price fixing 
cartel or damages claims brought by a co-contractor to a vertical agreement. The 
latter has occurred in Korea, as discussed in Chapter 3.8 
Throughout this thesis reference is made to the `optimal enforcement' of 
competition law. It is necessary to consider how competition law can be effectively 
enforced to achieve optimal enforcement against conduct that causes a welfare loss 
to society. 9 To ensure optimal balance between private and public enforcement, it 
is desirable that private enforcement and public enforcement work alongside each 
other to the best effect. Although the encouragement of private enforcement is 
desirable, it cannot alone achieve the objectives of competition law enforcement. 
Rather, there needs to be mutually fruitful interaction between private and public 
enforcement. Private enforcement must not alter the basic goal of the competition 
rules, which in Korea is to safeguard the public interest in maintaining free and 
undistorted competition. 10 Thus, it is necessary for private enforcement to be 
evaluated in terms of how successfully it helps to advance the public interest 
without unreasonably deterring legitimate business. The concept of optimal 
enforcement will be explored more fully in the later chapters but as way of 
introduction it can be taken to mean the way, or combination of ways, of enforcing 
competition law which best promote the objectives of that law. 
8 See section 3.2.1 which deals with the principle of compensation for damages in Korea. 9 In respect to consumer welfare, see section 1.2.2.1 which deals with the objectives of competition law 
in Korea. 
10 See section 1.2.2.1 which deals with the objectives of competition law in Korea. 
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1.1.1.3 What are the main issues in private damages actions? 
Many problems arise over the private enforcement of competition law, in all 
jurisdictions. Some of these are shared by litigation in other areas of law but some 
are peculiar to, or peculiarly difficult in respect of, competition law. They are 
especially acute in the area of damages actions. The problems include the issues of 
who should be able to sue; what type of damages should be awarded; the 
quantification of damages; the passing on defence; procedures, such as group 
actions, necessary to encourage individual victims to sue; costs rules; discovery 
rules; and the possible impact of private actions on public enforcement. 
It is impossible within the word constraints of this thesis to examine all these 
matters and therefore this thesis concentrates on considering the best rules for 
Korea to adopt in respect of four main issues: (i) the type of damages to be awarded 
(ii) whether or not a passing on defence should be recognised (iii) whether indirect 
purchasers should have standing to sue and (iv) group or representative actions. 
These matters have been chosen because they are of fundamental importance and 
raise issues of principle. The type of damages awarded involves a consideration of 
whether the basis should be compensation or something else, which in turn 
necessitates considering what is the function of damages actions. The passing on 
defence is related to the compensation question and raises the question of whether 
the desire to deter infringements by giving those most likely to sue the right to do so 
outweighs the conceptual difficulty of rewarding those who have not suffered loss. 
The indirect purchaser question is related to the passing on defence and who should 
be able to sue, and again raises the question of whether damages actions protect 
private rights or are merely a mechanism for bolstering the public interest. The 
group action question deals with one of the most intractable problems in damages 
actions, namely how to encourage such actions where the losses suffered may be 
widely dispersed and spread thinly over very many individuals, in other words how 
to enhance consumer welfare by ensuring effective actions for consumers. The 
thesis does not discuss jury trials because Korea does not have a jury system and, 
4 
given the civil law system of Korea, there is no likelihood of one being adopted. 
The problems of multiple enforcement by state and federal authorities in the US are 
not discussed because this multiple enforcement is restricted to the US and has no 
relevance for Korea. 
1.1.1.4 What lessons can be drawn from other jurisdictions? 
As private damages actions already exist to a greater or lesser extent in many 
other jurisdictions it is useful for Korea to examine the experience of other 
jurisdictions. Indeed, the efforts to encourage private damages actions in Korea will 
in a large part be an exercise in choosing whether to embrace, modify, or reject key 
aspects of competition litigation as it is practised in other jurisdictions. This thesis 
has chosen to look in particular at what Korea can learn from the US, EU, and UK. 
These three comparator jurisdictions have been chosen for the following reasons. 
1. The US has been chosen since the US has the most mature and long- 
established system of competition law (called in the US `antitrust') in the world, 
originating in the Sherman Act of 1890. However, there are many differences 
between the Korean legal system and the US legal system. Most crucially, the main 
difference between these two systems in the area of competition law is what is the 
primary enforcement mechanism. On the one hand, the US is exceptional in that 
private enforcement is the predominant way in which antitrust law is enforced. On 
the other hand, competition enforcement in Korea has been primarily entrusted to a 
powerful public authority which not only prosecutes infringers but is a decision- 
making body. Despite these substantial differences, it is impossible to discuss the 
issues raised in this thesis without reference to the American experience. With more 
than a century's experience of a private enforcement regime, the US is a valuable 
source of useful positive as well as negative policy lessons for private enforcement 
for Korea. The US experience of private enforcement shows that it is important to 
balance the facilitating of private competition enforcement against preventing the 
waste of resources that result from baseless lawsuits. It shows that it is desirable to 
strike a balance between the encouragement of private enforcement and the 
prevention of litigation abuse by considering the good and bad effects of strong 
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incentives in order to ensure effective private damages actions in Korea. 
2. The EU has been chosen since the European Commission is actively 
seeking to promote private enforcement despite the predominance of public 
enforcement. The EU has now had a system of competition law for nearly fifty 
years. " During that time the predominant method of enforcement has been public 
enforcement by the European Commission. Private enforcement in the EU is a far 
more complex issue than in a national state such as Korea or the US. This is 
because private actions in the EU have to be brought in the national courts of the 
Member States. It is not possible for private parties to litigate between themselves 
in the European Court of Justice (ECJ) or the Court of First Instance (CFI). 12 
However, on some issues an EU-wide rule has been laid down by the ECJ. On other 
issues the position may vary widely from Member State to Member State. However, 
the EU is at a particularly interesting stage as regards private enforcement at present 
as the European Commission is actively seeking to promote it. To this end it is 
attempting to harmonise the laws and procedures of the Member States on matters 
relevant to damages actions for breach of the competition rules and to achieve the 
optimum relationship between public and private enforcement. 13 Developments 
and discussions at EU level are therefore highly instructive in any consideration of 
the best rules to adopt on private damages actions. 
3. The UK has been chosen because although UK domestic competition laws 
are predominantly enforced by public competition authorities, the UK has tried to 
encourage private enforcement and has adopted various procedures for facilitating 
private enforcement. Also, the UK is a Member State of the EU and accordingly 
must adopt and follow rules in respect of private enforcement laid down by the ECJ 
or required by European legislation. It is therefore useful to look at the UK as a 
jurisdiction in which the EU rules are actually applied. Further, an increasing 
number of damages actions are coming before the UK courts and important 
" Competition law in the EU is EC rather than EU law until the Treaty of Lisbon comes into force. 12 Disputes between private parties only reach the ECJ on a reference from a national court under Article 
234 and return to the national court for a judgment in the case. See further section 2.2 which deals with 
overview of private enforcement in the EU. 13 The Green and White Papers of the European Commission on actions for damages are discussed 
further at section 2.2 which deals with overview of private enforcement in the EU. 
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principles have been laid down in a number of judgments. The UK is an interesting 
jurisdiction because, like the US but unlike Korea, it is a common law country but it 
does not have the same `litigation culture' as the US and opted for a system of 
primarily public rather than private enforcement. From Korea's perspective, 
therefore, the UK can be seen as a bridge between the common and civil law worlds. 
1.1.2 Outline and Structure of this Thesis 
The thesis consists of this Introduction and six further Chapters. 
Chapterl. 
This chapter explains that the primary issue is the role of private enforcement 
in achieving the optimal enforcement of competition law. The EU, UK and Korea 
have recently engaged in reviews on how to improve conditions for the private 
enforcement of competition law. As I will discuss below, 14 the key question is how 
to achieve optimal enforcement through effective and efficient combination 
between private and public enforcement. 
First, I discuss the objectives of competition law in the Korea, the EU, UK, 
and US. It must be noted that the UK is part of the EU and the UK legal system is 
part of the EU legal order. I also discuss the objectives of enforcement. The 
objectives of competition law should be distinguished from the objectives of 
competition law enforcement because the instrumental role of private and public 
enforcement must not be confused with the objectives of competition law itself. 15 
Thus, in Chapter 1I discuss the objectives of private competition enforcement 
separately from the objective of competition law but then examine how they relate 
to each other. Second, I discuss the importance and benefit of the private 
enforcement of competition law. Third, I discuss the relationship between private 
and public enforcement. The fundamental issue is how to strike the right balance 
between public enforcers' policy goals in pursuing the public interest and private 
parties' goals in pursuing their own interests, insofar as these conflict. 
14 See section 1.4.4 which deals with optimal enforcement with public and private enforcement. 15 Assimakis P. Komminos, "Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: Complement? 
Overlap? ", Competition Law Review, Volume 3,2006, p. 14. 
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Fourth, I discuss optimal enforcement and the roles of private and public 
enforcement in achieving it. Namely, what constitutes optimal competition law 
enforcement and how can it be achieved through effective and efficient 
combination of public and private enforcement? To achieve optimal enforcement, it 
is important to strike a right balance between private interests and public interests 
by coordinating them in an optimal way to achieve the highest probable 
compensation and effective deterrence. 16 Thus, I discuss the relationship between 
private and public enforcement to achieve optimal enforcement because optimal 
enforcement could be achieved through creating an effective system of private 
enforcement as a complement to, and not a substitute for, public enforcement. 
Chapter 2. 
The second chapter is the `Overview of EU, UK, US and Korean competition 
law'. This chapter is important because the EU, UK, US and Korean jurisdictions 
are different from each other. To ensure optimal enforcement through effective and 
efficient combination of private and public enforcement, it is necessary to 
understand the general competition laws and legal systems of the EU, UK, US and 
Korea. Thus, I explain the general characteristics of competition law of the EU, UK, 
US and Korea and also of the respective legal system insofar as these are relevant in 
this context. 
First, I discuss the importance of competition in Korea. I introduce Korean 
competition culture and the development and importance of competitive industry in 
Korea. In the last forty years, Korea has developed a competition culture, which has 
contributed to its sound and strong economy. In respect to this competition culture 
and competitive industry, I discuss competition law system and current private and 
public enforcement systems. 
In respect to public competition enforcement system, I discuss the 
characteristics and role of the public competition authority, the Korea Fair Trade 
Commission (hereafter, KFTC) because without judicial involvement, the KFTC 
has exclusive jurisdiction over the competition law. '7 I then discuss the private 
competition enforcement system in Korea. I explain the organization and 
16 Jürgen Basedow, "Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law", Kluwer Law, 2007, p. 17. 
17 Government Organization Law 3. 
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functioning of the courts in Korea since to be compensated for damages, private 
parties should bring damages actions of Competition Law before courts. Although 
plaintiffs can bring damages actions before district courts without the decision of 
the KFTC since 2004 when the provision of damages actions was revised18 1 
explain that Korean culture is a disincentive to such private claims. 
Second, I introduce private enforcement in the EU. Private enforcement of 
competition rules has been underdeveloped in the EU. It has played no significant 
role so far, although at least in some Member States that is beginning to change. In 
the EU the central role has always been given to public enforcement. It must be 
noted that in the EU private enforcement takes place in the courts of the Member 
States. However, the European Commission has regarded it as necessary to reform 
its system of competition law enforcement because there is a general recognition 
that public enforcement by the Commission and the National Competition 
Authorities (hereafter, NCAs) should be supplemented by private enforcement. 
Thus, there have been efforts to encourage private enforcement in the field of 
competition law. To ensure private enforcement, the Commission adopted 
Regulation 1/2003 and published the White Paper setting out its proposals for 
improving the legal conditions for victims to exercise their right to bring actions for 
all damage suffered as a result of a breach of the EC competition rules. 19 The 
Commission's White Paper is important because its proposals may lead to EU 
legislation aimed at harmonizing relevant national laws in the Member States. 
Third, I discuss private enforcement in the UK. I explain the development of 
competition law in the UK, including the changes to the competition rules such as 
the Competition Act 1998 and the Enterprise Act 2002. 
Fourth, I introduce private antitrust enforcement in the US. The US has a 
long history of antitrust law and its private enforcement. Private enforcement has 
been overwhelmingly the most common form of antitrust litigation in the US. 20 
'a Before the revision of this provision, plaintiff can bring damages action before court with the only 
decision of infringement of competition law of the KFTC. 19 European Commission, White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, Com 
2008)165 final, 2008 and Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper. 0 Charles E. Koob, David E. Vann, Jr. And Armany Y. Oruc, "Developments in Private Enforcement of 
Competition Laws: Introduction", Simpson Thacheer & Bartlett LLP., 2004, p. 1; Katherine Holmes, 
"Public Enforcement or Private Enforcement? Enforcement of Competition Law in the EC and UK", 
E. C. L. R 2004,25(l), p. 25. 
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The US antitrust enforcement scheme seems almost exclusively litigation oriented 
and dependent on mainly private parties to secure compensation, deterrence, 
punishment and disgorgement of illegal conduct. 21 Thus, I introduce the basis, the 
number of private actions and the rationale of having strong incentives to encourage 
private enforcement. I also discuss the characteristics of private enforcement such 
as the antitrust injury rule and other features of private actions. 
The US legal system has many good mechanisms to ensure efficient litigation 
such as simplified notice pleading in Twombly 22 and summary judgment. 
Simplified notice pleading standard of the Federal Rules23 relies on summary 
judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritous 
claims. 24 Despite these effective mechanisms of US legal system, the right of 
private action has been a critical, yet persistently controversial feature of US 
antitrust law because there are extraordinary opportunities for abuse that can 
ultimately overwhelm the benefits. 
Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 is about what type of damages can or should be awarded in 
competition cases. In Korean law the usual principle in awarding damages is to 
compensate for the loss suffered. The question is whether this principle should be 
applied in cases concerning infringement of the competition rules. The type of 
damages awarded is important in the encouragement of private enforcement 
because it can influence incentives to bring damages action. The plaintiff's 
incentive to bring actions depends on the scope of damages and on the amount of 
compensation he can obtain. 25 The more harm that is included in the scope of the 
claim and the more possible it is to obtain damages, the more probable it is that 
litigation will happen in the first place. Thus, it is necessary to consider the 
21 See Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, Table C-2: U. S. District Courts--Civil Cases Commenced, by 
Basis of Jurisdiction and Nature of Suit, During 12-Month Period Ending March 31,2002, available at 
http: // www. uscourts. gov/caseload2002/tables/cO2marO2. pdf (last visited Mar. 2,2004); Clifford A. Jones, 
"Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in the EU, UK and US", Oxford, 1999, p. 19. 22 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955,1974(2007). 23 Federal Rules 8(a)(2) 
24 Swierkiewicz, 534 U. S., at 511,122 S. Ct, 992. 25 Michael Harker&Morten Hviid, "Competition Law Enforcement and Incentives for Revelation of 
Private Information", 31(2) World Competition 279,2008, p. 292. 
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incentive side of the amount of damages. 26 Also, damages at an appropriate level 
can induce potential infringers to refrain from illegal conduct because effective 
damages actions can be a tool to increase private parties' motivation to detect and 
prosecute illegal activities. Therefore, in this chapter, I carry out a comparative 
analysis of the principles applied in the EU, UK, US and Korea. Above all, I 
discuss whether Korea should recognize exemplary, restitutionary or multiple 
damages such as treble damages. 
First, I discuss two characteristics of damages for anticompetitive conduct 
such as i) any possible differences between tort damage and competition damage, 
and ii) the infringer's financial gain from anticompetitive conduct. I define 
competitive damage based on these two characteristics. 
Second, I discuss what kind of anticompetitive damage could be compensated. 
If compensable anticompetitive damage exists, the key question is what the 
criterion of damage is. I discuss whether anticompetitive damage should be 
compensated under the principle of compensation for loss or the principle of 
restitution of the illegal gains. Restitutionalry damage which has gain-based 
compensation is different from tort damage because tort damages are based on 
compensation for loss. I also discuss whether damages should include some 
punitive element as well as a compensatory element. As far as compensatory, 
exemplary or restitutionary elements are concerned, it is necessary to consider the 
general rules of damages actions under tort law (or civil law as it is known in Korea, 
hereafter tort law) because fundamental principles of damages actions under tort 
law could be applied to damages actions under competition law. 
Thus, this Chapter explains the principle of damages actions under tort law. I 
discuss the attitudes of Korea, the EU and UK toward compensatory, exemplary 
and restitutionary damages. In respect of the amount of damages to be awarded, I 
discuss a number of crucial Korean cases. 
I then discuss the attitudes of US toward multiple damages such as treble 
damages. Currently, the US is the only country where treble damages can be 
awarded. I therefore describe treble damages actions in the US and discuss the 
rationale of treble damages in terms of compensation, deterrence, punishment and 
disgorgement of illegal gains. I also deal with the problems created by treble 
26 Jürgen Basedow, supra note 16, p. 13. 
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damages awards. I consider the arguments that although treble damages can be a 
strong incentive to encourage damages actions, they can also lead to the abuse of 
the of the litigation process. 
Third, I discuss whether Korea needs to recognize exemplary, restitutionary 
or multiple damages such as treble damages to ensure effective and efficient private 
enforcement. It can be argued that it is desirable for Korea to allow more than 
single damages in cases of the most serious anticompetitive infringements such as 
cartel because exemplary, restitutionary or multiple damages can create a strong 
incentive for plaintiffs to bring damages actions. I consider, however, the argument 
that the compensatory nature of damage actions in Korea conflicts with the idea of 
exemplary, restitutionary or multiple damages. In addition, I argue that competition 
authorities are better suited than private parties to safeguard the public interest 
through deterrence, punishment or disgorgement of illegal gain since the results 
achieved by individuals in their own interest are not necessarily aligned with public 
interests. 27 
Chapter 4. 
Chapter 4 deals with the passing on defence. The passing on defence is where 
a defendant denies liability on the basis that the plaintiff has passed on the illegal 
overcharge to his own customers. The passing on defence is important because it 
can affect a private party's incentive to bring actions by influencing on the amount 
of damages which can be obtained. If the passing on defence is permitted the 
amount of damages that direct purchasers can recover may be decreased, whereas 
indirect purchasers may be able to get compensation for the amount of damage they 
suffered. However, if the passing on defence is not allowed the amount of damages 
of direct purchasers can recover may be greater, but indirect purchasers may not get 
compensation at all. Therefore, I discuss the five major issues below. 
First, I define and explain the importance of the passing on defence. I also 
discuss the problems which are created if the passing on defence is allowed. 
Second, I discuss the US law on the passing on defence as established in the 
27 See section 3.2.5 which deals with the problems of mandatory treble damages and the desirability or 
otherwise of introducing them in other Jurisdictions. 
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Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp 28 case. The reason for dealing 
with the US ahead of the other jurisdictions is that the US has particularly striking 
rules on the passing on defence, embodied in the Hanover Shoe case29 In the 
Hanover Shoe case, the US Supreme Court rejected the use of the passing on 
defence. Thus, an antitrust infringer cannot avoid liability to a direct purchaser by 
showing that the direct purchaser suffered no injury because it passed on any 
overcharge to its own customers. I consider the three primary rationales of Hanover 
Shoe: ensuring effective deterrence, avoiding complexity and uncertainty, and 
encouraging damages actions. 
Third, I discuss the present position of the passing on defence in Korea. The 
key question is whether Korea should follow judgment of Hanover Shoe in order to 
encourage the private enforcement of competition law. This is part of the whole 
question of whether Korea should consider changing its legal system in some 
respects in order to introduce private enforcement rules more like those of the US. 
In considering any change, it is necessary to consider the differences between 
Korean legal system and the US legal system in respect of matters such as costs 
rules, class actions and treble damages and way that competition law is enforced. 
After discussing the position in the US, I look at the position in Korea, the EU and 
the UK before concluding whether or not Korea should consider changing its 
present stance on the issue. Therefore, I discuss the rationale of permitting passing 
on defence under the general principles of damages actions in Korea and compare it 
with the US position on the defence. 
Fourth, I discuss passing on defence in the context of EU law in particular in 
the light of the principles of effectiveness and equivalence. I also discuss whether 
applying general principles of tort law to competition law is possible by means of 
comparative analysis of tax and competition law cases. The EU is composed of 27 
Member States and the substantive and procedural principles of damages actions 
are governed by the national laws of those Member States. Therefore, I look at the 
proposals on the Commission about a passing on defence in the White Paper of 
30 April 2008 which may lead to legislation in Member States of the EU. 
Fifth, I discuss the passing on defence in the UK. I consider the rationale of 
28 Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U. S 481(1968). 29 Ibid. at 494. 
30 White Paper on Damages actions, supra note 19, at section 2.2. 
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permitting the passing on defence such as i) the compensatory nature of damages 
and ii) the prohibition of overcompensation as it is applied in the Devenish case. 31 
Chapter 5 
In this chapter, I discuss indirect purchaser actions. The issues of an indirect 
purchasers' standing and the passing on defence which is discussed in Chapter 4 are 
closely related to each other. If indirect purchaser actions are allowed and the 
passing on defence is not allowed, multiple liabilities can arise. Determining when 
and where indirect purchasers may bring actions for damages can cause difficult 
questions of fairness and efficiency. 32 Indirect actions are important for ensuring 
fairness of private enforcement because if indirect purchaser actions are not allowed, 
many potential plaintiffs are not able to exercise their rights under competition law. 
Furthermore, deciding whether or not to permit indirect purchasers to bring actions 
raises questions regarding over- or under- enforcement of competition law and the 
proper relationship between private and public enforcement in achieving optimal 
enforcement. Therefore, I discuss the five major issues below. 
First, I define indirect purchaser actions. I explain the importance of indirect 
purchaser actions for consumer interests because many indirect purchasers are 
consumers in the sense of private end users. I also discuss the relationship of the 
passing on defence and indirect purchaser actions because of the close relationship 
between the two. I then describe indirect purchaser actions in the US, Korea, EU 
and UK. 
Second, I discuss the position in respect of indirect purchaser actions in the 
US, in particular the Illinois Brick Co. v. State of Illinois case. 3 The reason for 
dealing with the US ahead of the other jurisdictions is that the US has particularly 
striking rules on the indirect purchaser actions, embodied in the Illinois Brick case. 
In this case, the US Supreme Court held that indirect purchasers are not entitled to 
recover damage suffered as a result of an infringement of federal antitrust law. In 
31 Devenish Nutrition Limited v. Sanofi-Aventis SA(France) and others, Case A3/2008/0080, 
12008]EWCA Civ 1086. 
2 Firat Cengiz, "Passing on Defense and Indirect Purchaser Standing in Actions for Damages against the 
Violations of Competition Law: what can the EC learn from the US"?, CCP Working Paper 07-21,2007, 
13. ý' 
Illinois Brick Co. v. State oflllinois, 431 U. S. 720 (1977) 
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respect to this case, I discuss the US position on indirect purchasers established in 
Illinois Brick. The problems are i) multiple liabilities, ii) inconsistent and uncertain 
enforcement, iii) significant injustice, iv) incorrect presumptions of passed on 
damages and capacity of calculation and v) conflict with ensuring consumer 
interests. 
Third, I discuss indirect purchasers' actions in Korea. The key question is 
whether Korea should follow the indirect purchaser principle established in Illinois 
Brick to ensure effective deterrence. In considering this it is necessary, again, to 
consider the differences between the Korean legal system and the US legal system. 
I discuss here the reasons for permitting indirect purchaser actions in Korea such as 
i) full effectiveness, ii) protecting consumers' interests, iii) the prohibition of unjust 
enrichment and iv) ensuring efficient and effective enforcement. 
Fourth, I discuss indirect purchaser's actions in the EU. As in the other 
jurisdictions under discussion, permitting indirect purchaser actions raises problems 
such as the conflict between full and just compensation and effective and efficient 
damages actions. However, given the direct effect of Articles 81 and 82 EC and in 
the light of the Crehan34 and Manfredi3S cases and the Commission White 
Paper36, it appears that the EU will allow indirect purchaser action. 
Fifth, I discuss indirect purchasers' actions in the UK with particular 
reference to the recent case of Devenish in which the standing of indirect purchasers 
was raised. 
Chapter 6. Group Actions 
In this chapter, I discuss group actions such as class, representative and 
collective actions. Group actions are important because they could be the only way 
to aggregate the small and dispersed claims of private parties, especially indirect 
purchasers such as consumers. As far as group actions are concerned, there are 
critical issues to be dealt with, such as standing, management of group actions and 
abuse of litigation. How all of these issues are resolved will determine whether 
34 Courage v Crehan, C-452/99, [2001] ECR 1-6297. 33 Manfredi v. LloydAdriatico Assicurazioni SpA, C-295/04, [2006] ECJ, 348 36 European Commission, "White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules", Com 
(2008) 165 final. 
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group actions result in a system that does more good than harm. As far as group 
actions are concerned, the US has a long history and many examples of class 
actions. Thus, it is desirable to compare EU, UK and Korean laws on group actions 
with US class actions. 
Therefore, first I introduce group actions in Korea. In particular, I will 
discuss current consumer policy, including changes in the KFTC's consumer policy. 
I then discuss group actions which were first recognized on 1 January 2007. I 
concentrate on the general characteristics, benefits and problems of group actions, 
and compare Korean group actions with US class actions, especially in respect to 
the benefits and problems of US class actions. 
Second, I discuss the EU stance on group actions and two types of collective 
redress mechanism considered in the White Paper. As far as Member States of the 
EU is concerned, given that group action can contribute to public interests such as 
the consumer interest through improving access to courts, it is desirable for national 
courts to be encouraged to use group action mechanisms at their disposal under 
national law in order to achieve optimal enforcement. 
Third, I discuss UK consumer claims under the Competition Act 1998 and 
the Enterprise Act 2002. UK law is particularly interesting because it contains 
special provisions on consumer claims in the Competition Act 1998. The OFT, the 
UK competition authority, has produced a Discussion Paper about class actions and 
I take this into account. 37 I discuss potential problems such as i) the limited role of 
the Competition Appeal Tribunal (hereafter, CAT)38 and ii) the limited role of 
consumer associations. I also discuss possible solutions of these problems. 
Fourth, I discuss certain features of the US system. I deal with the general 
character and problems of US class actions both from the plaintiffs' perspective and 
the defendants' perspective. 
Chapter 7. Conclusion 
This thesis considers how private competition enforcement can contribute to 
37 The Office of Fair Trading (OFT), "Private Actions in Competition Law: Effective Redress for 
Consumes and Business", OFT916,2007. 38 The UK Competition Appeal Tribunal is a special tribunal with cross disciplinary expertise in law, 
economics, business and accountancy whose function is to hear and decide cases involving competition or 
economic regulatory issues. available at http: //www. Catribunal. org. uk. 
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achieving optimal enforcement of the competition rules in Korea. To ensure these 
objectives, in this chapter I conclude that private enforcement must be positively 
encouraged since hitherto there has been only a limited private enforcement in 
Korea. For achieving the objectives of competition law, both public and private 
enforcement should be employed. However, private enforcement should work along 
with public enforcement, not replace it. The effective and efficient combination of 
private and public enforcement is important. To encourage private enforcement, it 
is necessary to consider the principle of compensation for damages, passing on 
defence, indirect purchaser actions and group actions because these issues can 
substantially increase or decrease private enforcement by influencing potential 
plaintiffs. I have reached certain conclusions about the major issues explored in the 
previous chapters. 
1.2 The Objectives of Competition Law and Private Competition 
Enforcement 
The question of the achievement of optimal enforcement through effective 
and efficient combination of private and public enforcement must be seen in the 
context of the more substantive question of the objectives of competition law. 
Therefore, I discuss in the following sections the objectives of competition law and 
the objectives of private competition law enforcement. 
1.2.1 Introduction to Competition, Competition Law and the 
Rights which Competition Law Protects 
1.2.1.1 The Importance of Competition 
It is recognized generally that competition is a key driver for productivity- 
along with innovation, enterprise and investment. 39 In neo-liberal economic theory 
39 Maher M. Dabbah, "Measure the Success of a System of Competition Law: A Preliminary View" 
21E. C. L. R369., 2000 p. 369-370; Mark Furse, "The Role of Competition Policy: A Survey", E. C. L. R., 
1996 p. 250; Sonya Margaret Willimsky, "The Concept(s) of Competition", I E. C. L. R. 52,1997, p. 54; 
See generally, Eleanor M. Fox, "We Protect Competition, You Protect Competitors", 26(2)World 
Competition 149,2003; Irina Haracoglou, "Competition Law, Consumer Policy and the Retail Sector: the 
systems' relation and the effects of a strengthened consumer protection policy on competition", 
Competition Law Review, 2007, p. 178-179.; Neelie Kroes, "Competition must drive European 
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competition exists when the number of buyers and sellers, freedom of trading, and 
market information are sufficient to drive prices toward marginal cost. 40 
Competition offers lower prices, better choices, and avoidance of wealth transfer to 
the power buyer and seller from individuals such as consumers41 because in a 
freely competitive market, each competing business generally tries to attract 
consumers by cutting its prices and increasing the quality of its product or 
services. 2 An essential condition of a competitive market is that unreasonable and 
unnecessary barriers to entry do not block access to the market by new firms, new 
products, or new ideas. 43 
It is therefore argued that competition affects consumers' interests because 
robust competition is the best means to protect consumers 44 It is claimed that 
strong competition regimes encourage open and dynamic markets, and drive 
productivity, innovation and value in consumers' interests 45 The theory is that in 
competitive markets economic resources are allocated between different goods and 
services in exactly those quantities which reflect consumer demand, so that 
resources are employed in taskes where consumers value their output most. 46 This 
is known as allocative efficiency. Productive efficiency, which is also a benefit of 
competition, means that goods and service are produced at the lowest possible 
cost 47 Competition may also lead to dynamic efficiency, which refers to the rate of 
innovation and technological change. The allocative efficiency and productive 
efficiency achieved by competition make up the overall efficiency that determines 
the level of consumer welfare by lowering the costs of goods and services or by 
competitiveness in a global economy", Villa d'Este Forum, Speech/05/477, Italy, 2005, p. 2; and see 
Chapter 2 for a discussion of the importance of competition in Korea. 40 Herbert J. Hovenkamp, "United States Antitrust Policy in an Age of IP Expansion", Berkeley Center 
for Law and Technology, 2005, p. 3. 41 Warren S. Grimes, "The Sherman Act's Unintended Bias against Lilliputians: Small players' Collective 
Actions as a Counter to Relational Market Power", 69Antitrust Law Journal, 2001 p. 205. 
42 Edward D. Cavanagh, Antitrust Remedies Revised, 84 Oregon Law Review 147,2005, p. 187. 
43 Robert Pitofsky, "Antitrust at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century: The Matter of Remedies", 91 
Geo. L. J. 169,2002, p. 178. 44 Timothy J. Muris, "Principles for a Successful Competition Agency", 72 University of Chicago 
Law165 Review, 2005, p. 175. 45 The Office of Fair Trading, "Private Actions in Competition Law: Effective Redress for Consumes and 
Business", OFT916,2007. 
46 Robert H. Bork, "The Antitrust Paradox", Free Press, 1993, p. 91 
47 Productivity efficiency therefore refers to the effective use of resources by particular firms. The idea of 
effective use encompasses much more than mere technical or plant-level efficiency. R. H. Bork, Ibid., 
p. 91. 
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increasing the value of product service offered. 48 In markets in which there is a 
monopoly, however, price rises above marginal cost, and there is a loss of 
efficiency. Not only is some consumer surplus (the difference between the market 
price and the consumers' willingness to pay) transformed into producer surplus (the 
difference between the market price and the costs of production) but some 
consumer surplus is lost to the market altogether (the deadweight loss). It is worth 
noting at this point that Robert H. Bork's concept of consumer welfare in his book 
The Antitrust Paradox is actually what is usually called `total' or `social' welfare, 
in that he is concerned only with the loss to efficiency represented by the 
deadweight loss and not with the loss of consumer surplus to producer surplus 49 In 
other words, he considers only the efficiency of the market, that is the sum of 
consumer and producer surplus, and not how that surplus is shared between 
producers and consumers. In this thesis, however, the term `consumer welfare' is 
employed in the sense that it is normally understood, in that it can be equated with 
consumer surplus. 
Allocative efficiency benefits consumers, therefore, in that it drives prices 
towards marginal costs. Consumer welfare is greatest when society's economic 
resources are allocated so that consumers are able to satisfy their wants. `Consumer 
welfare' in the technical sense may be equated with consumer surplus, as noted 
above, but it can also be described as the state of affairs which leads to consumers 
benefitting from low prices, choice, quality and innovation. Competitive and 
customer-focused markets are the best guarantee of consumer welfare because they 
result in such prices, choice, quality and innovation. It can also refer to the 
achievement of allocative efficiency without impairing productive efficiency to the 
so detriment of consumers 
The ultimate goal of consumer welfare provides a common denominator by 
which gains in destruction of monopoly power can be estimated against losses in 
efficiency. The role of competition law is to improve allocative efficiency without 
impairing productive efficiency. 
48 R. H. Bork, Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
49 Ibid., p. 91. 
50 S. M. Willimsky, supra note 39, p. 54. 
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The primary objective of competition law is to protect public interest such as 
fair competition and consumer welfare. 51 It is submitted that consumer welfare can 
be defined as the difference between what consumers are willing to pay and what 
they actually pay. Consumer welfare is greatest when society's economic resources 
are allocated so that consumers are able to satisfy their want. Lost consumer surplus 
should be considered because a transfer from consumers to firms does not improve 
social welfare. Competition may be any state of affairs in which consumer welfare 
cannot be increased. The role of competition law is to improve allocative efficiency 
without productive inefficiency which can impair consumer welfare. 52 Private 
competition enforcement 53 could be a method of achieving the objectives of 
competition law. In respect to private competition enforcement, there are a number 
of significant questions to address at the outset. The key question is how private 
enforcement could achieve the objectives of competition law effectively. It is fair to 
ask the broader policy question that to what extent private enforcement really needs 
to be promoted in Korea. 
1.2.1.2 What is Competition Law? 
According to a Korean authority, competition law can be defined as "a 
control exercised by a public competition authority over the anticompetitive 
activities of individuals, firms or public regulators in order to achieve defined goals 
such as promotion of competition or protection of consumer interests. " Sa 
Competition law reflects the willingness of the state to intervene in economic 
sl In respect to fair competition see section 1.2.2.1 which deals with the objectives of competition law in 
Korea; In respect to consumer welfare, see section 1.2.1.1 which deals with the importance of competition 
and consumer welfare. 52 Robert H. Bork, "The Antitrust Paradox", Free Press, 1993, p. 7,91. 33 As far as `Damages claims' and `private enforcement' is concerned, see Paolisa Nebbia, "Damages 
actions for the Infringement of EC Competition Law: Compensation or Deterrence", 33 European Law 
Review 23,2008, p. 23. In this article, Paolisa Nebbia stated that: "Damages claims and private 
enforcement are two terms commonly used to designate actions brought by victims of anti-competitive 
conduct to recover ensuing loss. These two terms, although used interchangeably, have different 
connotations: the former reflects the restorative nature of such claims, while the latter highlights their 
deterrent effect. It is also important to point out that the notion of private enforcement includes a broader 
set of remedies than the right to damages, ranging from injunctive to declaratory relief. " 
54 Chung Ho-Yul, "Competition Law"(2"d ed. ), Parkyoungsa, 2008, pp. 59-62 : Kwon Oh-Sung, 
"Competition Law"(5's ed. ), 2005, Bubmoonsa, pp. 13-15 : Shin Hyun-Yun, "Competition Law"(2nd ed. ), 
Bubmoonsa, 2007, pp. 11-12 
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activities by directing businesses to conform their practices to the achievement of a 
wider goal such as ensuring a competitive market where consumers can acquire 
ss good quality products for reasonable prices 
Competition law is the principal regulator of commercial forces in a market 
and of the market players by preventing anticompetitive conduct. Competition 
law is based on the idea that competition is the appropriate means to control the 
abuse of economic power56 and that law should be utilised to ensure that 
competition is not hindered in this role. For instance, in Korea the KFTC has stated 
that competition law has taken the role of fundamental law such as economic 
constitutional law to regulate and control anticompetitive practices in Korea. 57 
Competition law is relevant to anyone who has an interest related to the 
maintenance of the competitive market to the extent to which he (or she) can claim 
a specific injury deriving from the breach or the decrease of competition. 58 
However, as discussed below, competition law protects public as well as private 
rights. 
1.2.1.3 What are the Rights that Competition Law Protects? 
As will be explained in the sections below, competition infringements do not 
require the occurrence of harm to a person. It is sufficient to impair the public 
interest through restricting competition. Equally, some anticompetitive conducts 
may cause harm to certain persons and still may not be considered anticompetitive 
because it may not affect competition in the market. Thus, it is necessary to 
consider the public aspect of competition law. 
1.2.2 Objectives of Competition Law 
It has been said that the main objective of competition law is to regulate the 
55 Shin Hyun-Yun, Ibid. 
56 Harry First, "Antitrust Law", Fundamentals of American Law 427,1996, p. 427- 432. 
57 See KFTC Annual Report 2009,2008, p. 8. 
58 Chung Ho-Yul, supra note 54, p. 484. 
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way in which undertakings interact with each other and with their customers 59 
However, there are many different opinions about the exact goals of competition 
law. The main debate about the goals of competition law is between the idea that 
competition law is about promoting consumer welfare and the idea that it should 
protect competition in order to advance a wider range of public interests. These 
public interests can include, for example, employment, the environment, balanced 
economic development or the protection of national champions but can also 
embrace the concept of `economic freedom'. This means that competition law 
should be employed to maintain the freedom of undertakings to compete on the 
market, which may entail, for example, protecting small competitors against larger 
firms. Although protecting competitors for their own sake may also promote 
consumer welfare it can also lead to a loss of efficiency which is contrary to 
consumer welfare. The school of thought that holds that the objective of 
competition law is the protection of economic freedom is often called 
`ordoliberalism'. 60 In some jurisdictions (such as Korea) the objectives of the law 
are expressly set out in the competition legislation but even then they may be open 
to different interpretations. As far as competition authorities are concerned the 
current consensus around the world appears to be that the objective of competition 
law should be consumer welfare, but courts and governments may take a different 
view. 
The history of competition laws shows that even within a particular 
jurisdiction the objectives pursued by competition law have changed over time and 
have been affected by developments in the economy. Therefore, it is not possible to 
make generalizations about the objectives of competition law in Korea, the EU, the 
UK and the US and in the sections below the jurisdictions discussed in this thesis 
are therefore treated separately. 61 However, it should be noted that the objectives of 
competition law mentioned in this parargraph, such as consumer welfare and 
economic freedom are public interests, not private ones. It is important to remember 
this when considering the role that damages actions can play in the enforcement of 
competition law. 
59 Michael Harker&Morten Hviid, "Competition Law Enforcement and Incentives for Revelation of 
Private Information", World Competition 31(2), 2008, p. 279. 
60 See the section on the objectives of EU law, below. 
61 See below the jurisdictions of the EU, UK and US. 
22 
1.2.2.1 The Objectives of Competition Law in Korea 
As far as the objective of the Korean Competition Act is concerned, ensuring 
fair competition, protecting consumer interests62 and the balanced development of 
economy are the most important objectives of competition law. The Korea 
Competition Law 1 states that : 
"The purpose of this Act is to promote fair and free competition, to thereby 
encourage creative enterprising activities, to protect consumers, and to strive for 
balanced development of the national economy by preventing the abuse of Market- 
Dominant Positions by enterprisers and the excessive concentration of economic 
power, and by regulating improper concerted acts and unfair business practices. q-)63 
`Fair competition' is hard to define, however, it can be defined as ensuring 
competition by price and quality of product and preventing other factor such as 
politics as well as monopolization and cartel from affecting competition. `Free 
competition' means there is no private or governmental anticompetitive restraints 
on competition. Korean commentators have stated that fair and free competition can 
ensure competitive markets which drive an economy's resources toward their 
fullest and most efficient uses, thereby providing a fundamental basis for economic 
development. 64 The General Director of the KFTC has specifically stated that one 
of the main goals of the Competition Law is to foster competition as a means of 
promoting consumer welfare through lower market prices, increased variety and 
quality of products and services 65 
Korea legislative history shows a predominant concern for consumers. 6 In 
Korea, the competition law system has been established as part of an integrated 
62 This focus on the consumer has driven policy makers to demand that decisions and policies either 
enhance consumer welfare or minimise consumer detriment. 63 This is the official English translation by the KFTC. 
64 Chung Ho-Yul, supra note 54, pp. 59-62: Shin Hyun-Yun, supra note 54, pp. 129-132 65 Shin Yong Sun (General Director of the KFTC), "2009 Major Project of the KFTC", Journal of 
Competition, 2009, p. 8-9. 66 See 2008 KFTC Annual Report. 
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system of consumer law whose parts have different scope and functions but whose 
common aim is consumer welfare. 67 To achieve consumer welfare through 
competitive market, the KFTC has assumed responsibility over consumer policy. 
68 
To protect consumers' right effectively, the KFTC announced its Consumer policy 
development plans on April 16,2007.69 It laid the institutional groundwork for the 
KFTC to implement consumer policies in conjunction with competition policies, 
which also requires a shift of policy focus to `creation of consumer-oriented 
market. ' The plans completed the revision of consumer policy implementation 
system, based on which the KFTC works together with the Korea Consumer 
Agency and consumer groups. 
Besides protecting consumer interests directly, one of the main goals of the 
Competition Law is to maximize efficiency of the market economy. Maximization 
of efficiency of the market economy is possible when competition policy and 
consumer policy are pursued in conjunction with each other. It is necessary to use 
the resources better and to create more efficient system capable of ensuring 
effective protection of the competition and consumers' interests. 70 In order to fulfill 
objectives of Competition Law, the Competition Law provides various regulations 
banning and controlling certain forms of conduct. 7' 
1.2.2.2 The Objectives of Competition Law in the EU 
As far as EU competition law is concerned, from its inception, the 
Community's competition law system has been "special. "72 It has been used to 
protect competition but, unlike national competition law systems, it has also served 
as a means of achieving the specific goal of unifying the single internal EU 
67 "Consumer Policy Development Measures of the KFTC", KFTC, 2007, p. 1. 68 Consumer Fundamental Law 21 
69 KFTC Annual Report 2008, p. 312. 70 Competition Law 1( Purpose of Competition Law) 71 For example, there are many regulations such as Guideline for reviewing the abuse of market dominant 
positions, Guideline for Review M&A, M&A Notification Guidelines, Guideline for Review cartel, The 
Guideline for Review Unfair Trade Practice, Guideline for review of resale price Maintenance, 
Notification on the types of and criteria for unfair business practices relating to the offering of gifts. 72 With respect to the Community's competition law system, see generally, David J. Gerber, "The 
Transformation of European Community Competition Law? ", 35 Harvard International Law Journal 97, 
1994, p. 99-100. 
24 
market. 73 According to the Memorandum on the Anti-Trust Policy of the High 
Authority in 1954,74 "A genuine single market cannot be brought about except 
through free competition. If the market were to remain subject to the arbitrary 
decisions of the cartels, or to the restrictive practices of monopolies, then the 
benefits of the single market would soon be offset by the effects of price-fixing and 
production quotas.... "75 
Articles 81 and 82 were included in the Treaty of Rome in order to combat 
restraints on competition that could interfere with the creation of the Common 
Market. 76 Article 81 prohibits all agreements between undertakings, decisions by 
associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade 
between Member States. Article 82 prohibits any abuse by one or more 
undertakings of a dominant position within the common markets. Articles 81 and 
82 EC were a matter of public policy and these fundamental provisions of the 
Treaty were designed to protect competition in the single market. 77 
However, this does not mean that there was no interest in obtaining the 
benefits of competition. 78 Both the Commission (the EU competition authority) 
and the Court have referred to the potential benefits: lower prices, more rapid 
technological progress, better choice and better quality, as an anticipated result of 
" References here are numerous. See, e. g., Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, "EC Competition Law", 3'd 
ed., Oxford, 2007, p. 38-55; Sweet & Maxwell Limited and Contributors, "From Freiburg to Chicago and 
Beyond-The First 50 Years of European Competition Law", E. C. L. R. 29(2), 2008, p. 82; Barry E. Hawk, 
Antitrust in the EEC--The First Decade, 41 Fordham L. Rev. 229,231 (1972) ("Single market integration, 
and the elimination of restrictive practices which interfere with that integration, is the first principle of 
EEC antitrust law.... "); see also Chrisotper Bellamy & Graham D. Child, "Common Market Law Of 
Competition"(3d ed. ), 1987, pp. 15-16; Walter Van Gerven, "Substantive Remedies for the Private 
Enforcement of EC Antitrust Rules Before National Courts, " EUI-RSCAS/EU Competition Law and 
Policy Workshop, 2001, p. 5; Clifford A. Jones, "Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in the EU, UK and 
US", Oxford, 1999, p. 25.; David J. Gerber, Ibid., p. 99-103; S. M. Willimsky, supra note 44, p. 54; 
74 The High Authority was the fore-runner of the Commission in the European Coal and Steel 
Community(hereafter, ECSC). 
75 High Authority, European Coal and Steel Community, "Memorandum on the Anti-Trust Policy of the 
High Authority", 1954, p. 1. 76 The so-called "Spaak Report" of 1956, which served as the basis for the drafting of the Treaty of Rome, 
emphasized this function of Articles 81 and 82. 77 Eco Swiss China time Ltd v. Benetton International NV, C-126/97, [1999] ECR 1-3055, para. 36 and 
Manfredi v. LloydAdriatico Assicurazioni SpA, C-295/04, [2006] ECJ, 348, para. 31. 78 With respect to anticompetitive conduct, See generally, Beverley Robertson, "What is a Restriction of 
Competition? The Implications of the CFI's Judgment in 02 Germany and the Rule of Reason", ECLR, 
2007. 
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improved competition. 79 
Furthermore, these two defining features of the creation of the common 
market and protection of competition are related and mutually reinforcing. 80 To the 
extent that competition law eliminates obstacles to the flow of goods, services, and 
capital across EU borders, it can serve the cause of unifying the market. A 
competitive and open single market can also provide the EU economy with the best 
guarantee to market integration and development of economy through increasing 
their efficiency. 
Achieving sustained competition can simultaneously benefit consumers by 
increasing the number of actual and potential competitors in EU markets because 
competition is the force that drives undertakings to become efficient. 81 However, 
the history of EU competition law also shows that it has been driven by 
`ordoliberal' concerns82 about the protection of the structure of competition and the 
protection of competitors as well as the protection of consumers. This is seen in the 
judgment of one of the earliest cases in the European Court of Justice (ECJ), 
Continental Can. 83 
The Commission's present view on the objectives of competition law are 
exemplified. The Guidelines on the application of Art. 81 (3) of the Treaty, where 
the Commission stated that: 
"The objective of Article 81 is to protect competition on the market as a 
79 See generally, Neelie Kroes, "Effective Competition Policy-a Key Tool for Delivering the Lisbon 
Strategy", Introductory statement at EMAC Open Meeting of Coordinators, Speech/05/73, Brussels, 3`d, 
February, 2005; See also the Court's opinion in cases 56 and 58/64, Consten and Grundig v. Commission, 
11966] ECR 299,339-340. 
° Some types of infringements are, of course, more closely associated with the integration imperative 
than others. See Joel Davidow, Competition Policy, Merger Control and the European Community's 1992 
Program, 29 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 11,1991, p. 13. 81 David J. Gerber, supra note 72, pp. 100-101; David J. Gerber, "The Modernization of European 
Community Competition Law : Achieving Consistency in Enforcement: Part 1", ECLR, 2006, p. 10-11; 
see also Neelie Kroes's speech/05/477, supra note 39 82 For an explanation of ordoliberal ideas of competition law, see W. MBschel, `Competition Policy from 
an Ordo Point of View' in A. Peacock and H. Willgerodt (eds. ), German Neo-Liberals and the Social 
Market Economics (MacMillan, 1989), 142. 
83 Case 6/72, Europemballage Corp and Continental Can Co Inc v. Commission [1973] ECR 215. 
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means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring efficient allocation of 
resources. Competition and market integration serve these ends since the creation 
and preservation of an open single market promotes an efficient allocation of 
resources throughout the Community for the benefit of consumers. "84 
From this Guideline, it is submitted that the objective of competition in the 
EU according to the Commission is the pursuit of the enhancement of consumer 
welfare and the efficient allocation of resources. However, it must be noted that the 
EU pursues these objectives through market integration as well as ensuring 
competition 
However, it should be noted that the ECJ, in a judgment in June 2009, stated 
the objectives of EC competition law as being wider than consumer welfare and 
efficiency and as encompassing both the protection of competitors and the 
protection of competition itself: 
"Article 81 EC, like the other competition rules of the Treaty, is designed to 
protect not only the immediate interests of individual competitors or consumers but 
also to protect the structure of the market and thus competition as such" 85 . 
Given the above argument, it is submitted that the overall objective of EC 
competition law according to the Commission is to establish a system which 
ensures that competition in the common market is not distorted and thus to enhance 
consumer welfare by ensuring efficient allocation of resources. 86 However, the 
recent case law, quoted above, suggests that the Court also recognizes a wider 
`economic freedom' goal so that competitors and the competition process are 
protected for their own sake and not just for the sake of consumer welfare. 
84 Guidelines on the application of Art. 81(3) of the Treaty, [2004] O. J. C101/ß, at para. 13. 85 T-Mobile NL et la v. Raad van bestuur van de. Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, C-8/08, [2009] 
ECR I-(4.6.2009), para 38, repeated in effect in Case C-501/06 P. Commission v. GlaxoSmithKline 
Services Unlimited 6 October 2009. para. 63. 
86 Cf. Recital (1) of Reg. 1/2003 and Article 3 (1)(g) EC. 
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1.2.2.3 The Objectives of Competition Law in the UK 
The UK's Competition Act 1998 which reformed UK competition law has a 
more specific focus than the Fair Trade Act 1973.87 The Competition Act 1998 
relates primarily to the control of agreements between two or more undertakings, 
for which provision is made in the `Chapter I Prohibition', and to abuses committed 
by dominant firm, the `Chapter II Prohibition'. 88 However, the Competition Act 
does not, in fact, include clear goals or policy objectives of competition law. 89 
However, the debates in Parliament while the legislation was being passed, and the 
White Paper which preceded it, shed some light on these. For example, it is worth 
noting that this was said in the House of Lords such as `competition law provides 
the framework for competitive activity. It protects the process of competition. '90 
Given that the Office of Fair Trade (hereafter, OFT) is a competition 
authority concerned both with competition policy and consumer protection, it is 
useful to consider the goals of the OFT as a whole. These goals are i) to encourage 
business to comply with competition and consumer law and to improve their 
trading practices through self-regulation, ii) to act decisively to stop hardcore or 
flagrant infringers and iii) to empower consumers with the knowledge and skills to 
make informed choices and get the best value from markets, and helping them 
resolve problems with suppliers. 91 The OFT's position is that competitive and 
customer-focused markets are good for fair-dealing business, which flourish when 
markets are competitive. 92 
In respect to the objectives of competition law, it is also worth noting that 
John Vickers, former Chairman of the OFT stated that: 
"Our competition responsibilities-to combat anticompetitive agreements and 
behaviour, to scrutinize mergers, and to promote - are at once pro-consumer and 
87 The Fair Trade Act 1973 gave indications of the objectives of competition law at section 84(1)(a). The 
Fair Trading Act was repealed in 2002. It was replaced by the Enterprise Act 2002. 88 See Competition Act 1988, Chapters I and II. 89 Mark Furse, supra note 39, p. 257. 90 Hansard (HL) 30 October 1997, col. 1156. 91 See the OFT website available at http: //www. oft. gov. uk/about 92 See the OFT website available at http: //www. oft. gov. uk/advice_and_resources/resource 
_base/legal/ competition 
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pro-good business. So are our responsibilities under consumer law-to combat unfair 
trading practices, to encourage good self-regulation and to promote consumer 
awareness. "93 
Given the above discussion, it is submitted that the objectives of competition 
law in the UK are to make markets work well for consumers and to deliver low 
prices, innovation, choice and quality. These objectives are in line with the 
objectives of EU law, at least insofar as the latter are concerned with consumer 
welfare. 
1.2.2.4 The Objectives of Antitrust Law in the US 
In order to discuss the objectives of antitrust law, it is necessary to consider 
Sections of the Sherman Act94 which Congress passed in response to public 
discontent with monopolistic business. 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that: 
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, 
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, 
is hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or 
engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be 
deemed guilty of a felony. - 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act states that: 
"Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine 
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trader 
or commerce among several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty 
of a felony. " 
" John Vickers, "Chairman's foreword in the OFT Annual Report 2002-2003, " 2003, p. 6, 





The Sherman Act seeks to protect competition and consumer welfare. The 
Supreme Court has explained this in Northern. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States case. 
"The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic 
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It 
rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will 
yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest 
quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an 
environment conductive to the preservation of our democratic political and social 
institution. "9s 
One commentator has described the main objective of antitrust law as being 
to promote the optimal use of resources and to promote competition for the welfare 
of the society and its consumers. 96 Although the pro-competitive principles of 
antitrust law generally are accepted by courts, its more specific goals are subject to 
debate. 97 The debate includes three views, 98 all of which incorporate economic 
efficiency to some degree 99 This efficiency oriented approach is undertaken to 
95 Northern. Pacific Railway. Co. v United States, 356 U. S. 1,4 (1958) 96 Harry First, supra note 56, p. 432. 97 William J. Kolasky, "Global Competition: Prospects for Convergence and Cooperation", American Bar 
Association Fall Forum, 2002. In this article, he stated that the objective of antitrust law is consumer 
welfare through efficiency. Thus, antitrust law must not outlaw efficiency-enhancing transactions, 
agreements and conduct; With respect to the objectives of US antitrust law, see generally Mark Furse, 
supra note 39, pp. 250-255; See generally, R. H. Lande, "Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary 
Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged", 34 Hastings L. J. 67 (1982). Lande's 
paper is an intensive look at the legislative histories of the antitrust laws. Ultimately, Lande rejects the 
view that economic efficiency was Congress's primary goal for the antitrust laws. Instead, he states that 
the antitrust laws were broad mandates to improve consumer welfare. 98 Harry First, supra note 56, p. 427; R. H. Lande, supra note 97, p. 68-70; Richard A. Posner, "Antitrust 
Law: An Economic Perspective", Chicago, 1976, p. 18-22.; Gerhart, "The Supreme Court and Antitrust 
Analysis: The Triumph of the Chicago School", SUAT CT. Rev., 1982, p. 319. This view is not, of course, 
universally held; See generally, Pitofsky, "The Political Content of Antitrust" , 
127 U. PA. L. Rev. 
101 
, 
1979; Rowe, "The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of Models: The Faustian Pact of Law and 
Economics", 72 GEO. L. J., 1984, p. 1567. For the some reasons, the non-economic approach leads to an 
unpredictable and economically costly scope of liability. The view that efficiency should be the guiding 
standard for antitrust law does not require acceptance of efficiency as an ethical norm for society. If non- 
economic goals are admitted to antitrust analysis, then the, scope of liability will be presumably 
expanded.; Posner, "The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law 
Adjudication", 8 Hofstra L. Rev., 1980, p. 487. 
99 The efficiency could be defined as he difference between the cost of producing a product and the value 
consumers place on it. Use the terms 'efficiency' and inefficiency' conventionally to refer to the effect of a 
practice on total wealth. S. M. Willimsky, supra note 39, pp. 54-55; Amanda Kay Esquibel, "Protecting 
Competition: The Role of Compensation an Deterrence for Improved Antitrust Enforcement", Florida 
Law Review, 1989, p. 156; David Klingsberg, "Balancing the Benefits and Detriments of Private Antitrust 
Enforcement: Detrebling, Antitrust Injury, Standing, and Other Proposed Solutions", Cardozo Law 
30 
effectively ensure consumer interests. 100 
The first view considers economic efficiency along with social, moral and 
political concerns. '°' These concerns include the protection of small businesses, 
the dilution of concentrated economic power, and the promotion of individual 
liberty. 102 However, consensus is lacking on the relative importance of each of 
these concerns. 103 
The second view focus on the economic effects of wealth transfer by 
monopolists. In a monopoly situation, wealth transfers from consumers to the 
monopolist, and what would otherwise be consumer surplus become the 
monopolist's excess profits, as explained above. '04 Such excess profits are absent in 
a competitive market. 105 Under the second view, antitrust laws should deter wealth 
transfers to the monopolist and protect consumer surplus by preserving competitive 
prices. '06 
The third view concentrates on the inefficient misallocation of resources107 
which result when monopolists, as sole producers, ignore competitive consumer 
demand when choosing production levels. This misallocation harms consumer 
welfare because under monopoly, some consumers who would be willing to and 
able to pay a competitive price will be unable to purchase the goods. 108 It can 
therefore be argued that antitrust law should seek to maximize consumer welfare 
Review, 1987-1988, p. 1223-1224. 100 In respect to economic efficiency see also section 1.2.2.2 which deals with the objectives of 
competition law in the EU. Harry First, supra note 56, p. 432. 101 R. H. Lande, "Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency 
Interpretation Challenged", 34 Hastings L. J. 67,1982, p. 69 102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
104 See R. Blair and D. Kaserman, "Antitrust Economics" 36(1985) 
105 Economic theory demonstrates that in the long-run competitive industry, each firm will make only 
normal, not excess, profits. Normal profits are defined as what the firm requires as a return to keep its 
resources employed in the industry. See E. Dolan, "Basic Macroeconomics", 3d ed., 1983, p. 406-07. 106 Patricia Hanh Rosochowicz, supra note 61, p. l; T. J. Muris, supra note 44, p. 169; Esquibel, supra 
note 99, p. 157. 
107 The wealth transfer would result in a misallocation of resources if the monopolist were to take the rent 
and invest it in maintaining the monopoly instead of investing it in the production of some socially 
desirable good. 
108 Robert W. Crandall, Clifford Winston, "Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare? Assessing 
the Evidence", Journal of Economic Perspectives vol. 17,2003, p. 46. 
31 
and allocative efficiency. 109 This `Chicago' view is the one that has been in the 
ascendant in the US since the 1980's, replacing the previous concern of US antitrust 
law with protecting small competitors and other social, moral and political concerns 
as explained in the `first view' above. ' 10 
1.2.3 Objectives of Private Competition Enforcement 
In areas where private and public enforcement overlap conflicting objectives 
may arise. To solve these conflicts it is suggested that it should first be determined 
what purpose the private action serves. The key question is how private 
enforcement can and should work to protect existing and potential competition. III 
There are many different objectives of private enforcement. In the US, for 
example, the priorities of objective of private competition enforcement have shifted 
from time to time. 112 From the perspective of victims of anticompetitive conduct 
the objective of private competition enforcement is to protect their rights and 
interests. 113 It is necessary to consider both its substantive goals and the tools 
available to achieve its ends. Generally it can be said that the possible objectives of 
private competition enforcement are compensation, deterrence, punishment and 
disgorgement of ill-gotten gains. 114 
The first objective of private enforcement can be said to be the achievement 
of corrective justice by assuring compensation for losses sustained by reason of any 
anticompetitive conduct. 115 The day-to-day work of implementing private 
109 Esquibel, supra note 99, p. 157. 110 See e. g Judge Learned Hand in United States v Aluminum Co ofAmerica 148 F 2d 416 (2d Cir 1945), 
429 when he said that the Sherman Act aimed at preserving `for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, 
an organization of industry in small units'. 111 Ulf Boge, Konrad Ost, "Up and Running, or Is It? Private Enforcement -The Situation in Germany 
and Policy Perspectives", European Competition Law Review(ECLR) 27(4), 2006, p. 198. 112 Hannah L. Buxbaum, "Private Enforcement of Competition Law in the Untied States- of Optimal 
Deterrence and Social Costs", in rPrivate Enforcement of EC Competition Lawj (ed. by Jürgen 
Basedow), Kluwer Law,, 2007, p. 60. 113 Ulf Boge, Konrad Ost, supra note 111, p. 197. 114 See generally, Edward D. Cavanagh, "Detrebling Antitrust Damages: An Idea Whose Time Has 
Come?, "61 Tul. L. Rev. 777,1987, p. 786-788. In this article, Edward D. Cavanagh compares the goals 
and effects of mandatory trebling. 
115 Wouter P. J. Wils, "Should Private Antitrust Enforcement Be Encouraged in Europe? " 26(3) World 
Competition 473,2003, p. 478.; Esquibel, supra note 100, p. 153. 
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enforcement should involve compensation. 116 It can make the infringer compensate 
those who have innocently suffered from its anticompetitive conduct. "? Victims of 
infringements who pay too much or who are barred from participation in the market 
can thus obtain compensation. Achieving corrective justice through compensation 
is a tool to increase private parties' motivation to monitor anticompetitive conduct 
on the market because direct justice through compensation can make the 
competition rules relevant for individuals. 
As a previous EU Competition Commissioner said, the second objective of 
private enforcement is deterrence by creating a credible threat of detection and 
sanctions. 1 18 Private enforcement of competition law aims to prevent infringement 
and seeks to avoid the occurrence of anti-competitive conduct and effects. Even 
though actions for damages are primarily about victims effectively exercising rights 
protected by competition law, an enhanced level of actions for damages also have 
the positive effect of increasing deterrence for potential infringers since it creates a 
risk of having to pay damages for the harm caused by an infringement of the 
competition rules. 119 Through deterrence, competition law can contribute to 
ensuring that anticompetitive conduct does not occur. 120 Therefore the 
anticompetitive effects which are meant to be avoided are indeed avoided. 
For instance, as will be seen in Chapters 4 and 5, to achieve optimal 
enforcement US law has focused on optimal deterrence rather than compensation. 
A leading US authority has stated that in the US, "the primary goal of antitrust 
remedies is to achieve optimal deterrence. "121 The US Supreme Court has stressed 
116 Foad Hoseinian, "Passing on Damages and Community Antitrust Policy : An Economic Background", 
World Competition, 2005, p. 7. 
117 Ibid., p. 6. 
18 M. Monti, "Private Litigation as a key complement to public enforcement of competition rules and the 
first conclusions on the implementation of the new Merger Regulation" Speech/04/403, September 17, 
2004,3; European Commission, "Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on 
Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules", Com (2008) 165 final, 2008, p. 9; Edward P. 
Henneberry, "Private Enforcement in EC Competition Law: The Green Paper on Damages Actions- The 
Passing-on Defenses and Standing for Indirect Purchasers, Representative Organizations and Other 
Groups", Heller Ehrman, LLP, 2006, p. 2 ; Wils, supra note 115 119 Wils, supra note 115, pp. 478-479; European Commission, "Commission Staff Working Paper annex 
to the Green Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules", SEC (2005) 1732, p. 3. 120 Matthew C. Stephenson, "Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the 
Role ofAdministrative Agencies", 91 Va. L. Rev. 93,2005, p. 98-99. 121 Easterbrook, "Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies", 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263,1981, p. 319 
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the importance of the goals of both compensation and deterrence in antitrust private 
enforcement since its early case law, 122 but eventually "deterrence has emerged as 
paramount. " 123 The compensation goal is subsumed within the efficiency 
framework. 124 In this scheme of things compensation of parties injured by antitrust 
infringement is merely a by-product of private enforcement. 125 
Richard Posner has explained why US law prioritises deterrence: 
"The basic objective of a remedies system is to deter people from violating 
the law. Another is to compensate the victims of the violators, but I regard this as 
subsidiary because a well-designed system of deterrence would reduce the 
incidence of antitrust violations to a low level and because, as we shall see, such a 
system would, as a by-product, assure adequate compensation except in those 
°'126 instances where the costs of administrating compensation were prohibitive. 
This orientation is illustrated clearly in the judgment in Hanover Shoe, 127 
which eliminated the passing on defence and in Illinois Brick, 128 which barred 
actions by indirect purchasers. 129 In both decisions, the US Supreme Court stated 
that the complexity of establishing exactly where in the purchase chain overcharges 
had been absorbed would undermine effective deterrence. 130 As will be discussed 
in Chapters 4 and 5 the Supreme Court has therefore focused on ensuring optimal 
deterrence even when that means denying the chance of compensation to real 
victims injured by antitrust conduct. 131 In respect to the deterrent effect of private 
enforcement, private litigation is therefore of great importance, especially, in cases 
where no prior action has been taken by the authorities. 
122 Perma Life Mufflers Inc. v International Parts Co., 392 U. S. 134,139 (1968). 123 Hannah L. Buxbaum, supra note 112, p. 44. '24 Ibid., p. 46. 125 Easterbrook, supra note 121, p. 319. 126 See Posner, "Antitrust Law-An Economic Perspective", 1976, p. 21 or 22. 
127 Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U. S. 481(1968), p. 494. See Section 4.2 
which deals with Hanover Shoe, Inc case. 128 Illinois Brick Co. v. State of Illinois 431 U. S. 720 (1977). See section 5.2 which deals with Illinois 
Brick Co case. 
129 Hannah L. Buxbaum, supra note 112, p. 46. 130 Ibid. I will discuss Hanover Shoe in chapter 4 (Passing on defence) in detail. I will also discuss 
Illinois Brick in chapter 5(Indirect purchaser litigation) in detail. 131 Easterbrook, supra note 121, p. 319. ("the Court conclude that adequate deterrence should be preferred 
to a fair system of compensation"). 
34 
The EU, moreover, has taken the view that private actions have a deterrent 
effect, and that therefore the right of victims of a competition law infringement to 
bring an action for damages could be seen as public interest. 132 Thus, one can 
conclude from this that any right of action for compensatory damage should ideally 
be shaped by the larger societal goal of the remedy, in order to avoid the danger of 
over-deterrence. 133 
The third objective of private enforcement can be seen as providing 
punishment. Punishment can be defined as being imposed when a defendant is 
ordered to pay an amount in excess of actual gain. If the total amount of fines and 
damages paid is in excess of the actual gain made by the infringer, private 
enforcement can have punitive effect. Once a competition infringement has taken 
place, it can be argued that it is desirable to punish the infringer. 
The fourth objective of private enforcement can be the disgorgement of ill- 
gotten gains. Private enforcement can ensure that a defendant will not retain 
monetary benefit from its wrongdoing. 134 Even if public enforcers do not sanction 
the infringers to the extent of the profits of the infringement, competition law 
infringers can still be denied the fruits of their illegal conduct by virtue of the 
private enforcement. 
132 Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper, supra note 118, p, 10; See generally, 
Michele Carpagnano, "Private Enforcement of Competition Law in Italy: Analysis of the Judgment of the 
European Court of Justice in Joined Cases C-295-289/04", 3(1) Competition Law Review 47,2006.; 
Christian A. Heinze, "Discussion: Private Enforcement of EC Competition Rules in the ECJ- Courage v. 
Crehan and the Way Ahead", in rPrivate Enforcement of EC Competition Lawj (ed. by Jürgen 
Basedow), Kluwer Law,, 2007, p. 39. 133 William H. Page, "Policy Choices in Defining the Measure of Antitrust Damages", DAF/COMP/WP3, 
2006, p. 5. 
134 Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U. S. 465,472-73 (1982) (explaining that a private remedy 
serves to deprive wrongdoers of their ill-gotten gains). But this may only be so if the system allows for 
more than compensatory damages. See e. g. in the UK, Devenish Nutrition Ltd v Sanofi Aventis [2008] 
EWCA Civ 1086, discussed infra section 3.2.3 which deals with the current situation in respect of the 
criteria and measurement of damages in the UK. 
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1.3 Overview of Public and Private Competition enforcement 
1.3.1 Introduction to Private and Public Competition 
enforcement 
1.3.1.1 Definition of Private Competition Enforcement 
Natural and legal persons can defend themselves against infringements of 
competition law through actions before courts. A preliminary question is how to 
define private enforcement. In respect to the definition of private enforcement, it is 
submitted that it is summed up in the following passage: 
"If private enforcement were to be given a rather broad meaning, it meant 
enforcement of competition rules through the initiative or intervention of private 
parties. Such a definition seems to include cases of private parties acting also as 
complainants to competition enforcement agencies. However, it can be defined as 
privately triggered public enforcement not as private enforcement. Therefore, 
private enforcement can be defined as the situation as any private parties involved 
in the enforcement of competition rules as litigants against perceived offenders of 
competition law. "135 
1.3.1.2 Role of Private and Public Competition Enforcement 
The key question is how to achieve effective private enforcement to ensure 
competition because public enforcement alone cannot ensure competition. There 
has been much debate about ensuring competition through private enforcement. 
Competition enforcement can be described as an effective tool for fostering 
sustainable competition, breaking down barriers to entry, increasing economic 
efficiency and protecting consumer welfare by detecting infringements and 
sanctioning the infringers. 136 Correct enforcement of competition law is crucial for 
maintaining the ability of companies to compete effectively and efficiently. In 
designing any system of competition enforcement, it is essential to ensure the 
135 Claus Dieter Ehlermann & Isabela Atanasiu(ed. ), "European Competition Law Annual 2001: Effective 
Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law", Hart Publishing, 2003, p. xxiii. 136 Edward P. Henneberry, supra note 118, p. 331. 
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efficient and effective enforcement of the competition rules. 
As already explained enforcement of competition law can happen in two 
ways, by public authorities or by private parties. The European Commission's 
Green Paper stated that private and public enforcement are part of a common 
enforcement system and serve the same aim: to deter anticompetitive practices 
forbidden by competition law and to protect firms and consumers from these 
practices. 137 Combating infringements of competition law therefore raises 
fundamental questions about the relationship between public and private 
enforcement and their respective roles in the implementation of the law. 
On the one hand, public authorities are entrusted with the task of supervising 
and regulating the conduct of undertakings as far as it is relevant to the public 
interest. The increasing scale and frequency of international trade activities have 
required public competition authorities to adapt and enforce their competition laws 
in efficient ways. Public authorities conduct proceedings against a party or parties 
which it suspects have infringed competition law. The procedure may be 
commenced by the authorities upon their own initiative or by complaints by private 
parties. If an infringement is found, the authorities may require the undertaking 
concerned to bring the infringement to an end. Public authorities can also impose 
substantial fines to punish or disgorge illegal gains. 
On the other hand, private parties can enforce competition law and rights 
through private enforcement. Private parties can play a double role in the 
enforcement of competition law. In respect to public enforcement, they can bring 
complaints about anticompetitive conduct to competition authorities. Infringement 
decisions of competition authorities are a major operative part in the system for 
protecting competition. In respect to private enforcement, private parties have an 
incentive to bring actions in order to get a remedy for damage caused by 
anticompetitive conduct because anticompetitive conduct can cause damage, not 
only to competition in the whole economy, but also to individual persons. 138 
137 European Commission, "Green Paper - Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules", COM ((2005) 672 final, p. 3. 38 Neelie Kroes, "Damages Actions for Breaches of EU Competition Rules: Realities and Potentials", 
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Private enforcement relies on actions by injured private parties, including 
competitors, customers and co-contractors. 
1.3.1.3 The Way to Use Private Competition Enforcement 
Private enforcement can be used in two ways. It can be used as a shield when 
it is invoked as a defence against a contractual claim for performance by asserting 
the invalidity of anticompetitive agreements. Private enforcement can be also used 
as a sword when it is used proactively by private enforcers such as businesses and 
consumers as a basis for applying for an injunction or bringing actions for 
damages. 139 From a private enforcement perspective, the most significant cases are 
where competition law is pleaded as a sword because private parties can get 
remedies only through damages actions before courts. Although it may be at times 
sufficient for parties to bring complaints, and rely on the public competition 
authorities to stop or prevent the anticompetitive conduct, the authorities usually 
cannot compensate individuals for loss caused by infringement of competition 
laws. 140 
As explained above, two main functions of private enforcement can be 
compensation and deterrence. Providing compensation through private enforcement 
is not only necessary from a compensation point of view but also, from a deterrence 
perspective, fills in the gaps left by the public enforcers despite it being motivated 
by the pursuit of a more personal interest. '4' Private enforcement could straddle 
Opening speech at the conference `La reparation du prejudice cause par une pratique anti-concurentielle 
en France, Speech/05/613, Paris, 2005, p. 2. 
139 FG Jacobs and T Deisenhofer, "Procedural Aspects of the Effective Private Enforcement of EC 
Competition Rules: A Community Perspective, " European Competition Law Annual 2001, Hart 
Publishing, 2003; B Rodger and A MacCullogh, "Wielding the Blunt Sword: Interim Relief for Breaches 
of EC Competition Law before the UK Courts", ECLR, 17(7), 1996, p. 393-402, "; Wils, supra note 115, 
473-488.; Ulf Boge, Konrad Ost, supra note 111, p. 197. ý40 
Kent Roach, Michael J. Trebilcock, " Private Enforcement of Competition Law", Policy Options, 
1997 p. 14; Romanian Competition Council, "Public consultation on the Green Paper-Damages actions 
for breach of the EC antitrust rules", Position of the Romanian Competition Council, 2006, p. 12. See also 
John Pheasant, "Private Antitrust Damages in Europe: The Policy Debate and Judicial Developments", 
Antitrust, 2006, p. 59; Elena Wind, "Remedies and Sanctions in Article 82 of the EC Treaty", ECLR, 2005, 
663-666 ; Ulf Boge, Konrad Ost, supra note 111, pp. 197-198; OFT 916, supra note 37, p. 5 
Robert H. Lande and Joshua P. Davis, "Benefits from private antitrust enforcement : an analysis of 
forty cases", 42 University of San Francisco Law Review 879,2008, p. 882; US Department of Justice, 
"Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act", September, 
2008, p. 160; European Parliament resolution of 26 March 2009 on the White Paper on damages actions 
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both the private dispute between the parties and the wider public interest in 
promoting sound competition laws. 142 
However, these two functions must not be completely equated. Compensating 
the victims of the anticompetitive behaviour is arguably more important than the 
deterrent function. It can be argued that the primary function of the private 
enforcement is compensation because private competition enforcement through 
damages actions can be the only way that victims of anticompetitive conduct can 
obtain redress. '43 Damages actions can promote a personal interest and ensure the 
protection of an individual right protected by competition law in compensatory 
nature. 144 
For instance, although it recognizes the public nature of the goals of 
competition law, the EC Commission has acknowledged that the legitimate purpose 
of private damages actions is to ensure compensation for harm suffered and not to 
for breach of the EC antitrust rules (2008/2154(INI)), para H; Barry Rodger, "Private Enforcement of 
Competition Law, The Hidden Story: Competition Litigation Settlements in the United Kingdom, 2000- 
2005", 29(2) E. C. L. R. 96,2008, p. 98; Patricia Hanh Rosochowicz, Deterrence and the relationship 
between public and private enforcement of competition law, Amsterdam Centre for Law and Economics 
Workshop, 2005, pp. 1,5; see generally, Michael Kent Block, Federick Carl Nold, Joseph Gregory Sidak, 
"The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement", The Journal of Political Economy, 1981.; Byung-Ju 
LEE, "The Harmonization of Public and Private Enforcement: A Korea Perspective", Seoul International 
Competition Forum, 2008, p. 1; Joseph P. Bauer, "Multiple Enforcer and Multiple Remedy; Reflections 
on the. Manifold Means of Enforcing the Antitrust Laws: Too Much, Too Little, or Just. Right? ", 16 
Loyola Consumer Law Review 303,2004, p. 310-311; Jonathan B. Baker, "The Case for Antitrust 
Enforcement", Journal of Economic Perspectives 2003, p. 27; Claus Dieter Ehlermann & Isabela Atanasiu 
(ed. ), "European Competition Law Annual 2001: Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law", 
Hart Publishing, 2003, p. xxiv-xxxv; Douglas H. Ginsburg, "Comparing Antitrust Enforcement in the 
United States and Europe, Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2005, p. 439; Mario Monti, 
"Private Litigation as a Key complement to Public Enforcement of Competition Rules and the First 
Conclusions on the Implementation of the New Merger Regulation", Speech 04/403, IBA-8th Annual 
Competition Conference, Fiesole, 2004; William E. Kovacic, "Private Participation in the Enforcement of 
Public Competition Laws", British Institution of International & Comparative Law- Third Annual 
Conference on International and Comparative Competition Law: The Transatlantic Antitrust, 2003 p. 2; 
Donncadh Woods, "Private Enforcement of Antirust Rules : Modernization of the EU Rules and the Road 
Ahead", Loyola Consumer Law Review, 2004 p. 433.; Roach K. & Trebilcock M. J., "Private 
Enforcement of Competition Laws", 34 Osgoode Hall L. J. 461,1996, p. 14. 
142 Dan Wilsher, "The Public Aspects of Private Enforcement in EC law: Some Constitutional and 
Administrative Challenges of a Damages Culture", The Competition Law Review, 2006, p. 34. 143 Francisco Marcos and Albert Sanchez Graells, "Damages for breach of the EC antitrust rules: 
harmonising Tort Law through the back door? ", InDret, 2008, p. 9, available www. Indirect. com; 
Assimakis P Komninos, "EC Private Antitrust Enforcement: Decentralised Application of EC 
Competition Law by National Courts", Hart Publishing, 2008, p. 9; Robert H. Lande and Joshua P. Davis, 
SU ra note 141, p. 904. 
Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper, supra note 118, p. 1 1; Patricia Hanh 
Rosochowicz, supra note 58, p. 5. 
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act as a regulatory enforcement mechanism. las However, unlike competition 
authorities, courts cannot enforce the competition rules on their own initiative. 
Cases first need to be brought before them. 
1.3.1.4 Stand-alone and Follow-on Actions 
Victims of anticompetitive conduct may bring damages actions against the 
infringers for damages following administrative proceedings by a public authority 
that find a breach of competition rules. Such subsequent actions for damages are 
usually referred to as `follow-on actions'. 146 Follow on actions can encourage 
private enforcement if the procedural rules provide that there is no need to prove an 
infringement that the public authority has already established. 
Stand-alone actions, on the other hand, are actions which involve a third 
party suing for damage against the infringers of competition rules where there has 
been no prior interference by a public authority. In this action, the party that raises 
the competition law problem has to prove the infringement. 147 Plaintiffs may be 
reluctant to bring actions in cases involving complex economics in the absence of a 
decision by competition authorities. 
As far as Korea is concerned, in respect to the effect of decisions of 
infringement of the KFTC, the Supreme Court recognized factual presumption 
power in the Aloe case. 148 This means that although the KTFC's decision was not 
actually binding, the Supreme Court accepted its findings of fact as convincing or 
compelling fact insofar as there was no evidence to overrule the decision of the 
KFTC. 
145 White Paper on Damages actions, supra note 24, at section 1.1; Tim Reher, "The Commission's White 
Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules", European Antitrust Review 2009, p. 1. 146 Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper, supra note 118, p. 41. 147 Komninos, supra note 143, p. 6-7. 148 Supreme Court (1997.4.22), 96DA54195. In Aloe case, Supreme Court recognized the broader factual 
presumption power of the decision of the KFTC. The Supreme Court recognized that there was close 
relationship between unfairly refusing any transaction (23(5)) and trade under terms and conditions which 
unfairly restrict or disrupt business activities (23(1)). Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the 
defendant's practice was illegal and that it was liable to compensate the plaintiff for the damage it had 
suffered. The Supreme Court laid this rule down for the first time in this case. 
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As far as the EU is concerned, the position is that decisions of the 
Commission are binding on national courts by virtue of Article 16(1) of Regulation 
1/2003.149 However, the Commission has proposed that a final decision by an NCA 
and a final judgment by a review court upholding the NCA decision or itself finding 
an infringement should be accepted in every other Member State as irrebuttable 
proof of the infringement in subsequent civil competition damages cases. 150 In 
other words, the Commission would not limit the binding effect of an NCA 
decision to the domestic courts of the same Member Sates. The proposed rule set 
out above would confer binding effect only on decisions that are final, i. e. where 
the defendants has exhausted all appeal avenues, and relates only to the same 
practices and same undertaking(s) for which the NCA or the review court found an 
infringement. 151 
As far as the UK is concerned, at present the Competition Act 1998 only 
provides for the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) to hear follow on actions. 
However, it is worth noting that the UK's Office of Fair Trading (hereafter, OFT) 
has endorsed private, stand-alone competition litigation before the CAT as an 
effective tool for consumers and businesses hurt by price-fixing and other anti- 
competitive practice. 152 If adopted, parties could seek to recover losses before the 
CAT even if the OFT or European Commission has yet to take action against 
suspected anticompetitive practice. Otherwise standalone actions have to be 
brought before the ordinary courts. 
As far as the US is concerned, Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, enacted in 
1914, simply provides that "A final judgment or decree ... that a 
defendant has 
violated said [antitrust] laws shall be prima facie evidence against such defendant in 
any action or proceeding brought by any other party against such defendant under 
said laws as to all matters respecting which said judgment or decree would be an 
estoppel as between the parties thereto .... 11153 
149 Inntrepeneur Pub Company v Crehan [2006] UKHL 38. 130 See White Paper on Damages actions, supra note 19, Section 2.3.; See also infra section 5.3.1.1 of this 
thesis which deals with prohibition of any limits of standing. "' White Paper on Damages actions, supra note 19, Section 2.3. 132 OFT 916, supra note 37, pp. 14-30. 153 Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. § 16 (2004). 
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The basic Section 5(a) rule has been said to make good sense in terms of 
efficiency. If the government wins, then the defendants face follow-on actions in 
which the plaintiffs do not have to prove liability what the government has already 
established. '54 In the US, private actions most frequently follow on the public 
enforcement of competition authorities because plaintiffs have been reluctant to 
bring actions without the assistance of public enforcement. 155 
It is submitted that this binding effect of public authority decisions increases 
legal certainty and enhances the consistency in the application of competition rules. 
Without such a rule, infringers can call into question their own breach of the law 
that has already been established by competition authorities and courts have to re- 
examine all the facts and legal issue already investigated and assessed by 
competition authorities. 156 Such re-examination often entails lengthy disputes 
between the parties and their legal and economic experts. Therefore, not 
recognizing binding effect increases litigation costs and the uncertainty of damages 
actions. 157 
1.3.2 Benefits of Private Competition Enforcement 
The private competition enforcement of competition law has certain 
advantages over public enforcement. Here I discuss three major ones. 
154 Donald I. Baker, "Revising History-What have we learned about private antitrust enforcement that we 
would recommend to others? ", Loyola Consumer Law Review, 2004 p. 389; see generally, Thomas E. 
Kauper, Edward A. Snyder, "An Inquiry into the Efficiency of Private Antitrust Enforcement: Follow-on 
and Independency Initiated Cases Compared" 74 GEO. L. J. 1166,1986. 
155 See Hannah L. Buxbaum, supra note 112, p. 49; see also P. Friedman, D. Gelfand and C. Nordlander, 
etc., "Comments of the Section of Antitrust Law and the Section of International Law of the American 
Bar Association in Response to the Request for Public Comment of the Commission of the European 
Communities On Damage Actions for Breaches of EU Antitrust Rules", ABA, April 2006, p. 15; Joseph P. 
Bauer, "Reflections on the Manifold Means of Enforcing the Antitrust Laws: Too Much, Too Little, or 
Just Right? ", 16 Loyola Consumer Law Review 303,2004, pp. 311-312; Patricia Hanh Rosochowicz, 
U ra note 61, p. 6; Edward Cavanagh, supra note 42, p. 156 
European Commission, "White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules", Com 
(2008) 165 final, Section 2.3. 
157 Rainer Becker, Nicolas Bessot and Eddy de Smijter, " The White Paper on damages actions for breach 
of the EC antitrust rules", Competition Policy Newsletter, ISSN 1025-2266,2008, pp. 10-11. 
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1.3.2.1 Ensuring a High Level of Compliance and Developing a 
Competition Culture 
To ensure competition, public enforcement is not the only means of 
achieving compliance with competition laws. Private enforcement can ensure a high 
level of compliance and support the development of a culture of competition. '58 An 
effective legal framework for private actions has the effects of improving 
compliance levels. A high level of compliance of the competition rules will only be 
a realistic if victims of infringements of competition rules know they are able to 
fight - and win - their case in court. The more citizens and undertakings stand up for 
their right to damages, the more incentive the potential perpetrators of illegal 
actions will have to comply. Encouraging private competition actions before courts 
can increase the overall enforcement of the competition rules and the likelihood of 
competition law infringements being discovered and penalized. '59 
As one commentator on the European Commission's Green Paper on 
Damages has said: 
"Private enforcement can play an important role in enhancing compliance 
with antitrust legislation, since it potentially increases deterrence. This is true 
simply because infringements of antitrust law may not exclusively result in public 
proceedings and ultimately in administrative or criminal penalties, if there is also 
room for private enforcement. Court actions leading to damages awards can have a 
similar effect as sanctions imposed by the competition authorities. "160 
Facilitating private competition actions may broaden the basis of support for 
the competition rules and make competition policy more real through direct 
involvement of private parties. 161 For instance, the ECJ in its Courage decision 
stated that the right to claim damages can make a significant contribution to the 
maintenance of effective competition in the Community by discouraging practices 
158 Michele Carpagnano, supra note 132, p. 48.; Neelie Kroes's speech/05/613, supra note 138, p. 2. 159 Assimakis P. Komninos, "Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: Complement? 
Overlap? ", 3(1) Competition Law Review 5,2006, p. 9. 160 Christian Diemer, "The Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules", 27 
European Competition Law Review 309,2006, pp. 310-311. 161 Ulf Boge, Konrad Ost, supra note 111, p. 197. 
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forbidden by the competition rules. 162 
Thus, private actions may heighten the detection rate of anticompetitive 
conduct if they do not follow a public enforcement i. e. if they are `stand-alone' 
rather than `follow-on' actions. 163 
A higher level of compliance through a considerable number of private 
actions could contribute to further developing a culture of competition amongst 
market participants such as companies and consumers. 164 Public resources are not 
sufficient to pursue all of the cases to create a sufficient deterrent effect against 
infringing activity. The often limited resources of competition authorities could 
mean in certain situations that they have to pursue other priorities. Due to limited 
resources public authorities are often unable to take on cases that only affect 
individual companies and are of minor overall economic importance. 
165 Through 
private enforcement private parties can take the initiative to advocate their interests. 
This seems particularly important for cases that may be of comparably low overall 
importance for the authorities, but of high value to the individual. 
1.3.2.2 Cost Benefit over Public Enforcement 
Private enforcement has a cost benefit over public enforcement. It is claimed 
that the costs of detecting possible infringements and gathering initial evidence are 
lower than the costs of public enforcement because private enforcers are better 
informed about their own particular damage and the related industry. 
166 Public 
enforcers regulate a vast array of industries, and therefore cannot detect 
anticompetitive practices as easily as private enforcers who experience these 
practices on a regular basis. 
162 Courage v Crehan, C-452/99, [2001]ECR 1-6297, para. 27. 163 See section 1.3.1.4 which deals with stand-alone and follow-on actions; Patricia Hanh Rosochowicz, 
sera note 58, p. 7. 
M. Monti's speech 04/403, supra note 118 ; M. Monti, "Competition for Consumers' Benefit", Speech 
in European Competition Day, Amsterdam, speech 04/470,2004; John Pheasant, supra note 140, p. 59; 163 Ulf Boge, Konrad Ost, supra note 111, p. 197. 166 Jakob Riiggeber and Maarten Pieter Schinkel, "Consolidating Antitrust Damages in Europ: A Proposal 
for Standing in Line with Efficient Private Enforcement", World Competition, 2006 p. 396; M. Harker 
and M. Hviid, supra note 35, p. 279; Christian Diemer, supra note 160, p. 311 
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There is a widespread view that the competition authorities do not have at 
their disposal all the public financial and human resources that they would need in 
order to reach an optimal level of enforcement. 167 Private enforcement could ease 
the burden on competition authorities because it not only increases the volume of 
enforcement, but shifts the expense of enforcement away from the governmental 
agencies, thereby conserving public resources. 168 The crucial benefit of private 
enforcement over public enforcement derives from cases which would not 
otherwise be brought because the relevant information has not come to light. 169 
Efforts to encourage private parties to take legal action may induce them to make 
better use of their information, which could otherwise be lost to public authorities. 
For example, the US Congress created the private right of action to 
supplement public enforcement because it was aware that the government did not 
have the necessary resources to uncover, investigate, and prosecute all 
infringements of the antitrust laws. 170 
1.3.2.3 Ensuring Stability of Legal Norms 
It is argued that private enforcement can help ensure the stability of legal 
norms by preventing abrupt transitions in enforcement policy. 
171 Private 
enforcement can interpret competition law independently of the attitude of public 
enforcers and play an important role in establishing precedents independent of 
public policy, even though private enforcement has not been wholly independent of 
the policy of public enforcers. '72 Abrupt transitions in the enforcement policy of 
167 Lowri Evans, "Private enforcement and public enforcement -a European perspective", The 5t' Seoul International Competition Forum, 2008, p. 37; Tom Akzeki, "The Optimal Harmonization of the Public 
and Private Enforcement(Japanese Case) ", The 50' Seoul International Competition Forum, 2008, p. 55; 
Jacobs, `Civil Enforcement of EEC Anti-trust Law' (1984) 82 Mich LR 1364 ; K. Holmes, supra note 20, 
p. 198; Patricia Hanh Rosochowicz, supra note 61, p. 15; David Klingsberg, supra note 99, p. 1220. See 
also, State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U. S. 3(1997); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U. S. 752. 169 See Califonia v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U. S. 271,284(1990) 169 M. Harker and M. Hviid, supra note 25, p. 279. 170 See, e. g., Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630 (1981) at para 642 (explaining 
that the private action "supplements federal enforcement and fulfils the objects of the statutory scheme"). 171 Coffee, J. C. Jr., "Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty 
Hunter is not Working", (1983) 42 Maryland Law Review 215, p. 227. in Magnus Gustafsson, "What are the Prospects for Enhanced Private Antitrust Litigation? A Swedish 
Perspective", 30(4) European Law Review, 2005, p. 509. 
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public authorities do not affect civil proceedings. This implies a wider scope of 
enforcement beyond the priorities set by the competition authorities. 173 To do this, 
however, private competition enforcement must be encouraged and not entirely 
dependent upon public initiatives. 174 
For instance, in the US, the DOJ can set its own antitrust enforcement policy, 
but not that of the States or of private litigants. It has been argued that this should 
be considered strength of the US system: 
"Private enforcement also performs an important failsafe function by 
ensuring that legal norms are not wholly dependent on the current attitude of public 
enforcers or the vagaries of the budgetary process and that the legal system emits 
clear and consistent signals to those who might be tempted to offend. Absent 
private enforcement, potential defendants would have a considerably stronger 
incentive to lobby against public enforcement efforts or to seek to curtail funds to 
public enforcement agencies. Ultimately, private enforcement helps ensure the 
stability of legal norms by preventing abrupt transitions in enforcement policy that 
have not been sanctioned by the legislature. 175 
1.3.2.4 Opportunity to choose the most Effective Enforcement 
The extensive use of private enforcement can ensure that the more effective 
remedies will be used in accordance with the proper procedures. This is because it 
can offer private parties the opportunity to choose the more effective action 
between private enforcement and public enforcement. 176 
173 Coffee, J. C. Jr., "Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty 
Hunter is not Working", (1983) 42 Maryland Law Review 215, p. 217; Clifford A. Jones, "A New Dawn 
for Private Competition Law Remedies in Europe? Reflections from the US", EUI-RSCAS/EU 
Competition 2001/Proceedings, 2001, p. 5. 14 Neelie Kroes, "Reinforcing the fight against cartels and developing private antitrust damage actions: 
two tools for a more competitive Europe", Commission/IBA Joint Conference on EC Competition Policy, Speech/07/128, Brussels, 2007, available at http: //europa. eu. 175 Coffee, J. C. Jr., "Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is not Working", (1983) 42 Maryland Law Review 215, p. 217. 176 "Private antitrust enforcement of EC competition rules: recent developments", Competition Law insight, 2004, p. 3. 
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Private enforcement has the advantage that parties can combine claims or 
separate heads of claims before national courts, especially in cases where 
competition related aspects are being assessed within a wider-ranging commercial 
dispute. '77 Even though public enforcement remains of critical importance for the 
ability to detect anticompetitive practices and costs, 178 a court can be in a better 
position to accelerate proceedings compared to a purely administrative process by 
granting faster relief through interim measures. 179 
The differences offer the private parties the opportunity to balance the 
advantages and disadvantages of private enforcement and public enforcement. '8° 
Thus, the private enforcement can create optimal conditions for individuals to 
challenge anticompetitive conduct. 
1.4 Optimal Enforcement of Competition Law 
Optimal enforcement is the best way of achieving the objectives of 
competition law. Optimal enforcement could be achieved by an effective and 
efficient combination of private and public enforcement. Public enforcement alone 
cannot make a substantial contribution to the optimal enforcement because of 
limited resources to use. 181 To coordinate private and public enforcement in a way 
which achieves optimal enforcement, three important questions must be asked. First, 
what is optimal enforcement? Second, how do private and public enforcement 
contribute to optimal competition enforcement? Third, are public and private 
"' Memo 05/489-European Commission Green Paper on damages actions for breach of EC Treaty 
antitrust rules-Frequently Asked Questions. "' Council Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Arts 81 
and 82 of the Treaty, [2003] O. J. L1, Recital 7; Renato Nazzini, "The Wood Began to Move : An Essay 
on Consumer Welfare, Evidence and Burden of Proof in Article 82 Cases, European Law Review, 2006, p. 
521; Michael Van Hoof, "Will the New European Union Competition Regulation Increase Private 
Litigation? An International Comparison", Connecticut Journal of International Law, 2004, p. 659. 1" Woods, Sinclair and Ashton, "Private Enforcement of Community Competition Law: Modernisation 
and the Road Ahead" (2004) 2 Competition Policy Newsletter, p. 32. 10 Antonio Capobianco, "Civil Actions--Europe--Private Antitrust Enforcement of EC Competition 
Rules: Recent Development", CLI 25(3), 2004, p. 2. "1 Jürgen Basedow, "Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law", Kluwer Law, 2007, p. 15.; See e. g. Paulweber, "The End of a Success Story?: The European Commission's White Paper on the 
Modernisation of the European Competition Law: A Comparative Study about the Role of the Notification of Restrictive Practices within the European Competition and the American Antitrust Law", 23(2) World Competition 3,2000, p. 45: See generally, Wils, supra note 11 S. 




enforcement conflicting or complementary in attempting to achieve optimal 
competition enforcement? I review these issues in the following section. 
1.4.1 Definition of Optimal Enforcement 
Optimal competition enforcement is hard to define. However, one possible 
way of approaching it is that optimal enforcement is a situation in which the overall 
costs for society in processing a competition action do not completely outweigh the 
possible benefits of such enforcement. 182 If a practice involves both 
anticompetitive effects and cost savings, optimal enforcement would deter it only 
when the welfare loss from a reduction in competition outweighed the gains in 
productive efficiency. In other words, competition enforcement including public or 
private enforcement must deter undertakings from certain forms of conduct only 
when the deadweight welfare loss exceeds costs. If the costs of seeking a higher 
level of enforcement would exceed the benefits, less enforcement would be 
desirable. 
1.4.2 Under-Enforcement and Over- Enforcement of Competition 
Law 
The appropriate level of competition enforcement represents a critical 
balance between under- and over-enforcement. 183 Optimal enforcement should 
minimize the sum of the costs of under-enforcement and the costs of over- 
enforcement. 184 
1.4.2.1 Under-enforcement of Competition law 
Under-enforcement means that competition infringers are penalized for less 
182 Robert McNary, "Optimal Deterrence with Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement", University of 
Chicago Law school, Law and Economics Workshop, 2006, p. 2. 183 Ibid. 
'" Robert H. Landes, "Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations", 50 University of Chicago Law Review 652,1983, p. 652-653. 
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than for the harm they cause. If a practice causes anticompetitive effects and allows 
benefits to flow to the infringer, competition enforcement is too low to offset the 
gain to the infringer. Under-enforcement can be caused both by limited public 
enforcement and by limited private enforcement. For instance, if victims can be 
discouraged because of limited compensation and substantial cost, it can cause 
under-enforcement. If there is systematic under-enforcement it means that the threat 
of legal actions is not enough to deter potential infringers from anticompetitive 
conduct. 185 Consumers may engage in excessive consumption, and companies will 
undertake overly risky activities. 186 
1.4.2.2 Over-enforcement of Competition law 
Over-enforcement means that competition infringers are penalized for more 
than the harm they cause. 187 The key problem of over-enforcement is that some 
kinds of anticompetitive conduct are not pure social waste. They can be business 
practices permitting efficient practices and creating new wealth. 188 
Over-enforcement could occur if the private. interest diverges from the public 
interest. 189 As discussed above, private parties are generally driven by the private 
profit motive, and thus private enforcement could systematically diverge from the 
public interest. Individuals do not consider social benefits when deciding whether 
to bring actions. 190 Posner notes that for private plaintiffs, enforcement 
expenditures are optimal when additional money spent on enforcement will 
increase the expected value of litigation. 191 There is no necessary connection 
185 "Barry J. Rodger, "Private Enforcement and the Enterprise Act : An Exemplary System of Awarding 
Damages, 24 ECLR 103,2003, p. 106. 186 A. Mitchell Polinksy and Steven Shavell, "Punitive Damages and Economic Analysis", Harv. L. Rev. 
869,1998, p. 873. 187 Louis Kaplow, "Private versus Social Costs in Bringing Suit", 15 J. of Leg. Stud. 371,1986, p. 374. 188 See For an argument generally applauding this wide-ranging analysis, see Comment, "A Farewell to Arms: The Implementation of a Policy-Based Standing Analysis in Antitrust Treble Damages Actions", 72 
CALIF. L. Rev., 1984, p. 472-474.; Landes, supra note 184, p. 661-663. 189 A. Mitchell Polinsky, "Detrebling vs Decoupling Antitrust Damags : Lessons from the Theory of Enforcement, 74 Georgetown Law Journal 1231,1986, p. 1233. 190 See generally, Becker, "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach", 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 
1968 ; Coase, "The Problem of Social Costs", 3 J. L. & ECON., 1960, p. 1. 191 Richard A. Posner, "Economic Analysis of Law", Aspen 6th ed., 2002, p. 581.. 
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between the private benefit of litigation and the social benefit. 192 
With over-enforcement, the incentive to find infringers could be higher than 
socially desirable. Potential plaintiffs might undertake wasteful litigation and use 
excessive resources. 193 This could lead to undesirable effects such as 
disproportionate investment and a flood of unmeritorious claims. 194 With over- 
enforcement, consumers could face higher prices because it could also deter 
companies from engaging in pro-competitive and efficiency enhancing conduct-195 
It is submitted that over-enforcement which deters pro-competitive conduct 
could be considered as more a substantial problem than under-enforcement because 
over-enforcement can discourage investment and innovation, which harms 
consumers' interests. If defendants are forced to allocate a disproportionate amount 
of financial resources to legal defence costs, they cannot not invest those resources 
on the research and development of new products, for example. Moreover, over- 
enforcement could cause defendants to incur costs resulting from the diversion of 
company executives from their normal responsibilities and by other organizational 
disruptions necessitated by an antitrust action. Therefore, it has been argued that 
any rules should be designed to curb detrimental motives and eventually to exclude 
socially costly effects. 196 
Therefore, as far as over-enforcement is concerned, public enforcement can 
have some advantages over private enforcement. One of the advantages of public 
enforcement is that it has more effective investigative and sanctioning powers. 197 
192 Steven Shavell, "The Social versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System", 11 J. 
of Leg. Stud., 1982, p. 333,334; Steven Shavell, "The Fundamental Divergence between the Private and 
the Social Motive to Use the Legal System", 26 J. of Leg. Stud. 575,1997, p. 581-584. 193 Wils, "The Optimal Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law: Essays in Law & Economics", Kluwer Law 
International, 2002 p. 150; Frank H. Easterbrook, "Detrebling Antitrust Damages", 28 J. of L. & Econ. 445,1985, p 452. 194 Wils, supra note 115, p. 482. 195 William H. Page, supra note 133, pp. 4-9. '96 Wils, supra note 115, p. 482. 197 Ibid., pp. 480-482. 
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1.4.3 Ways to Achieve Optimal Enforcement of Competition Law 
Optimal competition enforcement could be achieved by various substantive 
and procedural law provisions. The choice between either methods of enforcement 
depends largely on how much value society generally attaches to the goals of 
competition enforcement and on how many degrees of either compliance or 
corrective justice is worth the additional Costs. 198 Legislatures could influence the 
returns to enforcement expenses by determining the rules of substance and 
procedure. 199 
The optimal amount of enforcement depends on the cost of punishment and 
the responses of infringers to changes in enforcement. 200 To achieve optimal 
enforcement, the infringer's expected penalty at the time he commits the 
infringement must correspond to the amount of damage caused by his 
infringement. 201 However, it has been argued that it is generally impossible for 
private litigation to achieve the optimal combination of penalty and probability of 
detection because a change in penalty will also change the returns of enforcement 
and the probability of detection, apprehension, and conviction. 202 Therefore, 
policymakers concerned with enforcement mechanisms must balance the present 
plaintiffs incentives to pursue litigation and the future defendant's incentives to 
take precautions. 203 
In respect to optimal enforcement, I propose to discuss two widely cited 
models. Under one model, the way to achieve optimal enforcement for competition 
198 Ibid., p. 487. 199 Richard A. Posner, supra note 98, p. 581. 200 Becker, supra note 190, p. 169 201 See Becker, supra note 190, pp. 176-179,180- 185,191-193; See also, R. Posner, supra note 98, p. 
221-224 : Robert H. Landes, supra note 184. The text implies that a system of penalties could achieve 
equal deterrence at lower cost by imposing higher penalties while devoting fewer resources to detection 
and prosecution. To the extent managers are risk-averse, however, any savings through reform in this 
direction would be at least partially offset by increased costs of risk-bearing on potential offenders. See 
Polinsky & Shavell, "The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines", 69 AM. 
ECON. 880,1979,880-881. The possibility of judicial error would magnify these costs. See J. G. Sidak 
and M. Block, "The Cost of Antitrust Deterrence: Why Not Hang a Price-Fixer Now and Then? ", 68 GEO. 
L. J 1131,1980, p. 1135-1138. 202 Polinsky, supra note 189, p. 1234. 203 Xinyu Hua and Kathryn E. Spier, "Information and Externalities in Sequential Litigation", 161 J. of 
Institutional and Theoretical Econ., 2005, p. 215; Robert McNary, supra note 182, p. 12; Patricia Hanh 
Rosochowicz, supra note 61, p. 1. 
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infringements is the "net harm to persons other than the infringer" multiplied by the 
reciprocal of the probability of detection. 204 The net harm includes the allocative 
inefficiency which comes from the deadweight loss welfare triangle. 05 Under this 
model multiplication, as discussed in Chapter 3, it is essential to create optimal 
incentives for would-be infringers when unlawful. acts are not certain to be 
prosecuted successfully. 206 It would be possible, to set damages multiples based on 
the likelihood that anticompetitive infringements will be detected and successfully 
prosecuted. This could counteract the intended trade-off between a high-penalty and 
a low-probability of detection. 207 The multiplier used in calculating anticompetitive 
damages should be larger than one because not all infringements are detected and 
208 proven. If the probability of detection were 25%, the multiplier would be 4. If 
the probability of detection were 10%, the multiplier would be 10. 
For example, in the case of price fixing, if the likelihood of detection is one- 
third, the optimal enforcement would be three times the sum of the overcharge and 
the deadweight loss. It could be argued that the trebling factor in private antitrust 
cases serves this function, imperfectly, in the US. 209 
In respect of optimal enforcement it seems to be reasonable to balance a low 
probability of discovering anticompetitive conduct with the risk of higher 
damages. 210 Therefore, it can be submitted that if positive enforcement costs and 
probability of apprehension and conviction were less than one (100%), the optimal 
enforcement equals the net harm, including enforcement costs, divided by the 
204 W. M. Landes, supra note 184, p. 657; See also Robert H. Lande, Why Antitrust Damage Levels 
Should Be Raised, 16 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 329,2004 (observing that the Landes model of optimal 
deterrence "is almost universally accepted, even by those who are not of a Chicago School orientation"); 
See generally, William H. Page, "Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach to Antitrust 
Innjury", 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 467,1980; William H. Page, supra note 133, p. 5. 20 `Deadweight loss' is the loss to plaintiffs arising out of their inability to buy the product due to its 
artificially high price. For example, a plaintiff might lose the opportunity to profit from a downstream 
sale. P. Friedman, D. Gelfand et al., supra note 155, p. 23; Robert H. Lande, "The rise and (Coming) Fall 
of Efficiency as the Ruler of Antitrust, 33 Antitrust BULL. 429,1988, p. 433-434. 206 Frank H. Easterbrook, supra note 193, p. 455. 207 Ibid. 
208 Edward P. Henneberry, supra note 118, p. 335. 209 See generally these three articles. Frank H. Easterbrook, supra note 121, p. 329-331; Frank H. Easterbrook, supra note 193 ; Frank H. Easterbrook and Fischel, "Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers", 80 MICH. L. 1155,1982. 
210 Ulf Boge, Konrad Ost, supra note 111, p. 201. 
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probability of apprehension and punishment. 211 
Under the other widely cited model, competition enforcement must strive to 
equalize marginal cost and marginal benefit. Conceivably, government or the 
private sector could achieve one hundred percent enforcement, but this is 
undesirable. 212 One hundred percent enforcement results in allocative inefficiency 
because resources allocated to enforcement do not produce an equivalent societal 
benefit. 
For example, if the government and private sector must spend £ 1,000 to 
apprehend an infringer inflicting P. 10 of harm on competition, then the cost of 
enforcement far exceeds its benefits. A better alternative would be to invest 
resources in enforcement only to the point at which marginal cost of enforcement 
equals resulting marginal benefit. For example, if society spends £ 1,000 to 
apprehend infringers inflicting £ 1,000 of harm to competition, but only achieves 
eighty-percent enforcement, eighty-percent enforcement would be society's optimal 
enforcement level. 
This model concludes, therefore, that for claims which do not have positive 
net social benefits, if the increase in deterrence from allowing private or public 
enforcement would be outweighed by the direct costs of litigation then that 
enforcement should be denied. It is then efficient for society to adopt legal rules 
that discourage litigation. 213 Furthermore, where the practice has no 
anticompetitive effects, it is an efficient offence, 214 and the optimal enforcement 
would be zero. 215 
211 Warren F. Schwartz, "An Overview of the Economics of Antitrust Enforcement", 68 Geo. L. J. 1075, 
1980, pp. 1083-1085 
212 See K. Elzinga and W. Breit, The Antitrust Penalties: A Study In Law And Economics", Yale 
University Press, 1976, p. 15. 213 Louis Kaplow, supra note 187, pp. 371,374. 214 See K. Elzinga and W. Breit, "Private Antitrust Enforcement: The New Learning", 28 J. L. & ECON., 
1985, p. 405; Note, "Rethinking Antitrust Damages", 33 STAN. L. Rev. 329 (1981); Easterbrook, supra 
note 193, p. 410-12; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 209, p. 1155; W. M. Landes, supra note 184. See R. 
Posner and F. Easterbrook, "Antitrust: Cases, Economics And Other Materials", (2d ed), 1981. p. 545-572 215 See Sidak and Block, supra note 201, p. 1132 (the solution to the enforcement-cost problem appears to 
be straightforward: 'Lumber for gallows is relatively inexpensive, and few offenders would actually be 
hanged; thus the cost of enforcing the antitrust laws would be trivial! ). Block and Sidak agree that 
enforcement should proceed to the point where marginal cost equals marginal benefit. They make several 
economic arguments that it may not be optimal to continuously trade higher fines for lower enforcement 
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1.4.4 Optimal Enforcement with Public and Private Enforcement 
1.4.4.1 Are Public and Private Enforcement complementary or 
conflicting? 
The pairing of public and private enforcement is not unique to the 
competition laws. However, it is important to ensure that the private party's 
interests in deciding to bring actions are aligned with, or at least take account of, 
society's interests. 216 In respect of competition law it is claimed that private 
enforcement is not always aligned with the objectives of competition law. 217 To 
achieve the objectives of competition law, it is important to optimize the level of 
law enforcement from the joint investments and efforts of the public and private 
enforcers. 218 
One the one hand, public enforcement pursues the public interest such as the 
protection of the competition and consumer welfare through administrative or 
criminal sanctions. 219 Public enforcement agencies normally have the power to 
impose fines and penalties, even though they cannot bring actions for damages on 
behalf of private parties. 220 It is often said that competition authorities are better 
suited than individuals to safeguard the public interest because the results achieved 
by individuals in their own interests are not necessarily also in the public interest. 
221 
costs. ; K. Elzinga and W. Breit, supra note 212, p. 15 216 William E. Kovacic, "Private Participation in the Enforcement of Public Competition Laws", British 
Institution of International & Comparative Law- Third Annual Conference on International and 
Comparative Competition Law: The Transatlantic Antitrust, 2003, p. 3; Elena Wind, "Remedies and 
Sanctions in Article 82 of the EC Treaty", ECLR, 2005, p. 664-668. 217 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics (4th ed., Pearson Addison Wesley, Boston, 2004), p. 476; Wils, 
supra note 115, p. 482. 21 David Resenberg and James P. Sullivan, "Coordinating Private Class Action and Public Agency 
Enforcement of Antitrust Law", Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2006, p. 9. 219 Ilya Segal, Michael Whinston, "Public VS Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law: A Survey", ECLR, 
2007, p. 306-312. 
220 See Mario Monti(former European Commissioner for Competition Policy), "Effective Private 
Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law", Speech at the 6th EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop, 
Speech/01/258,2001. available at http: //europa. eu. int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten. ksh? p_ action. gettxtgt. doe 
EN. 
221 Ulf Boge, Konrad Ost, supra note I11, p. 198; See generally, Peter S. Menell, "A Note on Private 
Versus Social Incentives to Sue in a Costly Legal System", 12 J. Legal Stud. 41,1983. 
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On the other hand, private enforcement pursues the private interest through 
civil sanctions, most notably through damages actions. 222 Private enforcers are 
primarily pursuing compensation to recover or prevent losses and are motivated by 
monetary objectives. 223 Private enforcement is therefore profit-motivated and lacks 
any incentive to maximize social over private benefit. 224 These incentives may lead 
some private plaintiffs to engage in unmeritorious actions. Hence, it is claimed 
that there is a risk that a private party's motive may either fall short or exceed the 
socially adequate motive. 225 For example, seeking settlement from can cause 
substantial litigation costs- and potential bad publicity associated with defending 
even non-meritorious claims to defendants. 226 As American experience indicates, 
private plaintiffs do not consider the public interest in their decision to bring actions, 
and have strong incentives to exploit antitrust actions to disadvantage larger 
rivals. 227 
Private parties will normally, of course, be less sensitive than government 
agencies to the economical and social costs of particular enforcement actions, such 
as its disruptive impact on affected communities, relative to the social benefits of 
such actions. 228 
It is argued that the existence of private actions, however, in particular the 
availability of damages actions to the victim of anticompetitive conducts, is 
consistent with the public interests that are inherent in competition norms. 229 In 
222 See Braakman, 'The Application of the Modernized Rules Implementing Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty 
in Injunction Proceedings: Problems and Possible Solutions", in: Hawk (Ed. ), international Antitrust Law 
and Polin' 1999, Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 2000, p. 161; See Shaw Jo, 
"Decentralization and Law Enforcement in EC Competition Law", 15 LS 128.1995, p. 158-159. In this 
article, he stated that "Private actions will generally be favoured where competition is seen primarily as a 
private, market-based matter, with competition policy being correspondingly limited in scope. They will 
tend to be discouraged where competition policy implies the existence of some elements of public interest 
in the maintenance of a particular type of trading structure". 223 Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper, supra note 118, p. 11; Ulf Boge, 
Konrad Ost, supra note 111, p. 198; Steven Shavell, "The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement" 36 
Journal of Law and Economics 255,1993, p. 268. 224 D. Resenberg and J. P. Sullivan, supra note 218, p. 4. us S. Shavell, supra note 223 226 M. C. Stephenson, supra note 120, p. 116. 227 William H. Page, supra note 133, p. 10. 228 Matthew C. Stephenson, "Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the 
Role of Administrative Agencies", 91 Va. L. Rev. 93,2005, p. 115-117. 229 Assimakis P. Komninos, supra note 159, p. 15. 
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respect to the interaction between public and private enforcement, private 
enforcement cannot be treated as an isolated issue because it is an integral part of 
the system and has to be seen in its interaction with public law enforcement. 30 
The key question is how both public enforcers and private enforcers could 
ensure optimal balance between private and public enforcement. Competition 
enforcement has been described as a public good which does not necessarily need 
to be provided for by government, but can be efficiently produced by relying on the 
private incentives. 231 It can therefore be argued that an effective system of private 
enforcement does not alter the basic goal of the competition rules, which is to 
safeguard the public interest in maintaining free and undistorted competition. 
232 
The existence of private actions is consistent with the public interest that is inherent 
in competition norm. Private claims for damages caused by competition 
infringements provide a complement for public enforcement, but the goals of both 
enforcement devices might not be common, as they protect different interests. 
233 
To ensure optimal balance between private and public enforcement, private 
enforcement and public enforcement should work alongside, and in harmony with, 
each other to the best effect for consumers and for the economy. 234 Pursuing 
private interests at the expense of public interests235 should not be allowed. A 
balance must be struck between giving way to substantial competition enforcement 
and maintaining the probable degree of legal certainty and protection of rights of 
parties having suffered damage from anticompetitive conducts. 
For instance, the Court of Justice of the EU, has recognised that private 
actions strengthen the working of the Community competition rules and discourage 
anticompetitive conduct restricting or distorting competition. 236 This view sees 
private enforcement as making a significant contribution to the safeguarding of the 
230 ESBQ "ESBG comments on the EC White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust 
rules", Position Paper, 2008, p. 2. 231 Robert McNary, supra note 182, p. 16. 232 Komninos, supra note 143, p. 15; R. Becker et al., supra note 157, p. 5; D. Resenberg and J. P. Sullivan, 
su note 218, p. 4. 
Francisco Marcos et al., supra note 143, p. 7 234 OFT916, supra note 37, pp. 4-5; David Resenberg and James P. Sullivan, supra note 218, p-4- 735 According to DGFT, was the previous name for the UK OFT, the definition of public interest is 
consumer wellbeing; Mark Furse, supra note 44, p. 257. 236 Courage v Crehan, C-452/99, [2001]ECR 1-6297, para 27. 
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public interest. 
Furthermore, the EU Competition Commissioner has stated that the key role 
played by public competition enforcement is not weakened by private enforcement. 
She considers that more private enforcement does not necessarily equal less public 
enforcement. 237 Rather, private enforcement is by nature complementary to and can 
even strengthen the enforcement actions taken by competition authorities. 
It should be noted that EC Regulation 1/2003 238 (the Modernisation 
Regulation) encourages the complementary roles of public and private enforcement 
in the EU by providing for national courts to apply Articles 81 and 82 in fu11.239 
Therefore, there needs to be a mutually fruitful interaction between private 
and public enforcers. 240 Neither public enforcement nor private enforcement can 
replace the other, 241 but they can continue to support each other. To ensure 
competition and to protect consumers' interests the private enforcement system 
should therefore be evaluated in terms of how successfully it helps to implement 
public interests without unreasonably deterring legitimate business conducts or 
unnecessarily burdening the judicial system. In other words, the substantial 
question is how efficient it is likely to be in helping to deter and prohibit 
anticompetitive conduct, while providing a fair and efficient way of compensating 
victims. 
Furthermore, the growth of private enforcement can be facilitated by 
assistance from public enforcers. 242 Obvious examples of such assistance are 
follow-on actions. 243 The involvement of the competition authorities in the private 
enforcement process will strengthen the impact of the rules, and the private parties 
237 Neelie Kroes. "Enhancing Actions for Damages for Breach of Competition Rules in Europe", Dinner 
eech at the Harvard Club, Speech/05/533, New York, 2005, p. 3. Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 
of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1. 
239 Arundel McDougall and Alexandra Verzariu, "Vitamins Litigation: Unavailability of Exemplary Damages, Restitutionary Damages and Account of Profits in Private Competition Law Claims", ECLR, 29(3), 2008, p. 181. 240 Barry Rodger, "Private Enforcement of Competition Law, The Hidden Story : Competition Litigation Settlements in the United Kingdom, 2000-2005", E. C. L. R. 29(2), 2008, p. 98. 241 T. J. Muris, supra note 44, p. 170; Ulf Boge, Konrad Ost, supra note 111, p. 198. 242 Dan Wilsher, supra note 142, p. 28. 243 See section 1.3.1.4 which deals with follow-on and stand-alone actions. 
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such as consumers will have more inclination to invoke the competition law 
provisions. 244 For competition authorities, the issue is how to strike the right 
balance between pursuing their own policy goals in the public interest and private 
parties' interests. 245 Securing the right balance between `nature' of private 
enforcement and `policy independence' of public enforcers may be difficult because 
of differences of objectives between public enforcement and private enforcement. 246 
Public enforcers therefore need to map out their broader policy goals and justify 
levels of assistance or non-assistance to private parties. 247 This leads to the 
conclusion that competition authorities need strong and clear guidelines on when 
and how they cooperate with private parties. This involves a full consideration of an 
assessment of the merits of private and public enforcement. 
1.4.4.2 Two Elements for Optimal Enforcement through Public 
and Private Enforcers 
As stressed above, to achieve optimal enforcement through private and public 
enforcement, the balance to be reached is very important. It is important to choose 
the most appropriate enforcer to achieve the objectives of competition law. It is 
desirable to give enough incentives to private enforcement but at the same time 
frivolous lawsuit should be avoided. 248 There are two main elements to be 
considered. 
The first element is access to relevant information for the enforcement. 249 
Relevant information is important to a fairer and more correct outcome. The choice 
between private and public enforcement depends to a large extent on the effort 
needed to get the necessary information. 250 To attain optimal enforcement, an 
efficient enforcer should have ready access to the evidence necessary to prove the 
infringement. Otherwise, an extensive amount of effort may be needed to establish 
2" M. Monti's speech/01/258, supra note 220. 245 Dan Wilsher, supra note 142, p. 28. 246 Ibid. 
247 Ibid., p. 27. 248 Patricia Hanh Rosochowicz, supra note 61, p-5- 249 See, Wils, supra note 193, p. 18; See generally, Maarten Pieter Schinkel and Jan Tuinstra, "Imperfect Antitrust Enforcement", Maastricht University research paper, 2002. 250 P. Friedman, D. Gelfand et al., supra note 155, pp. 5-11. 
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the find the infringement. 51 
On the one hand, private parties may more easily obtain relevant information 
because the victim of harm usually finds himself in the best position to gather the 
relevant information by identifying the infringer and infringement. On the other 
hand, public enforcement may have lower information gathering costs when the 
public authority is better situated to acquire information. 252 Where public enforcers 
are better situated than private enforcers is situations where harms are so widely 
dispersed that it is not cost-effective for all of the harmed individuals to share 
information. Economies of scale in information processing can therefore make 
public enforcement more cost-effective than private enforcement. Private parties do 
not have the same investigatory powers as authorities and are not necessarily in a 
position to spend considerable amounts of money on expert opinions and 
econometrics studies. 
For instance, it is difficult to uncover hardcore horizontal cartels. Private 
parties are hardly in a position to detect such practices without expending a great 
degree of effort in uncovering them. In this case enforcement requires a public 
authority with access to more effective techniques. This could be certain 
information systems such as databases, whose benefits would be hard to be 
captured if used by private parties alone. 253 Sometimes, it could require that huge 
degree of co-ordination between a number of individuals or bodies. Information 
sharing affects the costs and benefits of enforcement. 254 
The second element is that which enforcement is preferred, the more efficient 
enforcers must carry out enforcement. It is argued that whatever scheme is 
eventually preferred, to achieve optimal enforcement, the efficient enforcers must 
have the greatest incentive to bring actions. 255 The comparative effectiveness of 
public or private enforcement depends on the difference in enforcement costs 
251 M. Monti's speech/04/403, supra note 118, p. 2. 252 See generally, Antonio Capobianco, Wilmer Cutler, Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, "Private antitrust 
enforcement of EC competition rules: recent developments" CLI 25(3), 2004, p. 6. 253 See generally, Steven Shavell, supra note 223. ua Robert McNary, supra note 182, p. 14-15. us Steven Shavell, "The Fundamental Divergence between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the 
Legal System", 26 J. of Leg. Stud. 575,1997, p. 611. 
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between public and private enforcement 256 Both public and private enforcement 
involve certain administrative costs, for example caused by making use of either 
competition authorities or courts, but also other expenses such as lawyer's fees and 
the time dedicated to each case. 257 The most efficient enforcer can be described as 
the one who can bring actions for the lowest direct and indirect costs. Private 
enforcement could be more costly than public enforcement because of legal costs 
and social dead weight. 258 However, even if it is correct, therefore, that public 
enforcement should remain the dominant element in an optimal enforcement 
scheme, it still makes sense to rely additionally on the initiative of private parties 
because it is highly probable that public enforcers do not have sufficient resources 
to achieve optimal enforcement. 259 Follow-on actions can help the balance between 
public and private enforcement by encouraging private actions through allowing 
reliance on prior guilty verdicts by public enforcers. 260 
1.5 Conclusion 
This Introduction has introduced the concepts of public and private 
enforcement of competition law and argued that optimal enforcement can best be 
achieved when both the possible harm as well as possible benefits of each method 
of enforcement is taken into account. 
However, it appears undesirable for enforcement rules to exclusively rely 
either on public or private enforcement. Optimal enforcement can be achieved 
through efficient and effective cooperation between public and private enforcement. 
Both private enforcement and public enforcement can strengthen the impact of 
competition rules. These forms of enforcement are complementary and necessary 
256 A. Mitchell Polinsky, "Private Versus Public Enforcement of Fines", 9 J. Leg. Stud. p. 105,107 
1980). See also, Polinsky and Shavell, supra note 201, p. 880. s8 Wils, supra note 115, p. 480 258 First of all because of the effort needed to estimate the damages attributable to anticompetitive 
conduct, but also as private lawsuits often tend to be prohibitively expensive, at least in comparison to 
costs expended by competition authorities.; Christian Diemer, supra note 160, p. 313; see Wils, supra note 115, pp. 480-484. ; Clifford A. Jones, "Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: A Policy Analysis and 
Reality Check", 27 World Competition 13,2004; also in Is. Atansiu, C. D. Ehlermann, European 
Competition Law Annual 2001. Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law (Hart Publishing), 2003. 
259 Dan Wilsher, supra note 142, p. 28. 260 See Thomas E. Kauper & Edward A. Snyder, supra note 154. 
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for the effectiveness of the whole competition law enforcement. 261 Although 
private enforcement and public enforcement aim at different aspects of the same 
phenomenon each of the two systems must work in a complementary manner and 
be effectively coordinated. Private enforcement can positively contribute to optimal 
enforcement, even though public enforcement remains of critical importance not 
only for the ability to detect anti-competitive practices, but also in view of the costs. 
One view is that the primary function of the private enforcement is the 
compensatory one and that the deterrent function must be considered secondary 
since private competition enforcement through damages actions is virtually the only 
way that victims of anticompetitive conduct can obtain redress. 262 This combined 
enforcement system of private and public enforcers would bring the implementation 
of competition law closer to consumers and business. In this combined enforcement 
system the victims of anticompetitive practices, including consumers, could have 
the opportunity to avail themselves of effective remedies in order to protect their 
rights ensured by competition law. Therefore, competition law should ensure a fine 
balance between public and private enforcement and aim at facilitating private 
actions with appropriate incentives. It should be also worked within the 
enforcement system and available enforcement resources. I explore in the 
subsequent chapters various matters which have to be addressed if optimal 
enforcement is to be achieved. 
261 Paolo Giudici, "Private Antitrust Law Enforcement in Italy", Competition Law Review, 2004 p. 64- 
65.; See Behrens, "Comments on Josef Drexi: Choosing between Supranational and International Law 
Principles of Enforcement", in: Drexl (Ed. ), The Future of Transnational Antitrust - From Comparative to Common Competition Law (Berne/The Hague/London/New York, 2003, p. 344-345. 262 Francisco Marcos et al., supra note 143, p. 9; Konminos, supra note 143, p. 9; R. H. Lande and J. P. 
Davis, supra note 141, p. 904. 
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Chapter 2. Overview of Private Enforcement of 
Competition law in Korea, the EU, UK and US 
2.1 Overview of Private Competition Enforcement in Korea 
2.1.1 Competition Culture and Private Competition Enforcement 
2.1.1.1 Importance of Competition in Korea 
From 1970 to 2009, for almost 39 years, the Republic of Korea (hereafter, 
Korea) has developed a competition culture, which has contributed to a sound and 
strong economy. ' Unrestrained competition has made great economic development 
possible in Korea. 2 Competition has generated investment, efficiency and 
innovation. Through competition, companies have innovated and made the most 
effective use of their resources, pushed up quality, pushed down prices and ensured 
new companies have access to the market. Competition has been exceptionally 
important in high-tech industries where rapid progress has occurred through the 
introduction of new technologies. Competition has been beneficial to consumers' 
interests because competition has offered lower prices and better choices to 
consumers. Consumers and businesses have supported the principles of the 
competition laws by detecting anticompetitive conduct and reporting 
anticompetitive conduct to the KFTC. This support has helped to build the culture 
of competition. 
2.1.1.2 Competition Culture and Competitive Industry 
Korea therefore has a competition culture and competitive industry.; The 
1 "Recent Development in Korea's Competition Laws and Policies", Principle of KFTC Policy, 
2007.1.26, p. 1. 2 "Recent Development in Korea's Competition Laws and Policies" by Chairman Ohseung Kwon of the 
Korea Fair Trade Commission, 2006.5.18, p. 3; "Establishing Market Economy and Competition Policy in 
Korea" by former Chairman Chul-Kyu Kang of the Korea Fair Trade Commission, 2004.10.29, p. 3. 3 See generally, "Economic Reform in Korea: Past Progress and Future Challenges", OECD's perspective 
to Korea Policy, 2007, p. 17-29. 
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economy of Korea was the 14th largest in the world in 2007. In the 1940s, Korea 
was an agricultural economy. Since 1960, the Korean government has carried out 
extensive financial reforms that have restored stability to markets. Owing to these 
extensive financial reforms, since 1970, the Korean economy developed fast as it 
moved away from the centrally planned, government-directed investment system 
toward a more market-oriented one based on `fair competition. ' S Ensuring 
competition is, of course, more important to market-oriented industry than to 
government-directed industry. Thus, for 39 years the Competition Law has played 
crucial role in doing that. In the first three decades after the Park Chung Hee 
government launched the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan in 1962, the 
Korean economy grew enormously and the economic structure was radically 
transformed. Korea's real gross national product (hereafter, GNP) was expanded in 
the years 1960-2002 by an average of more than 10% per year. The economic 
growth pushed by President Dae-jung Kim helped Korea maintain one of world's 
expanding economies. Increasing trade with the People's Republic of China 
(hereafter, China) has boosted Korea to a leading position among the world's 
developed economies. 6 
To understand the economic development of Korea over the last sixty years, 
it is necessary to understand its competition culture. The culture of competition has 
played a major role in shaping and developing competitive companies and the 
relationships among market participants by prohibiting conduct that unreasonably 
restricts or distorts competition in markets. 7 
Korean companies have become very competitive because they have faced 
fierce competition in the domestic market. Only competitive companies can survive 
° This GDP (Gross Domestic Product) includes the value of all final goods and services produced within 
a nation in a given year. The GDP dollars are calculated at market or government official exchange rates 
and includes data for the year 2007 for all 180 members of the International Monetary Fund. Data are in 
millions of current United States dollars. 1$`, United States : 13,807,550 millions ... 14'x`, Korea: 
969,871 
millions. "World Economic Outlook Database", IMF, September 2007. 
s In respect to the definition of `fair competition', see section 1.2.2 which deals with objectives of 
competition law. 
6 2008 Annual Report, Korea Industry organization, 2009, p. 39 7 See generally, "Recent Development in Korea's Competition Laws and Policies", KFTC, 2007; "Recent 
Development in Korea's Competition Laws and Policies" by former Chairman Ohseung Kwon of the 
Korea Fair Trade Commission, 2006.5.18 p. 3; "Establishing Market Economy and Competition Policy in 
Korea" by former Chairman Chul-Kyu Kang of the Korea Fair Trade Commission, 2004.10.29, p. 3. 
63 
in such a market and once they survive in Korea, they can normally also survive in 
world markets. For example, Samsung was among the top 21 Global brands in 
2007.8 Samsung has invested heavily in the quality, design, manufacturing, and 
long-term research of its products to survive in related industry. Another example is 
Hyundai Motor Group which in the top 72 Global brands in 2007.9 LG is also a 
good example of a company which has flourished through competition. LG was in 
the top 97 Global brands in 2007.10 
According to the former Prime Minister of Korea, Soong- Su Han, 
competition is one of the most important factors in developing the Korea 
economy. " Yong-Ho, Baek, the former Chairman of the KFTC, states that free and 
fair competition is a powerful engine of growth for the Korean economy. 
12 Given 
the above, it is submitted that the success of the Korean economy can largely be 
attributed to its culture of competition. 
2.1.1.3 The Competition Law System and Private and Public 
Competition Enforcement in Korea 
In Korea, to regulate anticompetitive conduct there is the Monopoly 
Regulation and Fair Trade Law (hereafter, Competition Law). The Competition 
Law was enacted on April 1,1981 as a comprehensive charter of economic liberty 
aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. 
13 Besides 
Competition Law, to ensure competition and protect consumer interests, 9 laws are 
have been enacted. These 9 laws are Fair Subcontract Transactions Law (1984), 




11 Congratulatory Speech by the Prime Minister at 5`h Seoul Competition Forum, 2008. 12 2009 KFTC Annual Report, 2009, p. 8. 13 The Price Stability and Fair Trade Law produced side-effects such as restricting the proper functioning 
of price mechanism, since the focus of the law enforcement was primarily on achieving price stability. 
The price authorization by the government distorted the market function and prompted the public to 
expect inflation in the future, resulting in the avoidance of production, creation of double prices, and 
cornering and hoarding. Focusing on the regulations of the side-effects arising from monopoly and 
oligopoly deepened the problem of monopolization. The lack of a mechanism curbing the concentration 
of economic power gave rise to the problem of economic concentration. For the private sector to play the 
lead, instead of the government, in the operation of the economy, the sections involving fair trade were 
separated from those on price stability under the Price Stability and Fair Trade Act. 
64 
Fair Franchiser Actions Law (1984), Adhesion Contracts Law (1986), Instalment 
Transactions Law (1991), Door-to-Door Sales, Etc. Law (1995), Fair Labelling and 
Advertising Law (1999), Omnibus Cartel Repeal Law (1999), Consumer Protection 
Law on Electronic Transaction (2002) and Consumer Fundamental Law (2006). 
These laws are closely related to private enforcement because these laws protect not 
only public interests such as competition but also private interests protected by 
these laws. Furthermore, although the KFTC has exclusive jurisdiction to enforce 
these laws, it cannot compensate for damages caused by the anticompetitive 
conduct. To be compensated for damages, private parties should bring damages 
actions before courts. 
In recent years, much attention has been given in Korea to the role of private 
as well as public enforcement of competition law. Private enforcement has been 
introduced and recognized as an important way to ensure that the competition rules 
are applied. There have been many changes aimed at facilitating private 
competition law actions, not only for the benefit of individual interests but also for 
effective cooperation between public enforcement and private enforcement. The 
positive effects of private enforcement have been promoted and strengthened. 
Private enforcement is regularly invoked as a sword, but rarely used as a 
shield. Except in the case of a cartel, conduct infringing competition law is not void 
and does not remove contractual obligations. Competition Law 19(4) states that 
"Any contract ... stipulating the improper cartels listed in Clause (1) between 
enterprisers shall be null and void. " Therefore, except for cartel cases, private 
enforcement is usually used as a sword, to bring actions for damages. 14 This also 
means that in Korean law no issue has arisen about restitution of benefits which 
have passed between co-contractors to an illegal contract. 
The right to bring damages actions for loss suffered due to anticompetitive 
conduct has existed since 1981. Korean competition law creates individual rights 
that the courts are required to protect. The general principle of remedies under the 
Competition Law is to provide for the full compensation for damage caused by 
14 See section 1.3.1 which deals with the sword/shield terminology is explained. 
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anticompetitive conduct. 's 
Competition Law 56 states that: 
"Anyone who causes damage, through breach of Competition Law, to 
another person in whatever capacity or participates in bringing about such a 
infringement, is liable to make full compensation for the injured person or persons 
in accordance with the provision set forth in the Competition Law. " 
However, to date private action has been very limited. In particular, there 
have been few damages actions. Private enforcement has not performed an 
important failsafe function. Public enforcement far exceeds private enforcement. 
There has been a general reluctance by wronged parties to bring such actions. There 
had been 31 cases of private enforcement in the 20 years up to 2003.16 Generally 
speaking, most people would prefer to avoid becoming involved in legal actions. 
Substantial costs and lengthy court procedures have led to the considerable 
unwillingness of private parties to try to seek compensation through litigation. 
Public enforcement has therefore exceeded private enforcement by a factor of 
approximately ten to one or more. There is a general impression that public 
enforcement is the primary method of enforcing competition law. 
Furthermore, legal culture and tradition have been barriers to litigation in 
Korea because trust and honour in business relations is important. Business 
activities are based on an individual truthfulness and personal character. Business 
activities are able to be done well with good relationship with their business 
partners. Securing favourable relationship with their business partners is more 
important to potential plaintiffs than getting compensation for damages caused by 
anticompetitive practice. If there is any possibility to ruin their relationship by 
bringing actions, potential plaintiffs would not bring actions. '? 
is Competition Law is a law for all who are subject to the market as players. Anyone has juridical 
standing to the extent to which he/she can claim a specific damage deriving from the breach of 
competition law". 
16 Hong Dae-Sik, "Damages Claim under the Korean Antitrust Law - From the perspective of practice-", 13(2) Journal of Business Administration and Law 245,2003, p. 248 17 In respect to Korea legal culture, see generally, Yang Kun, "Law and Society Studies in Korea: Beyond 
the Hahm Theses", Law & Society Review, Volume 23, Number 5,1989; See also generally, Yang Kun, 
"The Sociology of Law in Korea", The American Sociologist/Summer 2001. 
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In reality, legal or natural persons usually use the Korea Fair Trade 
Commission (hereafter, KFTC) to achieve their objectives in the competition field. 
As a matter of fact, making a complaint to the KFTC is easier and more convenient 
for private parties than commencing damages actions before the courts because the 
parties can avoid substantial legal costs and lengthy procedures. Generally, the 
KFTC can handle the case faster than private parties. The most crucial instrument 
against anticompetitive conduct is the power of the KFTC to bring the infringement 
to an end and to impose a substantial surcharge 18 on the undertakings or 
associations of undertakings responsible. An economic sanction such as surcharge 
is efficient to ensure compliance because it is substantial. The principle of 
proportionality provides that sanctions imposed should not be excessive in relation 
to the breach. 19 
In respect to the limited incidence of private enforcement, it is not only a 
question of eliminating psychological barriers. Compared with the US, there are 
numerous reasons why private enforcement of competition law remains 
underdeveloped in Korea. Korea is a more difficult jurisdiction for plaintiffs in 
competition actions than is the US. The mechanism of US private enforcement 
contains government-directed strong incentives for plaintiffs, such as treble 
damages, the one-way costs rule, and broad discovery powers for those seeking 
damages for infringements of competition law. 20 Moreover, the legal traditions of 
Korea and the US differ in that Korea is generally considered to have a less litigious 
culture than the US. Korea does not have the culture or tradition of bringing cases 
to court. For instance, Korea has a loser-pay rule, no discovery rules and no opt-out 
representative actions. Comparing the number of complaint to the KFTC with the 
number of actions before courts, it is submitted that Koreans are not litigation- 
oriented. According to the KFTC's 2008 statistics report, the number of complaints 
to the KFTC in 2008 is about 13,000 and the number of actions before courts in 
2008 is 120.21 
1e In Korea, fined imposed by the KFTC is called as surcharge because fine could be imposed with only 
corrective order of the KFTC. 19 See, KFTC, "Guild line for Imposition of Surcharge, " 2007, sections III and IV. 20 See section 2.4 which deals with features of the US system. 21 See Statistic Report 2009 by the KFTC 
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However, given the limited resources of public enforcers to investigate and 
prosecute every single infringement of competition rules, it is considered that it is 
desirable to encourage private enforcement. In order to encourage private damages 
actions, the KFTC removed obstacles and created incentives by revising the 
provision made for damages actions for breach of the competition rules in 2004.22 
Under that revision private parties can bring damages actions before District Courts 
without a prior decision of illegality by the KFTC (i. e. plaintiffs can bring 
`standalone' and not just `follow-on' actions). 23 The revised damages procedure 
could encourage private enforcement, which places a significant further burden on 
companies that infringe competition law. Businesses face not only the prospect of a 
substantial surcharge from the KFTC, which can run to hundreds of millions of 
Won, 24 but also the possibility of private actions which can run to billions of Won 
in damages. 25 It is now generally recognised that private competition enforcement 
is an important complement to public law enforcement. 
However, it cannot be expected that private enforcement will play an 
important role in Korea immediately, if at all. In the US, the Sherman and the 
Clayton Acts were hardly used during their first decades of existence and needed 
nearly half a century to become commonly used. An analysis of the first fifty years 
of private enforcement in the US revealed that between 1890 and 1940 in total only 
175 private damages actions had been brought before courts with plaintiffs 
prevailing in only 13 reported decisions. 26 Since 1960, private antitrust litigation 
has outpaced public enforcement efforts by a wide margin because of the opt-out 
system?? 28 In the US, 90 % of competition cases were private actions in 2004. 
22 Competition Law 56(3) 
2' See section 1.3.1.4 which defines the concept of stand-alone and follow on actions. 24 Won is the Korean currency. Its ration of exchange to pound is that one pound sterling is about 
2 063 Won in September 7,2009. 73 Group actions have been brought before court since 2007 because of the provision of group actions in 
Consumer Fundamental Act. Group actions are important to encourage private enforcement because 
damage of individual parties is so small and dispersed. Without group actions mechanism, individuals 
would hardly ever bring actions before courts. In respect to group actions, see section 6.1.1 which deals 
with group action.. 
26 Clifford A. Jones, "Private Enforcement in the EU, UK and USA", Oxford, 1999, p. 79. Clifford 
A. Jones states that the average number of new private actions since 1985 is in the range of 600 to 1,000 
per year. 
Ibid., p. 79. See infra Chapter 6 which deals with opt-out system of group actions. 29 See Holmes. K, "Public Enforcement or Private Enforcement? Enforcement of Competition Law in the 
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2.1.2 Public Competition Enforcement System in Korea 
The KFTC is the only public competition enforcers in Korea. Thus, to understand 
public competition enforcement system in Korea, it is necessary to discuss 
characteristics and role of the KFTC. 
2.1.2.1 Organization and Role of the KFTC 
2.1.2.2.1 Organization of the KFTC 
In 1981, the KFTC was established within the Economic Planning Board29 
pursuant to the Competition Law as a working body. 30 To guarantee procedural 
fairness, the KFTC was established as an independent, professional and impartial 
government body. At present, the KFTC is a ministerial-level central administrative 
organization under the authority of the Prime Minister. The KFTC consists of a 
committee (the decision-making body) and a secretariat (a working body). The 
committee consists of nine commissioners, who deliberate and make decisions on 
competition and consumer protection issues. The Chairman and Vice-Chairman are 
recommended by the Prime Minister and appointed by the President, while other 
Commissioners are recommended by the Chairman and appointed by the 
President. 31 The term of office of the commissioners is three years. Regional 
Offices operate in Seoul, Busan, Gwangju and Daejeon, Daegu. 32 
2.1.2.2.2 Role of the KFTC 
The KFTC has highly centralized regulatory and law making powers. 3 The 
KFTC is committed to four main mandates: promoting competition, strengthening 
consumers' rights, creating a competitive environment for Small-and-Medium- 
EC and UK", [2004] 1 European Competition Law Review 25,2004, p. 25. 29 It was a department of government as a working body. 30 The KFTC was established as a division of the Economic Planning Board. It was only a working body 
without Committee, which means it was not commission until 1987. The KFTC has been a Commission independent from the Economic Planning Board since 1987. Since 1987, the number of staff and budget 
of the KFTC have been increased substantially. 31 Competition Law 37 
32 Presidential Decree of Competition Law 52 33 Lee Bong Hee, "Effective Enforcement of Competition Law", 2003, p. 2. 
69 
Sized Subcontractors (SMEs)34 and restraining concentration of economic power. 35 
The KFTC is concerned with protection of consumer interests as well as 
encouragement of competition laws. 6 The KFTC operates in the belief that free 
and fair competition benefits consumers by ensuring lower prices and better 
products. To enhance consumer' interests, the KFTC handles consumer protection 
policy and relevant laws. Consumers need to be educated on the values of 
competition policy and how these will benefit them. The KFTC has an important 
rule to fulfil in this educational process.  Active competition advocacy and 
regulatory reforms in the public sector are also major concerns for the KFTC. 
The KFTC holds a jurisdictional monopoly over competition issues. The 
KFTC operates the Competition Law independently, free of intervention by other 
administrative bodies, under the direct mandate of the Prime Minister. Not only has 
the KFTC been neutral and independent of political influence, but it has also been 
free from the interventions of administrative bodies because the Competition Law 
embodies the fundamental rules of corporate activity and economic transactions in a 
fair and free economic society. 38 
The Commissioners' function is to make fair and objective decisions 
independently. 39 They cannot intervene in, or influence, the investigation and 
review activities of the officials in the KFTC. Decisions on infringements of 
Competition Law are made by the KFTC Commissioners based on a 
confrontational structure formed by the accused and the official in charge of 
investigation and review. 
The secretariat is directly involved in drafting and promoting competition 
policies, investigating competition issues, presenting them to the committee, and 
handling them according to the committee's decision. 40 
34 According to Act on Small and Medium Size Enterprise (2), SMEs are undertakings with less than 200 
employees. 
35 Competition Law 1; Decree of Organization of the KFTC 3 36 See Competition Law(1); Consumer Fundamental Law (21) 
37 See 2008 KFTC Annual Report, 2009, p. 25-37. 38 Kim Kil-Tae, "A Study on Enforcement Procedure in Korean Competition Law", 13(2) Journal of 
Business Administration and Law 175,2003, pp. 176-177 39 See section 2.1.2.2 which deals with the KFTC's case procedure. 40 Competition Law 39 
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The KFTC has enormous powers to enforce competition rules. 41 Without 
judicial involvement, the KFTC alone has the power to order structural remedies, to 
impose a surcharge as an administrative action and to file a criminal complaint. 
42 There is no other quasi- judicial government body such as the KFTC. 
As I have already discussed in chapter 1, the objective of competition 
enforcement is to achieve optimal enforcement of the competition rules through an 
effective and efficient combination of private and public enforcement. 43 Given that 
public enforcement has played the dominant role and that private enforcement is 
only complementary to public enforcement, it is worth considering how the KFTC 
handles the cases and how many legal actions the KFTC brings before the courts. 
2.1.2.2 KFTC's Case Procedure 
KFTC's case proceedings involve two stages: examination and deliberation. 
Stage 1: Examination 
When a probable infringement of the law is reported, the KFTC launches an 
examination into the conduct concerned. 44 The examination process includes the 
investigation of relevant documents, taking statements from relevant parties, 
consultation with experts, and legal reviews. The parties concerned are given 
opportunities to give their opinions. Confidential business information acquired 
during examination is strictly protected. If the examiner decides legal measures are 
required, he (or she) makes an examination report and presents it to the committee. 
The report is also sent to the examinee who is given an opportunity to submit any 
objections or comments on the report. 45 
Stage 2: Deliberation 
41 KFTC, "2008 Korea Fair Trade Commission Annual Report", 2008, p. 5. 42 Government Organization Law 3. 
43 See section 1.2.2.1 which deals with the objective of competition law in Korea. " Competition Law 49 
45 Competition Decree 58 
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After the examiner presents the report to the committee, 46 the 
Commissioners review the report and any opinions put forth by the examinee. The 
report is composed in following order; the examiner's statement, examinee's 
statement, investigation into evidence, examiner's final opinion, and examiner's 
final statement. The deliberation process involves a thorough review of the 
investigation's findings in this order. The examinee is notified of the date, hour and 
venue of the legal proceedings. The examinee may express his (or her) opinion 
directly or indirectly through a lawyer during this process. 47 Through this 
procedure, the committee makes a final decision as to whether any laws have been 
infringed. If an infringement is duly recognized, the KFTC will impose corrective 
measures or impose a surcharge48 with corrective order, make a cease and desist 
order or prosecute some cases such as cartel to the prosecutory authorities. 49 The 
committee decision takes the form of a written resolution and it is sent to relevant 
parties. 
2.1.2.3 KFTC's statistics of case handling from 1998 to 2007 
In 2007, the KFTC handled a total of 2,979 cases concerned with 
infringements of laws under the jurisdiction of the KFTC. This was approximately a 
281 % increase from 1,061 cases in 1998.50 
Of these, competition law cases numbered 715, approximately a 177% 
increase from 407 cases in 1998, and a total of 424 billion Won was imposed in 
surcharge, a 311% increase from 136 billion Won of 1998. The increase is 
attributable to the KFTC's increasingly vigorous action against anticompetitive 
conduct, especially cartels, as is clearly demonstrated by the record amount of 
surcharge against cartels in the telecommunication sector. 
46 This is a committee composed of the nine Commissioners. 4' Competition Law 52 
48 It is a fine as monetary penalty. However, this fine could be imposed with the only corrective order in 
competition area. So it is called as a surcharge in Korea. 49 Competition Law 55(6) 
50 "KFTC's Case handling 2008", KFTC's Statistics Report 2009, p. 30. 
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Findings by Type of Measure 
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Corrective 
207 250 538 441 497 478 754 644 924 
Order 
Recommendation 
110 179 57 35 110 100 163 178 124 
for Correction 
Warning 307 454 466 399 1,965 2,350 2,389 2,478 1,931 
Total 624 883 1,061 875 2,572 2,928 3,306 3,300 2,979 
No. of 
68 22 69 49 91 91 274 157 327 
Sur- Cases 
charge Million 
2,575 16,275 136,217 225,635 87,931 35,883 259,059 175,265 424,220 
Won 
2.1.2.4 Appeals to the Court 
Potential plaintiffs may bring actions before court to appeal the decision of 
the KFTC when they are not satisfied with the KFTC's decisions. Looking at the 
statistics from 2001 to 2007, we see that the number of appeals has increased 
overall. In particular, in 2007, just 57 actions were filed. This was an increase from 
the actions per year 45 on average in the past. Among the 57 appeals handled in 
2007, the KFTC won 34cases (59.6%) and partially won 12(21.1%), while 11 cases 
(19.3%) lost. Thanks to expertise of the courts, respondents have had more 
opportunities than before during the actions. The table below shows the annual 
number for appeal in courts from 2000 to 2007.5' 
51 "The Number of appeal by the respondents in 2007", KFTC's Statistics Report, 2008. 
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<Table 4> Court rulings for the recent 7 years (based on final and conclusive 
rulings) 
(Unit: No. of case. %) 
Year Win Partial 
win/loss 
Loss Subtotal 
2001 27(71.0) 4(10.5) 7(18.5) 38(100) 
2002 28(68.3) 8(19.5) 5(12.2) 41(100) 
2003 31(66.0) 5(10.6) 11(23.4) 47(100) 
2004 35(74.4) 6(12.8) 6(12.8) 47(100) 
2005 26(57.8) 11(24.4) 8(17.8) 45(100) 
2006 50 (60.2) 14(16.9) 19(22.9) 83(100) 
2007 34(59.6) 12(21.1) 11(19.3) 57(100) 
Total 231(64.5) 60(16.8) 67(18.7) 358(100) 
2.1.2 Private Competition Enforcement System in Korea 
To understand private competition enforcement system in Korea, it is 
necessary to explain organization and role of courts in Korea because to be 
compensated for damages, private parties should bring damages actions before 
courts. There are six types of courts in Korea. They are the Supreme Court, the 
High Courts, the District Courts, the Patent Court, the Family Court, and the 
Administrative Court. The District Courts, the High Courts and the Supreme Court 
form the basic three-tier system. Other courts exercise specialized functions with 
the Patent Court positioned on the same level with the High Courts and the Family 
Court and the Administrative Court positioned on the same level with the District 
Courts. 52 The District Court and Family Court may establish Branch Court(s) 
and/or Municipal Court(s) and Registration Office(s) if additional support is 
necessary to carry out their task. The Branch Court(s) of both the District Court and 
the Family Court may be established within the same court. 53 
sZ Court Organization Law 3. 
Court Organization Law 3. 
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District courts have jurisdiction in civil disputes, actions for damages since 
2004 when the provision of damages actions of Competition Law was revised 54 
However, only the High Court has jurisdiction over the decisions of the KFTC 
because the KFTC's decisions take effect as judgments of the District Court. Only 
the High Court can nullify the decision of the KFTC. It has expertise in competition 
law and resources such as experienced judges. 
As the court of last resort, the Supreme Court hears appeals from judgments 
or rulings rendered by the High Courts, the Patent Court, and the appellate panels of 
the District Courts or the Family Court in civil, criminal, administrative, patent and 
domestic relations cases. The Supreme Court has the power to make a definitive 
review on the constitutionality or legality of orders, rules, regulations, and actions 
taken by administrative entities. 55 
2.2 Overview of Private Competition Enforcement in the EU 
2.2.1 Introduction of Private Competition Enforcement in the EU 
Private enforcement in the EU is a matter of looking at the Member States. 
The remedy for the individual is governed by national law and not EC law. So EC 
law itself provides no direct solutions as far as civil law consequences of 
competition infringements are concerned. In respect to damages actions the 
application of Articles 81 and 82 by the national courtsS6 is necessary. The 
initiative of the Commission to promote private enforcement of EC competition 
rules, thus, has major implications as regards the approximation of Member States' 
tort laws and civil procedure regulations. 57 
Competition law in the EU has mainly been applied by the public 
58 competition authorities such as European Commission and the NCAs. From the 
54 Before the revision of this provision, plaintiff can bring damages action before court with the only 
decision of infringement of competition law of the KFTC. ss Court Organization Law 14. 
56 Regulation 1/2003 Article 6. It expressly gives power to national courts to apply Articles 81 and 82. 57 Francisco Marcos and Albert Sanchez Graells, "Damages for breach of the EC antitrust rules: 
harmonising Tort Law through the back door? ", InDret, 2008, p. 5, available www. Indirect. com 58 Lowri Evans, "Private enforcement and public enforcement -a European perspective", The 5t' Seoul 
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adoption in 1962 of the first procedural regulation implementing the competition 
rules, Regulation 17,59 until its replacement by the Modernisation Regulation, 
Regulation 1/200360 on 1 May 2004, the Commission played the leading role in the 
application of the competition rules and the development of competition policy. 61 
The Commission continues in its leading role even after the decentralization 
brought about by Regulation 1/2003. 
Private enforcement of the competition rules has hitherto been 
underdeveloped in the EU. 62 During the past forty plus years the role of national 
courts in EC competition enforcement has not been particularly strong63 hence it 
can be assumed that a significant number of victims of anticompetitive activity are 
not being compensated for their losses. 64 The 2004 Ashurst study commissioned by 
the Commission65 revealed a "total underdevelopment" with regard to private 
enforcement and an "astonishing diversity" in the approach taken by the Member 
States. 6 It also stated that of all competition law enforcement procedures within 
International Competition Forum, 2008 p. 37; With regard to the 2005 and 2006 activities of the European 
Commission, See generally, John Kallaugher, Andreas Weitbrecht, "Developments Under Articles 81 and 
82 EC-The Year 2005 in Review, ECLR, 2006, p. 137-147; See generally, John Kallaugher, Andreas 
Weitbrecht, "Articles 81 and 82 EC in 2006-The Year in Review", ECLR, 2007; Assimakis P. Komminos, 
"Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: Complement? Overlap? ", 3(1) Competition Law 
Review 5,2006, p. 6; Barry Rodger, "Competition Law Litigation in the UK Courts: A Study of All Cases 
to 2004", ECLR, 2006, p. 241; Dan Wilsher, "The public Aspects of Private Enforcement in EC law: 
Some Constitutional and Administrative Challenges of a Damages Culture", The Competition Law 
Review, 2006, p. 39-40; Patricia Hanh Rosochowicz, "Deterrence and the relationship between public and 
private enforcement of competition law", Amsterdam Centre for Law and Economics Workshop 2005, 
p. 5; Lowri Evans, "Private enforcement and public enforcement -a European perspective", The 51 Seoul International Competition Forum, 2008, p. 37; With regard to the 2005 and 2006 activities of the European 
Commission, See generally, "John Kallaugher, Andreas Weitbrecht, "Developments Under Articles 81 
and 82 EC-The Year 2005 in Review, ECLR, 2006, p. 137-147: John Kallaugher, Andreas Weitbrecht, 
"Articles 81 and 82 EC in 2006-The Year in Review", ECLR, 2007 59 Council Regulation No. 17 on implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of 21 February 1962, 60 Council Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Arts 81 and 
82 of the Treaty, [2002] O. J. L1/1. 
61 Sue Ann Mota, `Hide it or Unbundle: A Comparison of the Antitrust Investigations against Microsoft 
in the U. S. and the E. U. ", Pierce Law Review, 2005, p. 194. 62 Arundel McDougall and Alexandra Verzariu, "Vitamins Litigation: Unavailability of Exemplary 
Damages, Restitutionary Damages and Account of Profits in Private Competition Law Claims", 
E. C. L. R., 29(3), 2008, p. 184. 63 Wils, "Should Private Antitrust Enforcement Be Encouraged in Europe? ", 26(3) World Competition 
473,2003, p. 475; Eric McCarthy, Allyson Maltas, Matteo Bay and Javier Ruiz-Calzado, "Litigation 
culture and versus enforcement culture :A comparison of US and EU plaintiff recovery actions in 
antitrust cases", Antitrust Review of the Americas, 2007, p. 39. 60 Katarina Pijetlovic, "Reform of EC Antitrust Enforcement: Criticism of New System is Highly 
Exaggerated", ECLR, 2004, p. 357. 65 Reference should be to whole report, not just to Executive Summary. 66 See the Ashurst Report, "Study on the Conditions of Claims for Damages in Case of Infringement of 
EC Competition Rules-Comparative Report", 2004. This study. was undertaken by the law firm Ashurst 
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the EU, approximately only 1-2 % is commenced by private parties. There had only 
been 60 adjudicated damages cases since the creation of the Community, and in 
only 23 cases were damages awarded. 67 
Despite some recent signs of improvement, successful damages actions are 
still rare, and the majority of Member States have had no real experience of private 
antitrust damages actions to date. 68 Many factors may have contributed to the lack 
of private enforcement in the competition area. One of main factors for the lack of 
private enforcement is the significant differences between the procedural and 
substantive rules in the Member States governing actions for damages. So barriers 
caused by different legal frameworks in different Member States have been blamed 
for the scarcity of private litigation. 69 Traditional rules of civil liability and 
procedure are also one of main factors for limited damages actions in competition 
area, due to the complex factual and economic analysis often required and the 
unfavourable risk/reward balance for plaintiffs. 70 
However, on the other hand it has also been argued that the lack of private 
competition litigation in the EU cannot be blamed on the content of the substantive 
rules7' and that there are other important reasons for lack of private enforcement. 
Firstly, these are partly cultural, related to a generally low level of litigiousness. EU 
citizens generally do not seem to be excessively concerned about the absence of 
private enforcement. 72 This may be because losses from competition infringement 
are often small and widely dispersed and thus do not pose a serious threat for the 
individual. 73 Secondly, the unavailability of class actions, contingency fee, treble 
2004 by order of the EC Commission, available on the internet: others/private_enforcement/comparative 
report clean en. pdf, 2004, at 1; Clifford A. Jones, "Private enforcement of Antitrust Law in the EU, UK 
and USA", Oxford 1999, p. 85. 67 Ashurst Report, supra note 66, p. 1; Christian Miege, "Modernization and Enforcement Pluralism-The 
Role of Private Enforcement of Competition Law in the EU and the German Attempts in the 7th 
Amendment of the GWB", Amsterdam Centre for Law and Economics Workshop: 'Remedies and 
Sanctions in Competition Policy', 2005, p. 5. 63 European Commission, "Commission Staff Working Document accompanying document to the White 
Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules", SEC (2008) 405, section 2.1. 69 Jones, supra note 66, p. 16. 70 European Commission, supra note 68, at sections 2.2 - 2.3. 71 Magnus Gustafsson, "What are the Prospects for Enhanced Private Antitrust Litigation? A Swedish 
Perspective", 30(4) European Law Review, 2005, pp. 491-492. n See Ashurst Report, supra note 66. " Wils, supra note 63, p. 487. 
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damages or discovery procedures such as those of the US have been suggested as 
other reasons for weak private enforcement. 74 
However, the importance of private competition enforcement has been 
recognized in the EU. 75 Realizing the potential benefits of private enforcement, the 
Commission has been actively seeking ways of establishing a Communitywide 
private enforcement regime by invigorating actions for damages before the national 
courts against the infringements of competition law. 76 
Furthermore, there is now a legal basis under Community law for damage 
actions in the case of Courage v Crehan. 77 After some 40 years of application of 
Article 81 of the EC Treaty, the Court of Justice, in Crehan, finally dealt with 
competition damages as a possible remedy for infringements of Article 81. In 
Courage the ECJ held that national courts must provide a remedy in damages for 
the enforcement of the rights and obligations created by Article 81.78 The judgment 
in Courage v Crehan was the seminal case in establishing a Community right to 
damages. 
In Courage the Court emphasised that actions for damages before the 
national courts can make a significant contribution to the maintenance of effective 
competition in EU and that the right to claim damages strengthens the working of 
the EC competition rules and discourages agreements and practices which are liable 
74 Walter Van Gerven, "Substantive Remedies for the Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Rules Before 
National Courts, " EUI-RSCAS/EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop, 2001, p. 21. 
75 Greg Olsen, "Actions for damages are Compensation and deterrence? The passing on defence and the 
future direction of UK private proceedings", CLI 4.8(3), 2005, p. 1.; Ulf Boge, Konrad Ost, "Up and 
Running, or Is It? Private Enforcement -The Situation in Germany and Policy Perspectives", European 
Competition Law Review 27(4), 2006, p. 205; Magnus Gustafsson and Foad Hoseinian, " Private 
Enforcement of EC Competition Law: Swedish Supreme Court Judgement on the Validity of Follow on 
Contracts", 27(1) European Competition Law Review 5,2006, p. 5; Gregory P. Olsen, "Enhancing Private 
Antitrust Litigation in the EU", 20 Antitrust 73, Fall 2005, p. 73; Jürgen Basedow, "Private Enforcement 
of EC Competition Law", Kluwer Law, 2007, p. 3; David J. Gerber, "The Transformation of European 
Community Competition Law? ", Harvard International Law Journal, 1994, p. 103-104.. 
76 European Commission, "Green Paper - Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules", COM (2005) 672 final; European Commission, "White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust 
rules", Com (2008) 165 final.. 
n Courage v Crehan, C-452/99, [2001]ECR 1-6297 
78 Courage v Crehan, C-452/99, [2001] ECR 1-6297. It is accepted that the Court's ruling here applies to 
Article 82 cases as well. 
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to restrict competition. 79 
It should be noted that the Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying 
the Green Paper acknowledges that "the obligation for national courts to provide a 
remedy in damages was established by the [ECJ] in its ruling Courage v Crehan , 80, 
and says that: 
"[T]he Courage judgment is based on a long established jurisprudence of 
the Community Courts relating to the effective protection of Community rights by 
the courts of the Member States"8' 
The ECJ reaffirmed the Courage principle in Manfredi, 82 again saying that 
any individual can rely on a breach of Article. 81 before a national court. In 
Manfredi it said that the Member State must provide for injured person to pursue 
the infringer for loss of profit as well as actual loss. However, in both Crehan and 
Manfredi the ECJ stressed that in the absence of Community rules it is for the 
domestic legal systems of the Member States to lay down rules governing actions 
for safeguarding the rights that individuals derive from Community law, subject to 
the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. 83 In Crehan the Court did lay down 
a Community rule, namely that a Member State cannot have an absolute bar on 
recovery by a co-contractor. However, in Manfredi the Court failed to take the 
opportunity to provide further harmonization as it left matters of limitation periods 
and the types of damages awarded to the law of the Member States. 84 In Manfredi, 
therefore, the ECJ declined to harmonize through case law, The only other method 
of harmonizing Member States' laws on damages actions is by Community 
legislation or soft law, and it is this route that the Commission is currently 
pursuing. 85 
79 Courage v Crehan, C-452/99, [2001]ECR 1-6297, at para 27; C-295/04, Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico 
Assicurazioni SpA, C-295/04, [2006] ECJ, 348, para. 91. 80 Commission Staff Working Paper Annex to the Green Paper SEC (2005) 1732, para. 18. i1 Ibid., para 19 ; See also the Ashurst Report, supra note 66. t2 Manfredi v. Lloyd Adrlatico Assicurazioni SpA, C-295/04, [2006] ECJ, 348, para.? 83 In respect to principles of equivalence and effectiveness, see section 3.2.3.3 which deals with current 
situation of compensatory, punitive or exemplary damage in the EU. 84 See section 3.2.2 which deals with the current situation in respect of the criteria and measurement 
of Damages in the EU. 
as See section 2.2.3. which deals with substantial changes necessary to encourage private enforcement in 
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2.2.2 The Need for Private Competition Enforcement in the EU 
The need to encourage private competition enforcement was first expressed 
officially in the White Paper on the modernization of the enforcement of the EC 
competition rules the Commission published in 1999.86 When the Commission 
launched the White Paper it had as a major objective the maintenance and the 
improvement of the effectiveness of the enforcement of the EC competition rules in 
an enlarged EU. 87 
According to the Commission an effective private enforcement is a crucial 
step to achieving the goals of the 2000 Lisbon agenda by ensuring competition. 88 In 
the Lisbon Agenda the Member States signed up to a programme of economic 
reforms designed to make the EU "the world's most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy" by 2010. 
Former Commissioner Monti explained, "it is our aim that companies and 
individuals should increasingly feel encouraged to make use of private actions 
before national courts in order to defend the subjective rights conferred on them by 
the EC competition rules. "89 
The Commission regards private enforcement, especially damages actions 
where loss has been suffered as a result of an infringement of EC competition law, 
as an integral part of competition law enforcement. 90 Private enforcement would, it 
is claimed, fill a gap91 by serving as an important means of ensuring competition. 
the EU. 
86 European Commission, White Paper on the modernisation of the rules implementing Articles 81 and 
82 of the EC Treaty, Commission Programme No 99/027. 
87 Philip Lowe, "Current Issues of E. U. Competition Law: The New Competition Enforcement Regime, 
Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business, 2004, p. 568; Philip Lowe, "Implications of the 
recent reforms in the antitrust enforcement in Europe for national competition authorities", Italian 
Competition/Consumers day, 2003, p. 1. 38 See "Commission of the European Communities", 2004 Report on Competition Policy, 2004, p. 3 The 
EU's system of economic governance and indeed the EC Treaty are based on the principle of an open 
market economy with free competition. 89 See Mario Monti, ex-Competition Commissioner, Speech Before the Sixth EU Competition Law and 
Policy Workshop, June 1-2,2001, p. 121-123. 90 John Pheasant, "Private Antitrust Damages in Europe: As the policy debate rages, what are the signs of 
$ractical progress? ", Business Law International Vol 8,2007, p. 228. 
The gap means the cases left uninvestigated through lack of resources. This gap is generated by the 
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To encourage private enforcement, there has been much talk of the need to 
stimulate private competition enforcement to supplement public enforcement. 92 
The European Commission also considers that it is necessary to encourage 
private enforcement in order to protect consumers' interests directly as well as 
promoting competition. By promoting private enforcement of EC competition rules, 
the Commission is not only looking at strengthening the enforcement of these rules 
by increasing the incentives for compliance, but also, as is seen from a speech by 
the former Commissioner Mario Monti, at improving the protection of consumers 
from anticompetitive behaviour. 93 He stated that: 
"The competition rules are to ensure that consumers benefit from lower 
prices and better products as a result of effective competition in 
markets........... Consumers should have more access to remedial action in the form 
of private enforcement in order to protect their rights and to obtain damages in 
compensation for losses suffered. "94 
The Commission announced in its White Paper on Compensating Consumer 
and Business Victims of Breaches of the Competition Rules that: 
"[f]acilitating damages claims for breaches of the [EC's] antitrust rules will 
not only strengthen the enforcement of competition law, but will also make it easier 
for consumers and firms who have suffered damage from an infringement of 
competition law to recover their losses from the infringer. 05 
Furthermore, it is necessary to ensure deterrence and compensation through 
perceived inability of public enforcement to deal with all worthy cases, 2 Lowri Evans, "Private enforcement and public enforcement -a European perspective", The 5t' Seoul 
International Competition Forum, 2008 p. 37; M. Gustafsson, supra note 71, p. 490. 93 See speech by former Commissioner Monti, M., "Private litigation as a key complement to public 
enforcement of competition rules and the first conclusions on the implementation of the new Merger 
Regulation", [2004] Speech/04/403, IBA - 8th Annual Competition Conference, Fiesole, 17 September 2004, p. 2; Corinne Bergen, "Generating Extra Wind in the Sails of the EU Antitrust Enforcement Boat", 
Journal of International Business and Law, 2006, p. 204. 94 Mario Monti, "Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law", 6th EU Competition Law and 
Policy Workshop (June 1-2,2001), Speech/01/258. 
95 Commission Presents White Paper on Compensating Consumer and Business Victims of Breaches of 
the Competition Rules, 2005 available at http: // ec. europa. eu/comm/competition/antitrust/actions dama 
ges/index. html. 
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enlisting consumer and competitor power through the civil justice system. 6 The 
current Commissioner for competition, Neelie Kroes has argued that increased 
private action would further promote a culture of competition among businesses, 
industry, and consumers. 97 She has identified a greater public awareness of 
competition rules as a key element in creating a "culture of competition" in the 
EU. 98 
2.2.3 Substantial Changes to Encourage Private Enforcement in 
the EU 
The Commission has made clear that it is keen to increase private 
enforcement of the full range of competition infringements under EC law and not 
just additional enforcement in cases already dealt with by the public authorities. 99 
On December 16,2002, the Council adopted Regulation 1/2003, which 
replaced the old Regulation 17/62.100 It established a new EC competition 
enforcement regime based on the joint enforcement of the EC competition rules by 
the Commission and national authorities. One of the main drivers of the 
modernization process was the need to rationalize the use of the Commission's 
resources. 101 To facilitate the functioning of a decentralised system102 and to 
96 Neelie Kroes, "Reinforcing the fight against cartels and developing private antitrust damage actions: 
two tools for a more competitive Europe", Commission/IBA Joint Conference on EC Competition Policy, 
Speech/07/128, Brussels, 2007, available at http: //europa. eu; "Facilitating compensation for breach of 
competition rules: the White Paper", Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 2008, p. 1; Neelie Kroes, "Damages 
Actions for Breaches of EU Competition Rules: Realities and Potentials", Opening speech at the 
conference `La reparation du prejudice cause par une pratique anti-concurentielle en France, 
Speech/05/613, Paris, 2005; Ulf Boge, Konrad Ost, "Up and Running, or Is It? Private Enforcement -The Situation in Germany and Policy Perspectives", ECLR, 2006, p. 205; M. Gustafsson and F. Hoseinian, 
supra note 75, pp. 5-6; Corinne Bergen, supra note 93, p. 204. 97 Neelie Kroes, "Enhancing Actions for Damages for Breach of Competition Rules in Europe", Dinner 
Speech at the Harvard Club, New York, Speech/05/533, Sept. 22,2005, available at http: // 
europa. eu. int/rapid/press releases action. 98 Neelie Kroes's speech/05/613, supra note 96, p. 3; John Pheasant, "Private Antitrust Damages in Europe: The Policy Debate and Judicial Developments", Antitrust, 2006, p. 64-64. 9 Commission MEMO/05/489, accompanying the Green Paper on damages actions, entitled "What in 
the Commission's view are the advantages of private actions for damages? ", n 32. 100 7 Council Regulation No. 17 on implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of 21 February 1962, 11957-621 OJ Special Edition 8. 
01 Antitrust, "Making Waves: Interview with EU Commissioner for Competition Neelie Kores", 22-SPG Antitrust 47,2008, p. 48. 102 Cornelis Canenbley, "Co-operation Between Antitrust Authorities in - and Outside the EU: What Does it Mean for Multinational Corporations: Part 1, ECLR, 2005, p. 106-110. 
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ensure the homogeneity of its application throughout an enlarged EU, the 
Commission decided to complement Regulation 1/2003 with a package of six 
accompanying notices and a Commission implementing regulation, '03 the so-called 
Modernization Package in 2004.104 The Modernization Package governs the 
application of Articles 81 and 82 EC. '°5 
Regulation 1/2003 made many changes. However, here I am concentrating on 
the change to encourage private enforcement by giving more power to Member 
States' courts to enforce the law. 106 To encourage private enforcement, Regulation 
1/2003 abolished the Commission monopoly over the application of the exemption 
provision contained in Article 81(3). 107 Article 81(3) EC became a directly 
applicable provision without the need for a prior administrative decision. Rendering 
Article 81(3) directly applicable provision means that the enforcement of Article 81 
in its entirety is no longer the de facto sole responsibility of the Commission. The 
reform enabled the decentralization of the enforcement of Community competition 
rules as Art. 81 as well as 82 EC can be now applied by national courts and NCAs 
throughout the EU in their entirety. Decentralised application, especially of Article 
81 (3) can bring the rules closer to the undertakings and the citizens since Member 
States have an obligation to apply the EC competition rules, at least alongside 
national law. 108 The direct applicability of Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty implies 
more potential for the application of the EC competition rules by Member States' 
courts and competition authorities. '09 
103 See, for example, Commission Notice on the cooperation between the commission and the courts of 
the EU member states in the application of Articles 81 and 82, OJ C 101/54, April 27 2004; Guidelines on 
the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, OJ C 101/81, April 27 2004; 
and Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty, OJ C 10 1/97, April 27 2004. 
104 The Modernization Package was finalised with the adoption of the new merger control regulation 
139/2004 on 20 March 2004. See Press Release IP/04/441 of 30 March 2004. See for a very 
comprehensive description of all these measures, Sven B. Völcker, "Developments in EC Competition 
Law in 2003: An Overview", 41 CML Rev. 1027,2004, p. 1028. 
105 Article 81 prohibits anti-competitive agreements or collusion and Article 82 prohibits the abuse of 
dominance. The actual numbering of the EC Treaty will be used throughout this thesis 106 Philip Haberman, "Quantifying antitrust damages: Flexibility rather than prescription is the best 
aF, roach", CLI 55 (9), 2006, p. 2. 1 Previously, only the commission could exempt restrictive agreements under Article 81(3). The 
commission's proposal for the regulation (COM (2000) 582) described one of the aims of the regulation 
as "promoting private enforcement through national courts" 108 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, [2003] OJ L1/l 
109 Damien Geradin, "Competition between Rules and Rules of Competition: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis of the Proposed Modernization of the European of EC Competition Law, Columbia Journal of 
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The adoption of Regulation 1/2003 was an important step toward increasing 
the involvement of national courts in competition enforcement, and the then 
Commissioner described it as constituting "a revolution in the way competition 
rules are enforced in the European Union". 110 It thus leads to a certain 
`privatisation' of competition policy enforcement, since the burdens and risks 
caused by infringement of competition rules now fall entirely on companies and 
their legal advisers. "' The decentralization extends the possible enforcers of EC 
competition law and allows the Commission to concentrate on the most serious 
infringements of Articles 81 and 82 EC by re-focusing its resources. 112 
However, the Commission has made it clear that it does not consider the 
devolution of responsibility for the enforcement of EC competition law to the 
NCAs as a sufficient means of achieving decentralization. 113 To encourage private 
enforcement, it is important to ensure effective damages actions. "4 To ensure 
effective damages actions, the Commission published a Green Paper in 2005 on 
ways in which this be achieved. "5 The purpose of the Green paper was to identify 
the main obstacles and to establish an adequate legal framework which facilitates 
damages actions before national courts. 116 It focused on aspects primarily of a 
procedural and practical nature, which are at the core of the effectiveness of private 
enforcement. 
European Law, 2002, p. 1. 110 Interview with Mario Monti, published in EC Competition Policy Newsletter, 2004, available at: 
http: //europa, eu. int/commicompetition/publications/special/interview monti. pdf. 111 Marsden, "Inducing Member State Enforcement of European Competition Law: A Competition Policy 
A1proach to `Antitrust Federalism"', 18 ECLR, 2009, p. 235. 11Assimakis P Komninos, "EC Private Antitrust Enforcement: Decentralised Application of EC 
Competition Law by National Courts", Hart Publishing, 2008, p. 40. 113 European Commission, "Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on 
Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules", Corn (2008) 165 final, 2008, p. 8-11. 114 Hannah L. Buxbaum, "Private Enforcement of Competition Law in the Untied States- of Optimal 
Deterrence and Social Costs", in rPrivate Enforcement of EC Competition Lawj (ed. by Jürgen 
Basedow), Kluwer Law, 2007, p. 41; Christian Diemer, "The Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach 
of the EC Antitrust Rules", ECLR, 2006, p. 312-313; Sven Norberg, "Some Elements to Enhance 
Damages Actions for Breach of the Competition Rules in Articles 81 and 82 EC", 32°d Annual 
International Antitrust Law & Policy Conference, Fordham, New York, 2005 p. 4; Paul Hughes, "The 
Enforcement of Private Actions for Breaches of EC Competition Law-The Role of the Shareholder under 
English Law", Competition Law Review, 2006, p. 80-81. IS European Commission Green Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC competition rules, 
COM(2005) 672 final of 19 December 2005. 116 John Pheasant, supra note 90, p. 227-228. 
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Following the Green Paper and the subsequent consultation, the Commission 
made specific proposals in the White Paper on EC competition damages actions in 
2008.117 The primary objective of this White Paper is to improve the legal 
conditions for victims to exercise their right under the Treaty to reparation of all 
damage suffered as a result of a breach of the EC competition rules. 118 The 
Commission clarifies in the White Paper that the main objective of damages claims 
is to fully compensate the victims of an anticompetitive conduct. 119 To ensure full 
compensation, there is a definite shift in the White Paper towards recognising the 
value of compensating victims for the victims' own sake, not just for 'deterrence'. In 
the White Paper, and the accompanying Staff Working Paper120 the Commission 
abandons deterrence as a primary objective of private enforcement. 
To ensure the right to compensation for all damage suffered as a result of a 
breach of the EC competition, the White Paper covers the wide range of problems 
that victims face when bringing an antitrust damages action. These include, for 
example, difficulties in relation to access to evidence, standing in court, great legal 
uncertainty regarding the admissibility and scope of the passing-on defence, and the 
lack of collective redress in most EU Member States. To solve these problems, the 
White Paper proposes policy changes and effective redress mechanism for victims 
to be fully compensated for the harm they have suffered. 121 These specific 
measures balance rights and obligations of both the plaintiff and the defendant and 
include safeguards against abuses of litigation. 122 The White Paper can therefore be 
seen as the latest stage of a policy initiative which was already laid down in 
Regulation 1/2003, in that Recital 7 to the Regulation stressed the essential role of 
national courts in the application of the EC competition rules, for example by 
"' White Paper on Damages actions, supra note 76; Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the 
White Paper, supra note 113. ' 18 White Paper on Damages actions, supra note 76, at 1.2(Objectives, guiding principles and scope of the 
White Paper) 
119 Tim Reher, "The Commission's White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust 
Rules", The European Antitrust Review, 2009, p. 1. 120 Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper, supra note 113, at paras 12-15. 121 See section 1.2.2.2 which deals with the objectives of EC competition law. 122 European Commission, "Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules", SEC (2008) 404, at paras. 10-12. 
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awarding damages to the victims of infringements. 123 The White Paper is an also 
important step politically, as can be seen from the European Parliament resolution 
of welcoming the White Paper as a way of furthering the protection of consumers. 
124 
However, it must be noted that the Commission has stressed that it wants to 
foster meritorious compensation, not excessive litigation, and to ensure that private 
actions can be effectively facilitated without incentivising unmeritorious 
litigation. 125 As Commissioner Kroes puts it, the Commission wants to "foster a 
competition culture, not a litigation culture. " 126 There is a fear that the introduction 
of elements of the US legal system could result in `an expansion of the US litigation 
culture'. 127 The Commission has apparently accepted that how to facilitate private 
enforcement means finding a balanced approach that mitigates the unwanted social 
costs of encouraging private competition law litigation. 128 
2.2.4 Harmonization of different National laws 
There are gross differences in civil procedure laws among the Member States 
because the rules of substance are in the domain of national law. That means 
potentially 27 different national laws. 129 Existing differences between legal 
systems, it has been pointed out, do not help the process of establishing private 
enforcement as a credible alternative to public enforcement. 130 
123 Council Regulation 1/2003, OJ L 1, Recital 7; See also, Rainer Becker, Nicolas Bessot and Eddy De 
Smijter, " The White Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules", Competition Policy 
Newsletter, ISSN 1025-2266,2008. 
124 European Parliament Resolution, at 26 march 2006 available at http: //www. europarl. europa. eu/ sides/ 
et. Doc. 
White Paper on Damages actions, supra note 76, p. 3; Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying 
the White Paper, supra note 113, pp. 10-12; Antitrust, supra note 101, p. 53. 126 Neelie Kroes's speech/05/533, supra note 97, p. 3. 127 Mark Wegener and Peter Fitzpatrick, "Europe Gets Litigious: Class actions and competition 
enforcement may change Europe's legal culture", Legal Times, 2005. 128 European Commission, "Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the Green Paper on 
Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules", 2005, p. 12. 129 Clifford A. Jones, "After the Green Paper: The Third Devolution in European Competition Law and 
Private Enforcement", 3(1) Competition Law Review2,2006, p. 2. "o Antonio Capobianco, Wilmer Cutler, Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, "Private Antitrust Enforcement of 
EC Competition Rules: Recent Developments", CLI 25(3), 2004, p. 4. 
86 
The current system is likely to lead to instances of actions against defendants 
in multiple jurisdictions based on the same claims, which may involve not only 
duplication and inefficiency but also threaten the uniform application of EC 
competition law. These different procedural rules could tend to create unequal 
competition conditions in the internal market131 and lead to forum shopping. 132 In 
the absence of some system of coordination, or mutual recognition of decisions by 
national courts from differing Member States, it is claimed that the scope for the 
inconsistent application of EC competition law is significant. 133 In order to prevent 
inconsistent judgments regarding the same infringement and multiple recoveries 
which seriously disturbed the dynamics of US private enforcement regime, 
commentators and practitioners have urged that the Community rules of conflicts of 
laws should be reconsidered. 134 
Furthermore, the issue of harmonization is closely connected to national 
procedural standards. In the absence of a significant harmonization effort at EU 
level, national courts will continue to play only a limited role in the enforcement of 
EC competition rules since they create confusion and uncertainty on the rights 
granted to private parties and creates opportunities for forum shopping. These 
uncertainties can be eliminated by harmonization measures taken at European 
level. 135 To eliminate these uncertainties, it is submitted that the plaintiffs in 
anticompetitive actions must have equal access to justice throughout the 27 
Member States. Important issues must be addressed in a homogenous way in order 
to maintain a level playing field. The interaction of measures facilitating damages 
actions with various aspects of public enforcement needs to be addressed because 
individual actions by Member States are not sufficiently capable of achieving 
consistent implementation of competition law. 
For the sake of ensuring efficient and uniform application of competition 
131 See generally, Assimakis P. Komninos, "New prospects for private enforcement of EC competition 
law", 39 C. M. L. Rev. 447,2002, p. 465. 132 Charles E. Koob, David E. Vann, Arman Y. Oruc, "Developments in Private Enforcement of 
Competition Laws- Introduction", Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, 2004, p. 3. "' G. Olsen, "Enhancing Private Antitrust Litigation in the EU", 20 Antitrust 73,2005, p. 76. 134 John Pheasant, "Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust rules: The European Commission's 
Green Paper", 27 ECLR 365,2006, p. 376-377. 135 Antonio Capobianco, supra note 130, p. 4. 
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rules within the 27 Member States, the Community legislature must -with a view to 
harmonizing the conditions for private liability to arise- take measures that must be 
sufficiently precise to satisfy the principle of legal certainty and the requirement of 
uniform application of Community law in the Member States. The possible 
solutions discussed to date range from a full or alternatively partial harmonisation 
of national procedural rules at the EU level right through to an approach to private 
competition enforcement at Member State level only. 136 
The combination of the national procedures for damages actions coupled with 
the more developed substantive laws of the Commission will create a more flexible 
environment for private actions in numerous jurisdiction. These should be in the 
form of general principles, perhaps implemented as directives to be adopted in the 
most suitable fashion for each member state. According to Commission Staff 
Working Paper accompanying the White Paper, depending on the degree to the 
level playing field in the EU, to ensure the effectiveness of competition damages 
actions, a choice will have to be made to between the available instruments for 
Community legislative action. 137 These could include not only soft law such as the 
guidelines but also a regulation and/or a directive based on Article 83 EC that 
would contribute to the harmonization of the procedural and substantive laws of the 
member states. 
It is worth considering that in order to increase the effectiveness of the 
exercise of the right to competition damages and to create a basic framework for an 
effective competition damages regime in all Member States, the Commission 
considers Community legislation -as opposed to soft-law approaches such as 
guidelines or recommendations - to be the most appropriate way forward. 
138 The 
issues that may require EC legislative actions are the availability of collective and 
representative actions, the broad discovery rule the binding effect of NCA decision 
and so on. 139 
It has been said that if everything in the White Paper comes to pass then there 
136 Mario Hilgenfeld, "Private Antitrust Enforcement: Towards a Harmonised European Model or a 
"Patchwork" of Various Member States' Rules", Int. T. L. R. 14(2), 2008, p. 39. 137 Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper, supra note 113, p. 96-98. 138 Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper, supra note 113, at para. 319 ; Tim 
Reher, supra note 119, p. 4. 
139 Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper, supra note 113, at para 322. 
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will surely be a change in the frequency and significance of claims based on 
competition grounds. However, details are still lacking to determine whether the 
system is likely to result in a preponderance of good or bad claims being brought. 
140 
2.3 Overview of Private Enforcement in the UK 
2.3.1 Development of Competition Law in the UK 
Competition law in the UK has undergone a number of radical changes to 
facilitate private competition enforcement since 1998. Before the implementation of 
the Competition Act 1998, UK competition law was based on a system of 
registration of agreements which contained certain types of clauses. 
141 A general 
competition law regime was set out in the Competition Act 1998 (CA98), which 
came into effect on March 1,2000, replacing the old Restrictive Trade Practices 
legislation142 with provisions based on Arts 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (save that 
an effect on trade between Member States need not be shown). 
In the UK, there are two systems of competition law: domestic law and the 
law of the European Community. The relationship has been clarified by Regulation 
1/2003, Article 3. The passage of the Competition Act 1998 strengthened the 
domestic regime and more closely aligned it with EC law. 
143 The Competition Act 
1998 carried out this alignment by section 60144 which requires the UK competition 
authorities and the courts to have to regard to the way in which the Community 
Courts have interpreted and applied Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. 
145 Section 
60(1) and (2) imposes a duty to achieve consistency of decisions of the Commission. 
S 60(3) says the courts `must have regard to' decisions of the Commission. The 
Competition Act 1998 introduced two new competition prohibitions which mirror 
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. 146 In the UK, infringement of Articles 81 and 
140 Luke R. Tolaini and Anna M. Morfey, "Antitrust Damages Actions in Europe: A Step in the U. S. 
Direction? ", 22-SUM Antitrust 93,2008, p. 97- 14 1 The system is described in R. Whish, "Competition Law" (3`d ed. ), Butterworths, 1993, Ch. 5. 
142 `Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976' (previously the `Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1956') 
143 Mark Furse, "Competition Law of the EC and UK7(6`h ed. ), Oxford, 2007, p. 2. 144 Competition Act 1998, s. 60. 
145 See R. Whish, "Competition Law"(6's ed. ), Oxford, 2009, pp. 362-367. 146 Most Member States of the European Community have competition laws which reflect EC law, 
though none has an equivalent to Competition Act 1998, s. 60. 
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82 of the EC Treaty is a tort for which the principle remedy is the award of 
damages. 147 The two competition prohibitions are a prohibition against anti- 
competitive behaviour (the chapter I prohibition) and a prohibition against an abuse 
of a dominant position (the chapter II prohibition) 148 which are enforced by the 
Office of Fair Trading (hereafter, OFT) and sectoral regulators. 149 However, 
although the Government introduced the Competition Act 1998 with the clear 
intention that it should allow private rights of action, the original Competition Act 
1998 was silent on the question whether injured parties have a right to bring action 
against those who infringe either of the prohibitions. 150 
In order to encourage private actions, the UK Government published further 
proposals for strengthening UK competition law in a consultation paper entitled "A 
World Class Competition Regime" published in July 2001. In the paper the 
Government stated: 
"Private actions are ... a very 
important limb of an effective competition 
regime. Where behaviour is illegal under competition laws, parties who are harmed 
"is ought to be able to bring action against the perpetrators. ' 
Following that consultation, radical changes were made, particularly in 
relation to the redress available to harmed parties. 
147 Courage Limited v Bernard Crehan, C-453/99, [2002]Q. B. 507; Courage v Crehan, C-452/99, 
[2001]ECR I-6297. 
48 These prohibitions mirror articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. As a result of the modernisation of EC 
competition law, where conduct investigated may have an effect on interstate trade within the EU, the 
enforcing authority is obliged to apply articles 81 and 82 (Regulation 1/2003, art. 3). As a result, these 
provisions are generally applied in parallel with the equivalent domestic prohibitions. See generally, 
N. Green and A. Robertson (eds), "The Europeanization of UK Competition Law", Hart Publishing, 1999. 149 In contrast to the position in other European systems, most UK sectoral regulators have the power to 
enforce general competition law in their sectors, in addition to their sector-specific regulatory powers. 
These powers are applied concurrently with the OFT, although in practice the regulators are left to apply 
competition law in the sectors they cover and detailed procedures exist to avoid conflicts. The extent to 
which sectoral regulators have made use of their general competition law powers were reviewed by the 
Department of Trade and Industry and HM Treasury; "Concurrent Competition Powers in Sectoral 
Regulation", May 2006, URN 06/1244. 
1" "A prohibition approach to anti-competitive agreements and abuse of a dominant position: draft bill", 
DTI, 1997, Ch. 7.23; `Barry J. Rodger, "Private Enforcement and the Enterprise Act : An Exemplary 
System of Awarding Damages, ECLR, 2003, p. 103; ; See also Edward Brown, "Legislation: Legislative 
Reform-EC Modernization Programme", ECLR, 2004, p. 133. "" A World Class Competition Regime, Cm. 5233, (2001). 
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First, the Enterprise Act 2002 was passed and the relevant competition 
provisions came into effect on June 20,2003. The Enterprise Act 2002 reformed 
those areas of law which had been largely untouched by the Competition Act 1998. 
The Enterprise Act 2002152 provided for private enforcement in what is now 
section 47A CA 1998. Under Section 47A a person who has suffered loss or 
damage as a result of a relevant prohibition may make any claim for damages, or 
any other claim for a sum of money, in proceedings brought before the specialist 
Competition Appeal Tribunal (hereafter, CAT). 153 The CAT can hear claims for 
damages following an infringement decision of the OFT or the EC Commission 
under section 47A. These actions are known as `follow-on actions'. 154 In these 
follow on actions, decisions of the OFT or the EC Commission that the UK or EU 
competition rules have been infringed will be binding on any court hearing a claim 
for damages provided that the appeal process, if pursued, has run its course. 155 The 
idea was that this binding effect would encourage private actions because private 
parties may be able to avoid inconsistent decisions and predict the result of 
action. 156 Follow on actions before the CAT must be brought within two years of 
the relevant date. 157 The relevant date is the later of the date on which the period to 
appeal to the European Court has lapsed, or if an appeal has been instituted, the date 
on which it is determined. 158 The CAT may give permission for a claim to be 
brought prior to the relevant date after hearing from any proposed defendant. 
152 Section 47 A CA 1998 was introduced by section 18 EA 2002. 153 This provision was adopted after much debate, with the Government initially resisting the proposal. 
The amendment, championed by Sir Jeremy Lever Q. C., was eventually adopted on a division at Third 
Reading in the House of Lords shortly before the Act received Royal Assent. 154 See section 1.3.1.4 which deals with stand-alone and follow-on actions. iss Section 58 A, CA 1998 inserted by Section 20 of the Enterprise Act 2002 provides for the binding 
nature of OFT and CAT decisions. It would have expressly provided that a decision of the EC 
Commission that there had been an infringement of Art. 81(1) or Art. 82 was binding upon a national court 
in proceedings before it for damages, was rejected as unnecessary. The Government considered that such 
decisions were in effect already binding on UK courts by virtue of Case C-344/98 Masterfoods Ltd (t/a 
Mars Ireland) v HB Ice Cream Ltd: [2000] ECR 1-11369; [2001] 4 CMLR 14, para 45-60. The 
Masterfoods judgment is now embodied in Regulation 1/20032003, Art. 16. However, note the attitude of 
the House of Lords to decisions in `parallel' cases in Inntrepreneur Pub Company V Crehan [2006] 
UKHL 38, discussed below. If such a decision is the subject of proceedings before the European Court of 
Justice or the Court of First Instance, the national court may stay its proceedings pending the outcome of 
the European proceedings, or to make a preliminary reference to the European Court. 156 Koob et al., supra note 132, p. 4. 157 Rule 31, CAT Rules. 
15$ See Rule 31(2) of the CAT Rules, which refers to sections 47A(7) and 47A(8) of the Competition Act 1998. 
91 
Second, the CA 1998 provides for a mechanism for representative actions to 
be brought on behalf of consumers against businesses which have infringed the 
competition rules. Representative bodies are able to bring damages actions before 
the CAT on behalf of two or more consumers. Representative actions are less costly 
for the consumers and they can enable consumers to bring actions where 
collectively substantial harm has been caused, although individually they may only 
have suffered a relatively small harm. Representative actions can create a more 
streamlined procedure, as the CAT is able to deal with all the claims in a single case. 
Third, the UK has a parallel system consisting of the CAT and the ordinary 
courts. The right to claim before the CAT is not exclusive and does not affect the 
right to bring other proceedings before the ordinary courts. 159 In England and 
Wales, therefore, actions may be brought before the High Court for the tort of 
breach of statutory duty or before the CAT. Proceedings for damages may be 
transferred between the CAT and the High Court 160 on the initiative of the High 
Court or on an application by the parties. 161 The Enterprise Act of 2002 enables the 
Lord Chancellor to make the High Court or any county court transfer damages 
actions to the CAT it if it is related to a competition law infringement. In 
considering whether to make an order for transfer, the High Court must take into 
account whether the CAT is dealing with, or has previously ruled on, a similar 
claim, or whether it has developed considerable expertise by dealing with a 
significant number of cases arising from the same or similar infringements. 162 
The CAT offers plaintiffs significant advantages over the High Court. The 
CAT is better equipped to handle complex legal and economic matters since the 
CAT has specialist judges, special procedural rules and the regime instituted by 
section 47A of the Competition Act 1998.163 Practitioners consider that the CAT is 
particularly well suited to deal with competition damages actions because it can 
159 Section 47A(10) of the Competition Act 1998. 160 Section 16 of the Enterprise Act 2002. 161 This applies only to proceedings in which damages for breach of articles 81 and 82 or chapter I and II 
are claimed, in circumstances where an infringement decision has been made by either the OFT, the 
Commission or the CAT (in relation to an appeal of an OFT decision). 162 Section 8.4 of the Practice Directions to the Civil Procedure Rules part 30. 163 See Bettercare v Director General of Fair Trading, Case No. 1006/2/1/01, [2002] CAT 6, paras 90-92 
and 161 respectively. 
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speed up proceedings, reduce costs, avoid inconsistent decisions and contribute to 
the development of a more stringent line in decisions. 164 The creation of the CAT 
placed the UK in an advantageous position compared with other Member States in 
the EU. 165 However, the choice of whether or not to bring damages actions before 
the CAT or the civil courts rests with the plaintiff. The plaintiff still can go to civil 
courts after having exhausted all appeal procedures. Most crucially, the CAT 
procedure is available only for `follow-on' actions, where there has already been a 
finding of infringement. 
Concern has been expressed by the OFT that more could be done to facilitate 
private damages actions. The OFT published a consultation paper regarding private 
redress for competition law infringements in April 2007.166 This Discussion Paper 
identified significant barriers to private actions by consumers and small and 
medium-sized businesses. The OFT's Discussion Paper also outlined principles for 
any proposals to make private competition law actions more effective and put 
forward a number of issues and options for discussion. 167 
2.3.2 Characteristics of Private Competition Enforcement in the 
UK 
Although the EC competition law provisions are directly applicable, 168 the 
direct applicability of the substantive law, alone is not sufficient to encourage 
private competition enforcement. 169 As discussed above, 170 remedies must be 
164 See, for example, Fergus Randolph, Aidan Robertson, "The First Claims for Damages in the 
Competition Appeal Tribunal", ECLR, 2005, p. 368. 1,65 Barry Rodger, "Competition Law Litigation in the UK Courts: A Study of All Cases to 2004 - part I", 
27(5) ECLR 241,2006, p. 242; Jeremy Lever QC, "Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Rules 
Substantive Remedies: ; Ilya Segal, Michael Whinston, " Public VS Private Enforcement of Antitrust 
Law: A Survey", 5ECLR 306,2007, p. 306. 166 The Office of Fair Trading, "Private Actions in Competition Law: Effective Redress for Consumes 
and Business", OFT916,2007 ; See also Int'l Bar Ass'n Antitrust Comm., Working Group on Private 
Antitrust Litigation in Europe, "Comments on the Office of Fair Trading Discussion Paper: Private 
Actions in Competition Law--Effective Redress for Consumers and Business", available at 
http: //www. ibanet. org/images/downloadsllpd/Discussion_Paper. pdf; Alex Potter, Kier Liddell and Simon 
Constantine, "United Kingdom, in Dominance 2007", ch. 37, p. 217-18. 167 OFT916 are available at http: // www. oft. gov. uk/shared oft/reports/comp policy/oft9I6. pdf [Accessed 
January 22,2008]. The proposals of the OFT are discussed in the relevant places in the following 
Chapters of this thesis. 
168 Courage v. Crehan, C-452/99, [2001 ]ECR 1-6297; Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, C- 
295/04, [2006] ECJ, 348. 
169 Koob et al., supra note 132, p. 3. 170 See section 2.2 which deals with overview of private enforcement in the EU. 
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provided by and under national law damages actions must be brought in the 
domestic courts of the Member States. 171 
Under English law, damages actions for breach of competition law are 
framed as a claim for the tort of breach of statutory duty (that is, failure to comply 
with article 81 or 82 of the EC Treaty). 172 It is a settled principle of English law 
that actions for breach of statutory duty must show not only that a duty is owed to 
the plaintiff, 173 but also that it is a duty in respect of the kind of loss he suffered. 
All claims arising in England and Wales pleading a breach of EC or UK 
competition law must be issued in or transferred to the High Court and, unless they 
come within the scope of Rule 58.1(2) of the CPR(in which case they are assigned 
to the Commercial Court), they are assigned to the Chancery Division. 174 
It is well recognized that private enforcement is important to competition 
culture and effective competition authorities by supplementing limited public 
resources. In its proposal paper for giving effect to Regulation 1/2003 and for re- 
alignment of the Competition Act 1998, the DTI noted: "The development of 
private enforcement is essential to a vigorous competition culture. Private 
enforcement allows those who are most directly affected by an infringement of 
competition law another option for action to obtain a remedy. Its availability allows 
competition authorities such as the Commission and the OFT to devolve more 
resources to the detection, investigation and remedying of the most serious 
infringements, such as cartels. "las 
This statement echoes the sentiments expressed by the European Commission 
in the preamble to Council Regulation 1/2003.176 
171 Tim Ward and Kassie Smith, "Competition litigation in the UK", 2005, Thomson, p. 258,7-008; Koob 
et al., supra note 132, p. 3. 
172 See Crehan v Interpreneur, [2004] EWCA Civ 637 para 156. This had previously been thought to be 
the case following Garden Cottage Foods LTD v Milk Marketing Board, [1984] I A. C. 130; Ward and 
Smith, Ibid., p. 270,7-040. 
173 In English law, 'plaintiffs' are now called as 'plaintiffs' but that I retain the word `plaintiffs' as 
discussing in England and other jurisdictions as well. 174 See County Act 1984, sections 41 and 42, and Rule 30.3 of the CPR. 17$ DTI, "Modernisation -A consultation on the Government's proposals for giving effect to Regulation 1/2003 and for re-alignment of the Competition Act 1998", April 2003. 176 See Council Regulation 1/2003, OJ L 1, Recital 7. 
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The OFT promoted a policy of facilitating private enforcement of 
competition law in Discussion Paper where the OFT considered that "most of the 
main structural and legal elements for effective private actions in competition law 
are already in place in the UK". 177 Private enforcement of competition rules in the 
UK is at the forefront of such enforcement in the EU because, inter alia, of the 
comparatively wide discovery rules, and the availability of follow-on proceedings 
in the CAT. 178 It has been said that "[t]he UK has proven the most aggressive in 
developing a regime for private competition enforcement. " 179 Under the 
continental (civil) legal systems of many other Member States of the EU, private 
enforcement of competition law is very much in its infancy. 
2.4 Overview of Private Antitrust Enforcement in the US 
2.4.1 Introduction of Private Antitrust Enforcement in the US 
2.4.1.1 Overview of Antitrust Enforcement in the US 
The US enjoys strong competition law enforcement. 180 Congress created a 
tripartite enforcement mechanism. The first element is the Department of Justice 
(hereafter, DOJ). The Antitrust Division of DOJ has broad civil and criminal 
enforcement powers. As a matter of DOJ policy, criminal sanctions are reserved for 
the worse infringements of law condemned by the courts as per se illegal-price- 
fixing among competitors and agreements among competitors to divide markets and 
thereby raise prices. 181 In addition to criminal sanctions, the Antitrust Division may 
seek treble damages where the federal government has suffered harm by reason of 
an antitrust violation. '82 
177 OFT916, supra note 166, p. 4. 
178 Commissioner Monti believed the creation of the CAT, a specialist tribunal that only hears 
competition law actions, provides a valuable opportunity for would-be plaintiffs; G. Olsen, "Actions for 
Damages are Compensation and Deterrence? ", C. L. I. 4.8. (3), p. 2. 
'" John H. Beisner, Charles E. Borden, "Expending Private Cause of Action: Lessons from the US 
Litigation Experience", presented at rThe Trans-Atlantic Challenge: Diverging approaches to 
regulatory and legal reform in the Untied States and Europep , Brussels, 2005, p. 11. 1$ Maher M. Dabbah, "Measure the Success of a System of Competition Law: A Preliminary View", 21 
European Competition Law Review 369,2000, p. 374. 1" Anne K. Bingaman, Gary It Spratling, "Joint Address Before the Antitrust Section of the American 
Bar Association Criminal Antitrust Law and Procedure Workshop" 1995, available at http: // 
www. usdoj. gov/atr/public/speeches/95-02-23. txt. 
182 15 U. S. C. § 15a 
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The second element is the Federal Trade Commission (hereafter, FTC). 
183 
The FTC was created by Congress in 1914 as an independent federal regulatory 
agency to administer the FTC Act. 184 The principal operative provision of the FTC 
Act is section 5, which prohibits unfair methods of competition. 
185 The FTC 
consists of a five-member commission appointed by the President that oversees a 
Bureau of Competition, a Bureau of Consumer Protection, and a Bureau of 
Economics. 186 The FTC has no criminal powers, nor does it have authority to 
recover civil damages. The courts, nevertheless, have held that the FTC does have 
authority to order disgorgement of ill-gotten gains obtained by those engaging in 
unfair methods of competition. 187 In addition, the FTC is empowered to levy 
substantial fines against those who fail to comply with FTC orders. 
188 
The third element is private enforcement through private parties' actions 
against antitrust infringements. The US has a fundamentally different attitude to 
private enforcement from that of the other jurisdictions discussed in this thesis. 
Private enforcement has played a central role in the US antitrust law regime since 
the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890.189 
183 See generally, Robert Pitofsky, "Past, Present, and Future of Antitrust Enforcement at the Federal 
Trade Commission", University of Chicago Law Review, 2005.; See generally, Charles E. Koob, "Civil 
Enforcement at the Antitrust Division and Federal Trade Commission: Emerging Patterns?, Simpson 
Thacher & Bartlett LLP, 2002.; See also generally, David Balto, "Returing to the Elman Vision f the 
Federal Trade Commission: Reassessing the Approach to FTC Remedies", Antitrust Law Journal, 2005. 
184 Act of Sept. 26,1914, ch. 311,38 Stat. 717,719; 15 U. S. C. §§ 41-58 (2000). 
las 15 U. S. C. § 45 (2000). 
186 15 U. S. C. § 41 (2000). 
187 FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D. D. C. 1999). 
188 See Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Federal Trade Commission Obtains Civil Penalty 
Against William H. Gates III for Violation of Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (May 3,2004) (describing how the 
FTC imposed a civil penalty of $800,000 on Microsoft head Bill Gates for HSR disclosure violations), 
available at http: // www. ftc. gov/opa/2004/05/gates. htm. 
189 Hannah L. Buxbaum, "Private Enforcement of Competition Law in the Untied States- of Optimal 
Deterrence and Social Costs", in rPrivate Enforcement of EC Competition Lawi (ed. by Jurgen 
Basedow), Kluwer Law, 2007, p. 43; "Charles E. Koob, David E. Vann, Arman Y. Oruc, "Developments 
in Private Enforcement of Competition Laws- Introduction", Simpson Thacher&Bartlett LLp, 2004 p. 5; 
Robert L. Hubbard, James Yoon "How the Antitrust Modernization Commission Should View State 
Antitrust Enforcement", Loyola Consumer Law Review, 2005, p. 505; Michael P. Foradas, "Private 
Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws", Practicing Law Institute, 1988 p. 229 ; Donald I. Baker, Revisiting 
History - What Have We Learned About Private Antitrust Enforcement That We Would Recommend to 
Others?, 16 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 379,2004, p. 382; Katherine Holmes, "Public Enforcement or Private 
Enforcement? Enforcement of Competition Law in the EC and UK", E. C. L. R. 2004,25(1), 25-36, p. 25; 
Clifford A. Jones, "Exporting Antitrust Courtrooms to the World: Private Enforcement in a Global 
Market", Loyola Consumer Law Review, 2004, p. 409; Michael P. Foradas, "Private Enforcement of the 
Antitrust Laws", Practising Law Institute Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series, 1988, p. 
229.; P. Friedman, D. Gelfand and C. Nordlander etc., "Comments of the Section of Antitrust Law and the 
Section of International Law of the American Bar Association in Response to the Request for Public 
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As the US Supreme Court has noted, "Congress has expressed its belief that 
private antitrust litigation is one of the surest weapons for effective enforcement of 
the antitrust laws. "19o The Supreme Court has also termed this private right of 
action "a bulwark of antitrust enforcement. s191 Plaintiffs seeking antitrust damages 
can be regarded as `Private Attorneys General' whose activity is encouraged to 
supplement and substitute for the scarce governmental resources. 192 
2.4.1.2 Rationale for Encouraging Private Antitrust 
Enforcement in the US 
Originally conceived of as a necessary incentive to spur on the private actions, 
the so-called `private attorney general' has served a variety of purposes of public 
interests as well as private interests. Looking at US political history can help us 
understand why and how the US has ended up with a private antitrust system that is 
significantly tilted in the plaintiffs' favour. 
First, Congress created the private right of action to supplement public 
enforcement because the government would not ' have the necessary resources to 
detect, investigate, and prosecute all infringements of the antitrust laws. 
193 
Infringement of antitrust laws is recognised as not merely an issue of public harm 
or a `victimless crime' 194 addressed by action taken by government agencies on 
behalf of the public at large. Private antitrust litigation has provided a significant 
Comment of the Commission of the European Communities On Damage Actions for Breaches of EU 
Antitrust Rules", April, 2006, p. 3.; John H. Beisner, Charles E. Borden, "Expending Private Cause of 
Action: Lessons from the US Litigation Experience", presented at r1he Trans-Atlantic Challenge: 
Diverging approaches to regulatory and legal reform in the Untied States and Europei , Brussels, 
2005, 
p. 9; A. Neil Campbell and J. William Rowley, "The Internationalization of Unilateral Conduct Laws- 
Conflict, Comity, Cooperation and/or Convergence? ", 75 Antitrust L. J. 267,2008, p. 294. 
190 Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U. S. 311(1965), 318. 
191 Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Co., 392 U. S. 134(1968) para 139. 
192 Jones, supra note 66, p. 80; Barry J. Rodger and Angus MacCulloch, "Competition Law Enforcement 
in the Community. Deregulation and Re-regulation: The Commission, National authorities and Private 
Enforcement ", 4 Columbia Journal of European Law, 1998, p. 604; Joseph P. Bauer, `The Future of 
Private Right of Action in Antirust: Multiple Enforcer and Multiple Remedy", Loyola Consumer Law 
Review, 2004, p. 310-311. 
193 15 U. S. C. § 15a (1994) (suits for damages by the United States); See, e. g., Texas Indus., Inc. V. 
Radcl fMaterials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630,642 (1981) (explaining that the private action "supplements federal 
enforcement and fulfils the objects of the statutory scheme").; See David Besanko and Daniel F. Spulber, 
"Antitrust Enforcement under Asymmetric Information", The Economic Journal, 1989, p. 408. 194 Victimless crime can be defined as not having identifiable victims in contrast with infringement of 
securities legislation, such as murder. Some white-collar crimes may also not be `victimless'. 
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supplement to the public enforcement. 195 
Second, in the US private enforcement is seen as serving as a countermeasure 
to the large corporate power of defendants. The private plaintiff is considered to 
need tangible help in attracting lawyers to prosecute antitrust cases against parties 
likely to be better heeled and better able to manage to successful conclusion an 
antitrust action because usually, antitrust actions are very expensive. To ameliorate 
the burden on private parties, Congress has built in powerful incentives such as 
mandatory treble damages; attorneys' fees for winning plaintiffs (although not for 
winning defendants); and in cases where a civil action follows a successful criminal 
prosecution by public enforcers such as the DOJ, the factual findings in the criminal 
action are given prima facie effect 196in the civil action. 197 The incentives such as 
treble damages, discovery, contingency fees and prima facie evidence need to be 
understood as part of a system that encourages private enforcement. Thus, the 
characteristics of US antitrust law must be assessed in the context of US policy on 
the role of private enforcement action. 
2.4.2 Basis of Private Competition Enforcement 
In enacting the antitrust laws, Congress decreed that competition would be 
the guiding principle governing commercial intercourse. 198 Competition is 
regulated by federal and state law. Federal courts generally have limited jurisdiction, 
but they have broad and exclusive jurisdiction over the federal antitrust laws. '99 
195 See Reiter v Sonotone Corp, 442 US 340(1979) para 344; Eric McCarthy et al., supra note 63, p. 38. "" Prima facie effect means if public enforcers find a breach of antitrust law, victims of the infringement 
can rely on this decision to raise a presumption of fact or to establish the fact in question unless rebutted 
in civil proceedings for damages: The `Lectric Law Library's Lexicon, available at 
http: //www. lectlaw. com. It is related to what I said in the UK section about the effect of infringement 
findings in s 47A actions before the CAT because it has prevailing effect even if it does not have binding 
effect. 
197 Prevailing defendants may, however, be entitled to sanctions if the plaintiffs action is frivolous and 
those sanctions may include lawyers' fees. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; see also 28 U. S. C. § 1927 (2000) 
callowing sanctions against lawyers for vexatious behaviour). 98 See Northern Pacific Railway. Co. v. United States, 356 U. S. 1(1958) para 4; ABA Section of Antitrust 
Law, The State of Federal Antitrust Enforcement: Report of the Task Force on Federal Antitrust Agencies, 
2001, p. 12 ("[E]ffective and appropriate antitrust enforcement is critical to the performance of a market 
economy. "), available at http: //www. abanet. org/antitrust/pdf docs/antitrustenforcement. pdf . 19' Gregory v. McCurdy, "The Impact of Modernization of the EU Competition Law System on the 
Courts and Private Enforcement of the Competition Laws: A Comparative Perspective", ECLR, 2004 p. 
513; Corinne Bergen, supra note 93, p. 203. 
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Some authors have traced back the roots of US antitrust to England's "Statute 
of Monopolies" of 1623 200 They have pointed out that when Congress enacted the 
Sherman Act in 1890,201 the framers looked back 267 years to that Statute which 
had been as a model for private antitrust actions in the US. 
The enactment of the Sherman Act was an important political event in 1890. 
The Supreme Court has stated that the Sherman Act was designed to be a 
comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered 
competition as the rule of trade: 
"The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic 
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It 
rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will 
yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest 
quality, and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an 
environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social 
institutions. But even were that premise open to question, the policy unequivocally 
laid down by the Act is competition. "202 
The Sherman Act203 has also been described by the Supreme Court as the 
`Magna Carta of free enterprise'. 04 There are similarities between sections 1 and 2 
200 England's Statute of Monopolies of 1623(21 Jac. 1, c. 3) repealed, S. L. (Repeals)(1969). The statute 
provided a civil remedy for victims of prohibited monopolies: - "wherein all and every such person and 
persons which shall be so hindered, grieved disturbed or disquieted ... shall recover three times so much 
as the damages which he or they sustained ... and double costs. " The statute arose out of the 
Case of 
Monopolies (Darcy v. Allein), 11 Co. Rep. 84b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K. B. 1602), in which the plaintiff 
sought to block the defendant from infringing the playing card monopoly that had been granted by Queen 
Elizabeth; Johan Ysewyn, "Private Enforcement of Competition Law in the EU: Trials and Tribulations", 
International Law Practice, 2006, p. 14; Thomas Greene, "Introduction to the Legal and Economic Issues 
at the Intersection of the Patent and Antitrust Laws", Sedona Conference Journal, 2007, p. 57-58; Harry 
First, ` "Controlling the Intellectual Property Grab: Protect Innovative, not Innovators", Rutgers Law 
Journal, 2007, p. 371-376; Jones, supra note 66, p. 35. 201 Act of 2 June 1890, Ch. 647,26 Stat. 209 (1890), current version at 15 U. S. C. §§1-7 (1996). 2°2 See Northern Pacific Railway. Co. v. United States, 356 U. S. 1(1958) para 4 203 15 U. S. C. §I 
204 United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U. S. 596,610 (1972); Clifford A. Jones, "Exporting Antitrust 
Courtrooms to the World: Private Enforcement in a Global Market", Loyola Consumer Law Review, 2004 
p. 409; Jonathan B. Baker, "The Case for Antitrust Enforcement", Journal of Economic Perspectives- 
Volunel7,2003 p. 27. 
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I 
of the Sherman Act and Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. 205 Section 1 prohibits 
concerted action in unreasonable restraint of trade206 and Section 2 prohibits 
anticompetitive conduct that contributes to the acquisition or preservation of 
monopoly power. 207 The other complementary statute was the Clayton Act208 
introduced in 1914, which contains all relevant provisions for private enforce- 
ment 209 The underlying legislative purpose of the Clayton Act was to create a 
group of `private attorneys general' to enforce the antitrust laws under section 4.210 
Another complementary Act is the Federal Trade Commission Act (hereafter, 
FTC Act). 211 Congress also passed the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements 
Act of 1976212 (hereafter, HSR) which empowered states' attorneys general to bring 
the action of parens patriae213 on behalf of consumers injured in price-fixing cases. 
The States also enforce their own antitrust laws. Every State has passed some 
form of antitrust statute, most of which are comparable to sections 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Act. 214 Many states also have passed laws respecting competition and 
outlawing particular practices (such as bid rigging and predatory pricing) 
215 A 
State may not make lawful conduct made unlawful by the Congress, 216 but a State 
may prohibit conduct that does not infringe any Act of Congress. 217 
205 See section 2.2 which deals with Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty of Rome. 206 15 U. S. C. § 1; See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1,60-70 (1911). 207 15 U. S. C. §2 
208 An Act to supplement existing laws against unlawful restraints and monopolies, and for other 
purposes, ch. 323,38 Stat. 730 (1914), current version at 15 U. S. C. § 12 (1996). 09 15 U. S. C. This provision supersedes the former Sherman Act, S. 7. Each of the Clayton Act and the 
Sherman Act specifically provides for private actions for damages. If the infringement of any substantive 
antitrust provision causes anyone's loss, this person can bring damages actions for compensation. 
210 The modern private right of action is provided for in section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. § 15 
(1994): [A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in 
the antitrust laws may sue there for in any district court of the United States ... and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. ; 211 Act of 26 September 1914, Ch. 311,38 Stat. 717 (1914), current version at 15 U. S. C. §§ 41-58 (1996). 212 Pub. L. No. 94-435,90 Stat. 1383 (1976). 
213 The government can bring actions on behalf of consumers which is called as parens patriae. 21 "The Three Core Federal Antitrust Laws", An FTC Guide to the Antitrust Laws, 2009, p. 1 available at 
www. ftc. gov; See also Debra J. Pearlstein, Robert E. Bloch and Ronan P. Harty, "Antitrust Law 
Development", 5th ed, American Bar Association, 2002, p. 803. 215 D. J. Pearlstein, R. E. Bloch and R. P. Harty, Ibid., p. 810. 216 See, e. g., Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197 (1904) (invalidating state law in 
conflict with Sherman Act § 1). 
217 See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland., 437 U. S. 117 (1978) (Maryland statute prohibiting 
producer or refiner of petroleum from operating retail gasoline station not preempted by Clayton Act or 
Robinson-Patman Act). 
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2.4.3 Characteristics of Private Antitrust Enforcement in the US 
2.4.3.1 Antitrust Injury rule 
The basic antitrust injury rule articulated by the Supreme Court is that to 
have standing, a plaintiff must be able to show `antitrust injury'- in other words, 
"injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. i218 The private 
plaintiff can only recover under the Clayton Act for economic injury that flows 
from a lessening of competition. Proving an antitrust infringement is not enough 
unless the plaintiffs injury flows from a lessening of competition created by the 
infringement. The point is clearly illustrated by the seminal and unanimous 
Supreme Court decision in Brunswick Corp. 219 In this case, the plaintiffs, a group 
of bowling alley operators claimed that Brunswick, the leading maker of bowling 
equipment, had made a series of bowling centre acquisitions that were illegal under 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act because the `failing company' doctrine had not been 
properly applied, and that the plaintiffs' centres would have been more profitable if 
some of the Brunswick-acquired centres had gone out of business or been acquired 
by `less anticompetitive' purchasers. The Court rejected this claim, noting that it 
was the essential survival of the centres that was the basis for the plaintiffs claim. 
Therefore, to award damages to these plaintiffs would be "inimical to the purposes 
of these [antitrust] laws. " 
In a post-Brunswick merger decision, the Supreme Court made clear that a 
firm would only establish antitrust injury, and have standing to challenge a merger 
of its competitors, if it could show that probable predation flowing from the merger 
threatened the plaintiff with destruction. 220 
218 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U. S. 477(1977) para 489; Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort 
of Colorado, Inc., 479 U. S. 104,109-10 (1986); Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U. S. 328, 
334 (1990). 
219 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U. S. 477 (1977) 220 See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U. S. 104(1986) para 104. 
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2.4.3.2 The Number of Private Actions in the US 
Private enforcement of antitrust law did not gain momentum until the late 
1930s. 22' After for the first 60 year period from 1890 to 1949, there were just over 
300 reported decisions and approximately 1,100 cases have been commenced since 
the Sherman Act was passed. 222 It seems that treble damages actions started after 
the Supreme Court in the Bigelow case, 223 had formulated the rules for the proof 
of the damages in 1949. 
In this case, Bigelow and others brought actions against RKO Radio Pictures, 
Inc., and others under the Sherman and Clayton Acts for an injunction and to 
recover treble damages because of defendant's alleged monopolistic practices in 
exhibiting motion pictures. The jury found a conspiracy for fixing minimum 
prices. 224 In this case, the crucial issue was proof of the damages. In respect to the 
rules for the proof of the damages, jury may not render a verdict based on 
speculation or guesswork but they can make a just and reasonable estimate of the 
damage based on relevant data. 225 
Private enforcement has played a fundamental role since 1960. There was an 
explosion in private antitrust litigation starting in the 1960s because of the changes 
in the rules on class actions. The expansion of the class action device under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23, coupled with "appellate court decisions recognizing 
new substantive rights or easing litigation burdens for plaintiffs pursuing existing 
rights, encouraged private actions and increased awareness of their possibilities in 
the antitrust context. , 226 
221 See Richard A. Posner, "Antitrust Law"(2nd ed. ), University of Chicago Press, 2001, p. 45. 222 Holmes K., supra note 28, pp. 25,31; Donald I. Baker, Revisiting History - What Have We Learned About Private Antitrust Enforcement That We Would Recommend to Others?, 16 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 
379,2004, p. 382 
W Bigelow V. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U. S. 251 (1946) ua Ibid., para. 4. 
225 Ibid., para. 6. 
226 Arthur R. Miller, "Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class 
Action Problem", 92 Harv. L. Rev. 672 (1979) ("The Advisory Committee's objectives in rewriting the 
[federal class action rule] were rather clear. It had few, if any, revolutionary notions about its work 
product. Although it was expected that the revision would operate to assist small plaintiffs, the draftsmen 
conceived the procedure's primary function to be providing a mechanism for securing private remedies, 
rather than deterring public wrongs or enforcing broad social policies. "). 
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Lin (2000) reports that after 1960, the average over the same period of 19 
years is more than tripled to 540 a year on average. 227 The number of private 
enforcement actions pending has fluctuated greatly, from about 1,400 in the late 
1970s to about 750 in the mid to late 1980s, but private actions continue to 
represent at least 90% of all Federal antitrust cases.. 228 In 2003, private enforcement 
complaints accounted for 90-95% of all antitrust actions. 229 The table below 
including public litigation and private litigation shows the annual number for civil 
antitrust filings in federal district courts from 1997 to 2004.230 
227 For the complete study see Lin et al., "The US Antitrust System and Recent Trends In Antitrust 
Enforcement", [2000] Journal of Economic Surveys, 14(3), Blackwell Publishers, p. 261, Table 2. The 
reported numbers in Lin et al. are intimately linked with the case law of Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United 
Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U. S 481 (1968) and Illinois Brick Co. v. State of Illinois 431 U. S. 720 (1977). 
Hanover Shoe protected plaintiffs (direct purchasers) by disallowing the defensive use of the pass on 
argument, and hence private cases thrived. They peak in 1977, the year in which standing to bring actions 
was restricted to direct purchasers in Illinois Brick. Even after standing to bring actions had been limited 
because of the judgment of Illinois Brick private damage actions have persistently outnumbered public 
cases ever since bringing private actions started in the late 1930's. This is attributable to increasing 
number of violations but also to the increased incentive to bring actions to direct purchasers in Illinois 
Brick. In respect to Hanover Shoe, see section 4.2 which deals with passing on defence in the US. In 
respect to Illinois Brick, see section 5.2 which deals with indirect purchaser actions in the US. ua See Patricia Hanh Rosochowicz, "Deterrence and the relationship between public and private 
enforcement of competition law", Amsterdam Centre for Law and Economics Workshop, 2005, p. 6. 229 In 2003, there were a total of 762 civil antitrust actions commenced in the federal courts. Private 
filings accounted for 729 of these cases or 95.6% of all such actions. Judicial Business of the U. S. Courts 
2003, Table C-2, available at http: //www. uscourts. gov/judbus2003/appendixiUSDistrictCourtCivil. pdf. 230 Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts, Federal Court Management Statistics: 2000 - 2005 (available online at http: //www. uscourts. gov/fcrostat/index. html). 
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[ Table 1] 
Antitrust Cases filed in US District Courts 2001-2007231 
Total 
Commenc Percent 
Federal Civil Commenc 
ed by US of Private Antitrust Cases ed by Private 
Government. 2 Cases 
Commenced 
2001 751 44 707 94.1 
2002 850 44 806 94.8 
2003 773 44 729 94.3 
2004 764 33 731 95.7 
2005 843 47 796 94.4 
2006 1,004 37 967 96.3 
2007 1,054 36 1,018 96.6 
Nearly 850 district federal courts antitrust cases were filed in the first seven 
months of 2008.232 
2.4.3.3 Controversial Features of Private Actions in the US 
As shown above in Table 1, private antitrust actions are now overwhelmingly 
the most common form of antitrust litigation in the US. 233 The US antitrust 
enforcement scheme seems almost exclusively litigation oriented and mainly 
dependent on private parties to bring damages actions before court to secure 
compliance, compensation, deterrence and punishment. 234 Plaintiffs are regarded as 
231Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, Table 5.41.2007, Antitrust Cases Filed in US District 
Courts, www. albany. edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5412007. pdf. 
232 Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, Table 5.41.2007, Antitrust Cases Filed in US 
District Courts, www. albany. edu/sourcebook/pdf/t541 2007. pdf; See generally, Joseph A Ostoyich and 
Eric Berman, "Trends in Dominant Firm Litigation: Convergence Towards What? ", Global Competition 
Review: The Antitrust Review of the Americas, 2008. 233 Koob et al., supra note 132, p. 1; K. Holmes, supra note 28, p. 25. 234 See Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, Table C-2: U. S. District Courts--Civil Cases Commenced, by 
Basis of Jurisdiction and Nature of Suit, During 12-Month Period Ending March 31,2002, available at 
http: // www. uscourts. gov/caseload2002/tables/cO2marO2. pdf (last visited Mar. 2,2004); Jones, supra note 
104 
a `private attorneys general' which supplements scarce governmental resources. 
Private plaintiffs are thought to be performing: 
"[A]n important failsafe function235 by ensuring that legal norms are not 
wholly dependent on the current attitude of public enforcers or the vagaries of the 
budgetary process and that the legal system emits clear and consistent signals to 
those who may be tempted to offend. Absent private enforcement, potential 
defendants would have a considerably stronger incentive to lobby against public 
i236 enforcement efforts or to seek to curtail funds to public enforcement agencies. 
, The US legal system has mechanisms which help to ensure effective private 
enforcement. For instance, as in Bell Atlantic Corp. V. Twombly, 237 the US 
Supreme Court required pleadings to contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief 
that is plausible on its face. " 238 The Supreme Court's decisions in Twombly raised 
the baseline pleading standard for all civil litigation. 239 The plausibility pleading 
standard can give judges substantial discretion at the threshold stages of 
litigation. 240 In Sinaltranial appeal case, the court adopted Twombly's pleading 
standard for this scrutiny. 241 The plaintiffs should arrive in federal courts with 
enough information to convince judges that their allegations are plausible because 
of Twombly judgment. Furthermore, as in Swierkiewicz case, in discrimination 
cases, precedents can require a plaintiff at the summary judgment242 stage to 
produce either direct evidence of discrimination or, if the claim is based primarily 
on circumstantial evidence, to meet the shifting evidentiary burdens imposed under 
the framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 243 Simplified 
66, p. 19. 
235 Failsafe function of private enforcement is private plaintiffs are thought to do an important role to 
prevent antitrust practices by ensuring that legal norms are not wholly dependent on the current attitude of 
public enforcers or the vagaries of the budgetary process and that the legal system emits clear and 
consistent signals to those who may be tempted to offend, C. Coffee, "Rescuing the Private Attorney 
General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is not Working" 42 Md. L. Rev. 215,1983, 
227. 
236 Ibid. 
231 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955(2007) 23$ Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 71vombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955,1974(2007). 239 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955,1974(2007). 240 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955,1965(2007) 241 Sinaltrania, 2009 WL 2431463, at 3. 242 Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. 243 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 243 411 U. S. 792,93 S. Ct. 1817,36 L. Ed. 2d 668(1973). 
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notice pleading standard of the Federal Rules244 relies on liberal discovery rules 
and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose 
of unmeritous claims. 245 
However, the US has been described as earning the reputation of having a 
litigation culture that permeates its entire legal system246 The private right of 
action has been a persistently controversial feature of US antitrust law because 
critics claim that there are extraordinary opportunities for abuse that can ultimately 
overwhelm the benefits. 247 It is an extraordinarily powerful weapon for a plaintiff 
to wield against a defendant. Such powerful weapons can create the potential for 
abuse, which in turn creates a need for safeguards. American law, however, is often 
criticised as having failed to ensure appropriate safeguards against actions which 
could be result in abuse of litigation caused by strong incentives such as treble 
damages, contingency fee, class actions, broad discovery, and so on. 248 Thus, there 
has been a great deal of debate in the US about necessary reforms that could curb 
this abuse of litigation. The Class Action Fairness Act (hereafter, CAFA) was one 
piece of legislation which has resulted. I consider the CAFA in Chapter 5 where I 
discuss indirect purchaser actions and Chapter 6 where I discuss group actions. 
2.5. Conclusion 
This Chapter has set out the main features and characteristics of the 
competition laws in Korea and in the three other jurisdictions at which this thesis is 
looking. It has indicated the main outlines of the existing systems of private 
enforcement in each of those jurisdictions. The following Chapters examine 
particular issues in private enforcement in each jurisdiction in order to come to a 
conclusion as to the best rules that Korea could develop in order to achieve its goal 
of optimal enforcement of its competition laws. 
244 Federal Rules 8(a)(2) 
Z's Swierkiewicz, 534 U. S., at 511,122 S. Ct, 992. 246 Eric McCarthy et at., supra note 63, p. 38. 247 Arthur R. Miller, supra note 226, p. 672. 2411 John H. Beisner, Charles E. Borden, supra note 189, p. 21-26. 
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Chapter 3. The Principle of Compensation for Damages 
3.1 What is Anticompetitive Damage? 
3.1.1 Overview of Anticompetitive Damage 
In Chapter 1 it was seen that private competition law enforcement can be 
used in two ways, as a shield and as a sword. ' 
Private damages actions are a sword. It is argued that they can be an 
important tool in the effective enforcement of competition laws because they can 
contribute to the correction of the harmful effects of anticompetitive activities and 
complement public enforcement. 2 The current EU Commissioner for competition 
has reiterated that it is important to have a just and efficient system for victims to 
claim damages. 3 The creation of a more effective legal framework for private 
enforcement might be expected to result in a greater number of damages actions. 
As a general rule, most jurisdictions require that in order to be compensated 
for the infringement of competition law, the plaintiff must prove an infringement of 
competition law, damage, and a causal link between the breach of the competition 
rules and the damage caused by the infringers. Therefore, the first thing to be 
considered is what kind of damage should be compensated. Namely, what is the 
appropriate scope of damage that victims of competition law infringements should 
be able to recover? However, it is not easy to define what kind of damage should be 
recovered. In this Chapter I discuss two major characteristics of anticompetitive 
damage and then based on these characteristics I will attempt to define 
anticompetitive damage. 
1 See section 1.3.1 which introduces private and public competition enforcement. 2 Andrew I. Gavil, "Federal Judicial Power and the Challenges of Multijurisdictional Direct and Indirect 
Purchaser", Antitrust Litigation, 69 George Washington Law Review 860,2000, p. 860. 3 Neelie Kroes. "Enhancing Actions for Damages for Breach of Competition Rules in Europe", Dinner 
Speech at the Harvard Club, Speech/05/533, New York, 2005, p. 3. 
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3.1.2 Characteristic of Anticompetitive Damage 
3.1.2.1 ' Damage under Competition . Law and Damage under 
.- 
Tort (or Civil) Law 
The difference between liability for the infringement of competition law and 
liability under tort law (or civil law)4 is important because competition law has its 
own characteristics differentiated from those of tort law (or civil law). 5 
Competition damage is sometimes different from most tort damage (or civil 
damage) because, as discussed in Chapter 1,6 competition law has the public 
interest aspect of protecting competition and consumer welfare as well as the 
private aspect of protecting individual interests. 7 Traditional tort law is seen as 
individualistic in origin whereas competition law starts from the basis of the public 
interest, but in fact in both cases there are both public and private interests involved. 
Tort law also has a public welfare aspect. For instance, in English law, the tort of 
public nuisance requires damage to the public before an individual can bring private 
proceedings. Economic theorists would argue that personal injury tort claims exist 
to deter conduct which causes accidents, ie the aim is the public interest one of 
reducing levels of harm. However, despite this it is submitted that the primary 
objective of tort law is to protect private parties' interests. 
In principle, infringements under competition law can include any 
anticompetitive activities such as price-fixing, market division, refusal to deal, tying 
or exclusive dealing arrangements, price discrimination and unlawful mergers and 
so on. However, an agreement or practice might cause harm to certain persons such 
4 In Korea, there is no branch of law known as `tort' law because Korea has a `continental' legal system 
similar to Germany and France. Illegal conduct caused by a breach of statutory law is regulated by the 
Civil law. Korean Civil law is composed of Property, Contract and Family law. In respect to damages 
actions, the Contract section includes provision of damages actions against illegal behaviour. This 
provision of damages actions is a fundamental part of Korean law and it can be applied to damages 
actions under competition law if there are no other special or exceptional provisions. s From this, I will mention only Tort law instead of Civil law. See generally, Jonathan B. Baker, "The 
Case for Antitrust Enforcement", Journal of Economic Perspectives-Volune 17,2003, p. 40; and, Spencer 
Weber Waller, "Prosecution by Regulation: The Changing Nature of Antitrust Enforcement", Oregon Law 
Review, 1998. 
6 See section 1.2.2 which deals with objectives of competition law. 
See section 1.2.2 which deals with the objectives of competition law; In relation to Korean tort damage, 
see generally, Kwac Yun-Gik, "Law of Obligations", Parkyoungsa, 2001. 
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as competitor, customer, or contractor and still may not be considered anti- 
competitive because a defendant's illegal conduct has no general impact on 
competition in the market. 
For example, the overcharge caused by an output restriction of a dominant 
company is an anticompetitive injury, as lost profits are associated with 
exclusionary practices. But other types of harm caused by anticompetitive 
infringements may not qualify for damages to compensate for anticompetitive 
activities. These may be legal wrongs under tort or contract law but they could not 
be regarded as competition law infringements because these legal wrongs may not 
affect competition in the market. It is always necessary to bear in mind the 
objectives of competition law, as discussed in Chapter 1. As explained there, in 
Korea this public aspect of competition law has been clearly shown by the 
Competition Law8 which states that the objective of this Act is to promote fair 
competition, 9 to protect consumers, 1° and to strive for balanced development of 
economy. So anticompetitive conduct harms public interests such as competition or 
consumer interests as well as private interests. 11 Therefore, to be compensated for 
anticompetitive conduct, the anticompetitive conduct must harm public as well as 
private interests. 
Korean courts have limited the scope of anticompetitive liability by an 
anticompetitive injury doctrine. 12 The anticompetitive injury doctrine requires an 
infringement of the competition rules but it does not necessarily require the 
occurrence of harm to a person. Therefore, even though the defendants may have 
acted anticompetitively, if the defendants' practice does not have anticompetitive 
See section 1.2.2.1 which deals with objectives of competition law in Korea. 
In Korea, fair competition is one of the most important objectives of competition law. As I discussed in 
chapter I(Introduction), `Fair competition' could be defined as ensuring competition by price and quality 
of product and preventing other factor such as monopolization and cartels from affecting competition. 
This concept of `fair' competition is different from `free' competition because free competition means 
there is no barrier for competition in market. In respect to definition of `fair' and `free' competition, see 
Kwon Oh-Sung, "Competition Law"(5t` ed. ), Bubmoonsa, 2005, pp. 79-80: Shin Hyun-Yun, 
"Competition Law"(2°d ed. ), Bubmoonsa, 2007, pp. 129-131. 
10 To protect consumer, the KFTC has made decisions and policies to enhance consumer welfare or to 
minimise consumer detriment., See section 1.2.2.1 which deals with objectives of competition law in 
Korea. 
II Mark Furse, "The Role of Competition Policy: A Survey", 17(4) E. C. L. R. 250,1996, p. 257. 
12 Supreme Court 90.4.10,89DACA29075. 
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effects, the plaintiffs cannot have compensation for damages under the competition 
rules. This is shown in Korean case law. The Korean, Supreme Court held that: 
"Damage from an anticompetitive infringement is not necessarily the one 
suffered by the injured party or parties but the general damage to competition of 
economy or the loss to consumer welfare because the Competition Law protects 
public interests such as competition or consumer welfare not competitor. "13 
It is submitted that this anticompetitive injury doctrine is sound because it 
limits damages to harm connected to the rights protected by the Competition Law. 
The right to relief should be limited by the anticompetitive injury doctrine, which 
restricts the right to recover to harm to competition not harm to competitors. Thus, 
the question is whether a particular conduct gives rise to the type of anticompetitive 
damage the Competition Law is designed to prevent. The broader the law's 
definition of harm to competition is the more damage will be compensated. This 
doctrine is the tools by which courts identify which victims of a competition 
infringement may recover damages, given the nature of the victim's harm. 
Anticompetitive injury doctrine issues have been also discussed in the US 
context where there is an antitrust injury doctrine. 14 This doctrine has been 
recognized in Brunswick. In this case, the Supreme Court, stated that: 
"The antitrust laws were enacted for `the protection of competition not 
competitors'. "1S 
ý3 Supreme Court DACA 2001. It is my own translation. ý' In respect of the antitrust injury doctrine and the related doctrine of antitrust standing, see William H. 
Page, "The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations", 37 Stan. L. Rev., 1985, p. 1445. For criticism of 
some judicial applications of the antitrust doctrine, see Ronald W. Davis, "Standing on Shaky Ground: 
The Strangely Elusive Doctrine of Antitrust Injury", 70 Antitrust L. J., 2003, p. 697,723; Roger D. Blair 
and William H. Page, "Controlling the Competitor Plaintiff in Antitrust Litigation", 91 Mich. L. Rev. 111, 
1992; see also Joseph P. Bauer, "The Stealth Assault on Antitrust Enforcement: Raising the Barriers for 
Antitrust Injury and Standing", 62U. Pitt. L. Rev., 2001, p. 437; With respect to comparative analysis of 
antitrust doctrine between the US and the EU see Douglas H. Ginsburg, "Comparing Antitrust 
Enforcement in the United States and Europe', I J. Competition L. and Econ., 2005, p. 427,436; Donald I. 
Baker, "Revisiting History - What Have We Learned About Private Antitrust Enforcement that We Would 
Recommend to Others? ", 16 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 379,2004 , p. 
390 ; In respect of the antitrust injury 
doctrine and optimal enforcement see William H. Page, "Optimal Antitrust Penalties and Competitors' 
Injury", 88 Mich. L. Rev., 1990, p. 2151. 
ýs Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U. S. 477 (1977) para 488. In saying this Supreme 
Court was expressly quoting itself in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294(1962) para 320. 
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It also stated that: 
"We therefore hold that for plaintiffs to recover treble damages on account of 
s7 violations, they must prove more than injury causally linked to an illegal 
presence in the market. Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury 
of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that 
which makes defendants' acts unlawful. The injury should reflect the 
anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made 
possible by the violation. It should, in short, be `the type of loss that the claimed 
violations... would be likely to cause. "16 
These doctrines of Korea and the US have common feature. There are 
common features in this specialised area such as competition law which mainly 
deals with economic policy. For example, US and Korean law are different in areas 
such as family law but it is submitted that the cultural gap may not be so great on 
the issues of commercial law and economic policy. 
However, as I am going to discuss, Korea has very important differences in 
matters of the organization of the legal system such as lawyers' fees and the amount 
of damages compensated for. 
3.1.2.2 Financial Gain and Economic Loss 
The natural or legal person committing the anticompetitive infringement will 
normally have a financial gain in mind. His objective is to maximize his profit and 
not to cause the damage for its own sake. Usually, the competition gain corresponds 
to damage suffered by the injured party. However, such a gain does not have to be 
equal to the loss for the injured party, but can be either smaller or larger. 
For instance, in cartel cases, the total loss to the individuals who are exposed 
to the competition restriction can by far exceed the infringers' total gain because of 
16 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U. S. 477 (1977) para 489. 
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social deadweight loss. '7 
"Economic loss" generally refers to financial detriment that can be seen on a 
balance sheet but not physically. Economic loss is then divided into `consequential 
economic loss' which arises directly from some physical damage or injury (e. g. loss 
of earnings - from having your arm cut off) and `pure economic loss' which is 
everything other. 
In Korea, damages recoverable under the Competition Law include all head 
of damage which are awardable. Economic and non- economic loss can be 
compensated. 18 However, the loss caused by anticompetitive conduct is almost 
always pure economic loss. Damage to other interests such as property or body 
integrity is improbable to occur as a consequence from an infringement of 
competition rules. Thus, in competition cases, there is a high probability that any 
damages will be awarded for pure economic loss. 
It is submitted that in the EU, Community law already required the 
compensation of pure economic loss in the context of damages actions against 
Member States for failure to fulfil their Treaty obligations, as in Brasserie du 
Pecher which is a case on damages against Member States. 19 In this case, the Court 
of Justice stated that: 
"Reparation from Member States for loss or damage caused to individuals as 
a result of breaches of Community law must be commensurate with the loss or 
damage sustained. In the absence of relevant Community provisions, it is for the 
domestic legal system of each Member State to set the criteria for determining the 
extent of reparation. However, those criteria must not be less favourable than those 
applying to similar claims based on domestic law and must not be such as in 
" As I discussed section 1.4.3, `deadweight loss' is the loss to plaintiffs arising out of their inability to 
buy the product due to its artificially high price. Social deadweight is sum of deadweight loss. Social 
deadweight loss can be estimated as difference between social welfare in competitive market price and 
social welfare in anticompetitive market price such as monopolized market price. Social deadweight loss 
is important under competition law because anticompetitive conduct can impair public interest such as 
social welfare. In respect to social welfare see Chapter 1. 
11= Competition Law 56(Damages actions against anticompetitive conduct) 19 Brasserie du Pecheur v Bundesrepublik Deutschland and The Queen v Secreratary of State for 
Transport Er p. Factortame, Joined Cases C 46 & 48/93, [1996] ECR I-1029. 
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practice to make it impossible or excessively difficult to obtain reparation. National 
legislation which generally limits the damage for which reparation may be granted 
to damage done to certain, specifically protected individual interests not including 
loss of profit by individuals is not compatible with Community law. Moreover, it 
must be possible to award specific damages, such as the exemplary damages 
provided for by English law, pursuant to claims or actions founded on Community 
law, if such damages may be awarded pursuant to similar claims or actions founded 
on domestic law. , 20 
In conclusion, competition harm has, generally, the nature of pure economic 
losses, as its main effects are likely to be increases in prices and/or loss of business 
opportunities for the competitors of the competition infringer. 
3.1.3 Definition of Anticompetitive Damage 
I would define anticompetitive damage as a loss of a legally protected interest 
or position caused by a restriction or distortion of competition. The measure of 
damage that an individual (or firm) sustained as a result of an infringement of 
competition law is the financial difference between the positions with and without 
the infringement. 
Anticompetitive damage is the difference between the total profit that could 
reasonably be expected throughout the duration of the infringement and the total 
profit if it had not taken place. It can be a something that has been lost as a result of 
the anticompetitive conduct or it can be a loss of future earnings if unlawful 
conduct could impair the possibility of earnings in the future. A loss of future 
earnings ought to be reasonably foreseeable because the damage must be certain 
and existing. 21 
20 Ibid., para. 5. 
21 In respect to a loss of future earnings, see section 3.2.1 which deals with Korea cases related to future 
earning. 
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3.2. If there is compensable anticompetitive damage, what should 
be the principle of compensation for damages? 
If compensable anticompetitive damage exists, the key question is that what 
the criteria of damage are. Namely, what is the right measure of damages to be 
awarded? Should the measure of damages be the loss to victims, the illegal gain of 
the infringers, or a sum calculated to punish the infringers? Which measures are the 
better criteria for recovery of damage? 
Compensatory damages are to compensate the plaintiff for the loss he (or 
she) has actually suffered. When court orders compensation it orders the defendant 
to compensate the plaintiff for his loss. 
The legitimacy of exemplary (or punitive) damages, on the other hand, is 
based on ideas of punishment, deterrence and wider social goals. 
22 Exemplary 
damages bear no relation to loss or gain. Exemplary damages may be imposed by 
the judge powering order to sanction the defendant. 23 A legal system may make 
exemplary damages available when there is the need for something more than 
compensatory award. 24 It is possible to have a system of multiple damages (such as 
the treble damages system in the US) whereby the amount of damages needed to 
compensate the plaintiff is multiplied by a certain factor to provide for deterrence 
and/or punishment. Multiple damages may also operate as a way of making the 
defendant disgorge illegal gains. 
Remedies in restitution are based on the concept of the defendant giving back 
what he has obtained from the plaintiff. Unlike remedies in tort, which are founded 
on the principle of compensation, restitution is based on the principle of recovery. 
However, there are complications where the plaintiff has made use of the 
See Lord Hailsham in Broome v Cassell & Co [1972] A. C. 1027; See also case Cooper Industries V. 
Leatherman Tool Grp., 532 U. S. 424 (2001); see also case Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323 
(1974). In this case "Punitive damages are not compensation for injury... but are private fines levied by 
civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence"; see W. Page Keeton et al., 
"Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts" 5th ed. 1984, p. 9. In this book, he explained that punitive 
damages are awarded to punish the defendant, to teach the defendant not to "do it again, " and to deter 
others from similar behaviour. 
23 Jürgen Basedow, "Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law", Kluwer Law, 2007, p. 17. 24 Jenny Steele, "Tort Law: Text, Cases, and Materials", Oxford, 2007, p. 540. 
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defendant's property to make a profit. Restitutionary damages are aimed at forcing 
the defendant to give up what he has gained at the plaintiffs expense. Therefore the 
plaintiff not only recovers what he lost but also the profit made with it. 
Restitutionary damages are sometimes called disgorgement damages. There is 
much controversy about whether such a gain-based remedy should really be called 
damages at all. 25 In this thesis, however, the remedy will for ease of discussion be 
treated as a form of damages called `restitutionary damages'. 
In respect to deciding what is the best type of damages to be awarded in 
competition cases, it is therefore worth considering whether the infringer should 
compensate the plaintiff for the loss it has suffered, punish the wrongdoer, or 
disgorge illegal gain which has been obtained through his anticompetitive activity. 
In the next sections, I discuss which approach is taken in the jurisdictions I am 
considering and, in the light of this, which approach is preferable and in particular 
which would be best for Korea. 
3.2.1 The Current Situation in respect of the principle of 
compensation for damages in Korea 
In Korea the principles governing compensation for breach of competition 
law are normally the same as those in the general civil law. 26 The general principle 
of damages under Civil Law is that compensation is awarded in terms of the 
damage actually incurred. 27 Damages actions can be seen as being compensatory in 
nature to promote private interests and to ensure the protection of an individual 
right. Damages are not intended to have a deterrence or punishment effect over and 
above compensation for damage. There is a general ban on exemplary damages 
since the primary aim of damages is compensation. 28 
u See for example the discussion by the UK Law Commission in Consultation Paper No. 132, Part VII, 
Restitutionary Damages; Peter Cane, "The Anatomy of Tort Law", Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997, p. l l- 
13 
26 As I already discussed Korea does not have Tort law. All provisions related to damages actions are 
under Civil Law. 
27 Kwac Yun-Gik, "General Principles of Obligations Law", Parkyoungsa, 2005, p. 108; Kim Hyung-Bae, 
"General Principles of Obligations Law", Parkyoungsa, 1999, pp. 245-246; Song Deok-Soo, "New Lecture 
on Civil Law"(3`d ed. ), Parkyoungsa, 2010, p. 943; Gi Won-Lim, "Lecture on Civil Law"(5`h ed. ), 
Hongmunsa, 2007, p. 907 
2* It is not expressly proscribed by the law, however, the primary aim of damages is compensation. Lee, 
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Following this general principle, in Korea, damages are awarded for the loss 
suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the anticompetitive conduct of a defendant. It 
can be argued that basing recovery on the plaintiff's loss rather than the illegal gain 
generally has worked we1129 because it aligns incentives for bringing an action with 
the parties most affected by the infringement, as they have the most to gain from a 
successful action. It also avoids difficult questions that determine whether an 
infringer has benefited from an illegal conduct and how to allocate any recovery of 
the defendants' illegal gain among plaintiffs. 
In this point, the roles of damages actions are different the roles of public 
enforcement. As already explained, the public interest is pursued by public 
enforcers and private interests are pursued by private parties through damages 
actions. 30 The courts have never required damages to be paid in excess of the 
amount of actual loss in order to punish. Nothing in the case law in respect of 
competition damages actions suggests that compensation for damage requires the 
introduction of remedies that allow a plaintiff to recover damages in excess of the 
losses actually suffered. Plaintiffs can recover only actual damages for 
infringements. In this way, the courts seem to be adjusting the normal civil law 
practice to take account of the particular nature of competition law because usually, 
civil law recognizes actual loss. 
While it is difficult to see Korea easily accepting the concept of exemplary 
damages, 31 Korea has the concept of full compensation. 32 Full compensation 
means plaintiffs should be fully compensated for the harm they have suffered. The 
compensation should cover both the effective loss (damnum emergens) and the gain 
that the victim could have obtained (lucrum cessans). For full compensation, courts 
have taken into account both the gravity and duration of damage sustained to 
quantify damage. 33 To ensure full compensation, Korean Civil Procedure Law 
Byung-Ju, "The harmonization of public and private enforcement: A Korean Perspective", 5t' Seoul 
International Competition Forum, 2008, p. 5-6. " See below Korea cases, Jung San, Sam An and Aloes. These cases are based on compensation for loss. 
In Korea, usually, recovery is based on loss because it has worked well. 30 See section 1.3.1.2 which deals with role of private and public enforcement. 31 See generally, Shin Hyun-Yun, supra note 9, pp. 405-412. In this book, Prof. Shin insists that 
compensation for anticompetitive conduct should be compensator not punitive or exemplary. Kwon Oh- 
Sung, supra note 9, p. 476: Chung Ho-Yul, "Competition Law"(2" ed. ), Parkyoungsa, 2008, pp. 484-485. 
32 Civil Law 750(Damages actions) 
33 Civil Procedure Law 207; Supreme Court, (1987.5.26), 86DACA1876. 
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allows inflation in maintaining the value of damage. Courts also have considered 
factors such as inflation that reduce the value of compensation in calculating 
damages. Plaintiffs are able to obtain compensation for those elements of damage 
that can not be limited, such as capital loss caused by inflation. 34 The award of 
interest in cases of damages for infringements has been also declared essential by 
the Supreme Court as an element of full compensation. 35 Compensatory interests 
for the period between the occurrence of a specific damage and the judgment 
ordering compensation should be taken into account as loss of monetary value. 36 
Even though he must be fully compensated, a plaintiff may be under a duty to 
mitigate his loss 37 Courts should ensure that reparation shall not be in full if the 
plaintiff has been guilty of contributory negligence or/and, being under duty to 
mitigate the damaged sustained, has not done so in an appropriate manner. 
Well-established case laws show that persons infringing competition law 
must pay compensation to victim for damages caused by illegal conduct. The 
following three leading cases illustrate how the principles are applied. 
A. Jung San co. Case 
This case concerned a vertical contract between the plaintiff and defendant. 
Jung San co. (hereafter, Jung San) is a company which manufactures and sells 
cosmetics. Jung San made a reseller agency 38contract with the plaintiff. The 
agreement contained territorial restrictions and price restrictions. Therefore the 
plaintiff (like Jung San's other resellers) could resell the cosmetics only in certain 
districts and at a designated price. The plaintiff, who had the right of re-selling the 
cosmetics in Ilwon district of On Yang city, broke the contract and sold the 
cosmetics at a lower price than designated and outside the Ilwon district. The Jung 
San warned the plaintiff that if it persisted in this breach of the contractual terms 
then Jung San would cease to supply him with cosmetics. In this case, there is 
3+ Supreme Court, (1987.5.26), 86DACA1876 
35 Supreme Court, (1966.10.21), 64DA1102; Supreme Court, (1975.7.27), 74DA1393. 
36 Civil Procedure Law 109 
37 Civil Law 750(Damages actions) 31 The `agency' was in fact an independent distributor. It is different from genuine agency agreements 
which are considered that the two parties form one economic entity in EU law. 
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causation between infringement and damage. 39 
The decision of the KFTC4° 
The plaintiff made a complaint to the KFTC. The KFTC brought proceedings and 
made a decision that the contract infringed the Competition Law 23(5)41 because of 
the territorial and price restrictions. Armed with the decision of the KFTC, the 
plaintiff brought damages actions before the court. Before the revision of the 
provision on damages actions (Competition Law 56) legal or natural persons could 
only bring damages actions before the courts following an infringement decision 
of the KFTC (ie only `follow-on' actions were available). In 2004, this provision 
was revised to allow plaintiffs to bring `standalone' damages actions before courts 
without any decision of infringement of the KFTC. 42 
Judgments of the High and Supreme Courts 
. 
In respect to the damages action, four main issues can be identified. Firstly, 
whether the defendant' conduct infringed Competition Law23 (5) 43 or whether the 
defendant has justified reasons not to supply cosmetics to plaintiff. Secondly, what 
is the effect of the decision of infringement of the KFTC. One important issue was 
whether, even though the KFTC had found an infringement, the court could decide 
that the refusal to supply was justified. The Supreme Court answered this 
question. 44 Thirdly, what kind of damage can be recognized and fourthly, how to 
calculate the damages. 
39 This is the conclusions of the KFTC and courts. 40 KFTC decision(1987) NA726 
41 Competition Law 23(5) Contract restricting district or price is illegal. 42 See section 2.1.1.3 which deals with the current situation of private competition enforcement in Korea. 
See also section 1.3.1.4 which deals with the stand-alone/follow-on action. Before the revision of 
provision of damages actions (Competition Law 56) with the only the decision of infringement of the 
KFTC, legal or natural person can bring damages actions before courts. In 2004, this provision was 
revised to bring damages actions before courts without any decision of infringement of the KFTC. 43 Competition Law 23(5) 
44 See judgement of Supreme Court of this case below. 
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High Court judgment45 
With regard to first issue, the defendant insisted it had justification for not 
supplying cosmetics to the plaintiff because the cosmetics were organic, and 
therefore needed special preservation and treatment. It claimed the plaintiff sold 
these special cosmetics at a lower price than contracted and did not treat them 
appropriately, which caused damage to consumers because the cosmetics were 
spoiled. The defendant claimed it could face damages actions brought by 
consumers for damage caused by plaintiff's behaviour. 
The defendant argued that these cosmetics needed special treatment or that 
the plaintiffs lower price restricted `competition' or impaired consumer `interests' 
by spoiling the quality of the cosmetics. The High Court did not accept the 
arguments of the defendant because there was no evidence of restricting 
competition or impairing consumer interests. On the contrary, the plaintiffs lower 
price benefited consumers. Therefore, the High court made the decision that the 
defendant should compensate the plaintiff reseller agency for the damage caused to 
it through restricting its business. The High court also held that it restricted 
competition in cosmetic market. 
The High court also made a decision on the amount of damages. The damage 
was to be measured from the day the defendant stopped supplying cosmetics to the 
day when the reseller agency contract between plaintiff and defendant would have 
expired. Therefore the court decided that the plaintiff could get damages in respect 
of the period from 19.11.1986 to 30.9.1987, in total 10 months and 12 day. 
From the day the plaintiff opened the reseller agency to the day it closed this 
agency, the plaintiff's total income was 3,780,000 Won46( average monthly income 
2,346,402 Wonxlmonth and 15days). Therefore, the total damages were 8,967,254 
Won, which is the average monthly income (2,346,402 Won) multiplied by the 
above period, 10 months and 12 days from which subtracted the average monthly 
cost (1,484,166Won) for the same period. The court's calculation was as follows: 
45 High Court (1989.10.13) 89NA18711 
4' According to current exchange rate £1 -T2,023 Won(July. 9). 
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{2,346,402x(10+12/30)}- {1,484,166x(10+12/30)} = 8,967,255 Won 
The Supreme court Judgment47 
The Supreme Court also agreed with the decision of High court. The Court 
recognized that when the undertakings made the reselling contract restricting the 
district where the goods could be resold and the price that could be charged, the 
contract was illegal because it restricted competition. When the defendant did not 
supply the product because the plaintiff sold at a lower price than contracted, it was 
behaving anticompetitive and thus illegally. Therefore, the defendant had liability 
to compensate the plaintiff for damage caused by termination of contract. 
B. Sam Jin Co. Case 
This case is also about a vertical contract between the plaintiff and defendant. 
The defendant was the enterprisers' association48 making and selling tofu, which is 
made of beans. The plaintiff, Sam Jin food co. (hereafter, Sam Jin) was a member 
of the defendant association. The defendant supplied the beans, the ingredient of 
tofu, to the plaintiff at a price that was cheaper than the wholesale market price. The 
defendant also made a contract with the plaintiff restricting the district and price as 
in the previous case. The plaintiff sold beans supplied by defendant to consumers. It 
also made and sold tofu which is made of beans supplied by defendant to 
consumers. Sam Jin broke the contract and resold beans as less than the stipulated 
resale price. The contract did not stipulate the price of the finished product, tofu. 
However, if the defendant does not supply beans, the plaintiff cannot make tofu and 
will suffer damage from not being able to make and sell tofu. The defendant 
expelled the plaintiffs from the association and did not supply 50,150Kg beans. 
47 Supreme Court Case (1990.4.10) 89 DACA29075 
4: Competition Act 2(Definition) (1) The enterpriser refers to an person who operates a manufacturing 
business, a service business, or any other business. (4) The term enterprisers association means a juristic 
person or federation that is organized by two or more enterprisers for the purpose of promoting their 
common interests, regardless of the organization's form. It is an official translation. 
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The KFTC decision49 
The plaintiff made a complaint to the KFTC which found that the defendant 
had restricted the districts into which the goods could be resold and the resale price 
thus infringing the Competition Law 23(5). It made a decision of infringement and 
issued a corrective order of supplying beans to plaintiff. The plaintiff then brought 
damages actions before court based on decision of infringement of the KFTC. 
Judgments of High and Supreme Court 
The High Court Decision50 
The High court gave a judgment finding an infringement because the defendant's 
practice restricted competition, and therefore it infringed the Competition Law 
23(5). Therefore, the defendant was liable to compensate the plaintiff in damages 
according to the Competition Law 56. 
The High Court also decided the amount of damages. The amount of 
damages was the price (per kg 975 Won) the plaintiff had to buy bean in the 
wholesale price after subtracting the price (per kg 440 Won) at which the defendant 
supplied it, multiplied by the amount (18,750 kg) the plaintiff bought. Therefore, 
the amount of damage was 535(Won)x 18,750 kg = 10,031,250 Won. High Court 
did not recognize foreseeable income by selling Tofu. However, if defendant had 
supplied more beans to plaintiff, it could have made more money by both selling 
beans and Tofu. 
The Supreme Court Decisionsl 
In this case, the decision of Supreme Court is very significant because it laid 
down important rules about the calculation of damages and the amount plaintiffs 
should recover. 
49 KFTC decision(1988) NA814 
50 High court (8.11.1990) 90 NA25586 
51 Supreme court (1991.5.19)90DA17422 
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The Supreme Court agreed with the decision of infringement of the High 
Court. However, it did not agree with the decision of High Court about the amount 
of damage. The Supreme Court, unlike the High Court, recognized foreseeable 
income i. e. the future profit which would have been gained but for infringement. It 
held that the difference between the prices (per kg 440Won) the defendant supplied 
and the wholesale price (per kg 975) was substantial and the plaintiff could have 
made more income if he could have obtained beans from the defendant because 
plaintiff could make more Tofu at a cheaper cost and sell it to consumers. 
Therefore, the amount of damage was the market wholesale price (per kg 
975) subtract the price (per kg 440 Won) the defendant supplied and was multiplied 
the amount (50,150kg) the plaintiff was expected to buy from defendant to make 
Tofu. ' Therefore, the amount of damage is 535(Won)x 50,150kg = 
26,830,250Won. 
This decision of Supreme Court is noteworthy because it recognized 
foreseeable income as well as actual income by allowing expected income, 52 which 
can ensure `full compensation'. 53 It is therefore more beneficial to plaintiff. 
In all these cases, the Supreme Court stated that 
"The reparation for loss or damage caused to individuals as a result of 
breaches of competition law must be commensurate with the loss or damage 
04 sustained so as to ensure the effective protection of those rights. 
It is submitted that when assessing damages, the plaintiff must do more than 
simply state his estimate of lost profit. He must introduce evidence that offers a 
comparison of his actual revenues with the probable revenues when the infringer's 
52 Actual income means gross receipts minus ordinary and necessary expenses required to produce 
income. 
s' In respect to this decision, commentators support Supreme Court decision because it can ensure full 
compensation. Kim Young Kab, "Damages actions of Competition Act", 30(4) justice 66,2003, p. 82 54 Jung San Co. Case- Supreme Court Case (1990.4.10) 89 DACA29075; Sam Jin Co. Case- Supreme 
court (1991.5.19)90DA17422; Aloe Case - Supreme Court (1997.4.22), 96DA54195 
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anticompetitive conduct is absent. Failure to offer an appropriate evidence of his 
damage may result in non-recovery for plaintiff. 
'Under Article 57 of the Competition Law, in case it is difficult to verify the 
amount of damages, the court may confirm the substantial amount of damages by 
55 virtue of its authority. 
The Competition Law 57 (Limitations on Claims for Damages and Related 
Matters) states that: 
"When it is extremely difficult to prove any necessary facts to verify the 
damaged amount considering the characteristics of the fact, even though the 
occurrence of damage is admitted for infringement of the provision, the court shall 
admit the substantial amount of damage based on the result of evidentiary 
"s6 investigation and the intent of overall pleading. 
- This provision seems very important in calculating damages. It is 
desirable to 
apply this provision in competition area especially in representative action because 
it is not easy to calculate the loss caused by anticompetitive conduct in this action. 
3.2.2 The Current Situation in respect of the principle of 
compensation for damages in the EU 
Articles 81 and 82 EC do not define the damage caused or the measure of 
damages for the purpose of an EC private competition law claim. Neither does 
Regulation 1/2003 answer all the questions on the remedies available to private 
parties. 7 It gives rise to the following question. Is it for the domestic legal systems 
to determine the assessment of compensation? The answer to this question would 
indicate the scope of the defendant's liability, and what a plaintiff would be entitled 
ss It is a reference to the Competition Act 57 which I set out in the following paragraph. 
56 Competition Law 57 (Limitations on Claims for Damages and Related Matters). It is an official 
translation by the Korea Fair Trade Commission. 
57 See Council Regulation 1/2003, [2003] O. J. L 1/ 1; See also, "Private antitrust enforcement of EC 
competition rules: recent developments", Competition Law Insight, 2004 p. 5. 
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to recover in a private competition damages claim. 8 
The ECJ has stressed that damages actions are important in enforcing the 
rights derived from Community law. Case law had already established that a 
Member State infringing EC law must pay compensation to private parties for 
damages caused because the Member State has failed to fulfil its Community 
obligations. 59 The ECJ judgment in Courage v Crehan stated in respect of 
competition law that: 
"As regard the possibility of seeking compensation for loss caused by such a 
contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort competition, the national courts, 
whose task is to apply the provisions of Community law in areas within their 
jurisdiction, must ensure that those rules take full effect and must protect the rights 
which they confer on individuals 60 
In Courage v Crehan, the Court recognized compensatory damages should be 
payable to individuals harmed by breaches of the competition rules. The ECJ 
judgment in Crehan indicated that damages serve the purpose of compensation 
rather than punishment or deterrence. The ECJ stated that: 
"... the practical effect of the prohibition laid down in Article 81(1) would be 
put at risk if it were not open to any individual to claim damages for loss caused to 
him by a contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort competition"61 
In respect to damage to be compensated, there are two important principles, 
effectiveness and equivalence, that must be observed. Where national courts are 
awarding damages, the principle of effectiveness requires that it may not be made 
impossible or excessively difficult for parties to exercise rights derived from EC 
law. 62 In a case on State liability, Brasserie du Pecheur, 63 the ECJ held that the 
s= Mihail Danov, "Awarding Exemplary (or Punitive) Antitrust Damages in EC Competition Cases with 
an International Element- The Rome II Regulation and the Commission's White Paper on Damages", 
29(7)E, C. L. R. 430,2008. 
59 Francovich, Joined Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, [1991] ECR 1-5357; Brasserie du Pecheur, Joined cases 
C-46/93 & C-48/93, [1996] ECR 1-1029; Courage v Crehan, C-452/99, [2001]ECR 1-6297. 
`O Courage v Crehan, C-452/99, [2001]ECR 1-6297. 
61 Courage v Crehan, C-452/99, [2001]ECR 1-6297 at para. 2 ; J. Edelman and 0. Odudu, "Compensatory 
Damages for Breaches of Article 81", 27 E. L. Rev. 327,2002. 
62 Rewe v Landwirtschaftskammer, C-33/76, [1976] ECR 1989, at para. 5 
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"reparation for loss or damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of 
Community law must be commensurate with the loss or damage sustained so as to 
ensure the effective protection of those rights. "64 In Crehan, the ECJ has also 
reconfirmed the principle of effectiveness by stating that national rules granting 
only symbolic compensation to the aggrieved party are contrary to the principle of 
effectiveness 65 and should be disregarded. 66 
In Manfredi, the ECJ applied this rule to damages actions in competition 
cases and held that the plaintiff must be entitled to compensation not only for the 
actual loss but also for loss of profit, including interest. According to the Court, "it 
follows from the principle of effectiveness and the right of any individual to seek 
compensation for loss caused by a contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort 
competition that injured persons must be able to seek compensation not only for 
actual loss (damnum emergens) but also for loss of profit (lucrum cessans) plus 
interest. s67 
In this case, the ECJ affirmed that an infringement of national law may also 
qualify as an infringement of Art. 81, and that national courts are entitled to apply 
both. 
The principle of equivalence requires that the remedies available to enforce 
EC law must be equivalent to those available to enforce comparable national law 
provisions. 68 The ECJ recalled that in Manfredi it: 
In Manfredi, the ECJ stated that: 
"In accordance with the principle of equivalence, it must be possible to award 
63 Brasserie du Pecheur v Bundesrepublik Deutschland and The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport 
Exp. Factortame, Joined Cases C 46 & 48/93, [1996] ECR 1-1029. 
" Ibid. 
65 Rewe v Landwirtschaftskammer, C-33/76, [1976] ECR 1989, at para. 5.; Courage v Crehan, C-452/99, 
L2001 ]ECR 1-6297. 
Sabine van Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen , C- 14/83, [1984] ECR 1891 61 Manfredi V. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, C-295/04, [2006] ECJ, 348 para 95. " See, for example, Hans Just 1/S v. Danish Ministry for Fiscal Affairs, Case 68/79, [1980] ECR 501; 
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato V. SpA San Georgio, Case 199/82, [1983]ECR 
3595; [1985]2CMLR658; Rewe v. Landwirtschaftskammer, Case 33/76, [1976] ECR 1989 at para. 5. 
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particular damages, such as exemplary or punitive damages, pursuant to actions 
founded on the Community competition rules, if such damages may be awarded 
pursuant to similar actions founded on domestic law. "69 
In Manfredi, 70 the ECJ was making the same point about exemplary damages 
as it had in Crehan. In Manfredi, the Court reaffirmed principle of equivalence. It 
was saying that the principle of equivalence means that if these types of damages 
are available in similar cases in national law they must be available for breach of 
the Community rules. 7' 
Given the principle of effectiveness, national courts are obliged to interpret 
national procedural rules in light of these principles of effectiveness and 
equivalence. 
In its White Paper, the Commission stated that compensatory damages should 
be the minimum available and did not expressly advocate the use of restitutionary 
damages. The White Paper recognizes that in the absence of Community law on the 
matter, Member States are allowed to take steps to ensure that the protection of the 
right to claim damages for the loss caused by a competition law infringement if it 
does not entail the unjust enrichment of the victims. 72 
Therefore, according to the judgments in Courage v Crehan, 
" and 
Manfredi74 and the White Paper, a domestic rule allowing exemplary damages may 
also be applied to actions under EC law. 75 It seems that, because of the principle of 
equivalence, victims of an EC competition law infringement are entitled to such as 
exemplary damages, to the extent such damages may be awarded pursuant to 
Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, C-295/04, [2006] ECJ, 348 at para. 93. 
ýo Ibid. 
71 Ibid., at para. 98. Although the judgment only refers to Article 81 EC because of the facts underlying 
the case, the reasoning of the Courts is such that it can also be applied to Article 82 cases. n Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages actions for breach of 
the EC antitrust rules, Com (2008) 165 final, 2008, p. 58. 
73 Courage v Crehan, C-452/99, [2001]ECR 1-6297 
74 Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, C-295/04, [2006] ECJ, 348. 
73 Brasserie du Pecheur v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland and The Queen v. Secretary of State for 
Transport Exp. Factortame, Joined Cases C 46 & 48/93, [1996] ECR 1-1029 para 90. 
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actions founded on the infringement of national competition law. 76 Provided that 
they are awarded in accordance with the general principles of Community law, 
exemplary damages founded on an infringement of EC competition rules are thus 
not excluded. It should also be noted that Courage v Crehan did not deal with the 
issue of restitution between the co-contractors (i. e. the recovery of what had passed 
between the co-contractors under the illegal contract). 77 
Most Member States provide for damages to be compensatory rather than 
punitive in nature. Hence there is no notion of multiple damages being awarded to 
successful plaintiffs as a matter of course in Europe. For example, in Germany, the 
introduction of double damages was discussed in the legislative process for the new 
German competition law as a means of deterring potential infringers, but was not 
ultimately enacted. 78 
The vast majority of Member States provides for damages to be 
compensatory and does not permit the recovery of exemplary damages. 79 The 
Commission's suggestion in the White Paper is that a minimum compensatory 
threshold should be set (i. e., to account for the actual loss, loss of profit, and 
interest), but that Member States should be free to go further and award punitive or 
other damages if their domestic legal systems provide for this. 
However, it is not probable that the issue of exemplary (or punitive) damages 
76 Georg Berrisch, Eve Jordan and Rocio Salador Roldan, "EU Competition and Private actions for 
Damages", Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business, 2004 p. 593; Commission Staff 
Working Paper accompanying the White Paper, supra note 72, p. 58. r Courage v Crehan was an Article 234 reference and the referring court (the UK Court of Appeal) did 
not ask about restitutionary remedies. See Assimakis P Komninos, "EC Private Antitrust Enforcement: 
Decentralised Application of EC Competition Law by National Courts", Hart Publishing, 2008,172; 
Alessandrao Di Gib, "Contract and Restitution Law and the Private Enforcement of EC Competition 
Law" (2009) 32 World Competition 199. 
7= Monopoly Commission, "Opinion on the draft of the revised competition law", 2004, p. 40. " See section 3.2.3 which deals with the current situation in respect of the criteria and measurement of 
Damages in the UK. Ireland, and the Netherlands, however, their use is extremely circumscribed and only 
in extreme cases of abuse. See Ashurst Report. "Study on the Conditions for Damages in Case of 
Infringement of EC Competition Rules-Comparative Report", 2004, the Executive Summary of the study 
of the Commission, 2004; Jonathan Sinclair, "Damages in Private Antitrust Actions in Europe", 14 Loy. 
Consumer L. Rev. 551,2002; Luke R. Tolaini and Anna M. Morfey, "Antitrust Damages Actions in 
Europe: A Step in the U. S. Direction? ", 22-SUM Antitrust 93,2008, p. 96; Patricia Hanh Rosochowicz, 
"Deterrence and the relationship between public and private enforcement of competition law", 
Amsterdam Centre for Law and Economics Workshop, 2005, p. 3. 
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is to be solved at EU level, as the matter was not touched upon by the Commission 
in the recently published White Paper on damages actions. 80 It is noteworthy, in 
spite of the fact that the Commission's White Paper makes references to Manfredi, 
which, as discussed above, confirms that exemplary (or punitive) damages may be 
available at national level, the paper does not deal explicitly with the issue . 
81 It is 
in contrast to the US, where the Clayton Act authorizes private competition cases 
and provides for treble damages. 82 
According to the White Paper, "[v]ictims of an EC competition law 
infringement are entitled to full compensation of the harm caused. " That means 
compensation for actual loss (damnum emergens) and for loss of profit (lucrum 
cessans) as a result of any reduction in sales and plus interest from the time the 
damage occurred until the capital sum awarded is actually paid. 83 However, the 
proposed damages are compensatory in nature, not punitive such as treble damages 
applicable in the US. 84 The White Paper also upholds the principle of not allowing 
unjust enrichment which is prohibited as a matter of Community law (the acquis 
communitaire as it is called) at present. 85 In the White Paper, the model outlined by 
the Commission is based on compensation through single damages for the harm 
suffered rather than multiple damages. This means compensation of the actual loss 
due to e. g. an anti-competitive price increase. 
3.2.3 The Current Situation in respect of the principle of 
compensation for damages in the UK 
In English law, the nature of the cause of damages actions for infringement of 
86 EC competition law is characterized as the tort of breach of statutory duty. This 
50 European Commission, "White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules", 
COM(2008) 165 fmal. 
Ibid., section 2.5. 
$2 15 U. S. C. § 12 
33 Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper, supra note 72, at 58; Sweet & 
Maxwell Limited and Contributors, "Commission Presents Paper on Compensating Victims of 
Competition Breaches", EU Focus 231,2008, p. 2. i4 White Paper on Damages actions, supra note 80, section 2.5. ýs Ibid. section 2.4 ; see also See Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper, supra 
note 72, para 191 onwards. 
' Garden Cottage Foods Ltd v. Milk Marketing Board [1984] 1 A. C. 130 
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stems from section 2(1) European Communities Act 1972 which provides a 
statutory basis for the recognition of directly effective EC law rights and duties in 
the English legal system. The principles of English law applicable to the tort of 
breach of statutory duty will, therefore, also apply to a claim for breaches of Article 
81 and 82 provided that those rules do not conflict with the Community law 
principles that require national law not to discriminate between similar claims under 
national and EC law and not to prevent the availability of an effective remedy for 
87 breach of EC law. The ECJ has held that an individual who has suffered loss as a 
result of breach of Article 81 or 82 by another undertaking or undertakings, must be 
able to recover damages in respect of that loss. 88 English law must supply the 
framework for such action. 89 
In the UK, infringement of the competition provisions is a tort for which the 
principal remedy is the award of damages. 9° In English tort law damages are 
normally assessed on the basis of injuries suffered by the plaintiff. Exemplary 
damages have been strictly controlled in Rookes v Barnard. 91 In this case, the 
House of Lord stated that: 
"The general principle is that damages should compensate the plaintiff and 
not punish the defendant..... Exemplary damages may be awarded for particular 
torts but it is entirely permissive and never mandatory. " 
It also stated that: 
`Exemplary damages are essentially different from ordinary, damages. The 
object of damages in the usual sense of the term is to compensate. The objective of 
exemplary damages is to punish and deter. It may well be thought that this confuses 
the civil and criminal functions of the law. s92 
87 "Executive summary and overview of the UK national report", 2006, p. 1. This report was made to 
respond to Ashurst Report 2004. See also Ashurst Report, supra note 79. 11 Courage Ltd v Crehan, C-453/99, [2001 ] ECR 1-6297. 
_' Ibid. See also Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, "EC Competition Law", 3'd ed., Oxford, 2007, p. 1338. 90 Crehan V. Interpreneur [2004] EWCA Civ 637 
91 See Rookes v Barnard [1964] A. C. 1129 at 1159. 92 Ibid., at 1221. 
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It set out three categories in which exemplary damages were available at the 
jury's or judges' discretion. 93 The three categories were confirmed by the House 
of Lords in Cassell v Broome. 94 The three categories in which exemplary 
damages95 have been allowed pursue deterrence and the public interest. 96 The first 
is in the case of conduct calculated to make a profit which may well exceed the 
compensation payable to the plaintiff. The second category is cases of oppressive, 
arbitrary or unconstitutional conduct by government servants. The third is express 
authorization by statute. 97 
However, it can be argued that gain-based damages are alternative remedies 
to loss-based damages for civil damages action. 98 Lord Blackburn in Livingstonev 
Raywards Coal Co stated that: 
"When awarding damages the law does not adhere slavishly to the concept 
of compensation for financially measurable loss. When the circumstances require, 
damages are measured by reference to the benefit obtained by the wrongdoer" 
99 
The House of Lords in Kuddus were not enthusiastic about exemplary 
damages. In Kuddus, the plaintiffs argued that'. exemplary damages should be 
available. 100 In this case, however, of the five Law Lords, Lord Nicholls was not 
keen on exemplary damages, three did not express concluded opinions but were not 
in favour of the possibility of making such awards and Lord Scott considered 
exemplary damages to be illegitimate and contrary to the fundamental principle of 
damages awards. '°' 
93 Ibid., at 1226. 
" See Broome v Cassell and Co [1972] A. C. 1027. 
93 Exemplary and punitive are in effect, the same thing. Thus, in this thesis, I use exemplary damages 
instead of punitive damages. 
% See Broome v Cassell and Co [1972] A. C. 1027. It could be also allowed where exemplary damages 
are expressly provided by statute. For instance, see the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988; See 
Williams v Settle [1960] 1 W. L. R. 1072. 
97 See e. g. Copyright Designs and Patent Act % Stephen Watterson, "An Account of Profits or Damages? The History of Orthodoxy", Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies, 2004, p. 471. In this article, Watterson argued that the money remedies available for civil 
wrongdoing are not limited to compensatory damages. 
99 Lord Blackburn in Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co (1879-80) L. R. 5 App. Cas. 25 at 39. 10° Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary [2001]UKHL29; [2001] 2 W. L. R. 1789. 
Where the `cause of action test' previously limited the use of exemplary damages to claims based on a 
cause of action for which such damages were already an established remedy. 
101 Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary [2001]UKHL29; [2001] 2 W. L. R. 1789, HL. 
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In BCL Old Co Ltd v Aventis, the CAT stated that it would need to consider 
whether the claims before it should be assessed on the basis of the question `what 
has been lost due to breach? ' or the question `what has been unjustly gained by 
defendant? ' and suggested that section 47A of the Competition Act 1998(which 
creates the right of third parties to bring follow-on actions) may cover both 
possibilities. '02 
As explained in section 3.2. above tort damages are different from 
restitutionary damages since restitutionary damages is gain-based whereas tort 
damages is loss- based compensation. 103 In Wass, there were two general rules 
governing the provision of relief in tort, expressed in the following terms: 
"The general rule is that a successful plaintiff in an action in tort recovers 
damage equivalent to the loss which he has suffered, no more and no less. If he has 
suffered no loss, the most he can recover are nominal damages. A second general 
rule is that where the plaintiff has suffered loss to his property or some proprietary 
right, he recovers damages equivalent to the diminution in value of the property or 
104 right. " 
In respect to restitutionary damages in competition area, the leading case is 
now Devenish Nutrition v Sanofi Aventis. 1°5 This case is about the measure of 
damages in cartel cases. The case represents the latest claim in a series of private 
competition law actions based upon the EC Commission Decision of November 21, 
2001 106 related to vitamins cartels which operated in the animal feed industry 
throughout the 1990s. 107 In 2001, the European Commission found that certain 
vitamin manufacturers, including the respondents, had participated in eight cartels 
102 BCL Old Co Limited and others v. Aventis SA and. Others, Case No 1028/5/7/04, [2005]CAT 2. 103 Peter Cane, "The Anatomy of Tort Law", Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997, p. 11-13. 104 Stoke-on-Trent City Council vW&J Wass Ltd and Halifax Building Society v Thomas [ 1988] 1 W. L. R. 
1406 at 1410. 
ios Devenish Nutrition Limited v. Sanofi Aventis SA(France) and others, Case A3/2008/0080, 
[2008]EWCA Civ 1086; See also, Devenish Nutrition Ltd v Sanofi Aventis SA [2007] EWHC 2394 (Ch). 06 Decision relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA 
Agreement (COMP/E-1/37.512-Vitamins) [2003] OJ L6/1. 
1° During the 1990s, members of the three defendant groups of companies participated, with a number of 
other vitamin manufacturers, in the cartels. In its case, the Commission found the defendants to be in 
breach of Art. 81 and delivered swingeing fines, intended to reflect the gravity and duration of the 
offences and also to represent a deterrent. 
131 
relating to the supply of various vitamin products and imposed fines totalling 
855.22 million. During the operation of the cartel, Devenish Nutrition Ltd 
("Devenish") was a purchaser of vitamins, which it mixed with other ingredients to 
make animal feedstuffs and it then sold them to customers. Devenish brought an 
action against certain companies within the Hoffman la Roche, BASF and Aventis 
groups, alleging damages for the tort of breach of statutory duty based upon the 
infringement of Article81 EC. Devenish was therefore a follow on action brought 
after the Commission's public enforcement. Claiming in tort for breach of statutory 
duty and relying on the Decision as legal proof. of an infringement of Community 
competition law, the plaintiffs sought compensatory damages, exemplary damages, 
restitutionary damages and an account of profits. 108 The case raised preliminary 
legal issues relating to the availability of a range of remedies beyond the normal 
compensatory measure of tortious damages. 
In 2007, the High Court ruled that neither restitutionary nor exemplary 
damages would be available to the plaintiffs. 109 On October 14,2008, the Court of 
Appeal delivered its judgment on the appeal from the High Court. It upheld the 
judge's rejection of Devenish's claim for restitutionary damages. 11° The Court of 
Appeal held that a restitutionary award was not available in this case and noted that 
even in cases where a restitutionary award is available, it is generally awarded 
where an award of compensatory damages would be inadequate to compensate the 
plaintiff for the infringement of competition law. " 1 
The Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of Lewinson J in the High Court 
by stating that: 
"A restitutionary award is not an available remedy in an antitrust case. 
Moreover, even where a restitutionary award is an available, it is generally awarded 
where an award of more traditionally based compensatory damages would be 
108 See section 3.2 which deals with the current situation in respect of the criteria and measurement of 
damages in the EU, UK, US and Korea. 1°9 Devenish v Sanofi-Aventis SA (France) and others, [2007] EWHC 2394 (Ch). 
110 Devenish v Sanofi Aventis SA (France) and others, [2008] EWCA Civ 1086, affirming [2007] EWHC 
2394 (Ch). 
"' Ibid. para. 108. 
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inadequate to compensate the plaintiff for the invasion of his rights. Yet in the 
present case, Dr Veljanovskil12 says that the measure of restitutionary damages is 
the same as the measure of compensatory damages. If that is so, then on the 
assumed facts compensatory damages would be an adequate remedy. Therefore, a 
restitutionary award is not available in the present case. "' 13 
According to the Court of Appeal in Devenish, therefore, under English law, 
damages are generally awarded on a compensatory basis. "4 The determination that 
exemplary damages, restitutionary damages and an account of profits should not be 
awarded by the English courts in claims for breaches of Community competition 
law, at least when the infringer has already been fined, has far-reaching 
implications for future private enforcement actions in England and Wales. The 
purpose of the Commission's fine included both punishment and deterrence and 
that an award to punish or deter the defendants further could compromise the 
Community law principle of double jeopardy or non bis in idem. 1is 
While the ECJ in Manfredi has held that, in principle, an award of exemplary 
damages is not precluded by European law, Devenish clarifies that following the 
public enforcement of competition laws and the imposition of a fine, whether 
commuted or not, only compensatory damages can be awarded by an English 
court. 116 In Devenish, the Court of Appeal recognized that in the absence of 
Community rules governing the matter, it is for the Member State courts to decide 
on the appropriate measure of damages, provided that the principles of 
effectiveness and equivalence are respected. It decided, in the light of that, that in 
English law compensatory damages are the normal measure. 
The Court of Appeal said that these principles merely require that national 
remedies should be sufficient and no less favourable than actions based on domestic 
"Z Dr Veljanovski was the expert witness in Devenish case. 113 Devenish v Sanofi-Aventis, [2008] EWCA Civ 1086 at para. 16. 114 Devenish v Sanofi-Aventis, [2008] EWCA Civ 1086 at para. 2 (Arden LJ); Greg Olsen, "Actions for 
damages are Compensation and Deterrence? The passing on defence and the future direction of UK 
? rivate proceedings", Competition Law Insight 4.8(3), 2005 , p. 3. 15i s Non bis in idem is the principle that a person should not be `sanctioned more than once for the same 
unlawful conduct to protect one and the same legal interest". See Archer Daniels Midland Co v 
Commission of the European Communities[2006] 5 CMLR28. 
16 Devenish v Sanofi-Aventis, [2008] EWCA Civ 1086 at para. 16. 
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legislation, conditions which are fulfilled by compensatory damages. The award of 
compensatory damages in this case fulfilled these conditions.. 1 7 
In 2007 the OFT conducted an informal consultation on how to make redress 
for consumers and business for breaches of competition law more effective and 
published a discussion paper. In its discussion paper, the OFT contemplated that in 
some cases there could be a restitutionary award which is different from exemplary 
damage since exemplary damages bear no relation to the loss by the victim or the 
gain by the infringer. The OFT stated that: 
"In terms of the type of damages that may be recoverable, it is well 
established that private actions involve claims for damages that are compensatory in 
nature. In certain circumstances, the courts may award restitutionary damages, 
which aim to strip away some or all of the gains made by a defendant which arise 
from a civil wrong. Furthermore, exemplary damages might be available in certain 
circumstances in England and Wales. Other forms of relief, such as the equitable 
remedy of accounting for profits, may also need to be considered in some cases. It 
will be for the courts to determine how the general principles for determining loss 
or damage in various types of case apply to actions for infringement of competition 
law. "' 18 
A significant infringement relevant for exemplary damage could be bid 
rigging against the state and public authorities. There is evidence drawn from the 
Netherlands"9 and the UK120 that bid rigging against the state is a pervasive form 
of serious anticompetitive activity. It is submitted that the abuse of a dominant 
position could be also relevant for exemplary damage in competition area. 
117 Devenish v Sanofi Aventis, [2008] EWCA Civ 1086 at para. 18. I's The Office of Fair Trading, "Private Actions in Competition Law: Effective Redress for Consumes 
and Business", OFT916,2007, at section 2.11. 19 Doree, "Collusion in the Dutch Construction Industry", Routledge, 2005. 
120 Third OFT Press Release on Roof Contractor Bid Rigging (2006). See: www. oft. gov. uk/News/ Press+ 
releases/ 2006/ 34-06. htm 
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3.2.4 The Current Situation in respect of the principle of 
compensation for damages in the US 
Currently, the US is the only jurisdiction which has mandatory multiple 
damages of any kind such as treble damages. It is the outstanding feature of US law. 
In respect to treble damages, there are two things to be considered. Firstly, what are 
the multiple damages? Secondly, what is the rationale for making the treble 
damages? 
3.2.4.1 Overview of Multiple and Treble Damages? 
Multiple damage remedies allow the plaintiff to recover multiple times the 
amount of damage actually suffered as a result of the anticompetitive conduct. 
Where an infringement of the competition laws is found, this damage could be 
automatically, selectively or discretionally trebled. 
Treble damage remedies allow the plaintiff to recover three times the amount 
of damage actually suffered as a result of the anticompetitive conduct. 121 Where an 
infringement of the antitrust laws is found, damages are automatically trebled. The 
courts do not have discretion to limit recovery to single damages, regardless of the 
nature of the infringement. 122 
In the US the treble damages remedy has been described as "the cornerstone 
of private antitrust enforcement. " 123 However, treble damages are not an 
innovation of the American legislator. Its roots can be traced back to the UK's 
Statute of Monopolies of 1623124 because in this statute, multiple damages were 
121 See the free dictionary by farlex at http: //legal-dictionary. thefreedictionary. com/treble+damage. 
122 With respect to difference between punitive damage and treble damage, See generally, Geraldine 
Alexis, Andrea Deshazo, "Punitive Damages: Is Bifurcation Right for Your Case? ", Antitrust, 2002. 
123 Edward D. Cavanagh, "Antitrust Remedies Revisited", 84 Oregon Law Review 147,2005, p. 222; 
Hannah L. Buxbaum, "Private Enforcement of Competition Law in the Untied States- of Optimal 
Deterrence and Social Costs", in "Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law", Kluwer Law, ed. by 
Jürgen Basedow, 2007, p. 43. 
124 England's Statute of Monopolies of 1623(21 Jac. 1, c. 3), while generally condemning monopolies, 
provided the true and first inventor of a given item up to fourteen years of exclusive rights to their 
invention, provided that : "they be not contrary to the law nor mischievous to the state by raising prices of 
commodities at home, or hurt of trade, or generally inconvenient. " In the UK, the Patents Act 1977 
harmonized UK Patent law, which was no longer based on the Statute of Monopolies; Clifford A. Jones, 
"Exporting Antitrust Courtrooms to the World: Private Enforcement in a Global Market", Loyola 
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recognized first time. The original version of Senator Sherman's bill allowed 
plaintiffs to recover only double damages for any harm suffered as a result of 
antitrust infringements. 125 Awarding treble damages instead was intended by 
Congress in 1890 to encourage private enforcement of antitrust laws for which no 
appropriate public enforcement had been provided. 126 It is argued that fear of non- 
enforcement or minimal enforcement by public enforcers was an appropriate 
political concern back then because there were no effective public antitrust 
enforcers. Treble damages also reflected the view that antitrust litigation was as a 
major and uncertain undertaking for the plaintiff. 127 The Judiciary Committee of 
Congress, in response to concerns that double damages would not sufficiently 
encourage private plaintiffs stipulated treble damages. 128 
However, strengthening the Sherman Act was part of the programme put 
forward by the campaign of Woodrow Wilson in 1912 and led to Clayton Act in 
1914. At the federal level in the US, the scope of recovery by private plaintiffs is 
prescribed by Section 4(a) of the Clayton Act superseding the relevant provisions of 
Sherman Act. The Clayton Act contains all relevant provisions for private enforce- 
ment and provides that: 
"Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of 
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore ... and shall recover 
threefold the damage by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee. " 
129 
Consumer Law Review, 2004, p. 410. 125 See Kintner, "The Legislative History of the Federal Antitrust Laws and Related Statues", 1978; 
Caranagh, "Deterrence Antitrust Damages-An Idea Whose Time Has Come? ", 61 Tul. L. Rev777,1987, 
782-83. 126 
Donald I. Baker, supra note 14, p. 379. 121 Much of the debate concerning the private right of action has focused on its authorization of treble 
damages. See, e. g., Roger D. Blair and William H. Page, "Speculative" Antitrust Damages, 70 Wash. L. 
Rev. 423,1995; Herbert Hovenkamp, "Treble Damages Reform", 33 Antitrust Bull. 233,1988; Robert H. 
Lande, "Are Antitrust Treble Damages Really Single Damages? ", 54 Ohio St. L. J. 115,1993; W. M. 
Landes, "Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations", 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 652,1983. For more 
comprehensive studies of the treble damage remedy, see ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Monograph No. 
13, "Treble-Damages Remedy", 1986; William Breit and Kenneth G. Elzinga, "Antitrust Penalty Reform: 
An Economic Analysis", American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1986; "Private 
Antitrust Litigation: New Evidence, New Learning", edited by Lawrence J. White, 1988. 128 Act of July 2,1890, § 7, ch. 647,26 Stat. 210, superseded by the Clayton Act, § 4,38 Stat. 731 
1914) (now codified as 15 U. S. C. § 15), and ultimately repealed by 69 Stat. 283,1955. 29 15 U. S. C. §15(a) Act of 26 September 1914, Ch. 311,38 Stat. 717 (1914), current version p. 15 U. S. C. 
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3.2.4.2 Rationale for Treble Damages 
US antitrust law was framed for private enforcement to assist public 
enforcement in attaining an optimal enforcement. The primary rationale of treble 
damages is to ensure optimal enforcement through efficient private enforcement. 130 
To encourage private enforcement, Congress made a private right of action for 
individuals or entities harmed by antitrust acts very attractive because it considered 
that single damages are not enough to encourage antitrust actions. 131 
As the Antitrust Modernization Commission noted: "Indeed, in light of the 
fact that some damages may not be recoverable (e. g., compensation for interest 
prior to judgment, or because of the statute of limitations and the inability to 
recover `speculative' damages) treble damages help ensure that victims will receive 
at least their actual damages. 99132 
To the extent the purpose of the remedy is compensation, the damages caused 
by an antitrust violation should consist of the sum of all relatively predictable harms 
caused by that violation affecting anyone other than the defendants. Damages 
should include the wealth transferred from consumers to the violator(s), as well as 
the allocative inefficiency effects felt by society, whether caused directly, or 
indirectly. Plaintiffs' lawyer's fees, the value of plaintiffs' time spent pursuing the 
case, and the cost to the American taxpayer of administering the judicial system 
should also be included. 
It is submitted that to achieve an optimal enforcement through private 
enforcement, the treble damages provisions created a powerful weapon to punish 
anticompetitive conduct. 
98 41-58 (1996). 
3 See generally, Edward D. Cavanagh, "Detrebling Antitrust Damages: An Idea Whose Time Has 
Come? ", 61 Tul. L. Rev. 777,1987, p. 786-788. 131 See generally, John D. Guilfoil, "Damages Determination in, Private Antitrust Suits", Notre Dame L., 
1966-1967; see also generally, John M. Desiderio, "Private Treble Damage Antitrust Actions: An Outline 
of Fundamental Priciples", 48 Brook, L. Rev. 409,1982; In respect to the necessity of treble damages, see 
below footnote 159 for detail. 
132 Antitrust Modernization Commission, "2007 Report and Recommendations", p. 264. available at 
http: //govinfo. library. unt. edu/ amc/report recommendation/amc_fmal report. pdf. 
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I discuss in the following sections four aspects of the rationale of treble 
damages: compensation, deterrence, punishment and disgorgement of illegal gain. 
3.3.4.2.1 Compensation 
The treble damage remedy was intended to serve compensatory purposes. 133 
Treble damages could be a means of full compensationl34 for losses sustained by 
anticompetitive infringements. 135 Treble damages are based on the idea that it can 
raise the incentive for private parties to start damages actions and thereby strongly 
influence on bringing legal action. It was thought that awarding treble damages to 
private enforcers could create a significant incentive for a plaintiff to undertake the 
complex, lengthy, and expensive task of uncovering and prosecuting antitrust 
infringements 136 because there is a high possibility that plaintiffs could get 
compensation three times as their actual damage. 137 Without treble damages, 
plaintiffs are less likely to undertake an arduous competition action even if the 
13s expected compensation is greater than the expected cost of litigating the case. 
3.3.4.2.2 Deterring Future Infringements 
The treble damages remedy serves not only the purpose of compensating the 
victims of antitrust law infringements but also generate a strong deterrent effect on 
133 Patricia Hanh Rosochowicz, supra note 79, p. 5. 134 In respect to the difference between full compensation and over compensation, see section 3.2 which 
deals with full compensation and over compensation. 133 Robert H. Lande and Joshua P. Davis, "Benefits from private antitrust enforcement : an analysis of 
forty cases", University of San Francisco Law Review Vol. 42,2008, p. 882; Edward D. Cavanagh, 
"Statement of Edward D. Cavanagh before the Antitrust Modernization Commission, 2005 p. 3.; See 
Robert H. Lande, supra note 127, pp. 122-124,158-168 136 S. C. Salop and L. J. White, "Private Antitrust Litigation: An Introduction and Framework", in rPrivate Antitrust Litigation] 
, 1988, pp. 1019-1020; Robert McNary, "Optimal Deterrence with 
Public 
and Private Antitrust Enforcement", University of Chicago Law school, Law and Economics Workshop, 
2006, p. 10. 
137 S. C. Salop and L. J. White, "Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust Litigation", 74 Geo. L. J 1001, 
1986, p. 1037; W. M. Landes, supra note 126, p 675. 138 Posner, "Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective", Chicago, 1976, p. 228.; P. Friedman, D. Gelfand 
and C. Nordlander, etc., "Comments of the Section of Antitrust Law and the Section of International Law 
of the American Bar Association in Response to the Request for Public Comment of the Commission of 
the European Communities On Damage Actions for Breaches of EU Antitrust Rules", ABA, April 2006, 
p. 27. 
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potential future perpetrators because treble damages can heighten the probability of 
detection of the infringement of competition law. 139 From a deterrence perspective, 
treble damage is necessary because some violations of antitrust laws go 
undetected. 140 It has been pointed out that because of their typically covert nature, 
antitrust violations such as cartels are often difficult to detect and very expensive to 
prosecute. 14 1 Trebling, however, creates a powerful incentive for private parties to 
investigate, detect and prosecute antitrust violations. 142 Supporters of the treble 
damages mechanism argue that if antitrust recoveries were limited to actual 
damages, private parties would have little motivation to sue, given the 
unpredictability and high costs of antitrust litigation. Nor would actual damages 
provide sufficient compensation at all cases. 143 
In the US, private enforcement has been considered as a deterrent mechanism 
as well as compensatory one, as the US treble damages indicate. '44 In enacting the 
antitrust laws, Congress recognized that mandatory trebling would increase 
prosecution of antitrust violators and enhance the overall goals of antitrust 
139 Hannah L. Buxbaum, "Private Enforcement of Competition Law in the Untied States- of Optimal 
Deterrence and Social Costs", in "Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law", Kluwer Law, ed. by 
Jilrgen Basedow, 2007, p. 45.; Patricia Hanh Rosochowicz, "Deterrence and the relationship between 
public and private enforcement of competition law", Amsterdam Centre for Law and Economics 
Workshop, 2005, p. 5-6; Edward D. Cavanagh, "Statement of Edward D. Cavanagh before the Antitrust 
Modernization Commission, 2005, pp. 4 -6; Franklin M. Fisher, "Economic Analysis and 
Antitrust 
Damages", World Competition, 2006, p. 391; Am. Soc v of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U. S. 
556 (1982); Edward D. Cavanagh, "Detrebling Antitrust Damages : An Idear Whose Time Has Come? ", 
61 Tulane Law Review 777,1987 p. 801-809; see also Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U. S. 465,470 
(1982); see also generally, John M. Desiderio, "Private Treble Damage Antitrust Actions: An Outline of 
Fundamental Principles", 48 Brooklyn Law Review 409,1982; Corinne Bergen, "Generating Extra Wind 
in the Sails of the EU Antitrust Enforcement Boat", Journal of International Business and Law, 2006, p. 
220-221; Robert H. Lande and Joshua P. Davis, "Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement : An 
Analysis of Forty Cases", University of San Francisco Law Review, 2008, p. 882; Tim Reher, "The 
Commission's White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules", The European 
Antitrust Review, 2009, p. 1; P. Friedman, D. Gelfand et al., Ibid., p. 19; 
140 Frank H. Easterbrook, "Detrebling Antitrust Damages", 28 J. L. Econ. 445,1985, p. 454. 
141 Edward D. Cavanagh, "Detrebling Antitrust Damages in Monopolization Cases", 76 Antitrust L. J. 97, 
2009, p. 101. 
12 Frank H. Easterbrook, supra note 140, p. 45 1. 1" Edward D. Cavanagh, supra note 139, p. 101. 144 P. Friedman, D. Gelfand et al., supra note 138, p. 65; Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool Grp., 532 
U. S. 424 (2001) ; see also Gertz, 418 U. S. at 350 (noting that punitive damages "are not compensation for 
injury... [but] are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future 
occurrence"); W. Page Keeton et al., "Law of Torts"(5th ed. ), 1984,, § 2, p. 9 (explaining that punitive 
damages are awarded to punish the defendant, to teach the defendant not to "do it again, " and to deter 
others from similar behavior); W. Kip Viscusi, Why There Is No Defense of Punitive Damages, 87 Geo. 
L. J. 381,381,1998), p. 383. 
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enforcement. 145 Treble damages will influence the incentive of potential plaintiffs 
to bring actions. 146 
The important question is whether mandatory trebling provides the 
appropriate level of deterrence. A multiple is necessary to force the violator to 
equate liability with damages caused. The function of treble damages is punishment 
as well as compensation, it is necessary to consider what kind of damage could be 
suitable for exemplary damage in competition cases. It is submitted that treble 
damages can be awarded for the typical and blatant competition law infringements, 
such as price-fixing cartel. Multiplication is essential to create optimal incentives 
for would-be infringers when unlawful acts are not certain to be detected and 
prosecuted successfully. 147 From an economic perspective, the appropriate 
deterrent level turns on the likelihood that objectionable conduct will be detected 
and penalized. 148 It is argued that a multiplier is desirable if the probability of 
detecting and penalizing the offence is less than one hundred percent. 149 If the 
likelihood of being caught is one in two, then double damages provide the 
appropriate deterrent. '5° If the chances of successful prosecution are one in ten, 
then damages amounting to ten times the actual damages would be optimal. 
Multiple damages may therefore counteract the low-probability of detection and 
prosecution and ensure appropriate level of enforcement. 151 If this is correct, the 
US mandatory trebling would be optimal when the chances of detection are one in 
three. 
Multiple damages are most relevant for practices that are concealable and 
clandestine, such as horizontal-price-fixing cartels because covert behavior is 
difficult to detect. 152 Furthermore, there is no probable justification of cartels since 
such infringements damage to competition as well as their victims i. e. they cannot 
145 Antitrust Modernization Commission, supra note 132, pp. 246-247. 1" Edward D. Cavanagh, supra note 141, p. 102. 147 See section 1.4.3 which deals with way to achieve optimal enforcement of competition law. 14s Frank H. Easterbrook, supra note 140, p. 454-458. 149 See W. P. J. Wils, "The Optimal Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law", Kluwer Law International, 2002, 
F; 24-26; Posner, "Antirust law-An Economic Perspective", Chicago, 1976, p. 226-27. 0 Frank H. Easterbrook, "Detrebling Antitrust Damages", 28 J. L. & Econ. 1985, p. 455. lsl Ibid. - 112 Donald I. Baker, supra note 14, p. 384; see Frank H. Easterbrook, supra note 140, pp. 445,450. 
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be justified by efficiency arguments. '53 Thus, it can be argued that the appropriate 
level of enforcement for most antitrust conduct such as in horizontal price-fixing 
cases may be double or even treble damage to set damages multiples because 
without strong incentive such as treble damages, potential plaintiffs are not likely to 
bring actions before the courts. '54 
3.2.4.2.3 Punishment for Anticompetitive conducts 
Punishment can be described as occurring whenever a defendant is ordered to 
pay an amount in excess of actual damages suffered by the plaintiff. The award of 
actual damages only may fail to punish infringers for the total harm caused by the 
infringers. For instance, the infringer in a price-fixing cartel could be insufficiently 
punished for the harm caused by its illegal conduct when compensation for 
damages is limited to the amount of actual damage caused by infringers. The 
overcharges which are transfers of consumer surplus from buyers to conspiring 
sellers are only part of the damage inflicted by the'illegal conduct for the following 
reasons. Firstly, compensation for the overcharging caused by price-fixing cartel 
does not include lost opportunity costs. '55 Secondly, it does not include the victim's 
share of the deadweight loss to society resulting from horizontal conspiracies, 
although cartels can create an inefficient allocation of resources, thereby causing a 
56 net loss to society as a whole, the so-called deadweight loss to society., It has 
been shown that the loss in allocative efficiency attributable to cartelization varies 
from case to case, depending on the nature of the restraint, the industry involved, 
and scope of the conspiracy. 157 
Trebling can play a role in antitrust proceedings similar to the role of 
exemplary damages since actual damages cannot play the role of punishment 
whereas mandatory treble damages can serve to punish antitrust infringers if treble 
153 Connor and Boltova, "Cartel Overcharges: Survey and Meta-Analysis", Purdue University, 2005 p. 22. 154 In respect to the appropriate level of deterrence for most antitrust conduct, see section 1.4.2 which 
deals with under-enforcement and over- enforcement of competition law; Frank H. Easterbrook, supra 
note 140, p. 455; Edward Cavanagh, supra note 123, p. 171. 
Iss Opportunity costs might be relevant in an over-charging situation in which purchasers could not buy 
the affected product or service because the price was too high as a result of the overcharge. 
Edward Cavanagh, supra note 123, p. 173. "ý E. D. Cavanagh's Statement before the AMC, supra note 135, p. 4. 
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damages are more than the actual loss. 158 In the US the availability of treble 
damages means that additional `exemplary' damages are not available in 
competition actions. 159 
3.2.4.2.4 Disgorgement of Illegal Gains 
Treble damages can take illegal gains away from the infringers and restore 
these profits to the victims. In theory, trebling is not necessary to assure 
disgorgement of ill-gotten gains because as already mentioned, plaintiffs' actual 
losses would correspond to defendants' actual illegal gains. 160 Without the 
incentive of multiple damages, however, potential plaintiffs may not bring damages 
actions before courts, as is discussed above. 
Antitrust infringers may therefore not be faced with damages action and may 
well be able to reap the benefits of their illegal conduct. Therefore, it has been 
suggested that antitrust damage awards must exceed the actual damage caused by 
the infringer in order to encourage the plaintiff to bring damages actions. 
161 
3.2.4.3 The Problems of Mandatory Treble Damages and the 
Desirability of introducing them in other Jurisdictions 
As indicated above, treble damages can contribute to optimal enforcement in 
cartel cases because practices such as price-fixing and market-allocation are 
clandestine and anticompetitive. It has been argued, therefore, that treble damages 
can impose the right amount of enforcement through civil damages. 162 However, 
treble damages actions are deeply problematic. 
152 See Note "Private Treble Damage Antitrust Suits: Measure of Damages for Destruction of All or Part 
of a Business", 80 Harvard Law Review, 1967, p. 1566 
's9 Round Table Discussion on "Private Remedies: Passing on Defence; Indirect Purchaser Standing; 
Definition of Damages: United States", Working Party No. 3 on Co-operation and Enforcement, 
DAF/COMP/WP3/WD (2006), p. 12. 
160 See section 3.2 which deals with the current situation in respect of the criteria and measurement of 
damages in the EU, UK, US and Korea; E. D. Cavanagh's Statement before the AMC, supra note 135, p. 
6. 
16' Robert H. Lande, supra note 127, p. 171. 
162 Donald I. Baker, supra note 14, p. 382. 
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As already noted, the US is at present the only country in the world which 
has a treble damages regime. It is therefore necessary to discuss the operation of 
this regime and the problems it presents in order to assess whether the adoption of 
such a mandatory multiplying system would be desirable in other jurisdictions, in 
particular for the purposes of the thesis, in Korea. 
We should recognize at the outset that the automatic trebling of damages 
under US antitrust law has been the source of extensive disagreement and a wide 
debate. 163 The problems of treble damages were not a major issue prior to the 
1960s because until then there were simply very few successful private antitrust 
actions. 164 In 1960, there was substantial change to the rules on class actions, such 
as certification of class actions. 165 This change made it easier for private parties to 
bring treble damages actions than it had been before 1960.166 Therefore, treble 
damages matters very much today because of the great increase in private actions 
and the problems are therefore more acute. 167 Furthermore. where other 
jurisdictions, such as Korea are concerned the rationale for treble damages in the 
US may not apply because of the different features of those systems. 
The following section discusses five major issues in the debate about treble 
damages. 
3.2.4.3.1 Prevention of Unjust Enrichment 
Unjust enrichment is a legal teen denoting a particular type of causative 
163 See generally, Kent Roach, Michael J. Trebilcock, " Private Enforcement of Competition Law", 
Policy Options, 1997, p. 14-15; See generally, Andrew Amer, "United States Supreme Court Strengthens 
Standards Enforcing Due Process Limitations on Punitive Damage Awards", Simpson Thacher & Bartlett 
LLP, 2003; Michael P. Foradas, "Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws", Practicing Law Institute, 
1988, p. 242-244; See generally, W. Breit and K. Elzing, "The Antitrust Realties: A Study in Law and 
Economics", 1976. 
16. See section 2.4.3.2 which deals with the number of private actions in the US; see also Milton Handler, 
"Trade Regulation", 1997, p. 106; Charles A. Sullivan, "Breaking Up the Treble Play: Attacks on the 
Private Treble Damage Antitrust Action", 14 Seton Hall L. Rev. 17,1983, p. 18-21. 165 Congress made certification of class actions less strict in 1960. See section 6.4.5 which deals with 
overview of class actions in the US. 
'" William H. Page, "Policy Choices in Defining the Measure of Antitrust Damages", DAF/COMP/WP3, 
2006, p. 3. 
161 See section 2.4 which deals with the overview of private antitrust enforcement in the US. 
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event in which one party is unjustly enriched at the expense of another. 168 Unjust 
enrichment involves disgorging the wrongdoer's gain. The doctrine of unjust 
enrichment is created to prevent the injustice that occurs where one person receives 
money or other property at the expense of another person. A claim based on unjust 
enrichment results in an obligation to make compensation. In an extreme case it can 
produce an award of money when the victim has lost nothing. If a person receives 
money or other property at the expense of another, he should return the property or 
money to the right owner. At a general level, there are three requirements that have 
to be met before a claim for unjust enrichment can be put forward. Firstly, there has 
to be some enrichment of the defendant. Secondly, enrichment needs to be 
unjustified. Thirdly, enrichment needs to correspond to deprivation of the 
plaintiff 169 
In respect to unjust enrichment, there are two established approaches. 
Traditionally, common law systems such as those of England and the US have 
proceeded on the basis of what may be termed the `unjust factor' approach which 
requires the plaintiff to point to one of a number of factors recognized by the law as 
rendering the defendant's enrichment unjust. Traditionally, civil law systems such 
as those of France and Germany have proceeded on the basis of what may be 
termed the `absence of basis' approach which seeks to identify enrichments with no 
legitimate explanatory basis. 170 Korea, which also has a civil law system, has 
likewise proceeded on the basis of unjust enrichment in the `absence of basis' 
approach. 171 
It can be argued that except in cartel cases, treble damages can result in a 
windfall to plaintiffs because treble damages are not related to actual loss. 172 Under 
"' Kwac Yun-Gik, supra note 7, p. 420; Kim Hyung-Bae, "Lecture on Civil Law"(5t' ed. ), Shinjosa, 2006, 
1321 ý`9 
Jan M. Smits, "A European Law on Unjustified Enrichment? A Critical View of the Law of 
Restitution in the Draft Common Frame of Reference", in r European Private Law Beyond the Common 
Frame of Reference] (ed. by Antoni Vaquer), 2008, p. 3-4. 
170 Kwac Yun-Gik, supra note 7, p. 433 171 Kwac Yun-Gik, Ibid. ; Kim Hyung-Bae, supra note 168, p. 1327; Gi Won-Lim, supra note 27, p. 1359 : 
Song Deok-Soo, supra note 27, p. 1480 
" Windfall to plaintiffs may be exacerbated in the US where treble recovery would be more than three 
fold recoveries because antitrust treble damage actions from many different states have been brought for 
the same illegal behaviour of same defendant. However, the matter of multiple actions in different US 
states is a problem unique to the US. In respect to problems caused by multiple actions, see section 
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this circumstance, multiple damages would be unjust enrichment for plaintiff 
because it could be a windfall to plaintiff. 173 On this argument treble damages 
would, in themselves, be anticompetitive because strong incentive to bring action 
caused by treble damages can prevent procompetitive conduct as well as 
anticompetitive conduct. 
As far as Korea is concerned, Civil law prohibits unjust enrichment. Civil 
Law states that: 
"The scope of damages compensated for breach of contract is actual loss. For 
the plaintiff to be compensated, the infringer should have intention or fault. "lea 
The avoidance of unjust enrichment of the plaintiff is a basic principle of 
Korean Law and the generally accepted principle of damages actions is that 
plaintiffs can only recover the actual damages they have actually suffered. tos 
Multiple damages such as treble damages may give greater compensation to parties 
than actual loss. However, it could be termed as `unjust enrichment' because it is 
not related to actual loss. As I already said, the rationales of treble damages are 
deterrence, punishment and disgorgement of the illegal gains, as well as 
compensation. 176 However, in Korea, the primary objective of legal action is 
compensation not deterrence, punishment or disgorgement of illegal gain. Multiple 
damages such as treble damage could result in unjust enrichment. 
In respect to the EU, the ECJ has touched upon the principle of the 
prevention of unjust enrichment in several proceedings in a non-competition law 
2.4.3.3 which deals with controversial features of private actions in the US; See generally, Donald I. 
Baker, "Revising History-What have we learned about private antitrust enforcement that we would 
recommend to others? ", Loyola Consumer Law Review, 2004, p. 384; Spencer Weber Waller, "The 
Incoherence of Punishment in Antitrust", p. 3. "' It can be a windfall to the lawyer only when the jurisdiction has a contingency fee system where the 
lawyer takes a percentage of the damages.; Eric McCarthy, Allyson Maltas, Matteo Bay and Javier Ruiz- 
Calzado, "Litigation culture and versus enforcement culture: A comparison of US and EU plaintiff 
recovery actions in antitrust cases", The Antitrust Review of the Americas 2007, p. 38. 
14 Civil Law 393; In respect to unjust enrichment related to passing on defence, see section 4.3.2.3 
which deals with passing on defence in Korea. 
In Kwac Yun-Gik, supra note 27, p. 108 ; Kim Hyung-Bae, supra note 27, p. 237 
176 See section 3.2.4 which deals with rationales of treble damages. 
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context, regarding unlawful taxes and administrative charges. '77 In these cases, the 
ECJ has accepted the defendants' (Member States and the Community institutions') 
ability to invoke the principle of the prevention of unjust enrichment. 178 The 
important case to look at here is Manfredi, 179 where the ECJ merely accepted that 
the Member State (Italy) could take measures to prevent the unjust enrichment of 
those enjoying rights protected by Community law, but did not have to do so. '80 
Given the stance of the Court in these cases towards the prevention of unjust 
enrichment, it could be argued that there cannot be unjust enrichment of the 
plaintiff, only that the Member States can prevent it if they want to. 181 
In conclusion, the introduction of the award of treble damages to plaintiffs 
may result in an excessive compensation and, therefore, generate unfair enrichment. 
It is submitted that this is an undesirable effect. Thus, the private enforcement of 
competition rules should guarantee the absence of any unfair enrichment of 
infringers but, at the same time, equally impede the unfair enrichment of the victims 
of any competition infringements. '82 
3.2.4.3.2 Over-Enforcement when there are Substantial Criminal Sanctions 
There are two kinds of criminal sanctions, on individuals and companies. 
Criminal sanction includes fines and imprisonment but imprisonment can only be 
imposed on individuals. It can be argued that if there are substantial criminal 
sanctions, piling civil treble damages on top of criminal fines can be unnecessarily 
117 See e. g. Just v. Danish Ministryfor Fiscal Affairs, case 68/79, [1980] ECR 501; Express Dairy v. IBAP, 
Case 130/79, [1980] ECR 1887; Treks-Arkady v. Council and Commission, case 238/78, [1979] ECR 2955; 
Comateb and Others v. Directeur general des douanes et droits indirects, joined cases C-192/95 to C- 
218/95, [1997] ECR I-165. 
178 See section 4.4.2 which deals with rationale of permitting passing on defence in the EU.; With regard 
to general introduction of unjust enrichment, see, R. S Franklin M. Fisher, "Economic Analysis and 
Antitrust Damages", World Competition, 2006, p. 386. 
179 The same point was made earlier too, in Courage. See Courage v Crehan, C-452/99, [2001]ECR I- 
6297at para 30. 
10 Manfredi V. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, C-295/04, [2006] ECJ, 348. 
See section 4.4.2 which deals with rationale of permitting passing on defence in the EU; See also, 
Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, C-295/04, [2006] ECJ, 348, para.?; See also, European 
Commission, "Commission Staff Working Document accompanying document to the White Paper on 
Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules", SEC (2008) 405, para 191. 
1H2 Francisco Marcos and Albert Sanchez Graells, "Damages for breach of the EC antitrust rules: 
harmonising Tort Law through the back door? ", InDret, 2008, p. 10. And refer to Devenish here, where the 
CA equated the plaintiff and defendant as `equally undeserving. '. 
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punitive and over-enforcing. '83 
Korea has substantial criminal sanctions for anticompetitive conduct such as 
cartels. Criminal fines for entering or operating cartel are more than 1,000 million 
Won and jail term at maximum is 3years. 184 These fines can be imposed on 
individuals as well as companies. This liability is related to intention. For instance, 
in the Oil Cartel, the KFTC imposed 100billion Won in surcharge185 in 2001. In 
this . Oil Cartel, 4 major oil companies colluded to fix the price and quantities 
produced for 12 years. In respect to this cartel, although no-one was imprisoned, the 
amount of the surcharge was substantial. '86 
US criminal fines are also substantial. 187 The Antitrust Criminal Penalty 
Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004 raised the maximum corporate fine to $100 
million and the maximum individual fine to $1 million and the maximum Sherman 
Act jail term to 10 years. 188 Until 2004 felonies committed in infringement of the 
Sherman Act were only punishable by a fine of up to $10 million for corporations, 
and a fine of up to $350 000 and/or 3 years imprisonment for individuals., 
89 The 
alternative sentencing procedures to the above fines, 190 enacted in 1984, gave the 
courts greater latitude in sentencing and dramatically increased the potential 
monetary penalties for criminal antitrust infringements because criminal fines could 
be based on twice the loss to victims or twice the gain to antitrust infringers. 
191 In 
13' David Resenberg and James P. Sullivan, "Coordinating Private Class Action and Public Agency 
Enforcement of Antitrust Law", Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2006, p. 4. 
Competition Law 62(Criminal Sanctions) This statute uses the word `cartel'. 
ias As discussed in section 2.1.2 which deals with introduction to the KFTC and the courts in Korea, a 
fine called as a surcharge because this fine could be imposed with the only corrective order. 
'" See the KFTC decision 2001. DAGA. 
117 William H. Page, supra note 166, p. 4; Jonathan B. Baker, supra note 5, pp. 41-42. See generally, John 
Graubert, "Civil Remedies Available to the Federal Trade Commission", Federal Trade Commission, 
2005 ; See eg, Joseph A Ostoyich and Arturo DeCastro, `The Increasing risks of US litigation for global 
companies: Antitrust Review of the Americas", Global Competition Review, 2006 
'_' Department of Justice release, Wednesday, June 23th, 2004, Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, 
It Hewitt Pate, "Issues statement on enactment of Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform 
Act of 2004", www. usdoj. gov 
'a9 These figures were originally very low as compared to the benefit that a conspirator could get out of a 
cartel agreement. At the time of the passing of the Sherman Act, the offence was only a misdemeanour 
and the maximum fine was $5,000 until it was changed in 1973 to become a felony punished by much 
higher penalties. 
' 18 U. S. C. § 3571(d) (2000). 
See Teilt W. Smith et al., "Finding the Right Price", Legal Times, Dec. 15,2003, p. 32 (criticizing 
legislation raising fines under the Sherman Act in absence of attempts to reform sentencing guidelines); 
See also Steven J. Miller, "Remarks Before the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association 
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practice, very large fines have been authorized and collected by enforcers. For 
example, a Swiss company, Hoffman-LaRoche, has paid over $1 billion in fines to 
the US. 192 
Given the substantial criminal sanctions, treble damages can over-enforce 
anticompetitive conduct which has already been punished by fines on companies by 
public enforcers. In the last ten years, the KFTC has imposed substantial surcharges 
on cartels amounting to several hundred billion Won to punish infringers and 
remove the profit from the infringers. Large fines and the potential for criminal 
sanctions on individuals, including prison sentences in Korea, create a powerful 
enforcement against illegal conduct such as cartels, without the need for treble 
damages. 193 For example, if a single anticompetitive activity such as a refusal to 
deal has been fined by the KFTC and is then the subject of exemplary damages 
actions, it could result in double liability both of public enforcers and private parties 
because it has already been punished, deterred or disgorged illegal gain by the 
KFTC. 194 Thus, it is submitted that it is not necessary to recognize treble 
damages. 195 
3.2.4.3.3 Over-Enforcement when there are Follow on actions 
As I already mentioned, Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act provides for the 
prima facie effect of a criminal judgment. 196 In the US, very often, private 
enforcement follows criminal prosecution because a criminal judgment can be 
considered as evidence for the making of the case. 197 Without prior government 
action, private parties may lack the resources necessary to detect and prosecute 
Remedies Foru, 2003, p. 97 (expressing concern about a "pile on" mentality arising from civil treble 
damages on top of criminal double damages). www. abanet. org/antitrust/remedies/roundtable l . doc . 192 Donald I. Baker, "The Use of Criminal Law Remedies to Deter and Punish Cartels and Bid-Rigging, " 
69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 693,2001, p. 701; EC Commission Release, available at http: // 
europa. eu. int/eurlex /pri/en/oj/dat/2003/1006/1_00620030110en000100089. pdf 
193 In respect to the substantial fines imposed by the KFTC see section 2.1.2.3 which deals with KFTC's 
statistics of case handling from 1998 to 2007. 
194 Lee Bong-Hee, "Effective Enforcement of Competition Law", 10 Competition Law Journal 1,2004, 
20 ý9S 
See section 2.1.2.3 which deals with the KFTC statistics of case handling from 1998 to 2007. 
196 See section 1.3.1.4 which deals with stand-alone and follow-on actions. _ "1 Patricia Hanh Rosochowicz, supra note 79, p. 6 
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anticompetitive conduct. 198 In the US, it has been shown how important follow-on 
actions of the antitrust laws were to the early development of treble damages 
actions. 199 In the 1960s, 75% of all individual actions followed on from 
government led actions. 200 It is argued by critics of the present US law that 
mandatory trebling may present a problem of overkill, 201 in those cases where there 
has been a prior criminal conviction since prima facie evidence202 increases a 
defendant's risk of facing a civil action. 203 
Thus, if most of the private actions follow the prosecution, it can be argued 
that it causes over-enforcement, leaving the prospect of paying treble damages in 
addition of a public fine. 204 
3.2.4.3.4 Undermining Amnesty and Leniency Programmes 
To achieve optimal enforcement of competition law, it is important to ensure 
efficient cooperation between private parties and public enforcers. Multiple 
damages such as treble damages can impair this cooperation because infringers who 
cooperate with public enforcers could face private treble damages actions unless 
measures are specifically taken to avoid this happening. 
One of problem of interaction between private actions and public enforcers 
concerns Leniency programmes. The purpose of Leniency programmes is to reward 
entities who reveal cartel activity to the public competition enforcers in exchange 
for not being prosecuted or receiving a lesser fine. A leniency programme can 
potentially be utilized in any jurisdiction where such conduct is treated as a criminal, 
P. Friedman, D. Gelfand et al., supra note 138, p. 156. 
See Comment, "Consent Decrees and Private Actions: An Antitrust Dilemma" 53 California Law 
Review, 1965, p. 627; See Kauper and Snyder in L. White, "Private Antitrust Litigation: new evidence, 
new learning", MIT Press, 1988, p. 329. 200 Jones, "Antitrust private enforcement in the EU, UK and USA", Oxford, 1999, p. 16. 201 In respect to overkill, see section 1.4.2.2 which deals with over-enforcement. 2'2 A prima facie evidence means if public enforcers such as the DOJ has a verdict of infringement of 
antitrust law which could be persuasive evidence in third parties' legal action. 213 Charles B. Casper, "The Class Action Fairness Act's Impact on Settlement", Antitrust, 2005, p. 26; 
Donald I. Baker, "Revising History-What have we learned about private antitrust enforcement that we 
would recommend to others? ", 16Loyola Consumer Law Review, 2004, p. 389; Franklin M. Fisher, supra 
note 178, p. 391 
204 See American Bar Association Section of Antitrust law, "Comment on remedial use of disgorgement", 
2002, p. 6. 
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civil or administrative offence. 205 In many jurisdictions Leniency programmes have 
been adopted. 206 
As far as US Antitrust Division's Corporate Leniency Program (hereafter, 
Amnesty Program) is concerned, under the US leniency programme antitrust 
infringers can escape criminal prosecution if they report criminal activity to the 
public competition enforcers. 07 This Amnesty Program is considered to have been 
enormously successful. 208 However, treble damages could obstruct the efficiency 
of Amnesty program. The chance of fact the probable imposition of treble damages 
decreases the comparative attractiveness of the Amnesty Program. 209 To solve this 
problem, legislation passed by Congress in 2004 provided that parties participating 
in the Antitrust Division's Amnesty Program would be liable to only single and not 
treble damages and would not be jointly and severally liable for all of the damages 
recoverable from all of the cartelists210 This legislation providing single damages 
for whistle blowers on the Amnesty Program was driven by the concern that treble 
damages in follow on civil actions dissuade conspirators from cooperating with the 
government and availing themselves of the benefits of the Amnesty Program. 211 
Korea also has a Leniency Programme. Thus, there is possibility for Korea to 
have similar problems if Korea adopts multiple damages such as treble damages. 
212 
205 U. S. Dept of Justice Antitrust Div., P 13,113, at 20,649-2 1; U. S. Dep't of Justice Antitrust Div., P 13, 
114, p. 20,649-22. 
Korea, the US, the EU and most Member State of the EU including the UK have Leniency 
Programmes for whistle blower for cartel. In the US, Cartel deterrence package is the DOJ's amnesty 
program. The compliance of this programme comes from undertakings thinking that if they infringe the 
rules their co-conspirators may turn them in to the competition authorities. 
207 U. S. Dep't of Justice Antitrust Div., "Prosecutorial Amnesty-- Whistle blowing Conspirators, " in 4 
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) P 13,112, at 20,649- 21 (Aug. 16,1994). 
' See generally, J. Harrington, "Corporate Leniency Programs and the Role of the Antitrust Authority in 
detecting Collusion", International Symposium in Japan Fair Trade Commission, 2006. 
209 Department of Justice release, Wednesday, June 23th, 2004, Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, 
R. Hewitt Pate, "Issues statement on enactment of Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform 
Act of 2004", www. usdoj. gov; Donald I. Baker, "The Use of what ?? This is incomplete; EC Commission 
Release", available at http: // europa. eu. intleurlex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/1 006/1_ 00620030110en 
000100089. pdf ; Donald I. Baker, supra note 192, pp. 707-710,713. 210 Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enforcement and Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-237, s. 213; To assist 
the government to discover and prosecute wrongful conduct and to encourage infringers to cease their 
illegal acts, the Antitrust Division has developed a Leniency Program covering both corporations and 
individuals. ; Pub. L. No. 108-237, §§ 212-221,118 Stat. 661,666-69 (2004). 
21' See section 3.3.4.4. which deals with impairing the cooperation of public and private enforcement. 212 Competition Law 60(Leniency Programme) 
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In respect to the EU Leniency programme, it is claimed that the most 
successful period of cartel enforcement in the history of the Directorate General for 
Competition (DG Competition) is being greatly aided by this Leniency Notice. 
Thus, successful operation of the Leniency Notice is being potentially jeopardized 
by private damages actions. 213 To ensure effective Leniency programme, the 
Commission's Leniency Notice has been revised (2006)214 specifically to take 
account of the undesirability of allowing leniency documents. 
3.2.4.3.5 Deterring Pro-Competitive Activity and Inhibiting Competition 
To balance encouraging private enforcement and avoiding abuse of litigation, 
the fundamental argument is that "the modern corporate managers having tendency 
to be risk averse and fear of treble damages leads corporate managers to shy away 
from conduct which, although permissible, may fall close enough to the mythical 
line separating legality from illegality to trigger a lawsuit. "215 
It is therefore argued that mandatory treble damages can chill pro-competitive 
conduct. Treble damages can provide individuals with strong incentives to bring 
damages actions against pro-competitive as well as anti-competitive conduct 
because treble damages can create too great an incentive for potential plaintiffs. 
"' 
Also, it is said that the possibility of treble damage liability could deter companies 
from engaging in pro-competitive conduct and could be put under pressure to settle 
out of fear that this lawful conduct may be prosecuted and be subject to treble 
damages actions. 217 Furthermore, although treble damages could reduce the 
213 Declan J. Walsh, "Carrots and Sticks- Leniency and Fines in EC Cartel Cases", ECLR 30(1), 30-35, 
2009, p. 31. 
214 European Commission, "Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel 
cases", 2006/C298/11, OJC298,8.12.2006 available at http: //eur-lex. europa. eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/ 
2006/c 298/c 29820061208en00170022. pdf 
11s Cavanagh, supra note 139, p. 802.; David Besanko and Daniel F. Spulber, "Are Treble Damages 
Netural? Sequential Equilibrium and Private Antitrust Enforcement", American Economic Review, 1990, 
21870 6 Eric McCarthy, Allyson Maltas, Matteo Bay and Javier Ruiz-Calzado, "Litigation culture and versus 
enforcement culture :A comparison of US and EU plaintiff recovery actions in antitrust cases", 
Antitrust Review of the Americas 2007, p. 38. 217 John Pheasant, "Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust rules: The European Commission's 
Green Paper", E. C. L. R., 2006, p. 368; John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., "A Comment on the Constitutionality of 
punitive Damages", 72 Va. L. Rev., 1986, p. 142; See generally William Breit and Kenneth G Elzinga, 
supra note 126, pp. 43-50; Richard A. Posner, "Antitrust In The New Economy", 68 ANTITRUST L. J. 
935,2001; Michael L. Denger and D. Jarrett Arp, "Does Our Multifaceted Enforcement System Promote 
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incentives of firms to infringe the antitrust laws, they may also increase their 
incentives to use the antitrust laws strategically against their rivals. 218 According to 
this argument firms could use the powerful threat of treble damages to extort money 
from successful rivals because mandatory trebling so inflates the defendant's cost of 
losing and the plaintiffs value of a victory. 219 So faced with potential numerous 
million- or billion-dollar treble awards, companies could readily avoid engaging in 
pro-competitive activities. 220 Trebling damages against their successful rivals could 
therefore discourage their rivals from efficiency-improving conduct. 221 Although 
clandestine cartels are never efficiency producing and pro-competitive other forms 
of conduct, especially unilateral conduct, may be pro-competitive or 
anticompetitive, depending on a range of complex factors. Treble damages should 
at least be limited to cartels. Thus, it is necessary to consider removing treble 
damages from open and non-clandestine conduct as discussed in 3.2.5 and 3.3. 
3.2.5 Is Mandatory Trebling Desirable for Optimal 
enforcement? 
In view of the considerations above, it is submitted that a private enforcement 
system should be evaluated in terms of how successfully it helps to implement 
optimal enforcement without unreasonably deterring legitimate business activities 
or unnecessarily burdening the judicial system. In other words, it depends on how 
efficiently treble damages can deter and prohibit illegal conduct, while providing a 
Sound Competition Policy"?, 15 Antitrust, Summer 41,2001, p. 43; W. M. Landes, supra note 126, p. 
678; R. Preston McAfee, Hugo M. Mialon and Sue H. Mialon, "Private Antitrust Litigation: 
Procompetitive or Anticompetitive? ", 2005, p. 2-6 available at http: // papers. ssrn. com/ sol3/ 
apers. cfm/abstract. 
11$ See R. Preston McAfee, Hogo M. Mialon, Sue H. Mialon, "Private v. Public Antitrust Enforcement: A 
Strategic Analysis", Emory Workshop, 2005, p. 7; Christian Miee, "The Role of Private Enforcement of 
Competition Law in the EU and the German Attempts in the 7' Amendment of the GWB", Amsterdam 
Centre for Law and Economics Workshop, 2005, p. 5; William F. Shughart II, "Private Antitrust 
Enforcement: Compensation, Deterrence, or Extortion? " Regulation Magazine Vol. 12 No. 3,2006, p. 2; 
See generally, Deward A. Snyder and Thomas E. Kauper, "Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: The 
Competition Plaintiff', 90 Michigan Law Review 551,1991. 
219 Johan Ysewyn, "Private Enforcement of Competition Law in the EU: Trials and Tribulations", 
International Law Practicum, 2006, p. 15. It is submitted that mandatory trebling can have a similar effect 
on the amount of settlements and deterrence of litigation in cases following on a criminal conviction or 
guilty plea for price-fixing or market-allocation. However, in such cases the deterrence rationale for 
mandatory trebling is much weaker. 
220 Donald I. Baker, "Revising History-What have we learned about private antitrust enforcement that we 
would recommend to others? ", Loyola Consumer Law Review, 2004, p. 391. 
A' R. P. McAfee et al., supra note 218, p. 7. 
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fair and efficient way of compensating victims. 
It has been argued that treble damages may be optimal if the probability of 
detecting and penalizing the offence is less than one in three. 222 Trebling may 
therefore be necessary in covert cases such as cartel because conspiracies impair the 
competitive market and their clandestine and secret character makes it difficult to 
detect and prosecute them. 223 If the probability of detection is one in three 
primarily for concealable offenses such as cartels treble damages could be 
optimal. 224 It seems appropriate therefore to treat them with criminal liability or 
treble damages. 225 However, as I have already seen above, trebling is neither fair 
nor desirable in every case. 226 Treble damages have been described as costly and 
leading to over-deterrence in some cases. 227 Limiting the multiplier to cartels 
makes sense, because exclusionary practices and mergers are ordinarily open and 
easy to detect. Thus, there is no need for strong incentive such as treble damages for 
those open anticompetitive conducts. 228 Mandatory trebling can over deter in those 
competition cases where unlawful conduct that is not concealed, such as tying, 
exclusive dealing and monopolistic overcharges. 229 In these open conduct cases, 
recovery of actual damages can serve as a sufficient incentive to bring an action. In 
the case of non-clandestine conduct, more potential plaintiffs would bring actions 
222 See Wouter P. J. Wils, supra note 149, p. 24-26; A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, "Should 
Liability Be Based on the Harm to the Victim or the Gain to the Injurer? ", 10 J. L. Econ. & Org. 427,1994, 
p. 427. 
See section 3.2.4 which deals with deterring future infringements by recognizing multiple damages; 
Frank Easterbrook, supra note 140, p. 450. 
214 W. M. Landes, suppra note 127, p. 657. 2" Edward Cavanagh, supra note 122, p. 171; Donald I. Baker, "Revising History-What have we learned 
about private antitrust enforcement that we would recommend to others? ", Loyola Consumer Law Review, 
2004, p. 407. 
226 See section 3.2.4 which deals with problems of treble damages; see also, Edward D. Cavanagh, supra 
note 138, p. 847; Diane P. Wood, "Antitrust at the Global Level", University of Chicago Law Review, 
2005, p. 323. 
21' See Alfred L Parker, "The Deterrent Effect of Private Treble Damage Suite: Facts or Fantasy, " 3 New 
Mexico Law Review 286,1973, p. 286; Malcolm E. Wheeler, "Antitrust Treble-Damage Actions: Do 
They Work?, ", 61 California Law Review 1319,1973, p. 1319. See Herbert Hovenkamp, "Economic And 
Federal Antitrust Law", 1985 at § 15.6; Herbert Hovenkamp, "Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of 
Competition And Its Practice", 2d ed. 1999 at § 17; Richard A. Posner and Frank H Easterbrook, 
"Antitrust Cases, Economic Notes, And Other Materials", 2d ed., 1981, p. 542-545; E. Thomas Sullivan 
& Jeffrey L. Harrison, "Understanding Antitrust And Its Economic Implications"(2rd ed. ) 1994 at § 3.02; 
Steven C. Salop and Lawrence J. White, "Private Antitrust Litigation: An Introduction and Framework", 
in rPrivate Antitrust Litigation: New Evidence, New Learning. (Lawrence J. White ed. ), 1988, p. 31- 
34 ; William Breit, "Efficiency and Equity Considerations", 8 SW. U. L. REV., 1976, p. 539; Herbert 
Hovenkamp, "Treble Damages Reform", 33 Antitrust Bulletin, 1988, p. 233 
22' Frank Easterbrook, supra note 140, pp. 458-461. 2' See generally Edward D. Cavanagh, supra note 139, pp. 831-832. 
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because it is easier them to detect illegal conduct and get evidence of breaches of 
antitrust law. Mandatory trebling creates significant incentives for private parties to 
enforce the antitrust laws as private attorneys general. If treble damages are 
imposed on open conduct, over-enforcement could occur over-compensation 
because treble damages do not reflect the actual damage suffered. 230 
For example, in the US the lure of treble damages and one-way costs231 may 
cause a plaintiff or plaintiffs' lawyer to try to turn any possibly competition-related 
dispute into a private antitrust case. In other words, treble damages encourage "any 
imaginative lawyer to try to repackage a business tort into an antitrust box 
whenever it is plausible to do so". 32 
Given the above US cases and practices, it can be seen that treble damages 
can result in excessive private enforcement and induce parties to make wasteful 
efforts in finding infringers. It can result in over-enforcement. Furthermore, if 
infringers have already been fined by public enforcers, treble damages can result in 
over-enforcement. This over-enforcement also comes at a cost to the judicial 
system. 233 It can consume large amounts of judicial resources by tying up court 
time and personnel. If full compensation is achieved through actual damage, private 
enforcement will restore the market to the state it was in before the illegal conduct 
occurred without any treble damages. It is possible to create civil or criminal 
sanctions sufficient to deter or punish wrongdoers or disgorge illegal gain through 
substantial fines234 or criminal sanctions. 235 It is possible to formulate sanctions 
230 Ilya Segal, Michael Whinston, "Public VS Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law: A Survey", 
5E. C. L. R. 306,2007, p. 311-312.; Donald I. Baker, "Revising History-What have we learned about private 
antitrust enforcement that we would recommend to others? ", 16 Loyola Consumer Law Review 379,2004, 
p. 384 ; Malcolm E. Wheeler, "Antitrust Treble-Damage Actions: Do They Work?, " 61 California Law 
Review 1319,1973, p. 1319; Francisco Marcos et al., supra note 182, p. 10 ; Alfred L Parker, supra note 
227, p. 286. 
2" One-way cost means if plaintiff loses the action it does not have to pay back the litigation costs of 
defendant. On the other hand, if the defendant loses the action, it has to compensate for the litigation cost 
of plaintiff. 
232 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Co., 467 U. S. 752,771-74 (1984) In Copperweld Corp. case, 
the Supreme Court has tried to prevent abuse of litigation caused by strong incentive such as treble 
damages in competition area. This case is a good example of negative effect of treble damages; See also 
Donald I. Baker, "Revising History-What have we learned about private antitrust enforcement that we 
would recommend to others? ", 16 Loyola Consumer Law Review 379,2004, p. 385. 
233 See generally, Edward A. Snyder and Thomas E. Kauper, "Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: The 
Competition Plaintiff', 90 Michigan Law Review551,1991. 
u' In Korea, the fine charged by the KFTC is surcharge because it is imposed on with only corrective 
order of the KFTC. See section 2.1.2.3 which deals with KFTC's statistics of case handling from 1998 to 
2007. 
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aimed at disgorgement, although the calculation and measurement of the profit may 
be difficult. Thus, it is submitted that deterrence, punishment and the disgorgement 
of illegal gain should be achieved through public enforcement not through private 
actions with the inherent risk of over-enforcement. 236 
It should be noted that the US Congress has, already engaged in selective de- 
trebling. It recognized that actual damages in R&D joint ventures and export 
companies whose participants have notified the Antitrust Division of their existence 
in the event an infringement is reasonable. 237 The de-trebling in cases where 
infringers were beneficiaries of the of the new leniency program was one of the 
Division's core missions to ensure the effect of its anti-cartel enforcement program 
and it achieved this with the passing of the 2004 Act238. 
As far as the Korean Leniency Program is concerned, the KFTC views the 
Leniency Programme239 as a key element of its enforcement policy because it has 
been useful for detecting and cracking cartels most notably in the international 
cartel situations. Over the last ten years, the KFTC's Corporate Leniency Program 
has been responsible for detecting and cracking more international cartels. 240 It is, 
unquestionably, the single greatest investigative tool available to anti-cartel 
enforcers. An effective Leniency Program will lead cartel members, in some cases, 
235 See generally, John M. Desiderio, "Private Treble Damage Antitrust Actions: An Outline of 
Fundamental Principles", 48 Brooklyn Law Review 409,1982; Ulf Boge, Konrad Ost, "Up and Running, 
or Is It? Private Enforcement -The Situation in Germany and Policy Perspectives", 27(4)E. C. L. R., 2006, 
p. 201-202; Marjorie Holmes, Lesley Davey, "Competition Enforcement in the European Union: A Three- 
way Partnership", Defence Counsel Journal, 2005, p. 35; Clifford A. Jones, "Private Enforcement of 
Antitrust Law in the EU, UK and USA", Oxford, 1999, p. 20; William B. Tye, Stephen H. Kalos, 
"Antitrust Damages from Lost Opportunities", Practicing Law Institute- Corporate Law and Practice 
Course Handbook Series, PLI Order No. B0-00D3,1998, p. 330-331; Donncadh Woods, "Private 
Enforcement of Antirust Rules: Modernization of the EU Rules and the Road Ahead", Loyola Consumer 
Law Review, 2004, p. 437 ; Clifford A. Jones, supra note 124, pp. 410-411 
21 Tim Reher, "The Commission's White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust 
Rules", European Antitrust Review, 2009, p. 1. 
237 15 U. S. C. § 4301 (2000); Export Trading Company Act, 15 U. S. C. § 4016(b)(1) (1982); National 
Cooperative Research and Production Act, 15 U. S. C. § 4304(a) (1992). In these instances, Congress 
also provided a loser pays cost rule, to make the litigation less attractive to private plaintiff ; see also 
Donald I. Baker, "Restating Law and Refining Remedies: The Trading Company Act, The Joint Research 
Act and The Local Government Antitrust Act", 55 Antitrust Law Journal 661,2004, p. 666-669. 
2= Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enforcement and Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-237, s. 213. For detail, 
see section 3.3.3.4 which deals with undermining amnesty and Leniency Programmes. 
239 "Detecting and Deterring Cartel Activity through an Effective Leniency Program", Address Before the 
International Workshop on Cartels, 2007, p. 1-2 
21 See KFTC 2004 Annual Report, "Detecting and Deterring Cartel Activity through an Effective 
Leniency Program", 2005, p. 98. 
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to confess their conduct even before an investigation is opened. If Korea adopted 
multiple damages such as treble damages, it could undermine its Amnesty and 
Leniency Programmes. 
As I already noted 241 as far as the Member States of the EU are concerned, 
currently, no Member State provides for treble damages in competition area. 
The White Paper has reiterated the desire of the European Commission to 
promote private actions, but it has retracted the option for double damages which 
was suggested in the Green Paper and instead suggests "full compensation for the 
real value of the loss suffered. 042 
Given, as is submitted, that optimal enforcement could be achieved by an 
efficient combination of private and public enforcement, it is desirable for adopting 
discretionary trebling to eliminate the perceived harshness and arbitrariness of 
mandatory trebling. As I already mentioned, every anticompetitive conduct does 
not need multiple damages. Cartel, bid-rigging or abuse of dominance position 
could need to recognize multiple damages because these illegal practices could 
substantially harm competitive market and consumers. Thus, discretionary rather 
than mandatory trebling is desirable. Commentators have advised that if the 
Legislature of the US selectively chooses to de-treble damages in certain cases, it 
should proceed with the utmost caution. 243 
3.3 Conclusion: Should Korea adopt exemplary, restitutionary or 
multiple damages 
Aspects of deterrence as well as compensation could justify either the 
introduction of exemplary, restitutionary or multiple damages such as treble 
241 See section 3.2.2 which deals with the current situation in respect of the criteria and measurement of 
damages in the EU. 
242 European Commission, "White Paper-Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM 
(2008) 165 available at http: //ec. europa. eu/competition/antitrust/ actionsdamages/files white paper/ 
whitepaper_en. pdf. 
243 See generally, David Klingsberg, "Balancing the Benefits and Detriments of Private Antitrust 
Enforcement: Detrebling, Antitrust Injury, Stanidng, and Other Proposed Solutions", Cardozo L. Rev 
1215., 1987-1988. 
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damages. However, it can be questioned where exemplary, restitutionary or 
multiple damages are necessary or even desirable to ensure optimal enforcement in 
Koreaaa 
Given above rationale of exemplary, restitutionary or treble damages, it is 
possible to argue that to encourage private enforcement, the traditional reluctance in 
Korea for exemplary, restitutionary or multiple damages must be changed. 245 It can 
be also be argued that it is desirable for Korea to provide for more than single 
damages in cases of the most serious covert anticompetitive infringements such as 
cartels because of the difficulty of detecting and prosecuting them. 246 Exemplary, 
restitutionary or multiple damages can create a strong incentive for plaintiffs to 
bring actions against the cartel. It is arguable that to encourage private enforcement, 
US treble damages are better than exemplary or restitutionary damage because the 
amount of treble damages can impose a bigger burden than exemplary or 
restitutionary damages on infringers. 
However, a court could impose very large exemplary and restitutionary 
damages, if these were available, just as big as treble damages. Compared to 
mandatory treble damages, it can be also argued that the application of exemplary 
or restitutionary damages is more flexible and may be more easily adjusted to both 
the impact of compensation and deterrence. However, it is submitted that 
exemplary, restitutionary or multiple damages should not be allowed because they 
are incompatible with Korean legal tradition. Korean legal tradition was and still is 
to compensate actual damage and to prohibit overcompensation and multiple 
liabilities because overcompensation and multiple liabilities contradict prohibition 
of unjust enrichment. Exemplary or mandatory multiple damages may be essential 
to fighting anticompetitive conduct such as cartel. However, it is still impossible to 
depart from `tradition', because civil law and competition law have never allowed 
multiple damages such as US treble damages. 
2" For an assessment of the effectiveness of the public competition enforcer (OFT) in the UK, see 
generally, "Positive Impact - An initial evaluation of the effect of the competition enforcement work 
conducted by the OFT", OFT 827,2005. 
z`s In respect to criteria and measurement of damages, see section 3.2 which deals with the current 
situation in respect of the criteria and measurement of damages in the EU, UK, US and Korea. 246 See section 3.2.5 which deals with the desirability of mandatory trebling of damage for optimal 
enforcement. 
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There are five major obstacles to the adoption of exemplary, restitutionary or 
multiple damages in Korea. 
Firstly, the principally compensatory nature of damage actions in Korea 
conflicts with the idea of exemplary, restitutionary or multiple damages. As I have 
already discussed, 247 the purpose of a damages award is to put the plaintiff in the 
position it would have been in if the infringement had not been committed. Korean 
legal tradition has hitherto avoided exemplary, restitutionary or multiple damages 
because they bear no specific relation to the actual loss suffered. As I discussed 
above, 248 exemplary, restitutionary or multiple damage have nothing to do with 
compensating plaintiffs. 249 Without exemplary, restitutionary or multiple damage, 
plaintiffs could have full compensation through compensatory damages which 
provide payment for economic losses including lost profit or interest. Korean Civil 
Law makes it clear that the damages which may be awarded include all monetary 
awards in respect of the relevant infringement without introduction of exemplary, 
restitutionary or multiple damages. 50 
Putting the obvious compensatory role of damages aside, exemplary or 
restitutionary or multiple damages could play a role of deterrence or punishment by 
giving monetary award to redress caused by the infringer. 
As discussed earlier'25 1 in the US the primary objective of private 
enforcement is to ensure effective deterrence not compensation even if it causes 
over-compensation to plaintiff. 
If punishment, deterrence or disgorgement of illegal gains is required, it is 
more desirable to achieve these by public enforcers such as the KFTC rather than 
247 See section 3.2.1 which deals with the current situation in respect of the criteria and measurement of 
damages in Korea. 
2'= See section 3.2.1 which deals with the current situation in respect of the criteria and measurement of 
damages in Korea. 
u' See Prosser, "Wade & Schwartz's Torts", Victor E. Schwitz et al., eds., 10th ed., 2000 p. 549-550 20 Civil Law 359,750; Bung-Ju LEE, "The Harmonization of Public and Private Enforcement: A 
Korean Perspective", The 5 Seoul International Competition Forum, 2008, p. 3. 
231 See section 1.2.3 which deals with objective of private enforcement. 
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by private actions. As far as deterrence, punishment or disgorgement of illegal gain 
is concerned, public enforcers such as the KFTC are more robust than private 
parties, with increases not only in civil fines and penalties but also in criminal 
sanctions. If heavy enough, a public sanction such as properly calculated surcharges 
and criminal sanctions including prison sentences could create a powerful effect of 
deterrence, punishment or disgorgement of illegal gain without the need for 
exemplary, restitutionary or multiple damages. 
Liability in damages actions relating to infringements of competition law 
should be about compensation and should not be used to punish companies. The 
additional deterrence or punishment provided by private enforcement has become 
correspondingly less meaningful. There is no reasonable justification for 
introducing exemplary, restitutionary or multiple damages that make an exception 
for competition law litigation as compared with other types of civil actions in Korea. 
It is therefore submitted that it is desirable to pursue compensation, not deterrence, 
punishment or disgorgement of illegal gain through damages actions. 
Secondly, double liabilities could be incurred when defendants are assessed 
exemplary, restitutionary or multiple damages awards for the same anticompetitive 
conduct that has already been punished by public enforcers. 252 If public enforcers 
have already pursued disgorgement or punishment by sanctions, exemplary, 
restitutionary or multiple damages awards for the same anticompetitive behavior 
could cause duplicative recovery. 
However, US law does not consider fine plus damages to constitute double 
liability which is different from that of Korea. 253 
Thirdly, recognizing exemplary, restitutionary or multiple damages can result 
in over-compensation. Korean legal tradition has prevented over compensation 
252 Civil Law 867 
253 Besides problem of double liability of public enforcers and private enforcers, in the US, there is a 
possibility of multiple punitive damages in many state and federal jurisdiction. However, it is distinctive 
problem restricted to the US; In respect to multiple punitive damages, see section 6.5.2.2 which deals 
with problems created by class action in perspective of defendant in the US; In respect of multiple 
punitive damage, see John Calvin Jeffries, supra note 217, p. 142. 
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because it is not related to actual loss. 254 Compensation should not generate 
unjustified wealth for the victim255 The obligation to compensate should not be 
transformed into an excessive and disproportionate overload of the infringer. 256 
With exemplary, restitutionary or multiple damages awards, individual plaintiffs 
can receive unfair compensation which could be unjust enrichment itself. These 
damages could transfer the unfair enrichment from defendant to plaintiff. Such a 
transfer is thought undesirable in Korea because it can cause unjust enrichment to 
the victim. If exemplary, restitutionary or multiple damages were allowed, over- 
enforcement comes at a cost, both to the judicial system and the economy because 
damages actions can consume a large amount of business and judicial resources. 
When Korea adopts legal ideas from other jurisdictions, it is necessary for it to 
avoid the negative aspects experienced in those other jurisdictions, particularly, in 
this instance, those which have occurred in the US. As I already mentioned, under 
Korean legal tradition, damages actions have the main objective of compensation 
not deterrence, punishment or disgorgement of illegal gain. Korea strictly prohibits 
over-compensation. 
Fourthly, exemplary, restitutionary or multiple damages can cause over- 
enforcement because such damages could produce strong incentives to bring 
actions with the mere aim of reaching a settlement as is sometimes the case in the 
us. 257 
Fifthly, exemplary, restitutionary or multiple damages would lessen the 
incentive to apply for leniency programme. Korea provides leniency for 
258 undertakings which reveal cartel activity to the KFTC, as does the EU and UK. 
'I will discuss unfair enrichment in section 3.3.3 which deals with the problems of mandatory treble 
damages and the desirability or otherwise of introducing them in other jurisdictions. 
u' In respect to unjustified wealth for the victim in competition area, it is worh considering European 
articles because there are not a lot of discussions of it in Koera competition area. Thus, see Jukka Ahtela, 
"Response to Green Paper-Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules", Confederation of 
Finnish industries EK, 2006, p. 4; Romanian Competition Council, "Public consultation on the Green 
Paper-Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules", Position of the Romanian Competition 
Council, 2006, p. 9. 
2-1 Julcka Ahtela, Ibid. ; Romanian Competition Council, Ibid. 
uI See section 3.2.4 which deals with the current situation in respect of criteria and measurement of 
damages in the US. 
251 See Korea leniency programme 2009. The KFTC has revised leniency programme many times. 
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Given the above reasons, it is submitted that there is no justification for the 
introduction in Korea of exemplary, restitutionary or multiple damages259 The 
recovery of actual damages can serve as a sufficient incentive to bring damages 
actions. In particular, exemplary or multiple damages are not justified, where 
significant sanctions have already been imposed for breach of competition law. 
Once the plaintiffs have obtained compensation, it is not logical to punish the 
defendant for the same anticompetitive conduct by exemplary, restitutionary or 
multiple damage where the public enforcers have already done this. 260 
In respect to the importance of creating the right balance between private and 
public enforcement, it is submitted that the correct approach to deterrence, 
punishment and disgorgement of illegal gains is that these matters must remain the 
domain of competition authorities and they must not become the task of private 
parties. Competition law would be ideally best enforced and monitored by public 
enforcement in their role of preserving or restoring competition without exemplary, 
restitutionary or multiple damages. Illegal gains can be recovered by means of any 
sanctions imposed by the public enforcer such as the KFTC. To disgorge such 
illegal gains, for instance, it must consider whether the sanctions the KFTC imposes 
can be calculated to be more in line with the amount of profit made by the 
infringers. 
Thus, given substantial civil fines and criminal sanctions261 in Korea and the 
apprehension of US abuse of litigation, damages actions must be about 
compensation and they must not be used to punish companies. The guiding 
principles of private enforcement for damage caused by anticompetitive conduct 
should be compensation of victims and the danger of over-deterrence caused by 
excessive litigation and unmeritorious law suits should be prevented. 
u9 See section 3.3.4 which deals with the problems of treble damages. 260 See, e. g., Victor E. Schwartz and Leah Lorber, "Death by a Thousand Cuts: How to Stop Multiple 
Imposition of Punitive Damages", Briefly(National Legal Center for the Public Interest), Dec. 2003, p. 1 
(explaining that although common sense informs a parent's decision to "not punish a child more than once 
for the same wrong-doing, " the U. S. "civil justice system has strayed from common sense and basic 
fairness"). 
261 There is the possibility of prosecuting individuals by criminal sanctions in Korea. 
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Chapter 4. The Passing on Defence 
4.1 Overview of the Passing on defence 
4.1.1 Definition of the Passing on defence 
The passing on defence is where a defendant denies liability on the basis that 
the plaintiff has passed on the illegal overcharge to his own customers. The passing 
on issue only addresses the passed on overcharge. The harm from the overcharged 
price is composed of the actual loss and the loss of profit. ' Under the passing on 
defence a defendant can therefore argue that a plaintiffs loss has been reduced or 
negated by the plaintiff having passed on to his customer all or a proportion of any 
overcharge resulting from the defendant's actions and that, as a consequence, the 
defendant should not be liable to compensate the plaintiff for a loss which, 
ultimately, the latter has not borne. 2 
For example, if an undertaking enjoying a dominant position or participating 
in a cartel sells its products at overcharged prices, the direct purchasers of these 
products such as wholesalers will pay the overcharged price. However, these direct 
purchasers could be in a position to mitigate their economic loss by passing the 
overcharge on to their own customers and thus suffer no loss. In other words, the 
overcharge may not represent the totality of the direct purchasers' loss because the 
damage caused by the anticompetitive conduct is suffered entirely or in part by the 
ultimate purchaser such as consumers. 
4.1.2 Crucial Issues of the Passing on Defence 
Two main problems arise in respect of the passing on defence. 
Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the 
EC antitrust rules, SEC (2008) 404 at para 201. 
2 Customer includes indirect purchasers such as consumers from the overcharged price; Greg Olsen, 
"Actions for damages are Compensation and deterrence? Passing on defence and the future direction of 
UK private proceedings", CLI 4.8(3), 2005, p. '; Foad Hoseinian, "Passing on Damages and Community 
Antitrust Policy: An Economic Background", 28(1) World Competition 3,2005, p. 3. 
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Firstly, the question is whether the so-called passing on defence should be 
allowed or not in damages actions for breach of competition rules. If a customer is 
able to pass on all or part of his loss to the next purchaser in the chain, should he be 
compensated for the whole loss or only for an amount reduced by what he has been 
able to pass on? 
It is submitted that the key determinants of permitting passing on are i) the 
nature of the damages to which a plaintiff will be entitled ii) the nature of the 
market on which the plaintiffs damage has occurred iii) the time scale over which 
the damage has occurred and iv) the effects of the overcharge on the position of the 
plaintiff and its competitors. These key determinants could be applicable to all 
jurisdictions. 
For instance, in an analysis of the passing on defence published in 1980 
Harris and Sullivan contended that the passing-on of the overcharge to indirect 
purchasers depends mainly on the structure of the market and the elasticity of the 
demand and supply on the market. 3 In general, the more competitive the 
downstream market where the plaintiff operates, the less the likelihood of passing 
on occurring. 
Secondly, the passing on defence is related to indirect purchaser actions 
brought by indirect purchasers to whom the overcharge has been passed. Indirect 
purchaser actions are sometimes called as the passing on offence. In theory the 
passing on defence could be pleaded against a customer in a situation where the 
supplier is also faced with parallel or consecutive actions brought by purchasers at 
other levels of the distribution chain. 4 When designing a private competition 
enforcement regime, each jurisdiction faces a crucial policy choice as to whether to 
allow the passing-on defence and (if it does) whether to allow standing to indirect 
purchasers. If the passing on defence is prohibited and the passing on offence is 
3 Robert G. Harris, Lawrence A. Sullivan, "Passing on the Monopoly Overcharge: A Comprehensive 
Policy Analysis", 128 University of Pennsylvania Law review 269,1980, p. 273. 4 See, in particular, Hoskins, H., "Garden Cottage Revisited: The Availability of Damages in the National 
Courts for Breaches of the EEC Competition Rules" 6 E. C. L. R., 1992, p. 257. 
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allowed, many problems can arise related to aggregation, calculation and 
distribution of damages between direct and indirect purchasers. Indirect purchaser 
actions are further discussed Chapter V. 
Therefore, in this Chapter, firstly, I discuss importance of the passing on 
defence and the problems of permitting it. Secondly, I deal with the position in the 
US. The reason for dealing with the US ahead of the other jurisdictions is that the 
US has particularly striking rules on the passing on defence, embodied in the 
Hanover Shoe case .5 After discussing the position 
in the US, I look at the position 
in Korea, the EU and the UK before concluding whether or not Korea should 
consider changing its present stance on the issue. 
4.1.3 Importance of the Passing on Defence 
Anticompetitive activities often harm an indeterminable number of direct and 
indirect purchasers because the production of goods or services frequently involves 
a number of intermediate markets or firms. Anticompetitive activities can therefore 
spill over into several markets. 6 As one includes more layers further down the 
vertical chain, it typically tends to increase the number of victims due to the fact 
that the damage tends to be spread over numerous remote parties.? Purchasers at 
each level, including final consumers, may face higher prices and a restricted choice 
between products and services because of an overcharged price at any level through 
the formation of a cartel or an abuse of market power. 8 
Whether or not the passing on defence is permitted is important in respect of 
the optimal enforcement of competition law because it influences the incentives of 
plaintiffs to bring actions. 9 Furthermore, the passing on defence can highlight the 
s Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U. S. 481 (1968), p. 494. 
6 Patricia Hanh Rosochowicz, "Deterrence and the relationship between public and private enforcement 
of competition law", Amsterdam Centre for Law and Economics Workshop, 2005, p. 13; Firat Cengiz, 
"Passing on Defense and Indirect Purchaser Standing in Actions for Damages against the Violations of 
Competition Law: what can the EC learn from the US? ", CCP Working Paper 07-21,2007, p. 6. 
I See Foad Hoseinian, "Passing on Damages and Community Antitrust Policy: An Economic 
Background", World Competition, 2005, p. 15; see also Ulf Boge, Konrad Ost, "Up and Running, or Is It? 
Private Enforcement -The Situation in Germany and Policy Perspectives", 27(4) E. C. L. R., 2006, p. 199- 
200; Kati J. Cseres, "The impact of Consumer Protection on Competition and Competition law: The Case 
of Deregulated Markets", Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper NO. 2006-0, p. 3-4. 
$ Firat Cengiz, supra note 6, p. 7. 
9 As I already discussed, optimal enforcement could be achieved by effective and efficient cooperation 
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conflict between the compensatory principle and effective deterrence. Denying the 
passing on defence can produce a strong deterrent effect, as it is claimed to do in 
the US. However, it may be unjust from a compensatory perspective. 10 Thus, 
whether the passing on defence is permitted or not is significant and controversial 
issue. 11 
4.1.4 Problems of Permitting the Passing on Defence 
Permitting the passing on defence may cause considerable problems. 
Firstly, on the one hand, the passing on defence can render competition 
litigation fragmented because if the action by the direct purchaser is replaced by 
actions brought by the indirect purchasers the potential range of persons can be 
extremely broad and the loss can be split between many private parties, such as 
consumers. 12 It may put the responsibility for private action in the hands of indirect 
purchasers, the buyers of a shirt, book or egg who may be unable or unwilling to 
bring actions for practical reasons such as their small losses and small 
resources. 13 Indirect purchaser actions can inflate litigation costs and time spent on 
the litigation of individuals or firms. Legal costs and time can be considerable 
because of the multiplication of cases. From the perspective of the courts, allowing 
the passing on defence could be a heavy judicial -burden because of an excessive 
number of cases. 
On the other hand, while allowing the passing on defence can decrease the 
number of potential plaintiffs because it may be uneconomical for indirect 
purchasers such as consumers to seek to recovery, it may also be uneconomical for 
between private and public enforcement. Thus, the incentive of plaintiff to bring actions could influence 
the optimal enforcement. 
10 See Hanover Shoe v United Shoe Machinery Corporation, 392 U. S. 481 (1968) 
l Edward P. Henneberry, "Private Enforcement in EC Competition Law: The Green Paper on Damages 
Actions- The Passing-on Defenses and Standing for Indirect Purchasers, Representative Organizations 
and Other Groups", Heller Ehrman, LLP, 2006, p. 3. 
12 Firat Cengiz, supra note 6, pp. 6-7; Round Table Discussion on Private Remedies: Passing on defence; 
Indirect Purchaser Standing ; Definition of Damages: United States, Working Party No. 3 on Co-operation 
and Enforcement, DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2006)11, p. 15. 
13 Philip Haberman, "Quantifying antitrust damages: Flexibility rather than prescription is the best 
approach", CLI 55 (9), 2006, p. 4. 
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direct purchasers because their damages will be reduced by the amount that was 
passed on down to the next tier. 
Secondly, the passing on defence risks causing considerable uncertainty over 
the level of recovery by individual plaintiffs because of the difficulties of 
determining and allocating those damages. Irrespective of the case being settled or 
won, difficulties will arise in determining and distributing damages between the 
many individuals in a way corresponding to the damage incurred. It may lead to 
unworkable complexity, and thereby constitute a significant impediment to 
effective private enforcement. '4 
Thirdly, there is the issue of over-compensation. " There is a possibility that 
direct purchasers will seek damages even if they themselves profit from the 
anticompetitive infringement. Some direct purchasers may argue that they have 
suffered loss due to their inability to pass on the overcharge depending on the 
relative levels of competition in the market even when it is untrue. It is, however, 
possible that direct purchasers themselves profit from the anticompetitive 
infringement. For instance, in cartel cases, the direct purchaser could himself profit 
by claiming for an overcharge he has passed on. Thus, the passing on defence is 
necessary to avoid a direct purchaser who avoided damage by passing on the 
overcharge from receiving damages for harm. The defendant should have to pay 
damages to those who were really harmed by the infringement. 16 
However, the exclusion of the passing on defence does not necessarily result 
in the over-compensation of the direct purchaser because passed on raised price can 
result in a reduced volume of sales as the direct purchaser has to raise its prices to 
its customers. Thus, it must be recognized that there is a possibility that direct 
purchasers still suffer damage due to a reduction in sales because of raised price 
even if the overcharge has been transferred to indirect purchasers. '7 
14 Johan Ysewyn, "Private Enforcement of Competition Law in the EU: Trials and Tribulations", 
International Law Practicum, 2006, p. 15. 11 In respect to unjust enrichment, see section 3.2 which deals with the current situation in respect of the 
criteria and measurement of damages in the EU, UK, US and Korea. 
11 Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper, supra note 1, Para 206. 17 Ibid. at Para 202; Jakob Riiggeber and Maarten Pieter Schinkel, "Consolidating Antitrust Damages in 
Europe: A Proposal for Standing in Line with Efficient Private Enforcement", World Competition, 2006, p. 
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4.2 The Passing on defence in the US 
4.2.1 The Hanover Shoe case 
The passing on defence in the antitrust area was first addressed in the US in 
the judgment of the Supreme Court in Hanover Shoe Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery 
Corp. 18 The facts of the case were as follows: 
Hanover Shoe case was a follow-on action to an action brought by the DOJ in 
respect of an infringement of s2 of the Sherman Act. The plaintiff (Hanover Shoe) 
was a shoe manufacturer. It alleged that the defendant, United Shoe, exercised 
monopoly power over shoe-making equipment because the defendant refused to sell 
its shoe-making machines and instead required lengthy and restrictive leases, which 
resulted in a significant overcharge to Hanover, the lessee. United Shoe raised the 
passing on defence, arguing that the plaintiff passed on some, if not all, of the 
overcharges to its customers by raising its prices. 
In this case, the issue was whether a defendant found guilty of 
monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act could defend itself against 
claims by the direct purchaser of its product by arguing that the direct purchaser 
passed on the overcharged price to its customers and that therefore the direct 
purchaser suffered no damage. 
The Supreme Court rejected the use of the passing on defence. It held that an 
antitrust infringer cannot avoid liability to a direct purchaser by showing that the 
direct purchaser suffered no injury because it passed on any overcharge to its own 
customers. As a general principle, therefore, defendants are prevented from 
invoking the passing on defence in respect of sales to direct purchasers under the 
federal U. S. antitrust laws due to Hanover Shoe. 
400-401. 
is Hanover Shoe, Inc. V. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U. S. 481(1968), p. 494. 
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4.2.2 Rtionale of Hanover Shoe 
In Hanover Shoe, the Supreme Court rejected the passing on defence for two 
main reasons: i) ensuring effective deterrence and ii) avoiding complexity and 
uncertainty. 
4.2.2.1 Ensuring Effective Deterrence 
The Supreme Court rejected the passing on defence to ensure effective 
deterrence. 19 The Supreme Court insisted that permitting the passing on defence 
could impair the deterrent effect of litigation because ultimate consumers such as 
the buyers of single pairs of shoes may suffer small and diverse damage and have 
few legal resources so they rarely have an incentive to bring damages actions. 
20 As 
one commentator has argued, "Hanover Shoe has been decided as a pro-plaintiff 
decision, animated by the twin aims of maximizing deterrence and minimizing the 
possibility that guilty antitrust infringers could escape liability and retain the fruits 
of their unlawful activity. "21 It appears that the judgment of the US Supreme Court 
in Hanover Shoe22 was motivated by the desire to protect potential direct victims 
by excluding the passing on defence. The Court considered that if competition 
infringers get off too lightly, the prospect of liability for private damages may not 
provide infringer with enough incentive to refrain from illegal conduct. The Court's 
judgment in Hanover Shoe rested on the concern that antitrust law will be more 
effectively enforced by concentrating the full recovery for the overcharging on the 
direct purchasers rather than by allowing every individual affected by the 
overcharge to bring actions. 23 
The fear is therefore that those who violate the antitrust laws by price fixing 
or monopolizing would retain the fruits of their illegality if the defence was allowed 
because no one would be likely to bring actions against them. Thus, the impact of 
19 Hanover Shoe, Inc. V. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U. S. 481 (1968) at 494. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Andrew I. Gavil, `Before the Antitrust Modernization Commission Panel II: State Indirect Purchaser 
Actions: Proposals for Reform", Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D. C., June, 2005, p. 13. 
22 Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U. S. 481(1968), p. 494 See section 4.2.2 
which deals with Rationale of Hanover Shoe in the US. 
23 Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U. S 481 (1968) at 2070 - 2074. 
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treble-damage actions, the importance of which the Court many times emphasized, 
would be substantially reduced by allowing the passing on defence. 24 
Therefore, by rejecting the passing on defence, the Supreme Court tried to 
ensure effective enforcement. 
4.2.2.2 Avoiding complexity and uncertainty 
The Supreme Court sought to avoid the complexity and uncertainty of the 
passing on defence. The judgment was driven by the difficulty of determining what 
effect a price has on total sales in the real economic world. 25 The impact of the 
increase in price of any one input on the price of the output is very difficult to 
determine. One reason for this will be that the input may only represent a fractional 
influence on the firm's production costs. Calculating the passing on would be 
insurmountable. 6 
The Supreme Court held: 
"We are not impressed with the argument that the sound laws of economics 
require recognizing this defence. A wide range of factors influence a company's 
pricing policies. Normally the impact of a single change in the relevant conditions 
cannot be measured after the fact. Indeed a businessman may be unable to state 
whether, had one fact been different... he would have chosen a different price. 
Treble damage actions would require long and complicated proceedings involving 
massive evidence and complicated theories". 27 
The system of calculating the total overcharge and distributing this between 
direct purchasers is a much simpler system than calculating overcharges passed on 
u Hanover Shoe, Inc. v United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U. S. 481 (1968) at 494; See section 3.2 
which deals with the current situation in respect of the criteria and measurement of damages in the EU, 
UK, US and Korea. 
23 Sven Norberg, "Some Elements to Enhance Damages Actions for Breach of the Competition Rules in 
Articles 81 and 82 EC", 32°d Annual International Antitrust Law & Policy Conference, Fordham, New 
York, 2005, p. 12. 
26 Philip Haberman, supra note 13, p. 1. 27 Hanover Shoe, Inc. v United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U. S. 481 (1968) at 492-493 
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to indirect purchasers. In this case, the Supreme Court also stressed that federal 
courts were ill-equipped to engage in tracing overcharges through a supply chain, 
and that any attempt to do so would yield unreliable results. Therefore, the Supreme 
Court prohibited the passing on defence in order to prevent both unduly long and 
complicated antitrust cases. 
4.2.3 The Implications of the Position of US law on the Passing on 
Defence 
Given the above rationales, the Supreme Court's decision was motivated by 
the ensuring effective deterrence and avoiding complexity and uncertainty by 
permitting only direct purchaser actions. As a result of Hanover Shoe decision, US 
direct purchasers are able to recover damages to the entire amount of any 
overcharge rather than their actual loss. The defendant's overcharges multiplied by 
the quantity of the product purchased can be obtainable irrespective of the question 
whether or to what extent the plaintiffs passed on the overcharge. The Supreme 
Court, however, did not base its conclusion on reasoning of what could be fairness 
or justice which means real victims must have compensation. On the contrary the 
outcome was rather directed by the difficulties in calculating the amount of what 
had actually been passed on. 28 US law comes down in favour of rapid and 
attractive damages actions for direct purchasers and against the concept of passing 
on defence, even though although permitting passing on defence may lead to a 
more just distribution of the damages. 
4.3 The Passing on defence in Korea 
4.3.1 The Current Situation of Passing on defence in Korea 
In Korea, there has been much talk about stimulating private enforcement in 
the area of competition law. In this respect it needs to be determined whether the 
passing on defence is allowed or not because of the argument, discussed above, that 
the defence can promote the incentives of potential plaintiffs by influencing the 
u Sven Norberg, supra note 25, p. 12. 
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amount of damages they receive. However, the availability of the passing on 
defence in competition law has not been yet established and there are as yet no 
precedents in the case law. 
The important question for Korea is whether it is desirable to follow the rule 
laid down by the US Supreme Court in Hanover Shoe, 29 discussed above in section 
4.2.2, in order to ensure deterrence of anticompetitive conduct as well as 
compensation for damage. It can be argued that to ensure effective private 
enforcement, it is desirable to prohibit the passing on defence as US law does, 
because direct purchasers are more likely to detect anticompetitive conduct and 
have more incentive to bring actions. The US position on the passing on defence is 
looked at with interest for comparative purposes by Korea. 
4.3.2 Rationale of Permitting Passing on defence 
It is submitted that the exclusion of the passing on defence is not compatible 
with fundamental Korean legal principles because of three main reasons. 
4.3.2.1 The Principles of Full Compensation and Sufficient and 
Adequate Causation 
It must be noted that compensation for anticompetitive damage requires the 
combination of the principle of full compensation30 and a sufficient and adequate 
causation. 31 The main questions are exactly what are needed for full compensation 
and what comprises sufficient and adequate causation. 
For full compensation, plaintiffs have to be able to obtain compensation for 
actual damage (damnum emergens). In quantification of damage, it is desirable to 
ensure that capital loss such as inflation does not reduce the value of 
29 Hanover Shoe v United Shoe Machinery Corporation, 392 U. S. 481 (1968). 
3O In respect to full compensation, see section 3.2.1 which deals with full compensation in Korea.; Kwac 
Yun-Gik, "General Principles of Obligations Law", Parkyoungsa, 2005, pp. 106-126. 
31 Kwac Yun-Gik, Ibid., pp. 110-116 ; Gi Won- Lim, "Lecture on Civil Law"(5`h ed), Hongmunsa, 2007, 
p. 920-930; Song Deok-Soo, "New Lecture on Civil Law"(3rd ed. ), Parkyoungsa, 2010, pp. 946-952 
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compensation. 32 To ensure full compensation, as I discussed in Chapter III, Korean 
Civil Procedure Law allows interest for the period between the occurrence of the 
specific damage and the judgment ordering compensation. 33 The award of interest 
has been also declared essential by the Supreme Court as an element of full 
compensation. 
The Supreme Court stated that : 
" The normal rule is that damages are assessed at the date of loss and not at 
the date of judgment. Interest will compensate the plaintiff for the passage of time 
between the time when he suffered his loss and the time when he gets judgment in 
respect of it. " 34 
A causal link is one of the elements of civil liability. In order to impose 
liability it is not sufficient merely to have an infringement and damage occurring. It 
is necessary to prove also a causal link between the infringement and the damage, 
namely that the damage was caused by that infringement. Under Civil law, private 
plaintiffs can recover damages only if they manage to prove an infringement and 
sufficient and adequate casual relationship between infringement and damage. 
35 
This provision of the Civil law is applied to damages actions under competition law. 
As far as damages actions are concerned, the provision of damages actions of Civil 
law is fundamental to other laws such as competition law. Thus, there must be a 
relevant causal link between the breach of the competition rules and the damage 
sustained by the injured parties. Sufficient and adequate causation is generally used 
to help distinguish between cases where liability should or should not be incurred 
rather than having any concrete and identifiable content such as exclusion of 
liability in the presence of intervening events. 36 For instance, if cartelists fixed the 
price of product and after this price-fixing the price of this product is higher than 
the competitive price, sufficient and adequate causation between this cartel and the 
32 Supreme Court, 26.5.1987,86DACA1876 
33 Civil Procedure Law 109, See section 3.2.1 which deals with the current situation in respect of the 
criteria and measurement of damages in Korea. 
34 Supreme Court, 21.10.1966,64DA1102; Supreme Court, 27.7.1975,74DA1393. 
3s Civil Law 750 
36 Kwac Yun-Gik, supra note 30, p. 112; Gi Won- Lim, supra note 31, pp. 920-921; Song Deok-Soo, supra 
note 31, pp. 946-947 
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damage appears when consumers buy this product and are damaged. 
4.3.2.2 The Principle of Compensatory Damages 
As already discussed in Chapter III, Korea favours the compensatory 
principle in damages actions. 37 The generally accepted principle of damages 
actions is that damage is compensatory and plaintiffs can only recover the actual 
loss. 8 So, if, as a result of a cartel, direct purchasers are able to pass on the higher 
price to indirect purchasers such as consumers, they cannot recover the difference 
between the competitive market price and the monopolized market price as 
damages because they have not suffered the whole loss. Thus, recognition of the 
passing on defence is compatible with the compensatory principle of damages 
actions. 
Furthermore, an exclusion of the passing on defence could in effect give 
damages actions a `punitive' function detached from a compensatory function. This 
does not correspond to Korean civil law principles. As I have already discussed in 
chapter 111,39 in Korea, there is no justification for the introduction of punitive 
damages. Therefore, prohibiting the passing on defence is inconsistent with the 
principles of Korean law. 
4.3.2.3 The Prohibtion of Over-compensation 
As I have already discussed, the prohibition of over-compensation is a basic 
principle of Korean Law. 4° In the case of a cartel the true injury is the difference 
between the economic profits of the purchasers under a regime of competitive 
37 See chapter 3 which deals with damages; Kwac Yun Gik, supra note 30, p. 108; . Kim Hyung-Bae, "General Principles of Obligations Law", Parkyoungsa, 1999, p. 237 
35 Actual loss is to be assessed net of any loss that the victim of the infringement has taken from the 
anticompetitive conduct; Supreme Court, (14.6.1962) Judgment 4294; Supreme Court, (25.11.1969) 
Judgment 69 DA887; Kwac Yun Gik, supra note 30, p. 108; Kim Hyung-Bae, supra note 37, p. 237; Gi 
Won-Lim, supra note 31, pp. 911,913 ; Song Deok-Soo, supra note 31, pp. 942,943 
39 See section 3.2.1 which deals with the current situation in respect of the criteria and measurement of 
damages in Korea. 
40 See section 3.2.1 which deals with the current situation in respect of the criteria and measurement of 
damages in Korea. 
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suppliers and under the cartelized suppliers. The compensation should provide for 
the only equitable restitution' that the victims would have had in the absence of 
the anticompetitive conduct. 
As I have already noted, the exclusion of the passing-on defence may serve a 
great deterrent effect for parties contemplating engagement in anticompetitive 
infringements because of the amount of liability they would face, as the defendants 
in Hanover Shoe did. 42 However, it could also be described as `unjust' because 
there is the probability that direct purchasers that had raised its prices and passed 
them on to indirect purchasers such as consumers could be unjustly enriched at the 
expense of those indirect purchasers' interests. 
If the passing on defence is denied, even if indirect purchasers can bring 
damages actions for the whole loss they initially suffered, the direct purchaser may, 
at least partially, be unjustly enriched. Korean principles demand that the direct 
purchaser who has passed on an excessive price in whole or in part must be unable 
to recover either on the grounds that no damage has been sustained applying a 
traditional `but for' approach or as regards any restitutionary remedies. The but for 
approach is the situation in the absence of the anticompetitive practice. The but for 
price is calculated by taking the difference between the price which the plaintiff 
paid because of the anticompetitive practice and the price that would have been 
paid in the absence of anticompetitive practice, multiplied by the volume purchased. 
The measure of damages is also determined by the length of time the plaintiff 
remained in the anti-competitive market. 
Therefore, it is submitted that the passing on defence should be recognized to 
prevent over-compensation by direct purchasers 43 
41 According to Prof. Kwack, compensatory damage covers the difference between what the injured has 
and what he(or she) would have had but for illegal behaviour. Kwac Yun-Gik, supra note 30, p. 106 
42 See section 4.2 which deals with the passing on defence in the US. 
4; Unjust enrichment would occur if direct purchasers both (i) recouped the excessive prices they had 
paid by charging their customers similarly inflated prices and (ii) were awarded damages on the basis that 
they had suffered injury as a result of the unlawfully inflated prices. See section 3.2 which deals with 
unjust enrichment in the EU, UK, US and Korea. 
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4.3.2.4 The Problem of Multiple Liabilities 
If the passing on defence were not to be allowed and indirect purchasers were 
entitled to bring actions in addition to direct purchasers who had suffered loss, there 
would be the risk of a multiplicity of damages actions arising out of a single 
anticompetitive conduct. The prospect of multiple liabilities could arise if all 
injured parties including direct and indirect purchasers were entitled to 
compensation without allowing passing on defence. 4 If the passing on defence is 
not permitted, it is arguable that it necessitates the denial of standing to indirect 
purchasers, as is the case in the US, in order to avoid the prospect of multiple 
damages awards. 
However, it is important to bear in mind the Korean Competition Law 56, 
which states that: "Anyone who has damage of anticompetitive behaviour can be 
compensated for the damage. " 45 
According to the Korean Competition Law 56, therefore, anyone who has 
suffered loss has the right to compensation in damages. `Anyone' must include 
indirect purchasers such as consumers as well as direct purchasers such as 
distributors or wholesalers. The Korean Civil Law also states that one who causes 
damage is obliged to compensate for the damage that arises through his action. It 
does not define any categories of persons entitled to damage 46 The Korean Civil 
Law states: 
"If a natural or legal person intentionally or out of neglect infringes the 
prohibitions in Civil Act, he or she shall compensate the damage thereby 
47 occurring". 
" Kim Gu-Nyeon, "A Study on Problems on Private Remedies for Damages of Korean Antitrust Law", 
14 Comparative Private Law 261,2007, p. 277 
45 Competition Act 56. This is an official translation by the Korea Fair Trade Commission. 
" Civil Act 750(Damages actions). Civil law is important in competition damages actions because the 
general principle of damages actions under Civil law is also applied to competition damages actions. In 
korean civil procedure, the person who asserts to be injured by the defendent has standing in damage 
action. Lee Shi-Yoon, " New Civil Procedure Law", Parkyoungsa, 2005, p. 128; Hoh Moon-Hyuck, "Civil 
Procedure Law", Bubmoonsa, 2006, p. 185; Song Sang-Hyun & Park Ik-Hwan, "Civil Procedure Law", 
parkyoungsa, 2008, p. 133 
47 This is an official translation by the Korean Government. The prescription period for raising a 
compensation action has been extended from five to ten years from when the damage occurred. It is also 
always possible to raise any such claim before the District courts. 
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In the competition field, it can be argued that it is difficult to show actual 
damage occurring to indirect purchasers because of small and dispersed damage. To 
mitigate this difficulty, the `Guideline of Anticompetitive Conduct' of the KFTC 48 
reduces or even reverses liability of proof of causality. According to `Guideline of 
Anticompetitive Conduct' of the KFTC, causality could be presumed as long as 
damage has been proven, in which case it is the defendant who has to prove that the 
damage was not caused by its conduct. Given the Guideline, it appears that in Korea 
claims by indirect purchasers for compensation are not to be denied on account of 
the difficulties they present. Thus, it is desirable to recognize passing on defence to 
avoid multiple liabilities. 
Given the above principles in the Competition Law and the Civil Law, it 
must be concluded that a person who causes damage must compensate for it and 
that anyone who suffers from anticompetitive practices must be able to obtain 
compensation. It follows from this that Korea has to allow indirect purchaser 
actions. Moreover, it would be wrong to allow indirect purchaser actions while 
excluding the passing on defence because it would give rise to the problem of 
multiple recoveries. 49 
Multiple liabilities refers to a situation where the defendant is condemned to 
pay the direct and indirect buyers the same amount, although the direct buyer has 
previously passed on the overcharge to the latter. S° For example, if the overcharge 
is £10, then multiple liabilities arise if both the. direct and indirect purchaser is 
compensated for £10 each. This occurs because, by excluding the passing-on 
defence, the defendant would not be able to limit liability by showing that the direct 
purchaser mitigated the loss by passing on the overcharge to downstream buyers. In 
this case, condemning the defendant twice is not desirable, since it results in an 
over-compensation to the direct buyer. However, such a situation can be avoided 
through procedural mechanisms that apportion compensation between the parties. 
4i Guideline ofAnticompetitive Conduct of the KFTC 26,2005.5.22. iii. I. Ga. (3) 
49 Kim Gu-Nyeon, supra note 44, p. 277 
S0 Harris and Sullivan, supra note 3, pp. 343-345. The authors defined the first situation as `duplicative 
liability'. In the US, this was perceived as a serious risk because of the 'treble damage' rule. 
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Avoiding multiple liabilities by combining the principles of, Hanover Shoe 
and Illinois BricP' is not accepted in Korea. Excluding the passing on defence 
and refusing standing to indirect purchasers infringes both the principle against 
unjust enrichment (ie. over compensation) and the principle that compensation for 
harm should be obtainable from the person causing the damage. It is submitted, 
therefore, that if both direct and indirect purchasers are allowed to bring damages 
actions against the infringer for competition damages, the passing on defence must 
be recognized. 
4.4 The Passing on defence in the EU 
4.4.1 Overview of the Passing on defence in the EU 
Until now there have been no specific or clear principles regarding the 
passing-on defence in EU law in respect of competition cases. It has left these 
matters largely to the national laws. 52 However, the Commission is now 
considering the harmonisation of national laws on this matter, as seen in its Green 
53 sa Paper of 2005 and subsequent White Paper of 2008. 
It should be noted, moreover, that the ECJ has dealt with this defence in the 
context of levied charges that infringed Community law. 55 The ECJ has established 
that such a defence is compatible with EC rules which the national rules must 
comply. 56 
Si Illinois Brick Co. v. State of Illinois 431 U. S. 720 (1977). See section 5.2 which deals with indirect 
purchaser litigation in the US. 
2 Firat Cengiz, supra note 6, p. 32. 
33 European Commission, "Green Paper - Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, " COM 
(2005) 672 final. 
European Commission, "White Paper on Damages actions for Breach of the EC antitrust rules", COM 
(2008) 165 final. 
s Hans Just I/S v Danish Ministry for Fiscal Affairs , Case 68/79, [1980] ECR 501. -` Carlo Petrucci, "The Issues of the Passing on Defence and Indirect Purchasers' Standing in European 
Competition Law", E. C. L. R., 29(1), 2008, p. 39-40. 
177 
4.4.2. Rationale of Permitting Passing on defence in the EU 
4.4.2.1 Principle of Effectiveness 
The ECJ has laid down the principle of effectivenessS7 and the ECJ recalled 
this principle in the leading cases of Courage v Crehan58and Manfredi. 59 
In Courage v Crehan, the ECJ held that: 
"in the absence of Community rules governing the matter, [it] is for the 
legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having 
jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for 
safeguarding rights which individuals derive directly form Community law 
provided ......... that they do not render practically impossible or excessively 
difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (principle of 
effectiveness)". 60 
The rejection of the passing on defence may be seen as running contrary to 
the effective deterrent principle. The passing on defence could efficiently increase 
the deterrent effect on potential competition infringers because it would give greater 
incentives for plaintiffs such as consumers to bring actions. It can be argued that the 
more parties bring actions, the more companies try to avoid illegal conduct afraid of 
facing damages actions. 
However, it can also be argued, as seen above when discussing the position in 
the US and Korea, that allowing the passing-on defence would collide with the 
principle of effectiveness of EC law because allowing the passing on defence could 
incur the considerable practical difficulties of the determination, calculation and 
distribution of damage between direct and indirect victims. 61 Effective enforcement 
s' See section 3.2.2 which deals with the principle of effectiveness; See, for example, Hans Just I/S v 
Danish Ministry for Fiscal Affairs, Case 68/79, [1980] ECR50 1; [ 1981]2CMLR714; Amministrazione 
delle Finanze dello Stato v SpA San Georgio, Case 199/82, [1983]ECR3595; [1985]2CMLR658. 
ss Courage v Crehan, C-452/99, [2001] ECR 1-6297. 
s' Manfredi v. LloydAdriaticoAssicurazioni SpA, C-295/04, [2006] ECJ, 348. 
60 Courage v Crehan, C-452/99, [2001] ECR 1-6297 at para. 29. 
61 See section 4.2 which deals with the passing on defence in the US and section 4.3 which deals with 
passing on defence in Korea; see also Riley, A, "EC Antitrust Modernisation: The Commission does very 
178 
would thus be reduced. Prohibiting the passing on defence, on the other hand, 
would correspond more closely to the principle of effectiveness because paying full 
damages to the direct victim is simpler than distributing damages between direct 
and indirect victims. 62 Those in favour of excluding the passing on defence refer 
to the consideration of practical difficulties of quantification and distribution of 
damage. The exclusion of the passing on defence, it is argued, could make litigation 
a more attractive option for potential plaintiffs such as direct purchasers who have 
motives and resources to bring actions. Therefore, it is necessary to compare the 
effectiveness both when the passing on defence is allowed and when it is not. 
In its White Paper the Commission recalls the Court's emphasis on the 
compensatory principle and its premise that damages should be available to any 
person who can show a sufficient causal link with the infringement in White Paper. 
The White Paper makes the suggestion that infringers should be allowed to invoke 
the possibility that the overcharge might have been passed on. 63 It suggests that the 
defendant in an antitrust damages case should be entitled to rely on the passing-on 
defence against a claim for compensation of the overcharge, brought by a plaintiff 
who is not a final consumer. 64 It also makes a suggestion as to how to alleviate the 
burden of proof on indirect purchasers. It suggests that indirect purchasers should 
be able to rely on the rebuttable presumption that the illegal overcharge was passed 
on to them in its entirety. 65 
It should be noted that the European Parliament has stated in its Resolution 
on the White Paper that it: 
"[n]otes that developing a common Community approach to passing on has 
merit and approves the admissibility of passing on as a defence and evidence for 
"66 such a defence must always be provided. 
nicely - thank you! Part 2: Between the Idea and the Reality: Decentralisation under Regulation", 1 
European Competition Law Review 657,2003, p. 670. 
62 John Pheasant, "Private Damages Actions: Response to the Commission's green paper", CLI 5 8(8), 
2006, p. 2. 
63 White Paper on Damages actions, supra note 54, para 2.6. 
" Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 European Parliament resolution of 26 March 2009 on the White Paper on damages actions for breach 
of the EC antitrust rules (2008/2154(INI)), para 18. 
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The attitude of the European Parliament is very important given that any 
adoption of EU harmonisation measures would involve a Directive, the legislative 
procedure for which would never the participation of the Parliament. 
4.4.2.2 The Principle of Prohibiting Unjust enrichment 
As I have already discussed in Chapter III, Community law allows the 
national laws of the Member States to prohibit unjust enrichment if they wish. 67 
This is clear from the Crehan and Manfredi cases, as I will discuss below. It is also 
clearly stated in the Commission Staff Working'. Paper accompanying the White 
Paper on Damages actions. 68 There is therefore a strong likelihood that EC law will 
not preclude the operation of the passing on defence in national laws based on the 
principle of prohibiting unjust enrichment. 
In the non-competition law case, San Giorgio, the ECJ recognized the 
principle that EC law does not prevent national law from taking into account the 
fact that unlawful charges are passed on to other buyers, thus preventing the 
recovery of such charges. 69 The Court confirmed this principle in Crehan. The 
Court stated that: 
"Community law does not prevent national courts from taking steps to ensure 
that the protection of the rights guaranteed by the Community law does not entail 
the unjust enrichment of those who enjoy them. "70 
Later, the Court repeated the same formula in Manfredi. 71 The Court stated 
that: 
"It is settled case-law that Community law does not prevent national courts 
from taking steps to ensure that the protection of the rights guaranteed by 
67 See Chapter 3.2.3 which deals with the current situation in respect of the criteria and measurement of 
damages in the EU. 
" Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper, supra note 1, para. 191. 
69 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v San Giorgio SpA, Case 199/82, [1983] ECR 3595, at 13. 
?0 Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan, C-453/99, ECR [2001] 1-6297 at 30. 
71 Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, C-295/04, [2006] ECR 1-06619, at 94. 
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Community law does not entail the unjust enrichment of those who enjoy them. " 72 
In respect to the relationship between passing on defence and unjust 
enrichment, it has been said by one commentator that: 
"Matters of unjust enrichment and passing-on defence are essentially similar 
in terms of their underlying rationales. They both stem from the fairness 
consideration...... The only practical difference is that analysis of passing-on proves 
much more complicated than analysis of unjust enrichment as it involves technical 
economic and econometric data. That difference aside, it is not hard to imagine that 
the Court's position would not be dramatically different in the matter of passing-on 
defense from its position regarding unjust enrichment' . 73 
It should be noted that the ECJ has, in several cases under Article 288(2) 
regarding the non-contractual liability of the Community institutions, recognized a 
passing on defence to avoid unjust enrichment. 
For example, in Dumortier Freres maize gritz producers brought damages 
actions against the Community because certain refunds to which they were entitled 
had been abolished. In this case, the ECJ held that: 
"If the loss from the abolition of the refunds has actually been passed on the 
prices the damage may not be measured by reference to the refunds not paid. In that 
case, the price increase by the producers would take the place of the refunds, thus 
compensating the producer". 74 
Under the principle of prohibition of over-compensation, a direct purchaser 
who has passed on an excessive charge will be unable to recover. There have been a 
number of Article 234 references in actions for the recovery of illegally levied 
n Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, C-295/04, [2006] ECJ, 348 at para. 94. This case 
confirmed what Advocate General van Gerven had argued in Case C-128/92, Banks v. British Coal, 
[1994] ECR 1-1209 at para 48 of his Opinion; See also Ireks-Arkady v Council and Commission, Case 
238-78, [1979] ECR 2955 at para. 14; See also, Michatlidis AE v. Idryma Koinonikon Asfaliseon (JKA), 
Joined Cases C-441/98 and C-442/98, [2000] ECR I-7145, at para. 31. 
73 Firat Cengiz, supra note 6, p. 32. ' Dumortier Freres v. Council, Case 64 and 113/76, [1979] ECR 3091 at para. 15. 
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duties brought by undertakings against Member States, such as Just, 75 San 
Giorgio, 76 Bianco, 77 Comateb78 and Mikhailidis. 79 In these cases, the ECJ has 
accepted the defendants' (Member States) ability to invoke the passing on defence 
based on the principle of prohibition of over-compensation. 
In Just, the ECJ held that: 
"It should be specified in this connection that the protection of rights 
guaranteed in the matter by Community law does not require an order for the 
recovery of charges improperly made to be granted in conditions which would 
involve the unjust enrichment of those entitled. There is nothing, therefore, from the 
point of view of Community law, to prevent national courts from taking account in 
accordance with their national law of the fact that it has been possible for chargers 
unduly levied to be incorporated in the prices of the undertaking liable for the 
charge and to be passed on to the purchasers... " 80 
In the Weber's Wine World case, 81 the ECJ also ruled that it was not 
incompatible with Community law for Denmark to apply its national principle of 
unjust enrichment where the unlawful charges had been passed on. 82 
In Banks, 83 a competition case, AG van Gerven dealt with the issue of 
quantification as well as that of the avoidance of unjust enrichment: 
"In quantifying the damage it is necessary, in any event, in accordance with 
the aforesaid prohibition on unjust enrichment to take account of the extent to 
75 Hans Just v. Danish Ministryfor Fiscal Affairs, Case 68/79, [1980] ECR 501. 
76 Amministrazione delle Finanze delta Stato v. (SpA) San Giorgio, Case 199/82, [1983] ECR 3595. n SA Les Fils de Jules Bianco and J. Girard Fils SA v. Directeur General des Downes et droits indirects, 
Joined Cases 331/85,376/85, [19881 ECR 1099. 
" Socidte Comateb, Joined Cases C-192/95 to C-218/95, [1997] ECR I -165. " Mikhailidis V. Asphaliseon (IKA), Joined Cases C-441/98 and 442/98, [2000] ECR I- 7145, para 31. SO Hans Just 1/S v Danish Ministryfor Fiscal Affairs, Case 68/79, [1980] ECR501; [1981]2CMLR714, 
para. 26; See also Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v SpA San Georgio, Case 199/82, [1983] 
ECR3595; [1985]2CMLR658, para 13. " Weber's Wine World and others v. Abgabenberufungskommission Wien, C-147/01, [2003] ECR I-11365. 
112 Weber's Wine World and Others v. Abgabenberufungskommission Wien, C-147/01, [2003] ECR 1-11365, 
para. 101,102 
Ranks v. British Coal, C-128/92, [1994] ECR 1-1209. 
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which the damage has been passed on in the selling prices of the complainant 
undertaking". 
84 
However, Community law does not allow a Member State to resist claims for 
reimbursement simply where the burden of a tax has been passed on. The ECJ has 
considered damages for lost profits due to reduced sales caused by overcharged 
price. 85 In Weber's Wine World the Court treated passed on damage and actual 
enrichment as cumulative conditions, which both have to be fulfilled in order for 
any reduction in repayment to a trader of an unduly claimed charge. In this case, the 
Court made judgment to preclude national legislation or a national administrative 
practice which makes the exercise of the rights conferred by the Community legal 
order impossible in practice or excessively difficult by establishing a presumption 
of unjust enrichment on the sole ground that the duty was passed on to third 
parties. 86 
For example, with reference to Just, the Court pointed out that: 
"The trader may have suffered damage as a result of the very fact that he has 
passed on the charge levied by the administration in breach of Community law, 
because the increase in price of the product brought about by passing on a charge 
has led to a decrease of sales... In such circumstances the trader may justly claim 
that... the inclusion of that charge in the cost price has caused him damage which 
excludes, in whole or in part, any unjust enrichment which would otherwise be 
caused by reimbursement". 87 
In Comateb, 88 the ECJ re-affirmed that the plaintiff s harm also consists of a 
loss of sales deriving from charging higher prices. In these cases, the Court thus 
made it clear that there is a distinction between, on the one hand, the extent to 
which there may be passed on damage and, on the' other hand, the damage suffered 
u See AG van GERVEN, Opinion of Case C-128/92, Banks v. British Coal, [1994] ECR 1-1209 at para. 
51. 
ss Societe Comateb, Joined cases C-192/95 to C-218/95, [1997] ECR I -165, CJ. at para. 26. " See generally, Weber's Wine World and others v. Abgabenberufungskommission Wien, C-147/01, [2003] 
ECR I- 11365 
j Societe Comateb, Joined cases C-192/95 to C-218/95, [1997] ECR I -165, para 31,32 u Societe Comateb, Joined cases C-192/95 to C-218/95, [1997] ECR 1 -165 
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as a result of reduced sales. 
In Weber, the Court also affirmed such rulings as EU consolidated case law. 
In this case, the ECJ ruled on the question of whether an Austrian retailer could 
recover state taxes, which were collected in infringement of EC law. 89 The 
Austrian authority argued that the retailer could not recover these taxes because it 
had passed them on to its customers. The ECJ accepted this defence in principle, 
but recognized the possibility that the retailer lost business as a result of charging 
higher prices. 
In Weber's Wine World, the Court held 
"It must therefore be concluded on this point that the rules of Community law 
on the recovery of sums levied but not due are to be interpreted as meaning that 
they preclude national rules which refuse repayment of a charge incompatible with 
Community law on the sole ground that the charge was passed on to third parties, 
without requiring that the degree of unjust enrichment that repayment of the 
charges would entail for the trader be established"90 
There is no persuasiveness in the idea that defendants should be exempt from 
liability and unjustly enriched merely in order to avoid a possible unjust enrichment 
in the direct victim's assets. 
In Weber's Wine World, 91 Advocate General Jacobs also stated that: 
"However, even where the burden of the charge has been passed on in whole 
or in part, repayment to the trader of the relevant amount does not necessarily entail 
his over-compensation. " 
'9 Weber's Wine World and others v. Abgabenberufungskommission Wien, C-147/01, [2003] ECR I- 
11365 at para. 119. 
9° Weber's Wine World and others v. Abgabenberufungskommission Wien, C-147/01, [2003] ECR I -11365 
at paras. 102 and 117. 
91 Weber's Wine World and others v. Abgabenberufungskommission Wien, C-147/01, [2003] ECR I- 11365, 
para 47. 
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After the ECJ's judgment in Weber, therefore, there is an unjust enrichment 
defence which requires both proof of passed on damage and proof of no reduction 
in sales or other reduction in income. 92 
It is submitted that in respect of the need for uniform, consistent and effective 
remedies, the existing EC case law on the passing on defence, although not directly 
on the point of private enforcement of competition law, may be extended without 
excessive difficulty to that area because EC law has developed clear principles in 
the areas of damages liability and causation. For consistency and legal certainty, it 
is desirable that EC law adopts the same or a similar approach towards the passing 
on defence in dealing with damages actions in competition cases as in other areas of 
law. Most importantly, to avoid unjust enrichment the European Commission 
suggests recognizing the passing on defence the White Paper. 93 
Given the above judgements of the ECJ, the principle of prohibition of unjust 
enrichment could play a decisive role in damages actions in respect of the position 
of the passing on defence in competition cases. It has been persuasively argued that 
there is a high probability that the passing on defence could be available because of 
this principle. 94 Given the principles of effectiveness and the disapproval of unjust 
enrichment, it appears improbable that the EU would adopt the position of US law 
under Hanover Shoe. Under EC law a direct purchaser who has passed on an 
excessive price in whole or in part should be unable to recover on the grounds that 
there has been unjust enrichment at the expense of the party that has been passed on. 
If a plaintiff has suffered as the result of a competition law infringement, the 
defendant should compensate plaintiffs for the damage because they are real 
victims. However, it is also necessary to allow the defendant to invoke the passing 
on defence in order to reduce the amount to what the plaintiff really suffered. To 
the extent that the plaintiff does not suffer the entire actual loss resulting from the 
illegal increase in price, he should not be able to entirely recover the illegal price 
92 John, "Private damages actions: part 2", CLI 53 (6), 2006, p. 4. 
93 White Paper on Damages actions, supra note 54, para 2.6. 
94 See, Brealey "Adopt Perma Life, but follow Hanover Shoe to Illinois? - Who Can Sue for Damages 
for Breach of EC Competition Law? ", I Competition Law Journal 127,2002; John Pheasant, "Private 
Damages Actions", CLI 52 (6), 2006, p. 4; Carlo Petrucci, supra note 56, p. 40. 
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increase imposed upon him. To ensure corrective justice for real victims of 
anticompetitive conduct, it is submitted that the passing on defence must be 
recognized in EU law. If defendants show by factual and/or expert evidence that 
such passing on occurred in practice, it should constitute a complete or partial 
defence to the claim. 
4.5 The Passing on defence in the UK 
4.5.1 Current Position of the Passing on Defence in the UK 
As explained above the ECJ has not yet given any definitive guidance on the 
passing' on defence in the area of competition law. 95 Therefore, the passing on 
defence is still a matter for law of Member States of the EU. 
The CAT noted the significance of the existence or exclusion of the passing 
on defence to future private enforcement in BCL Old Co v Aventis. 96 In this case, 
the CAT referred to the passing on defence as a "novel and important issue both in 
this case and in future cases" and noted that "these issues are as yet undecided in 
the United Kingdom nor, as far as we know, definitively decided in any other 
European jurisdiction". 97 
In BCL, the damages actions arose out of the Commission's decision on a 
long-standing vitamins cartel in November 2001.98 In this case, upstream and 
downstream passing on issues arose. 
See section 4.4 which discriminates passing on defence in the EU from the UK. 
% BCL Old Co v Aventis and Deans Foods v Roche Products Ltd, [2005] CAT 2 
BCL Old Co v Aventis and Deans Foods v Roche Products Ltd, [2005] CAT 2, paras 32-34. 
In the 1990s, vitamin manufacturers including Aventis (then known as Rhone-Poulenc), BASF, and 
Hoffmann-LaRoche, were pursued in the US and the EU because of price-fixing and market-sharing 
cartels. The European Commission found that 13 manufacturers of vitamins supplying the European 
Economic Area (EEA) participated in a series of continuing agreements contrary to Article 81(1)of the 
EC Treaty and Article 53(1) of the Agreement on the European Economic Area 1992: Commission 
Decision in Case COMP/E-1/37.512, Vitamins [2003] O. J. L6/1. The fines against Hoffmann-LaRoche 
were the highest ever imposed by the U. S. DOJ (U. S. $500 million) and the European Commission fined 
it JA62 million (including a reduction under the Leniency programme). Some of Hoffmann-LaRoche's 
customers brought actions for damages and since the time for appealing against the EC Commission's 
decision under Article 230 EC to the Court of First Instance had expired and no appeal had been lodged 
by the defendants the infringement decision of the EC Commission bound the CAT. Some of Hoffmann- 
LaRoche's customers brought actions for damages. 
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The claims were brought against two addressees of the Vitamins decision, 
Aventis SA99 and F Hoffmann-La Roche AG, and a UK subsidiary of each of them. 
The defendants were manufacturers or distributors of a wide range of vitamins. The 
plaintiffs stated that they carried on business throughout the time during when the 
vitamins cartel was in operation. The plaintiffs reared poultry for the supply of 
chicken meat and eggs to supermarkets and wholesalers. Each of the plaintiffs 
stated that it bought vitamins for incorporation in poultry feedstuffs in order to rear 
poultry, from one of the defendants directly or from nutrition companies which had 
themselves purchased vitamins from the defendants. 
The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants caused each of the plaintiffs to pay 
higher prices than competitive prices because of defendants' cartel. They also 
claimed that the power of supermarkets in the market for poultry meat prevented 
plaintiffs from passing on their increased costs caused by the vitamins cartel. The 
claims were advanced on the basis that the plaintiffs were seeking compensation for 
loss suffered as a result of higher vitamin prices resulting from the cartel. The 
plaintiffs claimed damages from the defendants pursuant to section 47A of the 
Competition Act 1998. These claims had the added complexity of requiring the 
plaintiffs to prove that third parties such as the nutrition companies had passed on 
higher prices, so-called upstream passing on. 
With regard to this argument, the defendants replied that not all increases in 
prices were always passed on in full or in part by the nutrition companies to the 
plaintiffs (upstream pass on) and that the plaintiffs were not precluded from passing 
on any increased costs from inflated prices in the form of higher prices to their own 
customers (downstream pass on). Thus, the plaintiffs needed to prove that they did 
not pass on increased costs they had incurred to their customers, the large 
supermarket chains, but absorbed those costs themselves. 10° 
In this case, the CAT suggested that the claims, pleaded on the normal 
compensatory basis, might possibly be alternatively pleaded in restitution. 101 
" Now Sanofi-Aventis SA. 
100 BCL Old Co Limited and others v. Aventis SA and Others, Case No 1028/5/7/04, [2005]CAT 2, para 9 10' BCL Old Co Limited and others v Aventis SA and Others, Case No 1028/5/7/04, [2005]CAT 2, pars 28 
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Applications to amendment to plead restitution and exemplary damages were made. 
The CAT also raised the question whether the plaintiffs were, as a matter of law, 
required to prove no downstream passing on. In the end the case was settled without 
these issues ever having to be resolved. 102 
From the statements of the CAT in this case, it is submitted that the CAT did 
in effect recognize the passing on defence. 
Although it can be argued that a competition claim should be categorised as 
lying in restitution, the Court of Appeal in Devenish Nutrition Limited v. Sanofi- 
Aventis SA (France) &ORS, a further episode in the litigation arising from the 
Vitamins cartel, was not prepared to make that finding. 103 On the contrary, it 
appears from this case that because of the nature of compensatory damages, where 
the defendant can show that the plaintiff has avoided or mitigated its loss by 
passing on loss, the defendant may be able to claim a reduction in the damages. The 
Court of Appeal said: 
"No one suggests that, to the extent that the plaintiff has in fact suffered a 
loss because it has paid too high a price which it has been unable (for any reason) to 
pass on to its own purchasers, that loss cannot be recovered. If, however, the 
plaintiff has in fact passed the excessive price on to its purchasers and not absorbed 
the excess price itself, there is no very obvious reason why the profit made by the 
defendants (albeit undeserved and wrongful) should be transferred to the plaintiff 
without the plaintiff being obliged to transfer it down the line to those who have 
actually suffered the loss. Neither the law of restitution nor the law of damages is in 
the business of transferring monetary gains from one undeserving recipient to 
another undeserving recipient even if the former has acted illegally while the latter 
has not. "°4 
In this case, whilst the matter was not directly addressed, both the High Court 
102 BCL Old Co Limited and others v. Aventis SA and. Others, Case No 1028/5/7/04, [2005]CAT 2 
103 Devenish Nutrition Limited v. Sanofr-Aventis SA(France) and otherS, Case A3/2008/0080, 
[2008]EWCA Civ 1086, paras 16,21. See also section 3.2.3 which deals with the current situation in 
respect of the criteria and measurement of damages in the UK. 
104 Ibid., Para 147. 
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and the Court of Appeal therefore proceeded on the basis that the passing on 
defence is available as a matter of English law. 105 
Another case in which an English court has made highly significant 
comments on the passing on defence is Emerald Supplies Ltd & Anr v. British 
Airways Plc, where the High Court stated that: 
"The judgment of the US Supreme Court in Hanover Shoe was a policy a 
decision not open to the courts in England. " 106 
Here the court identifies the principle in Hanover Shoe as being one of policy. 
That brings up the whole question of having a principle which sacrifices `fairness' 
or'justice' to other imperatives. As I already discussed, 107 in the Hanover Shoe case, 
the US Supreme Court sacrificed `fairness' to ensure efficiency by rejecting passing 
on defence. 
The OFT also supports the concept of the passing on defence in principle. 
However, it has expressed concern that it might allow defendants to escape liability 
and accordingly proposed that the burden of proof should be on the defendant to 
show that any overcharge had been passed on. '°8 
4.5.2 Rationale of Permitting Passing on defence 
There are four main reasons which militate in favour of the UK courts 
accepting the passing on defence. 109 
Firstly, the exclusion of the passing on defence would contradict the 
fundamental principles applied by the UK courts in making damages awards. "" 
los Ibid. 
106 Emerald Supplies Ltd v. British Airways Plc, IHC 46/09, [2009] EWHC 741(Ch), at para 37. 
107 See section 4.2.2 which deals with rationale of Hanover Shoe case. 
108 The Office of Fair Trading, "Private Actions in Competition Law: Effective Redress for Consumes 
and Business", OFT916,2007, pp. 38-39. 
109 Tim Ward and Kassie Smith, "Competition litigation in the UK", 2005, Thomson, p. 273,7-049. 
10 See section 3.2.3 which deals with the current situation in respect of the criteria and measurement of 
damages in UK; Greg Olsen, supra note 2, p. 3. 
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Whether the passing on defence should be recognized depends on whether private 
damages actions exist to provide a strong deterrent effect or real redress for 
harmed parties. Rationales of permitting the passing on defence rely mainly on the 
compensatory principle and the principle of justice or fairness. As I already 
discussed in Chapter 3,111 it is clear that the primary object of an award of damages 
in the UK is to compensate the plaintiff for damage done to him for actual loss. 
Therefore, exclusion of the passing on defence would conflict with 
established principles of compensation on which damages are usually awarded in 
the UK. 
As I have seen in Chapter 3112 the UK could adopt exemplary ((punitive) 
damages to ensure a deterrent effect. However, while exemplary (punitive) damages 
are known in UK law, the UK courts have only recognized a punitive element in 
exceptional circumstances. 113 This is particularly so where the payment of such 
will not result in the over-compensation of a plaintiff. 
Secondly, if the passing on defence were to be excluded in the UK, as it has 
been in the US, it would contradict the principles of the prohibition of over- 
compensation. In the UK, it is noted that in the BCL case, Sir Christopher Bellamy 
QC, President of the CAT, questioned whether: 
"claims arising from infringement of the 1998 Competition Act, or of 
Community Law are strictly speaking in the nature of damages in a way analogous 
to an action for tort or whether they can be looked at in some other way, for 
example, as some kind of claim that could perhaps go under the general heading of 
`unjust enrichment'.... " 1 14 
See section 3.2.3 which deals with the current situation in respect of the criteria and measurement of 
damages in the UK. 
112 See section 3.2.3 which deals with the current situation in respect of the criteria and measurement of 
damages in the UK 
113 Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129; Rv Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame [1997] Eu 
LR 475, QBD; Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary [2001] UKHL 
29; [2001]2WLR1789 
I" BCL Old Co v Aventis and Deans Foods v Roche Products Ltd, Cases 1028/5/7/04&1029/5/7.04. 
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Arguably, the primary justification for the recognition of the passing on 
defence is to prevent the over-compensation of the plaintiff. ' is In Devenish, as seen 
above, the Court stated that the plaintiff (ie plaintiff) was entitled to be 
compensated for any loss it has suffered as a result of the cartel, no more and no 
less. 116 However, although the OFT recommends recognizing the passing on 
defence, it takes the view that as a matter of policy, it is appropriate to place the 
burden of proof of passed on damages in respect of establishing a passing on 
defence with the defendant but, where established, that the defendant should not be 
liable for loss which has been passed on in whole or in part. 117 
Thirdly, there is the high probability of multiple liabilities. To enhance the 
deterrent effect, the promotion of direct purchasers at the expense of indirect 
purchasers can lead to the ban on indirect purchaser actions as in the US. 
118 That 
approach might appear to be in conflict with the compensation principle articulated 
by the ECJ because anyone who suffers a loss caused by anticompetitive conduct 
can bring damages actions before a court. 119 If indirect purchaser actions are 
allowed, it is necessary to recognize passing on defence to avoid multiple liabilities. 
To prevent multiple liabilities, as I already discussed above, prohibition of the 
passing on defence and recognition of indirect purchaser actions would not be 
acceptable as a matter of UK law. 120 
Fourthly, the passing on defence has been recognised in other areas of British 
law, in particular in relation to taxation. Where the state has imposed an unlawful 
tax on a person the courts have allowed the tax authorities to recognize the passing 
on defence in the face of claims for repayment. 12 1 For example, the passing on 
defence has already been successfully applied by HM Customs & Excise to deny 
's Courage v Crehan, C-452/99, [2001 ]ECR 1-6297 at para. 30. 
'16 Devenish Nutrition Limited v Sanofi-Aventis SA(France) and others, Case A3/2008/0080, 
[2008]EWCA Civ 1086, para 161. 
" OFT 916, supra note 108, p. 40; See also Lesley Farrell and Sarah Ince, "UK: Private Enforcement", 
European Antitrust Review, 2009, p. 5. 11$ See the Illinois Brick case, discussed in section 5.2 which deals with indirect purchaser litigation in 
the US. 
119 Courage v Crehan, C-452/99, [2001]ECR 1-6297, discussed below in section 4.4.2; Ward and Smith, 
s ra note 109, p. 278,7-058. 
Devenish Nutrition Limited v. Sanofi-Aventis SA(France) and others, Case A3/2008/0080, 
[2008]EWCA Civ 1086, paras 114 and 160. 
21 Greg Olsen, supra note 2, p. 5. 
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the repayment of overcharged VAT to plaintiffs who have passed on the amount of 
the overcharge to their customers. In Marks & Spencer v Customs and Excise, while 
the Court of Appeal recognised that the defence is not an easy one because of a 
large number of variables, it suggested that the matter was not so complex that the 
passing on defence could not be allowed. 122 
There could still be some question about permitting the passing on defence in 
the competition law area because it can be argued that tax cases are significantly 
different from competition cases. However, it is submitted that the fundamental 
principle of competition damages actions is not different from the fundamental 
principle of tort damages actions. The fundamental principle of tort damages 
actions could be applied to competition damages actions. Furthermore, as I already 
mentioned, in the competition field, it seems from the Devenish case that the courts 
will recognize the passing on defence. 123 
Therefore, it is submitted that there is the uncertainty whether the passing on 
defence is recognized or not, however, there is a high probability that the passing 
on defence could be allowed in the UK such as in in Devenish case. 124 
It seems likely, however, that a UK court would not apply a passing on 
defence without making a reference to the ECJ under Article 234 raising the 
compatibility of such a rule with the Community principle of effectiveness. In BCL, 
the CAT noted that "those questions in relation to passing on are not only relevant 
to actions in the UK. Courts in other EU jurisdictions may also be interested in how 
this CAT decides that issue. " 125 It has also been suggested that there is, 
furthermore, a probability that any decision in the UK would be followed by the 
other Member States of the EU since the UK may emerge as the forum of choice 
for private competition law proceedings. 126 
122 Marks and Spencer Plc v. commissioners of Customs and Excise, [1999] EWCA Civ 3024, paras 77- 
82 
123 Devenish Nutrition Limited v. Sanofi Aventis SA(France) and others, Case A3/2008/0080, 
[2008]EWCA Civ 1086, paral47. 
u Ibid. 
125 BCL Old Co Limited and others v Aventis and others, Case No 1028/5/7/04, at para. 33. 12' Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, "EC Competition Law", 3rd ed., Oxford, 2007, p. 1344.1345. 
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4.6 Conclusion on the application of the passing on defence in 
Korea 
The US Supreme Court's decision on the passing on defence in Hanover 
Shoe is based on ensuring effective and efficient private competition enforcement. 
The US Supreme Court considered that if competition infringers get off too easily, 
the prospect of liability for private damages may not provide infringer with enough 
incentive to refrain form illegal conduct. 
Given the tension between taking the best action to deter anticompetitive 
conduct by excluding the passing on defence (as was the motive for the Hanover 
Shoe ruling) and having rules which prevent over-compensation, the important 
question is whether Korea needs to follow the US approach in order to ensure 
effective and efficient private competition enforcement. If Korea follows the US, 
Korea would have to modify its usual approach to competition damages awards. 
Prohibiting the passing on defence will represent a significant exception to the 
Korean traditional legal principle. 
In considering whether to make such an exception, it is necessary to 
recognize the difference between the Korean legal system and US legal system. The 
Korean legal system is totally different from the US legal system. The competition 
enforcement mechanism has been privatised in the US. As Whish points out, it is 
worth noting that over 90% of all antitrust cases in the US involve private rather 
than public action. 127 The US system has the main objective of making private 
enforcement as attractive as possible, both in terms of the potential recovery and the 
speed and ease of the procedure. 128 
From the perspective of general Korean Civil law, however, prohibition of 
the passing on defence is incompatible with the principle of damages actions 
because payments for damages should provide for equitable compensation for what 
127 Clifford A. Jones, "Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in the EU, UK and USA", Oxford, 1999, 
p 199-200. is Brian Kennelly, "The Defence of "Passing On", Bar European Group Annual Conference", Cyprus, 
2005, p. 9; See, W. van Gerven, "Substantive Remedies for the Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Rules 
before national Courts, in : European Competition Law Annulal 2001-Effective Private Enforcement of 
EC Antitrust Law, ed. By Ehermann/Atanasiu, 2003, p. 53-93,74-75. 
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the victims would have had in the absence of the anticompetitive conduct. The 
damage suffered by the direct customers due to the payment of overcharged price 
has ultimately not resulted in any pecuniary losses if the direct purchaser passed on 
the overcharge to the next economic level. The payment for damages should not 
provide direct purchasers with over-compensation. If the direct purchaser is allowed 
to claim the amount of the overcharged price without any deductions for the extra 
revenues that he has got from his own customers by raising the prices that he was 
charging them, he get over-compensation. Purchasers of an overcharged product or 
service who have been able to pass on that overcharge to their own customers 
should therefore not be entitled to compensation of that overcharge. The defendant 
should be able to invoke the passing on defence in order to mitigate the damages 
claim brought by the direct purchaser. Furthermore, allowing direct purchasers 
actions whereas prohibiting passing on defence could cause multiple liabilities. 
However, the passing on of the overcharge may well have led to a reduction 
in the plaintiff's sales. Such loss of profits should obviously be compensated by the 
one who is responsible for the initial overcharge. Thus, the passing-on defence 
should be allowed to the defendant in cases only where the damage has been passed 
on and has not resulted in the plaintiff suffering a decline in sales which ultimately 
led to a loss of profit in comparison to the situation in the absence of the 
infringement. Thus, it is necessary to consider if passing on defence could decrease 
plaintiffs sales. 
If reduction in the plaintiff's sales is considered, given above five reasons 
such as i) full compensation and adequate and sufficient causation, ii) 
compensatory principle of damages actions, iii) prohibition of over-compensation, 
iv) prohibition of multiple compensations and v) need to recognize difference 
between Korean legal system and US legal system, it is submitted that Korea 
should not adopt the US rule of restricting the passing on defence but instead retain 
both the passing on defence and offence. 
Most of all, it is crucially important that "the passing on defence has no 
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relation to the plaintiffs entitlement to compensation of harm suffered. "129 The 
passing on defence may be seen less a defence in the strict sense and more as a part 
of the exercise of quantification of damage. Allocation of the overcharge is not a 
question of liability, but quantification of damage. While recognition of the passing 
on defence would involve a measure of complexity, there is considerable doubt that 
it would lead to insurmountable difficulties in the handling of private proceedings. 
As I already discussed, 130 to minimize the difficulties of quantification of damage, 
under Article 57 of the Competition Law, in case it is difficult to verify the amount 
of damages, the court may confirm the substantial amount of damages by virtue of 
its authority. 131 
While a certain level of complexity is necessary in determining the total 
overcharge of the anticompetitive activity, if the passing on defence is allowed, it 
does magnify the complexity at every stage of the supply chain, as shown in 
Hanover Shoe. However, it has been pointed out that Hanover Shoe was decided in 
1968, at a time when the current tools of sophisticated economic analysis were not 
available to plaintiffs. 132 The considerable practical difficulties of the 
determination, calculation and distribution of damage between direct and indirect 
purchasers could be solved with the more sophisticated techniques now than in1968. 
In respect to the difficulty of proving passed on damage, it is submitted that Korea 
should consider adopting the type of presumption that the EC Commission suggests 
in the White Paper. 
Korea should not follow Hanover Shoe 133 to deny passing on defence. 
Therefore, it is submitted that under Korean competition and civil rules, a direct 
purchaser who has passed on an excessive price in whole or in part should remain 
unable to recover the loss in whole or in part either on the grounds that no damage 
has been sustained applying a traditional `but for' approach. If the defendant 
succeeds in proving the passing on defence, the indirect purchaser may have a good 
129 Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper, supra note 1, p. 58. 130 See section 3.2.1 which deals with the current situation in respect of the measurement of damages in 
Korea. 
131 It is a reference to the Competition Act 57 which I set out in the above paragraph. 
132 Greg Olsen, supra note 2, p. 4. 
133 Hanover Shoe v United Shoe Machinery Corporation, 392 U. S. 481 (1968). 
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argument in his action against the him as he may then no longer be in a position 
to plead that the damage has not been passed on to the indirect purchaser. 
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Chapter 5. Indirect Purchaser Litigation 
5.1 Overview of Indirect Purchaser Litigation 
Competition infringements may give rise to both direct and indirect damage. 
The negative effects of anticompetitive practices could have a direct or indirect 
impact on all intermediary or final consumers in the production-distribution chain. 
For example, a price-fixing agreement among products results in downstream 
purchasers such as indirect purchasers paying an overcharged price which is the 
difference between the competitive price in the absence of an anticompetitive 
agreement and the price where there is an anticompetitive agreement. 
If damage is caused by the anticompetitive practice, the question is `who can 
recover? ' in whole or part. The key question is whether all parties including indirect 
purchasers in a chain of distribution may bring actions to recover damages from the 
infringer with whom they have no direct contractual relationship, based on the 
proportion of the overcharge that has been passed on by the direct purchaser. 
The question of the standing of indirect purchasers is an important and 
controversial one and is likely to have a major influence on the development of 
private competition enforcement because of its effects on potential plaintiffs., In 
this Chapter I examine whether it is desirable for Korea to recognize indirect 
purchaser actions in the light of the position on indirect purchaser litigation in the 
EU, UK and US. 
5.1.1 What is an Indirect Purchaser Litigation? 
An indirect purchaser action is where a party forced to pay the passed on 
overcharge seeks to recover losses from the party responsible for the original 
' Edward P. Henneberry, "Private Enforcement in EC Competition Law: The Green Paper on Damages 
Actions- The Passing-on Defenses and Standing for Indirect Purchasers, Representative Organizations 
and Other Groups", Heller Ehrman, LLP, 2006, p. 3. 
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overcharge. Depending on a number of economic variables, a direct purchaser may 
or may not be able to pass on all or some of the illegal overcharge to the next 
indirect purchaser in the chain such as the retailer or consumer. 2 
In respect to indirect purchaser litigation, a basic issue is the breadth of the 
definition of `indirect purchaser'. How far should indirect purchaser rights of action 
be extended? Should the right of action be limited to indirect purchasers of only the 
actual product that is the subject of the anticompetitive activity? Or should it 
include purchasers of derivative products, for example, other products containing 
the overcharged product as an ingredient? 3 If `indirect purchaser' includes 
derivative purchasers, it is necessary to consider what constitutes a derivative 
product. 
For instance, if central processing unit (hereafter, CPU) manufacturers fix the 
price of the CPU, there are a variety of indirect purchasers. Firstly, purchasers of 
the CPU not from the manufacturers but from intermediaries such as wholesalers 
can be indirect purchasers of a product. Secondly, purchasers (retail dealers) of 
computer on which the CPU has been mounted by the manufacturers who bought 
the CPU as a component can be indirect purchasers of a derivative product. Thirdly, 
consumers who buy computer at higher prices due to the overcharges on the CPU in 
retail store can be also indirect purchasers of a derivative product. 
Should all these indirect purchasers of derivative products have standing to 
bring damages actions against the CPU price-fixers? If all indirect purchasers of 
derivative products have the right to bring damages actions against the infringer, the 
complications of private actions could impair efficiency. However, if derivative 
purchasers are not recognized, it would impair fair and just compensation. 4 If the 
primary objective of private actions is compensation, 5 it is submitted that it is 
necessary to recognize these derivative purchasers because usually the obvious 
2 European Commission, "Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules", SEC (2008) 404,2008 at para 27. 3 See Andrew I. Gavil, "Antitrust Remedy Wars Episode I: Illinois Brick from inside the Supreme Court", 
79(3) Saint John's Law Review 553,2005, p. 565-566. 
4 In respect to full compensation, see section 3.2.1 which deals with the current situation in respect of the 
criteria and measurement of damages in Korea. 
s See section 1.2.3 which deals with the objectives of private competition enforcement. 
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victims of anticompetitive conduct are, direct and indirect purchasers such as 
consumers of derivative products. 6 
Given what is said above about derivative purchasers, an indirect purchaser 
could be defined as a purchaser who has no direct dealings with the infringer but 
who nonetheless may have suffered harm because an illegal overcharge was passed 
on to him along the distribution chain. Moreover there could be also some 'side- 
effect' victims who cannot choose effectively among competitive products due to 
cartelists'. artificially high price. There is a high. possibility that those would-be 
purchasers could not buy the affected product or service because the price was too 
high as a result of the overcharge. 7 
5.1.2 The Tensions between Fairness and Efficiency 
Issues of indirect purchaser standing and the passing on defences raise 
certain tensions between the elements of fairness and efficiency. It can be argued 
that if all indirect purchaser actions are recognized, it can impair efficient and 
effective private enforcement because of the difficulty of bringing damages actions. 
These difficulties are caused in part by the complexity of calculation and 
distribution of damage. Indirect purchaser litigation has the potential to become 
unmanageable and extremely expensive because of these difficulties. 
For instance, as I discuss below, 9 in order to ensure efficiency, the US 
Supreme Court rejected every prior federal Court of Appeals decision on the 
subject and denied a federal antitrust remedy to millions of indirect purchasers, 
such as consumers, in Illinois Brick. 10 
6 Foad Hoseinian, "Passing on Damages and Community Antitrust Policy: An Economic Background", 
World Competition, 2005, p. 24. 7 Luke R. Tolaini and Anna M. Morfey, "Antitrust Damages Actions in Europe: A Step in the U. S. 
Direction? ", 22-SUM Antitrust 93,2008, p. 94; Patricia Hanh Rosochowicz, "Deterrence and the 
relationship between public and private enforcement of competition law", Amsterdam Centre for Law and 
Economics Workshop, 2005, p. 13. s In respect to the passing on defence see Chapter 4. 9 See section 5.2.3 which deals with rationale of decision of Illinois Brick. 10 Illinois Brick Co. v. State of Illinois 431 U. S. 720 (1977). See also these cases which were rejecting 
indirect purchaser actions. South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F. 2d 414 (4 
Cu. 1966); Midway Enter., Inc. v. Petroleum Mktg. Corp., 375 F. Supp. 1339,1344-45 (D. Md. 1974); 
Southern Gen. Builders, Inc. v. Maule Indus. Inc., 1973-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 174,4 84 at 94,152 (S. D. Fla. 
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However, it can be argued that, in the name of efficiency, the Illinois Brick 
decision has substantially impaired fair justice by denying compensation to indirect 
purchasers who are the real victims of anticompetitive conduct. " Fairness requires 
that every individual, including final consumers, should be entitled to claim 
damages in order to make good any injury they have incurred as a result of illegal 
conduct. 12 Fairness therefore requires recognition of both indirect and direct 
purchaser standing (and also the passing-on defence as discussed in Chapter IV) to 
avoid unjust enrichment eg. over-compensation) so that each plaintiff can receive 
compensation for the amount of damage they suffered. 
Furthermore, if indirect purchaser actions are not permitted, there is a 
possibility of unjust enrichment since the direct purchasers could have passed on 
the overcharged price to indirect purchasers. 13 Whereas, the real victims such as 
indirect purchasers could not obtain any compensation. 14 Any right of action for 
compensatory damage should ideally be shaped to ensure a remedy for indirect 
purchasers such as consumers in order to avoid the danger of significant injustice 
and ensure fairness and justice through compensating real victim damages. 
Above all, permitting compensation for only the direct purchasers leads to 
sub-optimal compensation because direct purchasers' litigation goals, strategies and 
incentives may not necessarily align with those of indirect purchasers. 
15 It 
1972); Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391 (S. D. Iowa 1968), aff'd, 409 F. 2d 1239 
(Ste Cir. 1969); Mangano v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp. 438 F. 2d 1187 (3d Cir. 
1971) (per curiam). In this case, the third Circuit upheld dismissal of an antitrust action based on 
plaintiffs' failure to answer interrogatories and, alternatively, plaintiffs' failure to "show that these 
overcharges became components of the prices they paid. " However, the third Circuit recognized 
plaintiffs' right to recover if they could prove pass-on. 
Prior to Illinois Brick, indirect purchasers were plaintiffs in almost two-thirds of all private federal 
antitrust actions. S. Rep. No. 95-934,95th Cong., 2d Sess., 1978, p. 19-20; Greg Olsen, "Actions for 
damages are Compensation and deterrence? The passing on defence and the future direction of UK 
private proceedings", CLI 4.8(3), 2005, p. 2; Andrew I. Gavil, supra note 3, p. 565-566. 
I Firat Cengiz, "Passing on Defence and Indirect Purchaser Standing in Actions for Damages against the 
Violations of Competition Law: what can the EC learn from the US"?, CCP Working Paper 07-21,2007, 
p, 8; Edward P. Henneberry, supra note 1, p. 4. 
See section 4.3.2.3 which deals with probability of unjust enrichment in the US if passing on defence 
is not allowed. 
14 See Donald I. Baker, "25Years Later: Walking in the Footsteps of Brunswick, Illinois Brick, and 
Sylvania Cover Story: Federalism and Futility: Hitting the Potholes on the Illinois Brick Road", 17-FALL 
Antitrust 14,2002, p. 17; John Pheasant, "Private Damages Actions: Response to the Commission's green 
paper", CLI 5 8(8), 2006, p. 3. 
Andrew I. Gavil, "Before the Antitrust Modernization Commission Panel II: State Indirect Purchaser 
Actions: Proposals for Reform", FTC, Washington, D. C., 2005, p. 17-19. 
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represents the only direct purchasers' interests not all of victims. Repairing their 
relationship with their suppliers and securing more favourable future terms may be 
more important to them than compensating indirect purchaser damages caused by 
anticompetitive practice. 16 
5.1.3 The Relationship between the Passing on defence and 
Indirect Purchaser actions 
As I have already mentioned above in 5.1.2., the questions of the indirect 
victim's right to bring an action and the admissibility of the passing on defence are 
interrelated. '7 If a passing on defence is allowed then this will affect the right of 
indirect purchasers to bring damages actions for prevention of multiple liabilities. 
18 
Therefore, any answer to the question of whether to permit passing on defence can 
influence the number of potential plaintiffs in indirect purchaser actions. 19 
For example, as I have already discussed in Chapter 4, the judgment of the 
US Supreme Court in Hanover Shoe20 protected direct purchasers by excluding the 
passing on defence. In that case, there was a possibility of unjust enrichment if the 
direct purchasers could obtain substantial damages even if they passed on the 
overcharged damage to indirect purchasers. 2' However, Hanover Shoe did not 
address the issue of whether indirect purchasers who were harmed by an antitrust 
conduct passed on by a direct purchaser could maintain an antitrust damages action 
against the infringer. The answer was given in 1977 when the ruling in Illinois 
16 Edward A. Snyder, "Efficient Assignment of Rights to Sue for Antitrust Damages", 28(2) Journal of 
Law and Economics 469,1985, p. 470-471. 
17 See section 4.2 which deals with passing on defence in the US; see also Assimakis P Komninos, "EC 
Private Antitrust Enforcement: Decentralised Application of EC Competition Law by National Courts", 
Hart Publishing, 2008, p. 202; Kati J. Cseres, "The impact of Consumer Protection on Competition and 
Competition law: The Case of Deregulated Markets", Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working 
Paper NO. 2006-0, p. 5-6; Andrew I. Gavil, supra note 3, p. 565-566; Ulf Boge, Konrad Ost, "Up and 
Running, or Is It? Private Enforcement -The Situation in Germany and Policy Perspectives", 27(4) ECLR, 2006, p. 201. 
1= In respect to multiple liabilities, see section 4.3.2 which deals with rationale of permitting passing on 
defence in Korea. 
19 See Edward P. Henneberry, supra note 1, p. 4. 
20 Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U. S. 481 (1968) p. 494; See the section 
4.2.2.1 which deals with Rationale of Hanover Shoe in the US. 
21 See section 4.3.2.3 which deals with probability of unjust enrichment in the US if passing on defence 
is not allowed. 
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Brick, discussed below in section 5.2, was delivered22 
Given that the passing on defence is controversial, as discussed in Chapter 
4,23 it is unsurprising that the issue of indirect purchaser action is also controversial. 
The Illinois Brick case24 in the US is crucial and illuminates certain issues that 
other jurisdictions should take into account. 25 Therefore, in this chapter, first, I 
consider the position of indirect purchaser litigation in the US and then discuss such 
litigation in respect of Korea, the EU and the UK before concluding what is the 
optimal position for Korea to take in the future. 
5.2 Indirect Purchaser Litigation in the US 
5.2.1 Overview of Indirect Purchaser Litigation in the US 
The substantive question is whether indirect purchasers should be permitted 
to bring actions under Section 4 of the Clayton Act to redress damage as a 
consequence of overcharges passed-on to them from direct purchasers. The Clayton 
Act does not contain any restrictions on standing to bring actions. The Clayton Act 
gives standing to "any person who is injured in his business or property by reason 
of anything forbidden by the antitrust lawss26 
`Any person' has been interpreted broadly to include individuals, 
partnerships, corporations and associations. 27 The Supreme Court has noted that 
"the Clayton Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are 
u Illinois Brick Co. v. State of Illinois 431 U. S. 720 (1977) The Court viewed this issue as intertwined 
with the question it had faced nearly a decade earlier in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery 
Corp., 392 U. S. 481 (1968). That case presented the question whether a defendant who had already been 
found guilty of an antitrust infringement (monopolization in that case) should be permitted to defend a 
subsequent private treble damage action by arguing that the direct purchaser suffered no injury because it 
? assed on its damages to firms further down the chain of distribution. 
See section 4.1.4 which deals with problems of permitting passing on defence. u Illinois Brick Co. v. State of Illinois, 431 U. S. 720 (1977). u Carlo Petrucci, "The Issues of the Passing on Defence and Indirect Purchasers' Standing in European 
Competition Law", E. C. L. R., 29(1), 2008, p. 35. 
26 The Clayton Act of 1914,15 U. S. C. § 15. 
r OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, "Roundtable 
Discussion on Private Remedies: Passing on Defence; Indirect Purchaser Standing; Definition of 
Damages of United States", DAF/COMP/WP3/WD (2006)11, p. 2. 
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made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated. "28 
It has also stated that "Congress used the phrase any person intending it to have its 
naturally broad and inclusive meaning. "29 Almost anyone can bring actions as a 
person for the purposes of section 4.30 Corporations and associations are included 
in the definition of person or persons as used in the Clayton Act. 
31 States, 
municipalities, and foreign nations are also deemed to be persons within the 
meaning of the Act. 32 
The wording of Clayton Act, Section 4 (a) does not make it very clear if there 
are any limitations to standing that could prevent indirect purchasers from bringing 
damages actions. Standing limitations have, however, been developed by the 
Supreme Court in Illinois Brick. The Supreme Court has tried to set limits on the 
extent of treble damage liability in Illinois Brick case33 by limiting the kinds of 
harms that can be compensated under Section 4 of the Clayton Act. Standing 
requirements in the US are generally stricter than in most of Member States of the 
EU and Korea because of the decision of Illinois Brick. 34 
5.2.2. Introduction to Illinois Brick 
In Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether indirect 
purchasers that have suffered damage passed on by the direct purchasers can bring 
actions against the infringer to recover the portion of the overcharge they paid. 
The fact of Illinois Brick was as follows. 
The State of Illinois brought damages actions against Illinois Brick Company 
u Mandeville Islands Farms, inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219,236(1948) 
29 Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U. S. 308,312 (1978); Gerber, D. J., "American law in a time 
of global interdependence: U. S. national reports to the XVIth International Congress of Comparative 
Law: Section III Competition Law", 50 American Journal of Comparative Law 263,2002, p. 276. 
30 Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U. S. 308,312 (1978). 31 "The word 'person' or 'persons' ... shall be deemed to 
include corporations and associations. " 15 U. S. C. 
J$ 
12(a) (1976). 
2 Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U. S. 308 (1978) (foreign nations are persons); Hawaii v. 
Standard Oil Co., 405 U. S. 251 (1972) (states are persons); Georgia v. Evans, 316 U. S. 159 (1942) 
(states are persons); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390 (1906) 
(municipalities are persons). 
Illinois Brick Co. v. State oflllinois 431 U. S. 720 (1977) at 720. 
34 Illinois Brick Co. v. State oflllinois 431 U. S. 720 (1977) at 720. 
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who fixed the price of concrete blocks. Illinois Brick was a follow-on action to 
Department of Justice (hereafter, DOJ) civil and criminal proceedings against 
Illinois Brick and a group of its rivals. The State of Illinois was therefore a 
consumer of buildings which incorporated concrete blocks that had been purchased 
at overcharged prices. The State of Illinois was an indirect purchaser of the concrete 
blocks. There were more than two intervening purchasers between the defendants 
and the State of Illinois, and neither of the intervening purchasers was alleged to be 
part of the conspiracy. Illinois Brick argued that indirect purchasers should not be 
permitted to bring damages actions under federal antitrust laws. It argued that, as 
Hanover Shoe disallowed the use of a passing on defence35, the law should be 
symmetrical and forbid indirect purchasers to use passing on offensively. 36 
In this case, the Supreme Court accepted the claim of the defendants. It 
denied the right of indirect purchasers to whom unlawful overcharges had been 
passed on to bring actions under federal antitrust laws. The Supreme Court held that 
downstream purchasers are not entitled to recover damage suffered as a result of an 
infringement of federal antitrust law. 
For example, if computer monitor manufacturers entered into a cartel to fix 
the price of computer monitor sold on computers, only the computer manufacturers, 
who purchased the price-fixed computer monitor from manufactures, would be 
allowed to bring damages actions. Wholesaler, retail computer dealers, or 
consumers would not be compensated because they are indirect purchasers. 
It is submitted that the Supreme Court's decisions of Illinois Brick was 
intended to provide something of a trade-off between the interests of direct and 
indirect purchasers, as further explained below. The Supreme Court, however, 
sacrificed indirect purchasers' interests to direct purchasers' interests. 
31 See section 4.2.1 which deals with overview of Hanover Shoe case. 36 Illinois Brick Co. v. State of Illinois 431 U. S. 720 (1977) at 728-729. 
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5.2.3 Rationale of Decision of Illinois Brick 
There were four major reasons for the Supreme Court's decision to prohibit 
indirect purchasers' actions. 
5.2.3.1 Ensuring Effective Compensation and Strong 
Deterrence 
The Supreme Court prohibited indirect purchaser actions to ensure effective 
compensation and strong deterrence. 
In respect to compensation, the Court assumed that permitting indirect 
purchaser damages actions could dilute the compensation of direct purchasers and 
diminish the incentives of direct purchasers to bring actions. 37 It stated that it is 
desirable to bar indirect purchasers' damages actions and to concentrate all 
compensation in the hands of direct purchasers. 38 According to the judgment, 
compensation would be served well by concentrating recovery in direct purchaser's 
hands because "the direct purchaser absorbs at least some and often most of any 
overcharges. "39 The Supreme Court thus showed little concern about the right for 
compensation of real victim such as indirect purchasers who suffer the harm passed 
by direct purchasers. 
In respect to deterrence, the Supreme Court rejected the view that deterrence 
would be best served by permitting indirect purchasers to bring actions. 40 
Permitting indirect purchasers actions could diminish deterrent effect since indirect 
purchasers such as consumers would probably have insufficient incentive to bring 
actions because of their small and dispersed damage. 41 By concentrating the right 
of action in the hands of direct purchasers, the Court believed it would maximize 
Illinois Brick Co. v State of Illinois 431 U. S. 720 (1977) at 737-738. 3= Illinois Brick Co. v. State of Illinois 431 U. S. 720 (1977) at 746. 39 Illinois Brick Co. v. State oflllinois 431 U. S. 720(1977) at 746 40 Illinois Brick Co. v. State of Illinois , 431 U. S. 720(1977) at 746. 41 Citing Brief for the USA as Amicus Curiae at 20 n. 14, Illinois Brick Co. v. State of Illinois 431 U. S. 
720(1977) at 720 (No. 76-404)), at 3; Bobtail Bench Memo from Gene Comey, Justice Powell's Clerk, to 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Associate Justice, US Supreme Court, Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois (No. 76404) (Mar. 
23,1977) at 5. 
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direct purchasers' incentives to bring actions and thus enhance the deterrent impact 
of their efforts. 42 
In an article written shortly after the judgment, Landes and Posner also 
emphasize the deterrent impact of the direct purchasers' actions. They state that: 
"The most important consideration from the standpoint of deterrence is not 
who receives the proceeds of any judgment levied against the antitrust violator, but 
that there are adequate incentives to bring suit and prosecute it to judgment. "43 
Landes and Posner argue that deterrence can be gained by limiting indirect 
purchasers' remedies even if windfalls of damages to direct purchasers result. They 
stress that direct purchasers typically have superior information on the effects of 
any antitrust conduct of their suppliers, which also enhances deterrence. For 
instance, in a cartel case, direct purchasers could be best placed to have information 
that an infringement may have taken place. 4 Thus, deterrence would be served 
well by concentrating recovery in direct purchaser's hands. 45 
Based on the above reasons, the US Supreme Court concluded that nothing 
would be lost to either compensation or deterrence if indirect purchasers were 
entirely deprived of any federal antitrust right of action. Hence, the Court placed all 
rights to compensation and role for deterrence on direct purchasers' actions. 
However, in Illinois Brick the minority in the Supreme Court criticized the 
Illinois Brick judgment. In this case, Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice 
Marshall and Mr. Justice Blackmun joined, insisted that the majority decision 
which affords a remedy only to persons who purchase directly from an antitrust 
42 Illinois Brick Co. v. State of Illinois 431 U. S. 720 (1977), at 746; OECD directorate for Financial and 
Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, "Round Table Discussion on Private Remedies: Passing on 
Defence; Indirect Purchaser Standing; Definition of Damages: United States", Working Party No. 3 on Co- 
o oeration and Enforcement, DAF/COMP/WP3/WD (2006)11, p. 17. 
W. M. Landes and R. A. Posner, "Should indirect Purchasers Have Standing to Sue Under the Antitrust 
Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick"; 46 U. Chi. L. Rev., 1979, p. 608. 
" See Michael Harker and Morten Hviid, "Competition Law Enforcement and Incentives for Revelation 
of Private Information", World Competition 31(2), 2008, p. 291. 
's W. M. Landes and R. A. Posner, supra note 43, pp. 609,611; See also Edward A. Snyder, supra note 16, 
p. 470. 
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infringer is a regrettable retreat since real victims such as indirect purchasers could 
not have compensation. They also insisted that Section 4 of Clayton Act was clearly 
intended to operate to protect individual consumers who purchase through 
middlemen. 46 
5.2.3.2 Ensuring the Efficiency of Private Enforcement 
It is also argued that the Supreme Court denied indirect purchasers' standing 
to bring actions because it approached the matter of private enforcement almost 
exclusively from the perspective of efficiency. 47 The Court therefore assured the 
maximisation of effective private enforcement action through encouraging direct 
purchasers to bring actions. As I already discussed, 48 the Court's concern in 
Hanover Shoe was to enforce the antitrust law effectively by concentrating the full 
recovery for the overcharging in the direct purchasers rather than by allowing every 
victim such as indirect purchasers to bring actions. 49 
According to the judgment of Illinois Brick, permitting indirect purchaser 
actions would result in inefficient enforcement of the antitrust laws because the 
considerable difficulties of tracing the effects of overcharges through successions of 
sale-resale transactions. 5° In Illinois, the Court pointed out that tracing everyone 
who is damaged by antitrust conduct and calculating the extent of individualized 
damages in all submarkets would require courts to perform multiple, long and 
complicated analyses involving a large number of interested parties, which would 
s' impair efficiency. It reasoned that: 
"permitting the use of pass-on theories essentially would transform treble- 
damages actions into massive efforts to apportion the recovery among all potential 
46 Illinois Brick Co. v. State oflllinois 431 U. S. 720 (1977) at 746-747. 41 W. M. Landes and R. A. Posner, supra note 43, pp. 608-609; Firat Cengiz, supra note 12, p. 24; Brian 
Kennelly, "The Defence of'Passing On"', Bar European Group Annual Conference, Cyprus, 2005, p. 9 4i See section 4.2.2 which deals with rationale of Hanover Shoe. 49 Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U. S 481 (1968) at 2070 - 2074. 30 Illinois Brick Co. v. State of Illinois, 431 U. S. 720(1977) at 726. sl Illinois Brick Co. V. State of Illinois, 431 U. S. 720(1977) at 726; In respect to calculation of indirect 
purchaser's damages, see generally, "Margaret M. Zwisler, "State Indirect Purchaser Litigation and U. S. 
Antitrust Enforcement, Latham &Watkins LLP, 2005. 
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plaintiffs that could have absorbed part of the overcharge .... 
02 
The Supreme Court said that allowing such indirect claims would add whole 
new dimensions of complexity to treble-damages actions and seriously undermine 
their effectiveness. The Supreme Court also considered that the complexities and 
uncertainties involved in the defensive use of passing on against a direct purchaser 
are multiplied in the offensive use of passing on by a plaintiff. 53 The complexities 
of dealing with indirect purchaser claims could pose a significant challenge for 
litigants, experts and the courts. 
Furthermore, in Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court stressed that federal courts 
were ill-equipped to engage in tracing overcharges through a supply chain. In the 
Court's view, apportioning damages among various levels of injured parties is too 
complex a task for courts to undertake as they would require parties to trace alleged 
overcharges through multiple layers of distribution. Any attempts to do so would 
yield unreliable results. 54 
It is argued that direct purchaser actions can ensure efficiency because fewer 
plaintiffs economise litigation costs. Transaction costs involved in coordinating 
class actions can be reduced compared to a situation with many fragmented indirect 
cases. 55 Thus, to ensure efficiency, in Illinois Brick, indirect purchasers were 
banned from pursuing antitrust damage actions in the federal courts to recover 
overcharges paid to members of cartels, or monopolists. 56 From that perspective, it 
makes sense to put all monetary incentives with the direct purchaser, since 
efficiency could be best served by concentrating the right to recover exclusively in 
s2 See Illinois Brick Co. v. State of Illinois, 431 U. S. 720(1977), at 737-741. 33 Illinois Brick Co. v. State oflllinois, 431 U. S. 720(1977), at 732-733. 
44 Illinois Brick Co. v. State of Illinois 431 U. S. 720 (1977) at 725-726 ; For further analyses on Illinois 
Brick see Larue, P. H. and Newton, J. M., "Legislative Progress in Responding to the Illinois Brick 
Decision", 23Antitrust Bulletin 263,1978, p. 263-276; Joyce, J. M. and R. H. Mcguckin, "Assignment of 
Rights to Sue under Illinois Brick: An Empirical Assessment", Antitrust Bulletin 31(1), 1986, p. 235-259; 
Sneeden, E. M., "Illinois Brick-Do We Look to the Courts or Congress", Antitrust Bulletin 24,1979, 
205-231; Snyder, E. A., supra note 16, pp. 469-482. ýs 
See generally, W. M. Landes and R. A. Posner, supra note 43; John Pheasant, "Private Damages 
Actions", CLI 52 (6), 2006, p. 2. 
56 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U. S. 720 (1977); Harris, R. Q and Sullivan, L. A., "Passing on the 
Monopoly Overcharge: A Comprehensive Policy Analysis", 128 University of Pennsylvania L. R., 269, 
1979. The decision of Illinois Brick has been challenged by saying only overruling them yields the best 
balance between compensatory justice and deterrence. 
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the direct purchaser. 57 
It can be argued that the Illinois Brick decision of the Supreme Court 
embodies the so called indirect purchaser principle. This principle rests "on the 
judgment that the antitrust laws will be more effectively enforced by concentrating 
the full recovery for the overcharge in the direct purchasers rather than by allowing 
every plaintiff potentially affected by the overcharge to bring actions only for the 
amount it could show was absorbed by it. i58 Under this indirect purchaser doctrine, 
the right of action is limited to the parties who first purchased from the defendant. 
Given these decisions of the Supreme Court in Hanover Shoe and Illinois 
Brick cases, it is submitted that these two judgments are good evidence of an 
antitrust system striving for efficiency at all costs in that the Supreme Court was 
prepared to sacrifice the right of indirect purchaser to bring actions in order to 
ensure efficiency. 
However, as seen above, in Illinois Brick the minority in the Supreme Court 
considered that the majority view of Illinois Brick judgment flouted Congress' 
purpose and severely undermined the effectiveness of the private treble damages 
action as an instrument of antitrust enforcement because the brunt of antitrust 
injuries is borne by indirect purchaser, often ultimate consumers. 59 According to 
this view, the Court was regrettably weakening the effectiveness of the private 
treble-damages action as a deterrent to antitrust violations by, in most cases, 
precluding consumers from recovering for antitrust injuries. 60 
5.2.3.3 Complementing the Exclusion of the Passing on defence 
The Illinois Brick result was also driven by the need to ensure consistency 
with the Court's earlier decision in Hanover Shoe. Illinois Brick itself focused 
narrowly on the context of price-fixing by competitors, but it built upon the 
37 Illinois Brick Co. v. State oflllinois, 431 U. S. 720(1977) at 746. 3i Illinois Brick Co. v. State of Illinois, 431 U. S. 720(1977) at 735 
Illinois Brick Co. v State of Illinois, 431 U. S. 720(1977) at 749. 60 Illinois Brick Co. v. State oflllinois, 431 U. S. 720(1977) at 764. 
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Supreme Court's prior decision in Hanover Shoe. 61 A major factor motivating the 
Court to preclude offensive passing on in Illinois Brick was the idea that plaintiffs 
and defendants had to be treated alike. 2 The Supreme Court suggested the use of a 
passing on offence would be inconsistent with the holding in Hanover Shoe. The 
Supreme Court assured that offensive pass-on should be treated like defensive pass- 
on in Illinois Brick. The Court concluded that for reasons of fairness, as well as 
doctrinal consistency, Hanover Shoe had to apply both ways. 63 The Supreme Court 
finished what was begun in Hanover Shoe and completed the installation of the 
system of exclusive direct purchaser litigation. 
Thus, a fundamental premise of the decision was that "whatever rule is to be 
adopted regarding pass-on in antitrust damages actions, it must be applied equally 
to plaintiffs and defendants. "64 Therefore, damage that has been passed on to third 
parties cannot be taken into account defensively in a claim between a seller and the 
purchaser, according to Hanover Shoe, 65 and the indirect purchaser is unable to use 
the passing on principle offensively in damages proceedings by making a claim for 
his loss, according to Illinois Brick. 66 
5.2.3.4 Prevention of Multiple Liabilities 
Allowing offensive but not defensive passing-on could have created a serious 
risk of multiple liabilities for defendants. According to judgment of Illinois Brick, It 
is submitted that the US Supreme Court's most important concern in Illinois Brick 
was to protect defendants from the possibility of multiple recoveries given that 
direct purchasers were entitled, by virtue of Hanover Shoe, to recover the full 
amount of any overcharge by the defendant. 67 
61 Illinois Brick Co. v. State of Illinois, 431 U. S. 720(1977) at 731-733 62 The need for symmetry of Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick cases must have dominated in the 
judgement of Illinois Brick case. See. Illinois Brick Co. v. State of Illinois, 431 U. S. 720 (1977) at 728- 729. 
63 Illinois Brick Co. v. State of Illinois 431 U. S. 720(1977) at 728-729; See also, Andrew I. Gavil, supra 
note 15, p. 13. 
64 See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U. S. 720(1977) at 728-729 ; Donald I. Baker: "Federalism and Fertility: Hitting the Potholes on the Illinois Brick Road", Antitrust 17, Fall 2002, p. 14. 65 Hanover Shoe, Inc. V. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U. S. 481, at 494 (1968). ' Tun Ward and Kassie Smith, "Competition litigation in the UK", 2005, Thomson p. 273,7-048. 67 Illinois Brick Co. v. State oflllinois, 431 U. S. 720 (1977) at 720. 
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The Supreme Court therefore stated that: 
" The risk of multiple recoveries68 created by unequal application of the 
Hanover Shoe rule is much more substantial than in the more usual situation where 
the defendant is sued in two different lawsuits by plaintiffs asserting conflicting, 
claims to the same fund. "69 
By a symmetrical application of Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick, the Court 
sought to abandon the imposition of multiple liabilities. Allowing offensive but not 
defensive use of pass-on would create a serious risk of multiple liability for 
defendants since even though an indirect purchaser had already recovered for all or 
part of an overcharge passed on to him, the direct purchaser would still recover the 
full amount of the overcharge. 70 Thus, the Supreme Court excluded the passing on 
defence in its earlier judgment in Hanover Shoe and it also decided not to accept 
indirect purchaser actions to avoid a serious risk of multiple liabilities to defendants 
in Illinois Brick. 7' 
5.2.4 The Problems in following the US position on indirect 
purchaser litigation 
5.2.4.1 Incorrect Presumption of Damages Passed on to 
Indirect Purchasers and Incentive of Direct Purchasers 
In Illinois Brick, the Court stated that "Hanover Shoe does further the goal of 
compensation to the extent that the direct purchaser absorbs at least some and often 
most of the overcharge. 02 However, it has been claimed that there was and 
remains no support for the Court's presumption that often most of the overcharge 
will be borne by the direct purchaser. 
Multiple damages awards are the situation where many plaintiffs have the damages awards repeatedly 
for the same illegal behaviour. 
69 Illinois Brick Co. v. State oflllinois, 431 U. S. 720 (1977) at 730. 70 Illinois Brick Co. v. State of Illinois, 431U. S. 720 (1977) at 720. 7' Illinois Brick Co. v. State of Illinois, 431 US, 720 (1977) at 720. In respect to multiple liabilities, See 
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D. D. C. 2000), affd in part, rev'd in part, United 
States v. Microsoft Corp, 253 F. 3d 34 (D. C. Cir. 2001). 
72 See Illinois Brick Co. v. State of Illinois, 431U. S. 720 (1977) at 746 
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On the one hand, under Illinois Brick, it is notable that single products simply 
sold through minimal levels of distribution are lumped together and treated the 
same as component products. This is criticized by those who claim that such a one 
size fits all per se rule is ill-fitting to the broad range of possible circumstances. In 
practice, passed on damage from defendants to direct purchasers may or may not 
occur in any given case. 73 According to the Bobtail Bench Memo related to the 
Illinois case itself from Gene Comey, Justice Powell's Clerk, to Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 
Associate Justice "it is a rare case in which as a matter of the laws of economics the 
amount of a price increase of an input at one stage of distribution is passed on in 
full to the next stage in the chain. 04 Justice Powell's clerk Richard Meserve also 
insisted, "the indirect purchaser may on occasion be forced to bear all the harm 
from the violation. 05 From the Bench Memos of Justice Powell's Clerk, it can be 
suggested that in fact the opposite of the Court's assumption is true. There is a high 
possibility that downstream purchasers such as direct purchasers might mitigate the 76 
overcharge by passing it on to their customers such as indirect purchasers. Often 
most direct purchasers do pass-on all or part of the overcharge to their customers 
rather than absorb it. 77 
In the other hand, in the Illinois Brick case, the Supreme Court did not 
consider if suppliers (manufactures) are monopolists. However, if suppliers 
(manufactures) are monopolists direct purchasers may not bring actions because 
they do not want to disrupt the relationship with the supplier. 78 If the infringer 
possesses market power the direct purchaser may few alternatives when the 
relationship sours. Under such circumstances, direct purchasers may be especially 
reluctant to risk rupturing their relationships with their suppliers by initiating 
antitrust litigation against them because retaliation could be costly. 
" See Gavil's comment on Illinois Brick case, p. 735; See, also Andrew I. Gavil, supra note 15, p. 16. 14 Bobtail Bench Memo, supra note 41, at 4  See Bench Memo from Richard Meserve to Justice Blackmun's Clerk, Harry A. Blackmun, US 
Supreme Court in 111. Brick Co. v. Illinois (No. 76-404) (Mar. 19,1977), at 3 76 Carlo Petrucci, supra note 25, p. 33. r Andrew I. Gavil, supra note 15, p. 16-17. See also, "Antitrust Enforcement Act of 1979: Hearings on 
S. 300 Before the Senate Comm. ", Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1" Sess. 69-77,1979; Hovenkamp, "The 
Indirect Purchaser Rule and Cost-Plus Sales", 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1717,1990, pp. 1726-1727 and n. 46 
79 Illinois Brick Co. V. State of Illinois, 431 U. S 720(1977) at 746. 
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It has been suggested that perhaps more so today than in 1977 direct 
purchasers may be less inclined than ever to risk rupturing their relationships with 
suppliers because more suppliers have a dominant position today. 79 Harris and 
Sullivan pointed out that there is no empirical evidence that direct rather than 
indirect purchasers are more likely to bring actions. 80 There are significant 
examples of major antitrust infringements being challenged by only rivals, the 
government, or indirect purchasers - but not by direct purchasers. For instance, in 
the Microsoft case, 81 although many class actions have been brought by consumers 
or a number of Microsoft rivals, none of the major direct purchasers such as 
Original Equipment Manufacture(hereafter, OEM) of Microsoft Windows initiated 
treble damage actions against Microsoft. 82 That was because Microsoft involved 
bundling, not price fixing, and direct purchasers did not suffer any damage from 
Microsoft's antitrust conduct. 
It is submitted that there is a high probability that if direct purchasers are not 
willing to bring actions, private antitrust actions will have little compensatory and 
deterrent effect because indirect purchasers are not able to bring damages actions 
before court. 
5.2.4.2 Incorrect Presumption of the Calculation of Passed on 
Damage 
When the downstream chain is complicated and long, the effects of the 
overcharge are material and they do require an onerous inquiry. If the downstream 
chain is complicated and long, however, it can be argued that compensation for 
passed on damage is often only possible through increased efforts by the direct 
purchaser because only the direct purchaser is able to prove the damage caused by 
an anticompetitive activity. 83 The challenge is therefore how to prove the effects 
of the overcharge when the distribution chain is long and complex. 84 
79 Andrew I. Gavil, supra note 15, p. 15. I Harris and Sullivan, supra note 56, p. 273 " Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 214 F. R. D. 371 (D. Md. 2003). 
32 Andrew I. Gavil, supra note 15, p. 17. S3 Ulf Boge, Konrad Ost, supra note 17, p. 200. " Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U. S 481 (1968), at 494. 
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In Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court questioned the capacity of economics 
itself to deliver reliable theories to establish both the passed on overcharge and 
apportionment of damage. The Supreme Court rested on the assumption that 
economic analysis is incapable of tracing the actual effects of passed on 
overcharges through multiple distribution layers. US Supreme Court assumes that 
"always or almost always" pass-on will be immeasurable. 85 The argument is that it 
becomes more and more difficult, if not impossible for indirect purchasers at 
subsequent levels of the market to prove causality and attributable damage. 86 
It should be noted that the European Commission Staff Working Paper 
accompanying the White Paper stated that: 
"As far as the quantification and distribution of the damages are concerned, 
the more loosely the group of victims is defined, the more difficult it will be to 
precisely quantify the harm suffered by all the individual plaintiffs and distribute 
the damages awards to the victims" 87 . 
Furthermore, the views of marketing experts on the determination of the final 
price should be noted. According to Palmer, marketing studies show that the final 
price of a product is determined by three aspects. First is the cost-based pricing 
which is the cost of inputs of the final product. Second is the competitors' pricing 
which is how competitors price their products. Third is the demand-based pricing 
which is how much customers are prepared to pay. 88 It is argued therefore that the 
theory suggests that a combination of these three factors makes the task of 
identifying the effects of the overcharge on the final price even more difficult, since 
the inquiry is not limited to the increase in the cost of a certain input. 89 
However, as Justice White argued in the Kansas case, the majority opinion in 
Illinois Brick was that Illinois Brick case should be treated as an exception, 
=s Illinois Brick Co. V. Illinois, 431 U. S 720(1977) at 741-744. 
Ulf Boge, Konrad Ost, supra note 17, p. 200. 
Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper, supra note 2, p. 18. ss A. Palmer, "Introduction to Marketing : Theory and Practice", Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 322. i9 Carlo Petrucci, supra note 25, pp. 37-38. 
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applicable only in circumstances where the plaintiff can offer no readily provable 
damages: 
"In sum, I cannot agree with the rigid and expansive holding that in no case, 
even in the utility context, would it be possible to determine in a reliable way a 
pass-through to consumers of an illegal overcharge that would measure the extent 
of their damage. There may be cases, as the Court speculates, where there would 
be insuperable difficulties. But we are to judge this case on the basis that the pass- 
through is complete and provable. There have been no findings below that this is 
not the fact. Instead, the decision we review is that consumers may not sue even 
where it is clear and provable that an illegal overcharge has been passed on to them 
and that they, rather than the utility, have to that extent been injured...... I would 
hold that the petitioners in this case have standing to sue. This result would promote 
the twin antitrust goals of ensuring recompense for injured parties and encouraging 
90 
the diligent prosecution of antitrust claims. " 
As to this difficulty of allocating damages among direct and indirect 
purchasers, it has therefore been argued, as Justice White did, that while problems 
undoubtedly still remain, it does not seem necessary to preclude all indirect 
purchaser actions. 91 The American Bar Association assured the European 
Commission that passed on damages are not too difficult to calculate. 
92 
Economists have claimed that the procedural and analytical tools for addressing the 
complexity of allocation of damages through the distribution chain may not be 
perfect but they are more manageable today than in 1977 because far more robust 
econometric tools exist. 93 According to submissions made to the Antitrust 
Modernization Committee, advances since 1977 in data capture, storage and 
90 Kansas v. Utilicorp. United, Inc., 497 U. S. 199(1990), at 225-26. 91 See Ronald Cotterill, Leonard Egan and William Buckhold, "Beyond Illinois Brick: The Law and 
Economics of Cost Pass-through in the ADM Price Fixing Case", 18 Review of Industrial Organization 
45,2001; Curtis R. Taylor, "Indirect Damages from Price Fixing: The Alabama Lysine Case", 18 Review 
of Industrial Organization 33,2001. 
I Comments of the Section of Antitrust Law and the Section of International Law of the American Bar 
Association in Response to the Request for Public Comment of the Commission of the European 
Communities On Damage Actions for Breaches of EU Antitrust Rules, April, 2006, p. 40-41. 
93 See Cotterill, Egan and Buckhold, supra note 91 ; Taylor, supra note 91 ; Mark J. Bennett and Ellen S. 
Cooper, "Testimony of Concerning Indirect Purchaser Actions before the Antirust Modernization 
Commission", 2005, p. 6; Joel M. Cohen and Trisha Lawson, "Navigating Multistate Indirect Purchase 
Lawsuit", 15 Antitrust 29,2001, p. 6-11. 
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manipulation, as well as in econometric modelling have made ascertainment, 
allocation and distribution of damage less problematic. 94 The UK OFT has also 
stated that whilst it is true that quantification of damages may be more complex, it 
would seem possible for effective, fair and reasonable systems to be devised in 
order to calculate damages in the aggregate without the necessity to prove the 
individual loss suffered by each indirect purchaser such as consumer. 95 
For instance, in a cartel case, damages may be proved and assessed in the 
aggregate by statistical or sampling methods, or by the computation of illegal 
overcharges per unit of output multiplied by the total market output. 96 Therefore, 
as one commentator has observed, with the increasingly widespread availability of 
sophisticated econometrics and statistical analyses and the growing acceptance of 
these techniques by the courts, expert testimony can facilitate complex 
determinations of damages in a manner. 97 
Some states of the US have already demonstrated harm to downstream 
purchasing consumers and governmental entities. In a series of federal court cases 
with supplemental state claims, the states have submitted damages calculations in a 
wide variety of pharmaceutical cases by using available data. Some cases such as 
Mylan Laboratories highlight the success of the Attorneys General, and others, in 
obtaining recoveries under state law on behalf of indirect purchasers. 
In Mylan Labs, the Attorneys General of thirty-three states conducted a joint 
litigation with the FTC. The states represented government agencies and consumers. 
The majority of them were indirect purchasers of the anti-anxiety drugs lorazepam 
and clorazepate. The FTC and states jointly settled with defendants for $100 million. 
Under this settlement, affected consumers received compensation equal to 100% of 
the total value of their purchases. In total, 203,471 consumer refund checks were 
mailed worth $42,937,014.80. In addition, state agencies received $28,217,983.00. 
Over $2,880,000 was distributed under the express condition that the funds were to 
94 M. J. Bennett and E. S. Cooper, Ibid., p. 6. 
" The Office of Fair Trading, "Private Actions in Competition Law: Effective Redress for Consumes and 
Business", OFT916,2007, p. 22. 
I Ibid. 
97 Edward P. Henneberry, supra note 1, p. 9. 
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be used in a manner reasonably targeted to specifically benefit. 98 
It has been argued that this case provides important evidence that 
downstream purchasers with non-speculative claims could recover and that it call 
into question the continued viability of Illinois Brick. 99 Moreover, when the 
Supreme Court decided Illinois Brick in 1977, trial courts were limited in their 
ability to evaluate and exclude possibly dubious expert testimony. '°° Since then, 
the Supreme Court has recognized that the federal district courts are qualified to 
evaluate expert testimony and act as gatekeepers for the admission of such 
testimony. '°' Courts have been permitted to weigh such factors as the nature of the 
plaintiff's damage and the relationship between the specific damage and the 
antitrust infringement. '02 
Most of all, it is submitted that if indirect purchaser actions are allowed, 
concern about the difficulty of accurate quantification of damage may be overcome 
by accurately allocating burden of proof between plaintiff and defendant. If the 
defendant tries to use passing on defence to avoid liability for the damage of direct 
purchasers, he should bear the burden of proving the fact the overcharge was passed 
on by the defendant. Many of the perceived concerns as to the difficulty of 
recognizing indirect purchaser actions could probably be ameliorated by requiring 
some sophisticated economic analysis or reversing burden of proof which the 
defendant has to submit. 
5.3.4.3 Conflict with Ensuring Consumer Interests 
The effectiveness of private enforcement depends on the consumer's 
proactive attitude. It is often claimed that the consumer is better placed to promote a 
civil action against the company which has illegally disrupted competition because 
FTC v. Mylan Labs, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d I (D. D. C. 1999). 
M. J. Bennett and E. S. Cooper, supra note 93, pp. 7,14; Joel M. Cohen and Trisha Lawson, supra note 
93, p. 14. 
10° M. J. Bennett and E. S. Cooper, supra note 93, p. 6. 101 Daubert V. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579 (1993). 
102, Compare Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U. S. 465 (1982); see also, Associated General Contractors v. 
California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U. S. 519 (1983). 
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consumers themselves may in certain instances be the victims of antitrust 
infringements. 
However, in Illinois Brick, as I have seen above, the Supreme Court denied 
indirect purchasers' rights to bring damages actions before the (federal) courts. 
Illinois Brick appeared to be in conflict with what is seen as the avowed pro- 
consumer purposes of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. One commentator has 
identified the problem as being that Illinois Brick was "not a creature of 
Congress". 103 It was rather a "policy interpretation of Section 4 by the Supreme 
Court, delivered without any evidence that Congress had intended to prevent 
indirect purchasers from recovering under the Clayton Act". '°4 
During the Illinois Brick case, Richard Meserve, Justice Blackmun's Clerk 
pointed out what is perhaps the most obvious obstacle to a rule barring indirect 
purchasers from actions: the fact that "[t]he statute makes no mention of a 
distinction between direct and indirect purchasers. " 105 
The - exclusion of indirect purchaser is described as destructive of the 
"fundamental character of the private antitrust action" and against Congress' intent 
in providing for the private right of action. 106 Furthermore, at the time of Illinois 
Brick, the modem Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure107 had not been 
adopted, and the class action practice under it had not developed. Thus the fear of 
ultimate consumers not having a remedy is less serious in 1977 than it would be 
today. 108 Therefore, indirect purchasers such as consumers should have standing. 
True symmetry between Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe, it has been argued, would 
103 Donald I. Baker, supra note 14, p. 14-15. 
104 Ibid. 
ios See Bench Memo from Richard Meserve, supra note 75, at 3. 
106 Crouch v. Crompton Corp., No. 02 CVS 4375.2004 WL 2414027, at *5 (N. C. Super. Oct. 28,2004). 
10' The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereafter, FRCP) are rules governing civil procedure in SS 
district (federal) courts for civil actions. The FRCP are promulgated by the US Supreme Court pursuant to 
the Rules Enabling Act, and then approved by the US Congress. Although federal courts are required to 
apply the substantive law of the states as rules of decision in cases where state law is in question, the 
federal courts almost always use the FRCP as their rules of procedure. States determine their own rules 
which apply in state courts, though most states have adopted rules that are based on the FRCP. The FRCP 
was completely rewritten, effective since December 1,2007, under the leadership of a committee headed 
by law professor Bryan A. Garner, for the purpose of making them easier to understand. 
10, Donald I. Baker, supra note 14, p. 15-16. 
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have required permission of indirect purchaser actions to encourage greater 
deterrence and greater compensation by consumers. 109 
5.2.5 Exceptions to the Illinois Brick Doctrine 
However, there are two exceptions to the Illinois Brick Doctrine. These 
exceptions are considered to be necessary to prevent an infringer from avoiding and 
being insulated from antitrust liability. 
5.2.5.1 `Cost-plus' Contracts between direct and indirect 
purchasers 
A cost plus contract is a contract where a contractor is paid for all of its 
allowed expenses to a set limit plus additional payment to allow for profit. As the 
Court observed in Hanover Shoe, there might be situations where the direct and 
indirect purchaser had contractually agreed to pass on overcharge prices by using a 
cost-plus pricing formula. "° In situations where the middleman supplies the 
product to the indirect purchaser on a cost-plus contract, the Court reasoned that the 
direct purchaser is not at risk of suffering antitrust damage. The Court noted that: 
"It can be recognized that there might be situations--for instance, when an 
overcharged buyer has a pre-existing cost-plus contract, thus making it easy to 
prove that he has not been damaged--where the considerations requiring that the 
passing-on defence not be permitted in this case would not be present. " 111 
In the Microsoft case, it was deemed to be established that 100% of the 
overcharge is passed on to the indirect purchaser where it has a cost-plus contract 
that commits its customer to purchase a fixed price of the product. They may have 
in fact earned a percentage profit on the overcharge. 112 
109 Andrew I. Gavil, supra note 3, p. 615-616. 
110 Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U. S. 481 (1968), at 494. 
"1 Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U. S. 481(1968), at 494; See also Lefrak v. 
Arabian Am. Oil. Co., 487 F. Supp. 808 (S. D. N. Y. 1980). 
112 Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 214 F. R. D. 371 (D. Md. 2003). This case involved a class-action 
by consumers against Microsoft for overcharging them for the Windows operating system. The Microsoft 
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For example, in a cartel case, if all competing direct purchasers face the same 
overcharge, they are more likely to pass it on precisely because they know that all 
others have faced the same price increase. They themselves may act as members of 
cartel. Therefore, the indirect purchaser can bring damages actions against the 
upstream producer. 113 
5.2.5.2 The Defendants own or control the Direct Purchasers 
An exception is also in order when the defendant owns or controls the direct 
purchaser. 114 In cases where the middleman is owned or controlled by the upstream 
producer who took part in the conspiracy, the relation between the indirect 
purchaser and 'the producer becomes essentially a direct one. l l5 In such cases, 
indirect purchasers could bring actions against upstream producer. 116 
5.3 Indirect Purchaser Litigation in Korea 
5.3.1 Overview of Indirect Purchaser Litigation in Korea 
5.3.2 Principles of Permitting Indirect Purchaser Actions in 
Korea 
The Korean courts have not yet ruled on whether indirect purchasers may 
bring damages actions in competition area. It is not easy to see how Korea can 
ensure that indirect purchasers such as consumers are able to bring damages actions 
while also ensuring that direct purchasers such as wholesalers, who are more likely 
case illustrates the challenges posed by multiple liabilities. Following the initiation of the government's 
prosecution of Microsoft in May 1998, Microsoft faced 64 follow-on federal antitrust actions and 117 
state court actions. Almost all of these actions were class actions. Of the 117 state court class actions, 
forty-four were removed to federal court. Seventy-three cases were deemed irremovable by Microsoft and 
left to proceed in state courts. 
1'3 Firat Cengiz, supra note 12, p. 18. 
114 See Illinois Brick Co. v Stare of Illinois 431U. S. 720 (1977) at 730 n. 16; see also California V. ARC 
Am. Corp., 490 U. S. 93,97 n. 2 (1989) This case noted Illinois Brick's two exceptions. 
113 See ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Indirect Purchaser Litigation Handbook, 2007, p. 18-19,21. 
116 Firat Cengiz, supra note 12, p. 18. 
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to bring damages actions are not discouraged from doing so. 
It is worth considering the US position on indirect purchaser because the US 
has particularly striking rules on the indirect purchaser actions, embodied in the 
Illinois Brick case. The US Supreme Court prohibited indirect purchaser litigation 
primarily because of the considerations discussed above. However, there are many 
problems with the US position, as discussed above. 
As I discussed above, the exclusion of indirect purchaser actions has had 
many problems. 117 In Korea, the exclusion of indirect purchaser actions can be 
destructive of the fundamental principle of private competition actions because of 
four main principles of full effectiveness, protecting consumers' interests, 
prohibition of unjust enrichment and ensuring effective and efficient enforcement. 
5.3.2.1 The Principle of Full Compensation 
The exclusion of the passing on defence in Korea would most probably 
necessitate the denial of standing to indirect purchasers in order to avoid duplicative 
damages awards. 118 However, it is submitted that the exclusion of indirect 
purchasers' actions would be contrary to Korean law, as explained below, and 
inconsistent with the courts' ruling that full compensation requires that damages 
actions should be open to anyone to claim damages for a breach of competition 
law. ' 19 
Full compensation means to ensure that all victims from anticompetitive 
conduct have access to effective mechanisms for compensation for the harm which 
is composed of actual loss resulting from the illegal overcharge and the loss of 
profit resulting from the reduced sales. To ensure full compensation, the 
Competition Law states that the legal or natural person causing damage is obliged 
to compensate the damage that arises through his illegal practice without defining 
Oil In respect to the problems of exclusion of indirect purchaser actions, see section 5.2.4 which deals 
with the problems in following the US position on indirect purchaser litigation. 
1'S See section 4.3.2.4 which deals with probability of multiple liabilities if Korea prohibit passing on 
defence. 
119 In respect to courts' ruling, see section 3.2.1 which deals with courts' ruling about full effectiveness 
in Korea. 
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any categories of persons entitled to damage. 
Competition Law 56 (Competition Damages Actions) states that: 
If an enterpriser or an enterpriser's organization violates the provisions of this 
Act, and thereby inflicts on a person any damage, he or the organization shall be 
liable for compensation of such damage to the person. A natural limitation is an 
identifiable damage. 120 
The Korean Civil Law also recognizes that anyone could have compensation 
for the damage that arises through an infringer's illegal practice. 121 
If indirect purchasers' actions were not allowed, it would result in full 
compensation being unavailable because the damaged party would have no redress 
in damages. This approach does not correspond to the principle of full 
compensation under the Civil and Competition Laws in Korea. Given these Acts, 
even though there have been no cases in which the Korean courts ever accepted this 
position there is no reason why indirect purchasers should not benefit from actions 
for damages. Therefore, to ensure full compensation, no limitation should be placed 
on the categories of persons who can recover damages. Both direct and indirect 
purchasers should have the right to bring damages action even if there are no 
specific rules about the standing of indirect purchasers. Indirect purchaser could 
include competitors, consumer or other market participants that participated in the 
infringement but suffered loss. The only limit should be that those entitled to 
recover must be persons with damage caused by anticompetitive conduct. 
5.3.2.2 The Principle of Protecting Consumers' Interests 
As I discuss in Chapter 1, one of the objectives of the Competition Law is to 
120 Competition Act 56(Competition Damages Actions) This is the KFTC's official English translation. In 
Korea, the primary object of damages action is compensation for a victim not deterrence of 
anticompetitive conducts, punishment for an infringer or disgorgement of illegal gain. See generally 
Lion 1.2.2.1 which deals with the current situation of private competition enforcement in Korea. 
12l Civil Law (760) Provision of damages actions under Civil Law is fundamental to damages actions 
under Competition Act. 
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protect consumer interests. 122 The definition of a consumer is fairly broad. 123 It 
can include indirect purchasers such as intermediaries and end consumers who have 
no direct contract with the infringer. 
Indirect purchaser actions could provide an important means of compensating 
consumers because most indirect purchasers are small private parties such as 
consumers. 124 If indirect purchasers' actions are not allowed, there is a high 
possibility of prejudice to consumers' interests. The judgment of Supreme Court in 
Illinois Brick impairs consumers' interests by eliminating the consumers' right to 
bring competition damages actions. 
To protect consumer interests, it is important to ensure the right of indirect 
purchasers to bring actions because nearly all competition infringements could 
result in economic harm to other market participants, who may or may not be 
contractually related to the competition infringer. The standing of indirect 
purchasers such as consumers is consistent with the principle that competition law 
should maximise consumer welfare. 
As was said in Illinois Brick, multiple liabilities could be avoided through 
procedures for compulsory joinder that enable the judge to allocate the damage 
between direct and indirect purchasers in the same proceeding. 125 To encourage 
consumer actions and avoid multiple liabilities, it is necessary to recognize group 
actions by which indirect purchasers such as consumers would be able to bring 
actions. To protect consumer interests, the various group actions rules and 
procedures have to be addressed in order to provide for damages actions to 
consumers. I discuss group actions in Chapter VI. . 
in See section 1.3.2.1 which deals with objectives of competition law in Korea; Competition Act 
I (Objective of Competition Act) 
ui Consumer Fundamental Act(2) 
r24 Joel M. Cohen, Trisha Lawson, supra note 93, pp. 566-568. 
125 Illinois Brick Co. v. State of Illinois, 431 U. S. 720 (1977) at 762. 
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5.3.2.3 The Principles of Fair and Just Compensation and 
Efficient and Effective Deterrence 
In the US, in Illinois Bricks, the US Supreme Court pursued the balance 
between granting everyone who might have suffered a loss a right to bring actions 
and the interest of seeking efficient enforcement. In this case, however, to ensure 
effective deterrence through focusing on direct purchaser's right for compensation, 
the US sacrificed indirect purchasers' right for compensation. 126 
As already seen in the sections above, 127 in order to promote efficient and 
effective damages actions the competition rules may require prioritisation of the 
rights of direct purchasers over indirect purchasers because indirect purchasers are 
typically a disparate group who will normally be less inclined than direct 
purchasers to initiate proceedings, given that they would only recover damages 
based on the small amount of overcharge passed on to them. Furthermore, in many 
cases the chain of transactions from the original infringer to the indirect purchasers 
such as consumer is long. Thus, permitting indirect purchasers' actions having 
small and distant injuries, rather than encouraging direct purchaser actions, could 
lead to insufficient compensation and lower deterrence because of the decreased 
incentive to sue. 
However, private competition damages actions are potentially an important 
channel for both of the fair and just compensation and effective and efficient 
deterrence. 
On the one hand, Korean commentators have argued that fairness could be 
achieved through compensating real victims for damage. To ensure fairness the 
Karin-doer has to give redress to the harm-sufferer. 128 Damages actions for indirect 
purchasers against the infringements of competition law have a strong fairness 
aspect which aims to make good any harm done to victim. Allowing the direct 
purchaser to recover while denying the indirect purchaser the right to recover is 
Uu See section 5.2.3 which deals with rationale of decision of Illinois Brick. 
Jr See section 5.2.3 which deals with rationale of decision of Illinois Brick. 
in 
. join 
Gu-Nyeon, "A Study on Problems on Private Remedies for Damages of Korean Antitrust Law", 
14 Comparative Private Law 261,2007, p. 278 
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unfair because it allows a direct purchaser who may neutralise or reduce the harm 
by passing on damage to indirect purchasers to collect windfall recoveries, while 
leaving an indirect purchaser who is the true victim of the illegal overcharge 
without a remedy. Thus, indirect purchasers should be entitled to bring actions 
against infringers. 
As I already discussed in section [3.2] the primary objective of damages 
actions in Korea is compensation not deterrence, punishment or disgorgement of 
illegal benefit. 129 Denying indirect purchasers to have standing is consistent with 
the principle of compensatory justice. 
On the other hand, damages actions for indirect purchasers against the 
infringements of competition law do have a strong efficiency aspect which aims to 
make individuals obtain redress effectively when their rights are infringed by a 
breach of competition law. In this sense, effectiveness can be understood as 
`effective judicial protection'. 
Fair and just compensation and effective and efficient deterrence are 
intertwined. 130 Compensation and deterrence could be impeded by the denying 
certain victims' rights to recover damages because allowing standing to indirect 
purchasers for compensation could further discourages anti-competitive agreements. 
131 Even in the US, there is a strong body of opinion arguing that an effective 
private damages regime must provide a remedy for all victims of the overcharge 
even where that victim is an indirect purchaser. 132 Thus, fair and effective 
enforcement system can be found by compensating for indirect purchasers such as 
consumers. 
129 See section 3.2.1 which deals with the primary objective of damages actions. 130 See W. P. J. Wils, "The Optimal Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law: Essays in Law and Economics", 
Kluwer Law International, 2002, section 2.2.4; K. Roach and M. J. Treblicock, "Private Enforcement of 
Competition Laws", 34 Osgoode Hall L. J. 461,1996, p. 498. 131 As shown above section 5.2.3.1, this argument is challenged by those who believe that when a conflict 
between compensation and deterrence arises, the latter is to be preferred and is maximised by granting 
standing to direct purchasers only. 12 Comments of the Section of Antitrust Law and the Section of International Law of the American Bar 
Association in Response to the Request for Public Comment of the Commission of the European 
Communities On Damage Actions for Breaches of EU Antitrust Rules, April, 2006, p. 40. 
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5.4 Indirect Purchaser Litigation in the EU 
The question of the standing of indirect purchasers in competition damages 
cases has not yet been directly answered by the ECJ. The ECJ has touched upon 
these issues, particularly in the two cases of Crehan133 and Manfredi'34 but has 
not gone into specifics or set out clear rules. 135 The objective of the Commission, 
however, is to achieve a system which not only ensures that those who suffer loss 
can seek compensation but also provides appropriate incentives to promote actions 
by those who are most likely to be successful. It discussed options in respect of 
indirect purchaser actions in the light of this aim-in its Green Paper on Damages 
Actions136 and made proposals in its White Paper. 137 
5.4.1. Overview of Indirect Purchaser Action: Trade- off between 
Fair and Effective Damages Actions 
Commissioner Neelie Kroes, in discussing the Commission's view of private 
damages actions, has often addressed the fairness versus efficiency problem. After 
the Publication of the Commission's Green Paper in 2005,138 she recognized the 
`alleged tension' between a fair and just system and an effective and efficient 
system of private competition enforcement. 
On the one hand, Commissioner Neelie Kroes stated that: 
"A fair and just system of private enforcement implies that those who suffer 
losses as a result of an anticompetitive infringement can get compensation, and 
fairness and justice also imply that those who infringed the competition rules 
cannot easily escape from their duty to compensate for the damage caused by their 
133 Courage v Crehan, C-452/99, [2001]ECR 1-6297 134 Manfredi v. LloydAdriatico Assicurazioni SpA, C-295/04, [2006] ECJ, 348 133 Firat Cengiz, supra note 12, p. 28. 136 European Commission, "Green Paper - Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules", COM (2005) 672 final, section 2.4. 37 European Commission, "White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules", Com 
Q008) 165 final, section 2.6. 38 Supra note 136, section 2.4. 
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infringement. - 139 
On the other hand, Commissioner Neelie Kroes acknowledged that : 
"An effective and efficient system of private enforcement needs those who 
are most probable to be successful in bringing private competition actions should be 
given incentives to do so: `[e]fficiency further requires that the overall costs for 
society in processing a private competition action do not completely outweigh the 
possible benefits of such an action. "4° 
The tension to which Commissioner Kroes referred is, of course, manifest in 
the vexed question raised in this Chapter and in Chapter 4, of whether the defendant 
in private competition proceedings in the EU should be able to invoke the passing 
on defence and whether indirect purchasers should have standing to bring damages 
actions. 141 
In the Commission Staff Working Paper -annex to the Green Paper, the 
Commission tried to ensure the trade-off between the purity of a system which 
protects all relevant rights and an efficient and effective system of competition 
damages actions-142 It is suggested that the determining factor could be the 
effective enforcement of Community law. If limiting the rights of certain 
individuals to claim is necessary to ensure a system which is more effective in 
safeguarding the enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC, then it is submitted that 
such limitations should be accepted under Community law. The Commission 
concluded however that "Given the [above-mentioned] complexities, it is, however, 
likely that a trade-off between justice in the sense of full recovery for all those who 
have suffered a loss from an illegal practice and efficiency is inevitable". 143 
Thus, it is desirable to achieve a balance between a fair and just and an 
139 Neelie Kroes. "Enhancing Actions for Damages for Breach of Competition Rules in Europe", Dinner Speech at the Harvard Club, Speech/05/533, New York, 2005, p. 4. 140 Ibid. 
'a' Gregory P. Olsen, "Enhancing Private Antitrust Litigation in the EU", 20 Antitrust 73, Fall 2005, p. 74. 142 European Commission, "Commission Staff Working Paper annex to the Green Paper on Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules", SEC (2005) 1732 at para. 179. 143 Ibid. 
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effective and efficient system. To achieve this balance it is necessary to design a 
system which protects the interests of victims without imposing a disproportional 
burden on the defendant. 
5.4.2 Desirability of Permitting Indirect Purchaser Litigation in 
the EU 
The ECJ has recognized the direct effects of Articles 81 (1) and 82 EC Treaty 
in relation between individuals and creating rights for the individuals which the 
national courts must safeguard in Francovich, 144 Crehan'45 and Manfredi. 146 
The Francovich case is important in the development of private competition 
litigation because it has explicitly provided for a damages remedy of wide scope for 
breach of Community law which the national courts is required to recognize and 
enforce. In this case, it is submitted that the remedies principles of Community 
depart from the principle that Community law provides the substantive rule and 
national law provides the procedures and remedies. 
In Crehan, the ECJ also confirmed the general principle of direct effect 
which was applied in the context of Community competition law in Francovich. 147 
The ECJ recognized the right to recover losses of any individual, which could 
possibly include indirect purchasers. 148 In this case, the ECJ stated that 
infringements of Art. 81 EC in principle entitled any individual to claim damages. 
149 
In Crehan, the ECJ confirmed the principle that: 
"[I]t should be recalled that the full effectiveness of Article 81 EC and, in 
particular, the practical effect of the prohibition laid down in Article 81(1) EC 
144 Francovich and Bonifaci v. Italy, Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, [1991] ECR 1-5357, para 2-4 las Courage v Crehan, C-453/99, [2001]ECR 1-6297 at 23. 
'46 Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, C-295/04, [2006] ECR 1-06619. para 31,51, 
58-59,61-64 
147 Courage v Crehan, C-453/99, [2001]ECR 1-6297 at para 23. 
148 Courage v Crehan, C-453/99, [2001]ECR 1-6297 at para 26. 
149 Courage V Crehan, C-452/99, [2001]ECR 1-6297 at para 26. Advocate General Mischo even stated in 
his Opinion that the individuals protected by Art. 81 EC were primarily third parties, i. e. consumers and 
competitors who were affected by a prohibited agreement. A. G. Mischo Opinion delivered on March 22, 
2001 at para 38.. 
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would be put at risk if it were not open to any individual to claim damages for loss 
caused to him by a contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort 
competition. " 5° 
Any individual can rely on a breach of Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty before 
a national court even where the action was brought before the court by a party to an 
anticompetitive agreement against another party to the agreement. However, no 
specific decision on the entitlement of indirect purchasers to claim damages against 
defendant has been taken. '5' In addition, the ECJ explicitly stated in its Crehan 
decision that it was left to the discretion of the Member States to decide on 
procedural issues as long as it is consistent with the principle of efficiency and 
equivalence. 152 The Court did not exclude national provisions or case law that lead 
to barring damages actions brought by certain indirect purchasers for reasons of 
remoteness. 153 Consequently, it can be argued that the ECJ did not rule out the 
possibility that Community law would allow a limitation or exclusion of the 
indirect purchaser standing at national level. 
However, the prohibition of any limits of standing is reaffirmed by the ECJ in 
Manfredi. In Manfredi'54 the ECJ recognized the-right of persons with a `relevant 
legal interest' could sue. These persons could include indirect purchasers. In this 
case, the Italian Court asked whether individuals who purchased motor insurance 
from insurance brokers and agents should be entitled to bring damage actions 
against the insurance companies which were found to operate a price-fixing cartel 
in infringement of Article 81 EC. In its response to this question, the ECJ 
reconfirmed the principle of direct effect which must be open to any individual to 
exercise his rights. 155 In Manfredi, the ECJ stated that: 
"It follows that any individual can claim compensation for the harm suffered 
where there is a causal relationship between that harm and an agreement or practice 
150 Courage v Crehan, C-452/99, [2001 ]ECR 1-6297 at para. at 26 
's' See Ulf Boge, Konrad Ost, supra note 17, p. 201-202. '52 Courage v Crehan, C-452/99, [2001]ECR 1-6297 at para. 30. 153 Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper, supra note 2, para. 15. 154 Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, C-295/04, [2006] ECR 1-06619. 155 Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, C-295/04, [2006] ECR 1-06619, at 60. 
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prohibited under Article 81 EC". 156 
If third parties action is recognized from the direct effect of the competition 
rules, an indirect purchaser who is affected by an infringement which may not be 
easy to establish, could have the right to claim for compensation. 
In respect to Manfredi case, the crucial question is, whether Manfredits7 
created a Community-wide right of standing for indirect purchasers. In this case, as 
the ECJ neither mentioned the concept of indirect purchasers nor went into the 
specific aspects of the right of indirect purchasers to bring actions. Thus, it can be 
argued that Manfredi repeated a general principle of Community law in a specific 
field such as insurance industry rather than declaration of a universal right of 
indirect purchasers to bring actions. 158 
The Court's ruling in Francovich, 159 Couragel6o and Manfredi seems to go 
against any limitations with regard to any particular category of individuals. 
Commissioner Kroes also made clear that: 
"... a private enforcement system which disables or even discourages final 
consumers from bringing actions for damages is unacceptable. " 161 
Allowing indirect purchase actions is also supported by the vast majority of 
competition authorities of Member States in their comments on the Green Paper 
where a majority of Members States are in favour of allowing the passing on 
defence and indirect purchaser actions. 162 
The White Paper interpreted the ECJ's above rulings as demanding that 
'56 Ibid. para 61. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Firat Cengiz, supra note 12, p. 30; John Pheasant, "Private Antitrust Damages in Europe: The Policy 
Debate and Judicial Developments", Antitrust, Fall 2006, p. 61. 
139 Francovich, Joined cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, [1991] ECR 1-5357 at [32]. 
160 Courage v Crehan, C-452/99, [2001]ECR 1-6297 at paras. 23-24. 
161 Neelie Kroes's speech/05/533, supra note 139. 
162 In response to its request on public discussion the Commission received almost 200 comments from 
business, academic and government representatives. 
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indirect purchaser actions should be possible. According to White Paper, "Any 
citizen or business who suffers harm as a result of a breach of EC antitrust rules 
(Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty) must be able to claim reparation from the 
party who caused the damage. " 163 It stated that the aim of the White Paper was to 
ensure that: 
".. all victims of infringements of EC competition law have access to effective 
redress mechanism so that they can be fully compensated for the harm they 
suffered". 164 
Therefore, purchasers of an overcharged product or service who have been 
able to pass on that overcharge to their own customers should not be entitled to 
compensation of that overcharge. 165 
However, even if indirect purchaser actions are allowed, still there are 
problems such as quantification of damage. The White Paper deals with some of the 
166 
problems of quantification of damage discussed earlier by providing for a 
rebuttable presumption that the overcharge was passed on in its entirety. The White 
Paper states that: 
"... an indirect purchaser should be able to rely on the rebuttable presumption 
that the illegal overcharge was passed on in its entirety down to his level. "67 
Indirect purchaser actions can be facilitated by a presumption that the 
overcharge has been passed on in its entirety to their level since this would alleviate 
indirect buyers' burden of proof when they cannot provide accurate evidence of the 
amount of loss. 168 The presumption can be rebutted by the infringer, for instance 
by referring to the fact same overcharge price passed on to someone in the 
163 White Paper on Damages actions, supra note 137, section 1.1. 164 Ibid. 
165 Rainer Becker, Nicolas Bessot and Eddy De Smijter, "The White Paper on damages actions for breach 
of the EC antitrust rules", European Commission Newsletter, ISSN 1025-2266,2008, p. 6. 
'" For problems of quantification of damage, See section 5.2.4.2 which deals with incorrect presumption 
of damages passed on to indirect purchasers. 
167 White Paper on Damages actions, supra note 137, at section 2.6. 
168 Carlo Petrucci, supra note 25, p. 42. 
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distribution chain than the plaintiff. In practice this presumption will have far- 
reaching consequences as the infringer will find it difficult to rebut the 
presumption. 169 
Irrespective of whether national courts permit the passing on defence or not, 
the European Commission wishes to make both direct and indirect purchaser such 
as consumer proceedings more effectively by facilitating class action or 
representative litigation. 170 For the protection of the rights of indirect purchasers 
such as consumers, the Commission has also explored the possibilities of group 
actions which might be an efficient form of process given the very low level of 
individual damage suffered. 171 
It is worth noting that the European Parliament resolution on the White Paper 
on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules welcomed the White Paper 
and stressed that the EC competition rules and, in particular, their effective 
enforcement, required that victims of breaches of the EC competition rules must to 
be able to claim compensation for the damage suffered. 172 It also recognized 
collective redress which allows the aggregation of individual action for damages. 
173 It took the view that direct and indirect purchasers should have available to 
them, for the prosecution of their stand-alone or follow-up actions and individual, 
collective or representative action. 174 
Given the judgments of Francovich, Couragel75 and Manfredi176 and the 
proposals in the White Paper'77 and the European Parliament resolution on the 
White Paper, the US Supreme Court's solution to the balancing of fairness and 
169 . rim Reher, "The Commission's White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust 
Rules", The European Antitrust Review, 2009, p. 3. 
170 Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper, supra note 2, para. 30. 
11 See section 6.5 which deals with group actions in the EU; See also Neelie Kroes's speech/05/533, 
sera note 139. 
1 European Parliament resolution of 26 March 2009 on the White Paper on damages actions for breach 
of the EC antitrust rules (2008/2154(INI)), para 1. 
173 Ibid., para 4. 
1'4 Ibid., para S. 
175 Courage v Crehan, C-452/99, [2001]ECR 1-6297 at paras. 23-24. 
176 Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, C-295/04, [2006] ECJ, 348. 
177 White Paper on Damages actions, supra note 137, at para. 2.1. 
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efficiency in Illinois Bricks is unlikely to be replicated within the EU system. 178 
Particularly for reasons of fairness, all victims could therefore have the opportunity 
to bring damages actions. 179 Thus, the duty under Articles 81 and 82 EC not to 
infringe EC competition law should be owed not only to the direct purchaser in a 
supply chain but also to the subsequent members of the chain if they can be affected 
by competition infringements. 180 
To ensure effective private competition enforcement, harmonization of either 
national substantive standards regarding the passing-on defence and indirect 
purchaser standing is desirable for an effective private enforcement in the EU. US 
experience regarding passing-on defence and indirect purchaser standing illustrates 
that cooperation mechanisms amongst the courts applying those standards are 
inevitable for an effective private enforcement. As I already discussed above, '8' in 
the lack of solid mechanisms of cooperation, the result will either be forum 
shopping raising risks of inconsistency and multiple recoveries, as the US 
experience illustrates. 182 
5.5 Indirect Purchaser Litigation in the UK 
5.5.1 The Relationship between the Standing of Indirect 
Purchasers under Tort law and the Standing of Indirect 
Purchasers under the Competition Act 1998 
In the UK there is no specific rule that applies to the standing of indirect 
purchasers in competition law claims. The rules on standing depend on the tort 
which is to be pleaded as a cause of action. 183 English tort law requires damnum 
178 Gregory P. Olsen, "The Changing Face of Class Action Litigation: The Class Action Fairness Act 
Development International Development - Enhancing Private Antitrust Litigation in the EU', Antitrust, 
2005, p. 74. 
179 "Response to Green Paper-Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules", BAK Position Paper, 
2006, p. 6. 
180 L. R. Tolaini and A. M. Morfey, supra note 7, p. 94.  See section 2.2.4 which deals with harmonization of different national laws in the EU. 182 See e. g. Francis G. Jacobs and Thorns Deisenhofer, "Procedural Aspects of the Effective Private 
Enforcement of EC Competition Rules: A Community Perspective", in "European Competition Law 
Annual 2001: Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law", Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Isabela 
Atansiu (Eds. ), 2003, Oxford-Portland Oregon, 187-252; Firat Cengiz, supra note 12, p. 4 1. 
1S3 OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, "Roundtable 
discussion on private remedies: Passing on defence; Indirect purchaser Standing; Definition of Damages 
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and iniuria to be united in the same person, which means that damage suffered in 
consequence of an act may not be eligible for compensation if the plaintiff such as 
the indirect victim was not the person to whom 'the wrongfully acting defendant 
owed the duty he infringed. 184 The tort of breach of statutory duty arises when a 
court concludes that a statute primarily regulatory or criminal in nature should be 
treated as giving rise to civil liability. There appear to be two rules limiting 
`standing' in actions for breach of statutory duty. First, the statutory duty must be 
owed to the plaintiff or the plaintiff must fall within the class of persons that the 
statute intends to protect. Second, the plaintiff must have suffered injury of the kind 
which the statute is intended to prevent. If the statute is intended to prevent a 
mischief of a particular kind, a person who suffers loss of a different kind cannot 
recover its loss in an action for breach of statutory duty. 
The approach is the same in relation to the standing of indirect purchasers in 
competition area. The prevailing view appears to be that breach of the competition 
law prohibitions may amount to the tort of breach of statutory duty. 185 
There is no reason to believe that an indirect purchaser in a competition case 
would be unable to satisfy two rules referred to in the previous paragraph. 186 
Above all, whether or not UK tort law rules can limit or bar indirect 
purchaser actions will be dependent upon their being compatible with the 
Community principles of equivalence and effectiveness. '87 
of United Kingdom", OECD Working Paper, 2006, p. 2. 
1E4 Heuston, R. F. V. / Buckley, R. A. "Law of Torts", 21st ed., London 1996, p. 508. 
"" The Court of Appeal in Devenish v Sanoft treated it as breach of statutory duty. See, Devenish 
Nutrition Limited v. Sanofi-Aventis SA (France) and others, Case A3/2008/0080, [2008] EWCA Civ 
1086[Arden] , at paras 1-2. 1'6 OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, "Roundtable 
discussion on private remedies: Passing on defence; Indirect purchaser Standing; Definition of Damages 
of United Kingdom", OECD Working Paper, 2006, p. 2. 
187 Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, "EC Competition Law", 3d ed., Oxford, 2007, p. 1337. For the 
principles of equivalence and effectiveness, see section 3.2.2 which deals with current situation of 
compensatory, punitive or exemplary Damage in the EU. 
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5.5.2. Standing of Indirect Purchasers under the Competition 
Act1998 
As explained above, '88 in the UK there is no specific rule for indirect 
purchaser's standing in competition area. As explained in Chapter 2,189 the 
Competition Act 1998 contains provisions on monetary claims before the 
Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT). Section 47A of the Competition Act 1998,90 
provides that a person who has suffered loss as a result of the infringement of 
Articles 81 or 82 EC or their domestic equivalents, the Chapter I and Chapter II 
prohibitions, may make a claim in proceedings before the CAT if the infringement 
has already been established by a decision of the OFT, the CAT itself, or the 
European Commission. 
As also explained in Chapter 2,191 the Competition Act 1998 provides for 
representative consumer claims. A consumer claim is defined in section 47B(2) as a 
`claim to which section 47A applies which an individual has in respect of an 
infringement affecting (directly or indirectly) goods or services to which subsection 
(7) applies'. Subsection 7 provides: `This subsection applies to goods or services 
which - (a) the individual received, or sought to receive, otherwise than in the 
course of a business carried on by him (notwithstanding that he received or sought 
to receive them with a view to carrying on a business); and (b) were, or would have 
been, supplied to the individual (in the case of goods whether by way of sale or 
otherwise) in the course of a business carried on by the person who supplied or 
would have supplied them'. 
Section 47B (6) sets out who constitute consumers for these purposes. It 
states that a consumer is an individual who received goods or services, or sought to 
receive them. 192 The definition of consumer in the section 47 B is broad. Maybe 
even indirect purchasers that would encompass consumers can be enclosed in this 
I" See section 5.5.1 which deals with the relationship between the standing of indirect purchasers under 
Tort law and the standing of indirect purchasers under Competition Act 1998. 
189 See section 2.3.1 which deals with development of competition law in the UK. 
190 Inserted by section 18(1) of the Enterprise Act 2002. 
191 See section 5.5.1 which deals with the relationship between the standing of indirect purchasers under 
Tort law and the standing of indirect purchasers under Competition Act 1998. 
" In this context, business is defined in s. 47B(8) as including (a) a professional practice; (b) any other 
undertaking carried on for gain or reward; (c) any other undertaking in the course of which goods or 
services are supplied otherwise than free of charge. 
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broad definition. Thus, indirect purchasers would be entitled to claim under UK 
law, 193 subject to satisfying the requirements of causation and remoteness. 194 
The UK courts do not deny standing to indirect purchasers and indeed it 
appears that such a denial would be incompatible with EC law and contrary to the 
principles of direct effect and effectiveness. As discussed above, 195 the ECJ stated 
in Courage v Crehan196 that any individual could pursue a private action for breach 
of competition law. Indirect purchasers actions are recognized as desirable in the 
OFT Discussion Paper. 197 
In respect to indirect purchaser actions, the crucial case in the UK is Emerald 
Supplies Ltd & Anr v. British Airways Plc. This case arose from an alleged price 
fixing agreement in the air freight services market between British Airways (BA) 
and a number of other international airlines, including Korean Airlines. 198 BA and 
Korean Airlines made a plea agreement with the US Department of Justice in July 
2007 by which they agreed to plead guilty and pay criminal fines totalling $600 
million in respect of fixing the rates charged to customers for international air 
shipments of cargo. 199 The European Commission sent a Statement of Objections 
to various airlines, including BA, in respect of their alleged participation in an air 
freight cartel, in December 2007.200 
In September 2008 the plaintiffs instituted proceedings against BA seeking 
damages for those infringements. The plaintiffs import cut flowers from, 
respectively, Columbia and Kenya. For that purpose they use the air freight services 
of the defendants British Airway (hereafter, BA) and other international airlines. 
They brought damages actions on behalf of the direct or indirect purchasers and 
193 See Van Dijk and Niels, "The Economics of Quantifying Damages", C. L. J. 69,2002, p. 74. "arguably 
only a party that suffers an injury that competition law was designed to prevent should be allowed to 
claim damages". If direct purchasers pass on overcharged price to indirect purchasers, they are real victim 
from anticompetitive conduct. Thus, indirect purchasers should be allowed to claim damages for loss. 
194 In respect to forseeability in English law, this context, the courts/CAT will decide whether to apply 
the Polemis test in R. v Thames Magistrates' Court ex parte Polemis, [1974] 1 WLR 1371 case based on 
damage directly caused or the Wagon Mound basis in Morts Dock& Engineering Co v Overseas 
Tankship(UK) Ltd, [1961] A. C. 388 case of liability for losses which are reasonably foreseeable. 
195 See section 5.4.2 which deals with desirability of permitting indirect purchaser litigation in the EU. 196 Courage Limited v Bernard Crehan, C-453/99, para 26. 
197 The Office of Fair Trading, supra note 95. 198 The others included Air France, Cathay Pacific, Japanese Airlines, KLM, Qantas and SAS. 
199 Available at http: //www. usdoj. gov/atr/public/press releases/2007/224928. htm 
200 Case COMP 39.258, Airfreight, MEMO/07/622. 
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asserted the inflated prices. 
In that case the plaintiffs claimed the direct or indirect purchasers should 
have compensation for loss caused by price-fixing of the fuel surcharge. 201 They 
insisted that the direct or indirect purchasers including the plaintiffs, had suffered 
losses under one or more of the following three heads: 
i) the inflated element of the price, in so far as it was passed on to them, 
and/or] ii) loss of sales volume in so far as in the inflated price was passed on by 
them to their own by them to their own buyers, and iii) loss of sales volumes of 
other products as a result of brand damage. 
The claim was not limited to direct or indirect purchasers of air freight 
services from British Airways (hereafter, BA). It extended also to the direct or 
indirect purchasers of air freight services from any other airlines which were party 
to this price-fixing cartel 202 
It is submitted that this case recognized the right of indirect purchaser actions 
because the class was described by the court as "direct and indirect purchasers of air 
freight services the prices for which were inflated by the agreements or concerted 
practices. " 203 
The Court of Appeal stated that: 
"Whether or not an individual member of the class can establish that 
necessary ingredient will depend on where in the chain of distribution he can and 
who if anyone in that chain had absorbed or passed on the alleged inflated price. "204 
It also stated that: 
201 This case is significant private actions in the UK. 202 Emerald Supplies Ltd v. British Airways Plc, IHC 46/09, [2009]EWHC 741(Ch) at paras. 2-7. 203 Ibid., at paras 3-4. 
204 Ibid., at para 36 
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".. [t]he conflict between different members of the class is not a consequence 
of any esoteric defence of `passing on' but is inherent in damage being a necessary 
ingredient in the cause of action. That this is so in apparent from the judgments of 
" 205 Tuckey and Longmore LJJ in Devenish Nutrition Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis SA... 
The OFT in its Discussion Paper also indicated that it would not seem 
appropriate if there is any limitation on the standing of consumers and other end 
users to bring a competition claims as such limitations possibly have the unintended 
consequence of discouraging private actions. 206 This Discussion Paper states that: 
"Consumers and business suffering losses as a result of breaches of 
competition law should be able to recover compensation, both as claims for 
damages on a standalone basis as well as in follow-on cases brought after public 
action. "207 
It is worth noting that in respect of the prevention of over-compensation the 
UK section of the Ashurst Report stated that: 
"Direct purchasers should be encouraged to claim against the infringer for all 
losses that they have not been reasonably able to mitigate.... However, the direct 
purchaser should be under a duty to prove that he will not be unjustly enriched by 
identifying all customers to whom he has passed on his potential loss caused by the 
infringer and to notify these indirect purchasers so that their claims against the 
direct purchaser may be joined to the direct purchaser's claim. In this way, the 
Court can either order damages to be paid by an infringer by reference to the direct 
loss proved to have been caused by the infringement for each class of purchasers, or 
the whole loss could be ordered to be paid to the direct purchasers, with a second 
order requiring the direct purchaser to meet the claims of the indirect 
purchasers. s208 
205 Ibid., at Para 37; Devenish Nutrition Limited v. Sanofi-Aventis SA (France) and others, Case 
A3/2008/0080, [2008]EWCA Civ 1086, para147. See section 4.5.2 which deals with rationale of 
permitting passing on defence. 
06 OFT 916, supra note 95, pp. 37-39. 
207 Ibid., p. 4. 
20S Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 at p. 24 of the UK report. This is the `second model' that I 
discuss towards the end of the Korea section. 
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This is an interesting idea because in this way the defendant would 
compensate the direct purchasers for all losses that have occurred and then the 
direct purchasers would compensate the indirect purchaser for the damage they 
suffered. Thus, real victims such as indirect purchasers would be compensated 
through the court's second order. 
5.6 Conclusion on the application of the Indirect Purchaser Actions 
in Korea 
It has been see from the discussion in this Chapter whether to permit indirect 
purchasers actions or not is closely related to both public policy goals such as 
ensuring fair and just compensation and effective and efficient enforcement through 
redressing indirect purchaser loss. 
If all indirect purchasers brought damages actions, there would be a number 
of complications in ascertaining, apportioning and distributing the loss resulting 
from the infringement. 
To avoid these problems and to ensure effective enforcement, in Hanover 
Shoe case, the US Supreme Court prohibited passing on defence. To prevent 
multiple liabilities, the Supreme Court later decided that denying passing defence 
entailed prohibiting the passing on offence, i. e. indirect purchaser actions. However, 
it has been strongly argued that there is insufficient compensation and deterrence in 
the US because of Hanover Shoe209 and Illinois Brick-210 decisions. 
Therefore, it is necessary to determine the appropriate balance that should be 
achieved in Korea between fairness (by providing the right of any individual to 
claim damage) and effectiveness by paying close attention to the experience in the 
Us. 
209 Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U. S 481(1968). 
210 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U. S. 720(1977) 
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As I already mentioned above, 211 it is not easy for indirect purchasers such as 
consumers to bring damages actions because the chain of victims can be very long 
and the damage of indirect purchasers can be small and disperse. However, it is 
submitted that effective and efficient private damage actions must provide a remedy 
for the all victim of the anticompetitive conduct because the more indirect 
purchasers bring damages actions, the more effective the competition system will 
be. Damages actions for indirect purchasers against the infringements of 
competition law have also a strong fairness aspect through compensating real 
victims for damage. Any right of actions for damage must be shaped to ensure the 
remedy for indirect purchasers such as consumer in order to avoid the danger of 
significant injustice. 212 As I already discussed, 213 there is no valid reason in 
principle to deny compensation to indirect purchasers. 
If indirect purchasers' actions were not allowed in Korea, it does not 
correspond to the principle of full and just compensation under civil law and 
competition law in Korea because the damaged party would have no redress in 
damages. Even if there have been no cases in which the Korean courts ever 
accepted this position there is no reason why indirect purchasers should not benefit 
from actions for damages. If the indirect purchasers are able to prove that the 
damage has been passed on to them indirect purchasers should have the right to 
bring damages action. Therefore, to ensure full and just compensation, it is 
submitted that no limitation should be placed on the categories of persons who can 
recover damages. Indirect purchasers could include competitors, consumer or 
other market participants that participated in the infringement but suffered loss. The 
only limit should be that those who entitled to recover must be persons with 
damage caused by anticompetitive conduct. 
Given the above reasons of full compensation, protection of consumers' 
interests and ensuring efficient and effective enforcement, it is highly probable that 
Korea will recognize indirect purchaser actions under the rules of damages of the 
211 See section 5.2.3 which deals with rationale of decision of Illinois Brick. 
212 William H. Page, "Policy Choices in Defining the Measure of Antitrust Damages", DAF/COMP/WP3, 
2006, p. 5. 
213 See section 5.3.2 which deals with principles of permitting indirect purchaser actions in Korea. 
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competition law and civil law. 
". Recognizing indirect litigation would confer a significant advantage over the 
US system because in the US indirect purchasers such as final consumers are not 
entitled to seek damages, at least before the federal courts. 
If indirect purchaser actions are allowed, it is necessary to decide how to 
measure the effects of the overcharge along the distribution chain. In respect to 
indirect purchaser actions, there is a high probability that it is difficult to calculate 
the amount of damage of indirect purchasers especially, when their damage is small 
and diffused. However, what seems inappropriate'is the rule that limits the right of 
indirect purchaser on the assumption that identifying the effects further down the 
distribution chain is always complicated and inaccurate. 214 With the availability of 
sophisticated econometrics and statistical analyses and the growing familiarity and 
acceptance of these techniques by the courts, it is not too difficult to calculate the 
amount of damage even if is small and dispersed. To ameliorate the difficulty of 
quantification of damage, specific rules for allocating recoveries between direct and 
indirect purchasers must be enacted to streamline probably complicated process. 
These rules should be based on fairness and efficiency in compensating victims and 
remedying wrongs in predictable ways. 
As I already explained, 215 however, victims will rarely, if ever, bring a 
damage action individually when they have suffered scattered and small damage. In 
order to avoid these victims remaining uncompensated, the burden of proof in 
respect to passed on damage should always lie-with the defendant. It is worth 
considering that European Commission's White Paper recognized presumption that 
the overcharge has been passed on in its entirety to their level. 216 
In order to avoid these victims remaining uncompensated, it is also necessary 
to ensure mechanism of consolidation of the numerous claims for damages. If 
214 Carlo Petrucci, supra note 25, pp. 36-37. 
215 See section 5.2.3 which deals with rationale of decision of Illinois Brick. 216 White Paper on Damages actions, supra note 137, at section 2.6; See also section 5.4.2 which deals 
with desirability of permitting indirect purchaser litigation in the EU. 
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indirect purchaser actions were consolidated and shown to be capable of being 
managed and heard without undue complexity, it is beneficial to public interests 
such as the consumer interest. This approach corresponds best to the deterrent 
function as well as compensatory function of the damages actions. 217 
217 In respect to group actions, see Chapter 6 which deals with group actions. 
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Chapter 6. Group Actions 
6.1 Overview of Group Actions 
6.1.1 Introduction of Group Actions 
In a mass producing and consuming society, anticompetitive conduct can 
result in a great many natural or legal persons suffering some loss because one 
product or service can cause loss to a large number of natural or legal persons. 
Many individuals, especially those whose losses are small can be discouraged from 
going to court because they believe the process is too difficult or because the 
potential costs outweigh their own individual loss even though the aggregate loss to 
consumers or business at large may be very significant. ' Thus, some mechanisms 
such as group actions are necessary. Group actions can improve the situation of the 
plaintiffs by making the cost /benefit analysis of the litigation more attractive by 
reducing the costs and sharing the evidence. Economies of scale may be realized 
when claims are aggregated, both for the courts and litigants since a single judge 
can consider all of the issues and litigants' average costs of representation will 
decrease as the number of fellow plaintiffs' increases? Competition law is a field 
where group actions can significantly enhance the victims' ability to access to 
justice and obtain compensation. ' 
Group actions are particularly valuable in the protection of consumers' 
interests, particularly in relation to indirect purchasers' claims (subject to satisfying 
the requirements of causation and remoteness)5 by embracing a whole class of 
1The Office of Fair Trading, "Private Actions in Competition Law: Effective Redress for Consumes and 
Business", OFT916,2007, p. 13; See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note (suggesting 
that a class action is appropriate when "the amounts at stake for individuals are so small that separate suits 
are impracticable"); Richard Posner, "Economic Analysis of Law", (5th ed. ), 1998, p. 626 (noting that the 
class action is "most needed" when "the individual claim is very small"). 
2 Rainer Becker, Nicolas Bessot and Eddy De Smijter, "The White Paper on damages actions for breach 
of the EC antitrust rules", European Commission Newsletter, ISSN 1025-2266,2008, p. 7. 
3 OFT 916, supra note 1, p. 21. 4 European Commission, "Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules", SEC (2008) 404, p. 4. 
s For instance, in Korean law, remoteness appears generally to constitute some combination of the 
directness and foreseeability of the damage caused. Foreseeability appears to limit liability on the basis of 
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interested persons and ensuring a fair and equal allocation of rights or burdens. 6 
Therefore, it can be argued that to protect consumers' interests, the various group 
actions rules and procedures have to be addressed in order to provide properly for 
any damages actions by consumers. 
Furthermore, the threat of group action liability may provide a powerful 
deterrent effect that can offer widespread benefits because group actions allow 
more than just a small number of victims to bring damages action.? Where there 
are group actions procedures, a competition infringer cannot believe that the 
anticompetitive effects of its conduct are so diffuse that no one would bring a 
damages actions. 8 
In this chapter, I will discuss group actions to encourage private enforcement 
in the US, Korea, EU and UK. 
6.1.2 Definition of Group Actions 
There are many different kinds of group actions such as class, representative, 
collective, and joint actions. However, according to the Ashurst Report, the study 
on damages actions prepared for the European Commission in 20049 group actions 
can be defined as below. 
Class actions can be defined as a civil court procedure under which one party, 
the predictability of certain aspects of the damage caused by the defendant such as the (type of) damage 
or the extent of the damage. 
6 Romanian Competition Council, "Public consultation on the Green Paper-Damages actions for breach 
of the EC antitrust rules", Position of the Romanian Competition Council, 2006, p. 11; Neelie Kroes, 
"Reinforcing the fight against cartels and developing private antitrust damage actions : two tools for a 
more competitive Europe", Commission/IBA Joint Conference on EC Competition Policy, Speech/07/128, 
Brussels, 2007, available at http: //europa. eu. 
Paul Friedman, David Gelfand and Christina Nordlander, etc., "Comments of the Section of Antitrust 
Law and the Section of International Law of the American Bar Association in Response to the Request for 
Public Comment of the Commission of the European Communities On Damage Actions for Breaches of 
EU Antitrust Rules", ABA, 2006, p. 45. 
John H. Beisner, Charles E. Borden, "Expending Private Cause of Action: Lessons from the US 
Litigation Experience", presented at The Trans-Atlantic Challenge: Diverging approaches to regulatory 
and legal reform in the Untied States and Europe, Brussel, 2005, p. 22. 
9 Ashurst Report, "Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC 
competition rules", 2004, p. 43. 
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or a group of parties, may bring actions as representatives of a larger class of 
unidentified individuals. '0 
Representative actions can be defined as claims made by, or defended by, a 
representative or representative organization on behalf of a group of individuals 
who may, or may not, be individually named in a situation where an individual 
would have a direct cause of action. " There are two types of representative action. 
One is where one plaintiff brings the action as the representative of the group and 
the other is where an organization, firm etc brings an action on behalf of the 
group. 12 
Collective actions can be defined as single claim brought on behalf of a group 
of identified/identifiable individuals. Any award resulting from the action will be 
made to the group as whole. 13 
Joint actions can be defined as set of claims brought by several plaintiffs 
together or joined by the judge hearing the claims due to some link between them 
(e. g. the same defendant, damages resulting from same facts). This type of action 
differs from other group actions because each group litigant is a member of a 
procedural class as a party, rather than as a represented non-party. Although a 
single judgment may be made covering the cases of all the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs' 
claims will be treated separately within that judgment and awards will be made 
individually to the different plaintiffs. '4 
Above all, although group actions are different each other in some points, 
these actions may be available when plaintiffs are pursuing a common defendant 
and pursue the same remedy. In respect to these group actions, there are two types 
of standing. The one is an opt-in system and the other is an opt-out system. 
10 Ibid. ; Andrew Lockley, "Regulating Group Actions", 139 New L. J. 798,1989 available in LEXIS, 
UKJNL Library, NLJ File. 
Ashurst Report, supra note 9, p. 43 
12 For example, see UK Competition Act 1998 s 47B. 
13 Ashurst Report, supra note 9, p. 43. 14 Ibid. 
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An opt out system is where the class member is bound by the resolution of 
the class actions unless a class member choose to opt out of the class., 5 Members of 
the class may exclude themselves from the proceedings if they expressly opt-out. 
Only the class members who opt out are not bound by the judgment in the case. 
This opt-out system allows potentially thousands of plaintiffs to be conscripted into 
class actions unknowingly. 
, The opt-in group action system is where the victims 
have to express their 
intention to be included in the action. 16 The key difference from an opt-out system 
is that an individual must choose to participate and expressly state their intention to 
be included in the action before he (or she) will be included in the group action. 
There is no way for them to be part of the litigation unless they affirmatively 
choose to do so. 
Currently, UK competition law provides for a consumer claim which is an 
opt-in system. However, it is worth noting that the OFT has recommended 
extending the scope of representative actions by permitting actions to be brought on 
behalf of consumers at large (that is, both named and as yet unnamed individuals). 17 
6.1.3 Necessity of Group Actions 
Individuals could be discouraged from going to court because of two main 
reasons. 
First, individual damage is usually small and dispersed, 18 As the US 
is Edward F. Sherman, "American Class Actions: Significant Features and Developing Alternatives in 
Foreign Legal Systems", 215 F. R. D., 2003, p. 146. 
16 R. Becker et al., supra note 2, p. 7. 
17 OFT 916, supra note 1, pp. 19-20. 
'$ Kati J. Cseres, "The impact of Consumer Protection on Competition and Competition law : The Case 
of Deregulated Markets", Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper NO. 2006-0, p. 4; see 
also Sven Norberg, "Some Elements to Enhance Damages Actions for Breach of the Competition Rules in 
Articles 81 and 82 EC", 32"d Annual International Antitrust Law & Policy Conference, Fordham, New 
York, 2005, p. 26; "Private Actions in Competition Law: Effective Redress for Consumes and Business", 
OFT Discussion paper/OFT916,2007, p. 8; John Pheasant, "Private Antitrust Damages in Europe: As the 
policy debate rages, what are the signs of practical progress? ", Business Law International Vo18,2007, 
p. 234; Thomas Lampert and Georg Weidenbach, "Antitrust Litigation in Germany", CLI 4.12(3), 2005, 
p. 3. 
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Supreme Court pointed out in Hanover Shoe, 19 an individual rarely has a sufficient 
interest in bringing damages actions because they would only recover damages 
based on the small amount of overcharge passed on to them. 20 
Second, costs, delays and other burdens involved in ordinary judicial 
proceedings can discourage individuals who suffer a relatively minor economic loss 
from seeking a judgment against undertakings engaging in anticompetitive 
conduct. 21 Usually, competition cases are expensive and involve complex 
argument and/or specialised evidence that is beyond the resources of individuals 
and it is improbable, although not impossible, that the victims can bring damages 
actions without sharing the risks and costs associated with the action. 22 It would 
not be economically efficient for each individual to pursue his (or her) claims 
against the defendant through litigation although the overall aggregate sum might 
be large. 
However, there will be problems in ensuring effective competitive markets if 
competition rules can not be effectively enforced. The crucial issue is that if 
consumers cannot enjoy their rights then business has less incentive to obey the 
rules. Infringers who break the law can escape paying compensation and gain an 
unfair advantage over their fair dealing competitors. 23 
Furthermore, an important principle of access to justice is that potential 
plaintiffs should not be denied access to the courts because they do not have the 
means to litigate. Namely, lack of means should not disqualify potential plaintiffs 
from taking actions. In particular consumers and SMEs24 with small value claims 
19 Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U. S. 481(1968), p. 494; See also section 4.2 
which deals with passing on defence in the US. 
20 Jeremy Lever QC, "Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Rules Substantive Remedies: The 
Viewpoint of an English Lawyer", in rEuropean Competition Law Annual 2001: Effective Private 
Enforcement of EC Antitrust Laws ed. by Claus Dieter Ehlermannn & Isabela Atanasiu, Hart Publishing, 
2003, p. 111. 
Z' European Parliament resolution of 26 March 2009 on the White Paper on damages actions for breach 
of the EC antitrust rules (2008/2154(INI)) at para 4; Paolo Giudici, "Private Antitrust Law Enforcement 
in Italy", I Competition Law Review 61,2004, p. 80-81; Michele Carpagnano, "Private Enforcement of 
Competition Law Arrives in Italy: Analysis of the Judgment of the European Court of Justice in Joined 
Cases C-295-289/04 Manfredi, ", 3(1) The Competition Law Review 47,2006, p. 69; OFT 916, supra note 
1 p. 13. 
Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper, supra note 4, para. 16. 
2' See section 6.1.1 which introduces group actions; See section 5.1 which deals with the Importance of 
indirect purchaser litigation. 
24 As I already noted in section 2.1.2.1 which deals with the role of the KFTC, in Korea, according to 
Article 2, Act on Small and Medium Size Enterprise, an SME is an undertaking with less than 200 
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need better access to justice, and should have the possibility to group their claims. 25 
To enable consumers to bring actions it is therefore widely argued that some 
facilitating instruments such as group actions must be considered. 6 Group actions 
help to address the problems above, particularly given the economies of scale that 
may be realized. 7 Group action procedures could offer significant benefits to the 
litigants and to the judicial system as a whole. 28 
As far as group actions are concerned, however, it is submitted that generally 
speaking, there is also a danger of abuse of litigation because they can encourage 
legal actions by lowering cost and raising benefit. - For instance, as I discuss below, 
the US has significant problem of abuse of litigation caused by strong incentives to 
litigate such as opt-out class actions. 29 However, these problems are not limited to 
the US. There is a possibility that other jurisdictions such as Korea could also 
develop problems such as abuse of litigation. Thus, it is desirable to keep a balance 
between encouraging legal actions and preventing abuse of litigation. The key 
question is how to improve access of justice and to avoid imposing unnecessary 
costs on potential defendants and the judicial system. It is important to design 
specific features in order to serve as effective safeguards against misuse of group 
actions. 
employees. For the definition of an SME in the EU see Commission Recommendation of 06/05/2003 on 
the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises [2003] OJ L 124. 
u Sweet & Maxwell Limited and Contributors, "Commission Presents Paper on Compensating Victims 
of Competition Breaches", EU Focus 231,2008, p. 2. 
21 R. Becker et al., supra note 2, p. 7; Antonio Capobianco, "Civil Actions---Europe---Private Antitrust 
Enforcement of EC Competition Rules: Recent Development", CLI 25(3), 2004, p. 5; "Comments of the 
Section of Antitrust Law and the Section of International Law of the American Bar Association in 
Response to the Request for Public Comment of the Commission of the European Communities On 
Damage Actions for Breaches of EU Antitrust Rules", April, 2006, p. 53-54; Clifford A. Jones, "Private 
Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: A Policy Analysis and Reality Check", 27(1) World Competition 13, 
2004, p. 15. 
27 OFT 916, supra note 1, p. 13. 
28 See generally, Stephen Calkins, An Enforcement Official's Reflections on Antitrust Class Actions, 39 
Ariz. L. Rev. 413,1997, p. 437-445. 
2' See section 6.5.2 which deals with problems created by the class actions in the US. 
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6.2 Group Actions in Korea 
6.2.1 Overview of Consumer Policy and Current Situation of 
Group Actions in Korea 
6.2.1.1 Overview of Consumer Policy in the KFTC 
Since the development period of the 1960s and 1970s, Korea has pursued a 
`producer-oriented economic policy' of supporting and fostering various industries 
under the leadership of the government. 30 Meanwhile, consumer policy has only 
been recognized as a collateral part of the industrial policies, and has been mostly 
focused on ex-post remedies for consumer damage. However, there has been a need 
to transform consumer policy in order to recognize consumers not as subjects of 
protection but as independent and responsible market players. This is because, with 
the growth of the economy, the role of consumers as the final judge of the 
competition among producers has increased. This is a result of the change in 
Korea's economic growth pattern from development reliant on government support 
to development driven by market efficiency. 
In the light of the need of the changed role of consumers, the consumer 
policy paradigm has shifted from approaching consumer issues from regulatory 
perspective to approaching problems within the framework of market principles 
with an emphasis on consumer rights. It is necessary to create a market 
environment where consumers can make reasonable purchases with increased 
capacity. 31 
As I have already discussed in Chapter 1, the competition law system has 
been seen as an integrated system of consumer law system and the common aim of 
competition law and consumer law is to ensure consumer welfare. 32 
6.2.1.2 Current Situation of Group Actions in Korea 
The prevailing civil redress procedures are based on an individual system -a 
30 See section 2.1.1 which deals with competition culture 'and private competition enforcement in 
Korea; See also Section 1.2.2.1 which deals with objectives of competition law in Korea. 
31 KFTC Annual Report 2008,2009, p. 322. 
32 See section 1.2.2.1 which deals with objectives of competition law in Korea 
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victory for one plaintiff does not apply to others similarly affected. Any judgment 
obtained can only be enforced against a person who is a direct party to the 
proceedings. They can be individually reimbursed for a wrong done to them. 3 The 
principal Korean jurisdiction has traditionally avoided US class actions as described 
in section 6.4. However, Civil Procedural Law has already provided for joint 
actions. These actions allow individuals to band together to claim damages where it 
would not be cost-effective for each to pursue their own. They are litigation brought 
jointly by two or more individuals who have common interests and are pursuing the 
same remedy However, joint actions, are not usually suitable for numerous 
consumers because these actions are not treated as an entity. With joint actions 
individuals obtain compensation individually even if each action is joined to 
proceed together. In the absence of group action mechanisms such as representative 
or class actions, consumers are not able to bring damages actions to recover 
damages which may be individually minor but collectively major. In particular, 
competition damages actions may need complex analysis by economic experts, 
which could result in legal actions being very costly. It is unlikely that legal or 
natural persons with small claims would bring damages actions for breach of 
competition law without group actions. 
Given competition cases need often complex economic analysis which could 
increase litigation costs, it is worth considering the cost rules in group actions. The 
basic Korean costs rule under civil actions is the upfront and loser pays rules. 34 
Under the upfront and loser pays rules, each party has to pay its legal costs and the 
losing party has to bear not only its own but also the costs of the other party. The 
winning party will recover a substantial part of its costs of perhaps hundreds of 
thousands of Wons. 35 This rule is applied to all forms of civil proceedings, not just 
competition litigation. 36 This differs from the situation in the US, where in antitrust 
cases there is a special rule that enables plaintiffs to get their costs if they win the 
action but are not required to pay the defendants' costs even if the action is 
successfully defended. This is called the one-way cost rule. In Korea, this one-way 
33 Civil Law 750(Damages actions for illegal behaviour) 
34 Civil Procedure Law 98(Principle of litigation cost) 
35 Won is Korean Currency. £1 42,023Won(at July 31,2009) 
36 Civil Procedure Law 98(Principle of litigation cost) 
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cost rule and contingent fee arrangements providing for the lawyers representing a 
plaintiff to receive a proportion of the damages awarded are not permitted. 
In Korea, the right to act collectively in response to a power-wielding 
commercial player has been recognized. For instance, Korea passed the Securities 
Class Action Law in 2004, which provides for class actions for damages by 
shareholders to prevent illegal activity such as stock price manipulation. Under the 
Securities Class Action Law a large number of shareholders are treated as an entity 
when bringing damages actions against the illegal practices of a stock-issuing 
company. 37 Any shareholders who suffered financially can bring actions against 
illegal practices in financial market. The shareholders concerned have to be 
identified. The award resulting from any such action can be made to person who 
brought the action. 38 
6.2.2 Competition Group Actions in Korea 
In order to defend consumer interests in the competition area, the KFTC 
made provision for group actions which has been adopted by the legislature on 
January 1 2007 under the Consumer Fundamental Act. Under Article 70 of the 
Consumer Fundamental Act, consumer protection bodies such as consumer 
organizations can bring a group action on behalf of consumers with similar 
interests. 39 It is a representative action because only representative organizations 
such as a consumer organization can bring actions. It is submitted that these actions 
are advantageous to consumers because of their group strength, knowledge and 
expertise. These consumer actions will be useful in cases where the wider public 
has been harmed by infringers because the sum of the individual consumers' 
damage may be substantial. 
A representative action system can only operate successfully if the bodies 
permitted to bring such actions are credible and reputable. According to this Act, to 
pursue a claim, a body should be established specifically subject to appropriate 
37 Securities Class Action Law 2. 
38 Securities Class Action Law 39-43. 
39 Consumer Fundamental Law 70 
251 
safeguards and should be required to meet objective, transparent and non- 
discriminatory requirements. 40 The criteria for designation are good reputation for 
the well-being of consumers and the ability to handle a case. Designated bodies 
should be required to seek approval from the court before formally bringing a 
representative action. 41 Only pre-approved entities are capable of initiating such 
group actions. The courts should decide in each case whether a consumer 
organisation is suitable to bring representative actions, based on criteria set out in 
legislation. 42 The reason that Korean law provides for representative actions is the 
recognition that expert organizations such as consumer organizations will more 
readily start legal actions against competition law infringers than individual 
consumers or small businesses. However, to ensure that the public interest as well 
as the individual interest is served, only non-profit making organization such as a 
consumer association can bring representative actions. 43 
As far as group actions are concerned, the key question is why Korea adopted 
representative actions not class actions. It is worth considering the difference 
between Korean representative actions and US class actions because the US has a 
long history of class actions. 44 Korean representative actions and US class actions 
share common essential features because each makes available remedies to a 
number of litigants with a common loss against a common infringer in 
circumstances where there are questions of fact and/or law common to all the 
individual claims. However, the Korean representative actions differ from the US 
class actions. The substantial difference is that a representative action is brought by 
a body authorised to bring a representative claim based on pre-determined criteria 
and does not allow opt-out arrangements such as in US class actions . 
4S In Korea, 
the members of representative actions must be individually named whereas in the 
US, class actions are opt-out arrangements. Owing to this opt-out arrangement, the 
US class action can be unmanageable because it can include very large numbers of 
40 Consumer Fundamental Law 70 
41 Consumer Fundamental Law 73 
42 Consumer Fundamental Law 74 
43 Consumer Fundamental Law 70 
44 I will discuss US class actions in section 6.5. 
45 As I already discussed, an opt-out arrangement is the system under which all potential plaintiffs are 
included unless they expressly opt out: See section 6.1 which defines opt -out system. 
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class-members. 46 The management of large numbers of plaintiffs in the same 
action has to be a paramount aim of any mechanism in any kind of group actions. If 
the action becomes unmanageable, it loses its superiority to individual actions. 7 In 
terms of manageability, by involving an organizationally strong association and by 
adopting an opt-in mechanism, the Korean representative action could avoid the 
obvious risk of making group actions unmanageable such as US class actions by 
allowing opt-in representative actions. However, it can be argued that opt-in actions 
are simply not as effective as opt-out systems because there is no perfect way to 
notify every victim of the suit. Furthermore, opt-in collective action can make the 
litigation complex by requiring the identification of the plaintiffs and the specific 
harm suffered. An opt-out collective action can be more efficient in terms of 
corrective justice and deterrence by including a wide number of victims. 
One of the most important points to note about the Consumer Fundamental 
Act is that it limits the remedies in representative actions to those dealing with the 
defendant's conduct, such as injunctive relief and does not include monetary claims. 
Injunctive relief provides an efficient means of ensuring the maintenance of a 
competitive market insofar as it provides private litigants with the opportunity to 
put a stop to ongoing harms of anticompetitive conduct. Injunctive relief allows a 
legitimately threatened party to compel adherence to the competition laws. 
However, victims of anticompetitive conduct can have financial compensation only 
if they can bring civil damages actions. If representative actions do not allow for 
compensation in the form of damages, individuals or SMEs will not normally 
obtain compensation because, as discussed above, 48 their damage is usually too 
small to bring damages actions individually. Therefore, it is submitted that it. is 
necessary for Korean representative actions to provide for damages actions as well 
as injunctive relief because only the courts, not the competition authorities can 
order compensation. If damages actions are allowed, there is a possibility many 
private parties bring damages actions for monetary gain. 
Moreover, alongside representative actions, it is submitted that in order to 
41 John H. Beisner and Charles E. Borden, supra note 8, p. 5. " Sullivan, L. A., "Handbook of the Law of Antitrust", St. Paul, 1977, p. 779. 43 See section 6.1.3 which deals with necessity of group actions. 
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protect the consumer interest, it would be desirable for the empowered consumer 
body to also have power to complain to the KFTC. At present the Consumer 
Fundamental Act does not provide for a consumer body's right to complain to the 
KFTC. 
6.3 Group Actions in the EU 
6.3.1 Overview of Group Actions in the EU 
It is now generally accepted that it is unlikely that the modernisation of EC 
competition law 49 will encourage private damages actions unless potential 
plaintiffs such as consumers can seek redress for damages suffered. The European 
Commission has recognized the necessity of group actions for small-value claims 
arising from breaches of competition law by consolidating a large number of 
smaller claims into one action. 
The European Commission noted in its Green Paper and White Paper on 
Damages Actions50 that small-value claims arising from breaches of competition 
law were most unlikely to be brought, and hence, "collective actions can serve to 
consolidate a large number of smaller claims into one action". 51 
Within the EU, however, there are different approaches amongst the Member 
States towards how to handle multiple plaintiff cases, and some Member States of 
the EU recognize multi-party legal actions such as representative actions. Different 
procedural rules of EU Member States' and the lack of general mechanisms to solve 
these discrepancies can be a crucial obstacle to development of private enforcement 
in the EU. An efficient and consistent system for bringing group actions is required 
to facilitate damages claims for breach of competition law. 
Given that group action can contribute to public interests such as the 
consumer interest through improving access to courts, it is desirable national courts 
to be encouraged to use group actions mechanism under national law at their 
49 See section 2.2.3 which deals with substantial changes to encourage private enforcement in the EU. 
50 See section 2.2.3 which deals with Green Paper and White Paper on damages actions in the EU. 
51 European Commission, "Green Paper - Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules", COM 
(2005) 672 final, at section 2.5. 
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disposal in order to achieve optimal enforcement. 
US style class actions, however, are not common in the legal systems of the 
Member States of the EU. 52 Nor are they generally envisaged. 53 There has 
traditionally been a strong suspicion of US class actions because of the perception 
that US class actions produce undesirable consequences, such as abuse of litigation 
as discussed above. 54 Furthermore, within the EU, there are different approaches 
among the Member States towards the handling of multiple plaintiff cases. The 
Commission considers that discrepancies in the EU Member States' procedural 
rules and the general lack of mechanisms permitting group actions may weaken EU 
consumers' rights which the law is intended to protect from anticompetitive acts, 
and endanger a more level playing field for businesses. SS These results have been 
further exacerbated by the decentralised enforcement of EC competition law under 
the Modernization Regulation, Regulation 1/2003.56 
Thus, the Commission has argued that a more efficient system for bringing 
group actions is required because "facilitating damages claims for breach of 
competition law will not only make it easier for consumers and firms who have suf- 
fered damages ... to recover their losses from the infringer but also strengthen the 
enforcement of competition law. s57 
52 John H. Beisner, Charles E. Borden, supra note 8, p. 4-6; John Pheasant, "Private Antitrust Damages in 
Europe: The Policy Debate and Judicial Developments", Antitrust, Fall 2006, p. 61; Christopher Hodges, 
"Multi-Party Actions: A European Approach", 11 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 321,2001, p. 346-347 
("Europe neither needs nor wishes to import U. S. -style class action litigation, representing huge, 
avoidable, and unnecessary cost which distorts the economy ... "). 53 See, e. g., Edward F. Sherman, supra note 15, p. 131 ("Most European countries eschewed American 
class action practice until quite recently, although some had distinctive procedures permitting expanded 
standing and aggregation through `group litigation. "'); see also Christopher Hodges, supra note 52, p. 327 
("The first factual observation is that it is only recently that some European jurisdictions have introduced 
a rule of court procedure on the recognition or management of multi-party actions. "); For an overview of 
the US experience on antitrust class actions see C. G. Lang, "Class Actions and the US Antitrust Laws: 
Prerequisites and Interdependence of the Implementation of a Procedural Device for the Aggregation of 
Low-Value Claims", 24(2) World Competition, 2001, P 285. 
sa From 1984 through 2003, the costs of the tort system had increased by 367%, from $67 billion" to 
$246 billion. Tort costs represented only 0.6% of America's gross domestic product ("GDP") in 1950, 
1.3% of GDP in 1970,54 and more than 2% of GDP by 2001, U. S. Tort Costs: 2004 Update, p. 2 (showing 
the average annual increase in tort systems cost); Christopher Hodges, "Europeanization of Civil Justice: 
Trends and Issues", Civil Justice Quarterly, 2007, p. 117-118. 
55 Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper, supra note 4, Chapter 2(Standing: 
Indirect purchasers and Collective Redress). 
56 Reg. 1/2003 [2003] OJ LI/1. 
s" European Commission's "Green Paper"( COM (2005) 672 final), supra note 51, n 2. 
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The ECJ has never objected to national rules providing for such collective 
rights of action. The possibility of consumer group actions was first raised in the 
EU context in a Commission paper of 1984.58 The Commission concluded in this 
paper that it was not possible to propose binding harmonisation of national 
mechanisms on collective actions, since there was too much complexity and 
diversity amongst the national systems. 59 
In 1998, the EU issued the `European Directive on Injunctions for the 
Protection of Consumers' Interests' (the `Injunctions Directive') which required all 
member nations to adopt laws which provides for the qualified entities to bring 
actions for injunctions to protect the `collective interest' of consumers by the end of 
2000.60 This Directive, 98/27 on consumer injunctions, established the right to 
bring actions by qualified entities. It provided that certain consumer associations or 
independent public bodies such as administrative agencies responsible for 
protecting the collective interests of consumers should be granted the authority to 
bring actions on behalf of a specifically defined group of citizens. The citizens of 
EU Member State can seek injunctions through qualified entities61 with respect to 
infringements of national law provisions implementing certain EC consumer 
protection directives in another Member State. Given the prior absence of 
representative actions in the EU, generally, this directive represented a significant 
break with past practice. This directive, however, did not mandate the creation of 
US style class action laws. 
As far as private competition actions are concerned, the European 
Commission has endorsed the use of collective litigation procedures. It signalled its 
5 European Commissions, "Memorandum from the Commission: Consumer redress", COM (84)692, 
1984; see also "Supplementary Communication from the Commission on Consumer Redress", COM 
(87)210, May 7,1987; Council Resolution of June 25,1987 on consumer redress, [1987] O. J. C176/2. 
9 Memorandum from the Commission, supra note 58. 60 Directive 98/27/EC on Injunctions for the Protection of Consumers' Interests 1998 O. J. L 166/51 (May 
19,1998), available online at http: //europa. eu. int/comni/consumers/policy/developments/ acce_just/ acce 
Regulations 
The Directive was implemented in the UK by the Stop Now Orders (EC Directive) 
Regulations SI 2001/1422, replaced by the Enterprise Act 2002 s 217. 
61 Directive 98/27/EC on Injunctions for the Protection of Consumers' Interests 1998 O. J. L 166/51 (May 
19,1998), Article 4. 
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interest in introducing group actions mechanism across the EU. 62 The Commission 
observed that if private enforcement were to be effective in advancing consumer 
interests, then consumers must have access to some form of representative or 
collective procedure to bring private actions. The Commission referred to the 
Opinion of A. G. Jacobs in the Osterreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund case where he 
states: 
"Collective rights of action are an equally common feature of modern judicial 
systems. They are mostly encountered in areas such as consumer protection, labour 
law, unfair competition law or protection of the environment. The law grants 
associations or other representative bodies the right to bring cases either in the 
interest of persons which they represent or in the public interest. This furthers 
private enforcement of rules adopted in the public interest and supports individual 
complainants who are often badly equipped to face well-organized and financially 
stronger opponents". 63 
In the Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the Green Paper, the 
European Commission expressed an interest in facilitating the enforcement of 
individuals' legal rights as a means of "bringing European citizens and their 
associations closer to European laws and policies". 64 
According to the Green Paper, "It will be very unlikely for practical reasons, 
if not impossible, that consumers and purchasers with small claims will bring an 
action for damages for breach of antitrust law. Consideration should therefore be 
given to ways in which these interests can be better protected by collective actions. 
Beyond the specific protection of consumer interests, collective actions can serve to 
consolidate a large number of smaller claims into one action, thereby saving time 
and money. "65 
62 Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper, supra note 4, pp. 13-14. 
63 Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund v Austria, Case C-195/98, [2000] ECR 1-10497 at para 47. 
64 European Commission, "Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the Green Paper - Damages 
Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules", SEC (2005) 1732 final para. 194. 
65 See Green Paper-Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM (2005) 672 final at 2.5. 
The genesis of the EU's Green Paper was that individuals who have suffered a loss arising from an 
infringement of the competition provisions of articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty have a right to claim 
damages. 
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The Commission's effort to encouraging private actions has been 
strengthened by a 2006 survey which found that 74 % of Europeans would be more 
willing to defend their rights in court if they could join with other consumers who 
were complaining about the same thing. 66 
Speaking in Brussels in March 2007, Commissioner Kroes also indicated that 
the proposals on private enforcement were about protecting "customers and 
consumers, the small business and individual citizens who foot the bill of illegal 
behaviour" 67 
Most of all, in the White Paper68 on damages actions which resulted from the 
Green Paper and the Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White 
Paper, 69 the European Commission recognizes that the development of a 
framework for group actions is necessary in establishing a system of private 
enforcement. Given, it is desirable to achieve optimal enforcement of group actions, 
it is worth noting that the White Paper says that: 
"In case of joint, parallel or consecutive actions brought by purchasers at 
different levels in the distribution chain, national courts are encouraged to use 
whatever mechanism under national or Community law at their disposal in order to 
avoid under- or over-compensation of the harm caused by a competition law 
"70 infringement. 
The Commission has abandoned ideas of US-style class actions, opting 
instead for `representative actions', to be brought by qualified entities, such as 
consumer associations, and opt-in collective actions "in which victims expressly 
66 Eurobarometer Special Report 252, "Consumer Protection in the Internal Market", European 
Commission, 2006, QB28.5 (available at europa. eu. int/rapid/cgi/rapcgi. ksh). It is worth considering that 
this report notes that since Greeks are those who most regard resolving a consumer dispute in court as 
easy (51 %), it is not surprising that 86 % of them would be willing to assert their claims in a joint action. 67 Neelie Kroes's speech/07/128, supra note 6. 
68 European Commission, "White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules", Com 
J2008) 165 final, section 2.1. 
9 Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper, supra note 4, chapter 2 (Standing: 
Indirect purchasers and Collective Redress). 
70 Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper, supra note 4, p. 69. 
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decided to combine their individual claims for harm they suffered into one single 
action". 71 
The European Commission envisages representative actions could be used 
where, for example, individuals or small businesses do not have the time or 
resources to start an action of their own or for commercial reasons are reluctant to 
bring an action against a trading partner. 
6.3.2 Two Types of Collective Redress Mechanism in White 
Paper 
In the White Paper, it recognizes that the development of a framework for 
group actions is necessary in establishing a system of private enforcement. The 
White Paper is proposing useful criteria for group actions. The Commission 
suggests two types of collective redress mechanism to encourage actions for the 
victims such as consumers or SMEs that otherwise be unable or unwilling to seek 
compensation given the costs, uncertainties, risks and burdens involved. 
6.3.2.1 Opt-In Collective Actions 
As I already explained, an opt-in collective action combines in one single 
action the claims from those individuals or businesses who have expressed their 
intention to be included in the action. 72 Such a system can improve the situation of 
the plaintiffs by making cost low and raising benefit high by sharing the evidence 
and costs. However, opt-in collective action can make the litigation complex by 
requiring the identification of the plaintiffs and the specific harm suffered. An opt- 
out collective action can be more efficient in -terms of corrective justice and 
deterrence by including a wide number of victims. The crucial problem of opt-out 
collective action, however, it can lead to excesses as discussed above in respect of 
the US. 73 In the White Paper, the European Commission suggests an opt-in 
71 Ibid. at paras. 41,51,59 ; White Paper on Damages actions, supra note 68, p. 4 72 See section 6.1.2 which deals with definition of group actions. 73 R. Becker et al., supra note 2, p. 7. 
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collective action. 74 It is submitted that these mechanisms which are not combined 
with US style one-way cost rule and other features of the US system are preferable 
to the US class actions because they can avoid crucial problems such as abuse of 
litigation and unmanageability. To avoid abuse of litigation, the European 
Commission considered that opt-in collective actions are more appropriate than opt- 
out collective actions since opt-out actions in other jurisdiction have been perceived 
to lead to excesses. 75 
6.3.2.2 Representative Actions by Qualified Entities 
As I already explained, a representative action for damage is an action 
brought on behalf of two or more individuals or businesses who are not themselves 
parties to the action. 76 The European Commission suggests that a representative 
action can be brought by two different types of qualified entities. 77 
The first type is the actions by qualified entities covering entities such as 
consumer organizations, trade association or state bodies representing legitimate 
and defined interests which are officially designated in advance by their Member 
Sates to bring representative actions for damages. 78 
The second type of qualified entities covers-entities which are certified on an 
ad hoc basis by a Member States to bring an action on behalf of some or all of their 
members only. 79 Eligibility is limited to entities whose primary task is to protect 
the defined interests of their members other than pursuing damages claims. In order 
to be designated, i. e. `endorsed' by their Member State, these qualified entities need 
to meet specific criteria set in the law. 
It has been argued by Commission officials that these two suggestions (opt-in 
" White Paper on Damages actions, supra note 68, at section 2.1. 
's Rainer Becker, Nicolas Bessot and Eddy De Smijter, "The White Paper on damages actions for breach 
of the EC antitrust rules", European Commission Newsletter, ISSN 1025-2266,2008, p. 7. 
76 See section 6.1.2 which deals with definition of representative actions. 
77 European Commission, "White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules", Com 
(2008) 165 final, section 2.1. 
3 White Paper on Damages actions, supra note 68, section 2.1. 
71 Ibid. 
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and representative collective action) can improve the victim's ability to effectively 
enforce their right to damages. Since these two complementary collective redress 
mechanisms can constitute a set of solutions that will significantly improve the 
victims' ability to effectively enforce their right to damages. 80 
6.4. Group Actions in the UK 
6.4.1 Overview of Group Actions in the UK 
As in Korea, indirect purchasers, such as individual consumers are unlikely to 
bring actions because individuals and small companies can face numerous potential 
difficulties in bringing actions before the English courts. Therefore, it is worth 
considering group actions as useful method to encourage these plaintiffs (in English 
law called plaintiffs) to bring actions. 
In England, 81 there are at present three ways in which the general civil 
procedure rules allow for some kind of collective action to be brought. 
First, the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) provide for the consolidation of a 
number of individual actions into one set of proceedings. 82 The consolidated claims 
are treated as if they were one single action with multiple parties joined to it. The 
court can also direct that two or more claims should be tried on the same 
occasion. 83 
Secondly, a number of parties can be joined to a single set of proceedings84 
but it is also possible for one named party ('the representative') to prosecute or to 
defend an action on both his own behalf and on behalf of a class of individuals. " 
This is a type of `representative action'. However, it is important to note that the 
80 Rainer Becker, Nicolas Bessot and Eddy De Smijter, "The White Paper on damages actions for breach 
of the EC antitrust rules", European Commission Newsletter, ISSN 1025-2266,2008, p. 8. 
111 References to England include England and Wales. In Scotland and Northern Ireland, different 
pZrocedural and substantive rules are applied. 
CPR 3.1(2)(g). 
83 CPR 3.1(2)(h). 
sa CPR 19.1. 
85 CPR 19.6(1). 
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representative must have the same interest in the litigation as the individuals who 
are represented. 86 The provision therefore does not allow for a representative action 
to be brought by an organization, such as a consumer body for example, on behalf 
of a class of individuals. The `same interest' condition has been strictly interpreted 
by the courts and an attempted class action in a competition case, Emerald Supplies 
Ltd and am v British Airways pIc, 87 which is discussed below, failed on this point. 
The case has severely limited the potential to use the existing representative action 
as a class action in competition damages cases. 
Thirdly, a mechanism known as a Group Litigation Order (GLO) was 
introduced in 2000.88 It was a response to the problems the courts faced in dealing 
with large scale multi-party litigation such as those involving transport and product 
liability disasters89 for which consolidation and representative actions were not 
adequate. GLOs are basically a form of case management of a large number of 
individual claims. The Civil Justice Council concluded in 2008 that the GLO had 
not succeeded in one of its major goals, namely providing access to justice where 
large numbers of people have been affected by another's conduct, but individual 
loss is so small that it makes individual action economically unviable. This is 
mainly because, as an opt-in action, it requires individuals to take positive steps to 
commence litigation or join the claim register but individuals who have suffered 
small losses tend not to take such steps, even though the totality of the aggregated 
claim is very large. 90 
In addition, the Competition Act 1998 includes a provision, s 4713, for 
representative consumer actions in cases of infringement of the competition rules 
" CPR 19.6(1). See Civil Justice Council Report, "Improving Access to Justice through Collective 




_Actions. pdf. _7 Emerald Supplies Ltd v. British Airways plc, IHC46/09, [2009] EWHC 741 (Ch). 
Ss Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2000, SI 2000/221. GLOs were introduced as a result of the so- 
called "Woolf reforms" stemming from the "Woolf report", "Access to Justice: Final Report to the Lord 
Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in England and Wales" (HMSO, London, 1996) Ch. 17. GLOs are 
now provided for in CPR 19.10-19.15. 
89 See See Civil Justice Council Report, "Improving Access to Justice through Collective Actions", 





Actions. pdf. Civil Justice Council is an Advisory Public Body 
established under the Civil Procedure Act 1997. 
90 Ibid., p. 51 
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whereby `specified bodies' may bring claims on behalf of consumers before the 
Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT). These are dealt with in section [6.4.2] below. 
There has recently been a review of the existing mechanisms for collective 
redress in the form of a report by the Civil Justice Council to the Lord Chancellor. 
91 The Civil Justice Report recommended to the Lord Chancellor that a `generic 
collective action' applying in respect of any type of civil law claim should be 
introduced into English law by Act of Parliament. These actions should be able to 
be brought by a wide range of representative parties and should be on an opt-in or 
opt-out basis, subject to court certification. In July 2009 the Ministry of Justice 
rejected the Civil Justice Council's recommendation for a `generic' collective 
action and stated that it preferred to proceed on a sector by sector basis whereby 
specific provision would be made in respect of different sectors. 92 
As far as competition group actions before the ordinary civil courts are 
concerned, the most important case is Emerald Supplies Ltd and am v British 
Airways plc case in the UK. 93 As I already discussed abovein Chapters 2 and 5,94 
the case arose from an alleged price fixing agreement in the air freight services 
market between British Airways (BA) and a number of other international airlines, 
including Korean Airlines. 95 
The plaintiffs were two firms which imported cut flowers into the UK from, 
respectively, Columbia and Kenya. The plaintiffs instituted proceedings on their 
own behalf but also as representatives of `all other direct or indirect purchasers of 
air freight services' the prices of which were inflated. Emerald Supplies was not a 
`follow-on' action in that neither the European Commission nor the OFT had made 
any decision of a competition law infringement. As representatives the plaintiffs 
relied on CPR 19.6. 
In this case, the Court set out the pre-conditions for standing in class actions. 
Firstly, there should be more than one person who satisfies the remaining 
". Civil Justice Council Report, "Improving Access to Justice through Collective Actions", November 
2008, Part 2. 
92 Ministry of Justice, "The Government's Response to the Civil Justice Council's Report: Improving 
Access to Justice through Collective Actions" , July 2009, 
http: //wwwjustice. gov. uk/publications/ 
response-civil-justice-report-collective-actions. htm 
93 Emerald Supplies Ltd v British Airways Plc , IHC 46/09, [2009] EWHC 741 (Ch). 94 See sections 2.3.3 and 5.5.2 which deals with Emerald Supplies Ltd v British Airways plc case. 
95 The others included Air France, Cathay Pacific, Japanese Airlines, KLM, Qantas and SAS. 
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preconditions. There is no limit to the number or persons in the class to be 
represented. Secondly, those persons should have the same relevant interest at the 
time the claim is begun. The identity of interest must exist at the time that when the 
claim is begun as well as when judgment is given. 96 
The Chancellor of the High Court made an order striking out the 
representative elements of the claim. He held that the problem was not that the class 
of `all other direct and indirect purchasers' was extremely numerous and 
geographically widely spread97 but that all the persons in the represented class 
must have the same interest in the claim as the plaintiffs. That had to be 
determinable at the time that the claim is issued. In this case the condition was not 
fulfilled. This case was so crucial because it was a set-back for the use of collective 
group actions in competition cases in the UK. 
6.4.2 Consumer Claims in the Competition Act 1998 
6.4.2.1 Overview of Consumer Claims 
As I already explained, a representative damages action can be brought under 
s 47B of the Competition Act 1998 on behalf of two or more individuals or 
businesses who are not themselves parties to the action. 98 Its aim is to compensate 
all plaintiffs included in this action for the harm from anticompetitive practice. 
As seen above, in England and Wales, some collective mechanisms do exist 
to enable consumers to achieve redress through the courts, including individual-led 
group actions. Alongside these mechanisms, in competition area, there is a specific 
provision enabling representative consumer damages actions to be brought. The 
Enterprise Act 2002, s. 19 introduced an amendment to the Competition Act 1998 
which is now s 47B. 99 According to 47B, follow-on damages actions can be 
brought before the CAT by a `specified body' on behalf of two or more consumers. 
These `consumer claims' must follow a finding of a breach of the Chapter I or 
96 Emerald Supplies Ltd v British Airways Plc, IHC 46/09, [2009] EWHC 741 (Ch)., at paras. 30-31. 
97 Emerald Supplies Ltd v British Airways Plc, IHC 46/09, [2009] EWHC 741 (Ch)., at para. 30. 
See section 6.1.2 which deals with definition of representative actions. 
Competition Act of 1998 s. 47B; Ashurst Report, supra note 9 
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Chapter II prohibitions of the Competition Act 1998 or of Article 81 or 82 EC by 
the OFT or of a breach of Article 81 or 82 EC by the European Commission. 100 As 
I already explained, there are two types of representative action. 101 Consumer 
claims under s 47B is opt-in rather than opt-out representative actions brought by 
designated body. 102 
The main benefit of representative actions in the section 47B lies in pooling 
the resources of a large number of plaintiffs for the purpose of establishing a breach 
in the law. The then Chairman of the Competition Commission said in 2002 that 
this provision was inserted to support the aims of the Enterprise Act of reinforcing 
the links between competition law and consumers' interests. 103 
It is worth considering s 47B in comparison to US class actions because both 
the UK and the US have a common law legal system. However, the UK has adopted 
and developed the representative action under s 47B with an opt-in system, which is 
different to US class actions. US class actions adopt opt-out system under which 
unless individual members have specifically objected, the final judgment is binding 
on all members. The major difference with the US class action is that in the UK 
under section 47B of the Competition Act consumer claims require the clear 
identification of the plaintiffs. The express consent of all individual members to 
bring actions is not essential, but those who would like to join the action have to be 
clearly identified. Thus, the consumers and the represented persons have to be 
named individually. 101 
Alongside consumer claims, consumer bodies designated by the Secretary of 
State for Business, Innovation and Skills can complain to the OFT about significant 
harm to the interests of consumers. These are called super-complaints. '05 The OFT 
has to publish a reasoned response as to how it proposes to deal with the complaint 
within 90 days. The designated bodies at present (ie 30 June 2009) are the 
11 Competition Act 1998, s. 47A((6) and s. 47B(2). 
10' See section 6.1.2 which defines group actions. 
102 Competition Act of 1998 s47B (9) says the body is designated by the Secretary of State. 
103 Derek Morris, "First annual lecture of the National Consumer Council", April 30,2002. 
104 Competition Act 1998, s. 47A and B. For the background of this regulation see Department of Trade 
and Industry, "A World Class Competition Regime", White Paper, Crown Copyright, July 2001, p. 50; See 
also, Holmes, K., "Public Enforcement or Private Enforcement? Enforcement of Competition Law in the 
EC and UK", 1 ECLR 25,2004, p. 32-33. 
105 Enterprise Act 2002 s. 11. 
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Campaign for Real Ale Limited (CAMRA), the Consumer Council for Water, the 
Consumers' Association (trading as "Which? "), the General Consumer Council for 
Northern Ireland (GCCNI), the National Association of Citizens Advice Bureaux 
(NACAB) and the National Consumer Council (trading as "Consumer Focus"). 
6.4.2.2 The s 47B Consumer Claim in Practice 
The first issue which arises is what bodies are empowered to bring s 47B 
damages' actions. In 1999, only the Consumers' Association was empowered to take 
action against infringements under the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
legislation. 106 The Consumers' Association ('Which? ') was the first body 
appointed, as a specified body to bring damages actions before the CAT, on behalf 
of a group of two or more named individuals. 107 The consumer claim can only be 
brought on behalf of consumers who consent which mean that this is an opt-in 
action, not an opt-out. 108 It can be brought only on behalf on 'consumers' and not 
on behalf of small businesses. Any organization which is empowered to bring 
damages actions has to notify the OFT before any action is taken and the outcome 
of any proceedings. 109 
The first consumer claim under s47B was Consumers Association v JJB 
Sports PLC. "° The Consumers Association under their trading name `Which? ' 
brought an damages action on behalf of the overcharged consumers after the OFT 
fined JJB Sports £6.7 million for price fixing of replica England and Manchester 
United football shirts in 2003. The OFT decided that JJB and a number of other 
retailers infringed the Chapter I prohibition by fixing the prices of replica football 
shirts of England and Manchester United in 2000 and 2001 and this was ultimately 
upheld on appeal to the Court of Appeal. "' Which? ' then recruited consumers to 
join an action against JJB Sports for overcharging on the football shirts pursuant to 
I" The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, SI 1999/2083, Sch. 1, Pt 2. 
107 Specified Body (Consumer Claims) Order 2005/2365. 
108 See Competition Act 1998 s 47B (3) 
109 Tim Ward and Kassie Smith, "Competition litigation in the UK", 2005, Thomson, p. 280,7-063. 
10 Consumers Association v JJB Sports PLC, 1078/7/9/07. 
"' Football Kit Price Fixing, OFT decision 1 August 2003, [2004] UKCLR 6, JJB Sports plc v OFT 
[2004] CAT 17; JJB Sports plc v OFT [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1318. 
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the price fixing. 112 One interesting feature of this case was that `Which? ' suggested 
that -whilst a receipt for purchase would be good evidence, a photograph of the 
consumer (or the person for whom the shirt had been bought) in the `relevant' shirt 
might be enough because the team shirts were changed annually. A photograph of 
the consumer in the `relevant' shirt could therefore be used to identify the year they 
were produced to prove that the consumer had bought a shirt which the OFT had 
proved had been sold at an overcharge. - 
The case was settled on 14 January 2008. In the settlement JJB Sports agreed 
to compensate directly any customers who were parties to the action with a 
payment of £20. Under the settlement agreement, the 130 customers who joined the 
damages action and who purchased relevant football shirts during the relevant 
period for up to £39.99 therefore received a payment of £ 20 each. The settlement 
also provided that other affected customers who were not parties to the Consumers 
Association's action should receive a payment of £10 by presenting the relevant 
replica shirt or proof of purchase. If only the shirt was presented and the label was 
missing, the payment was reduced to £5.113 
6.4.2.3 Problems with Consumer Claims under s 47B 
However, there are considerable problems with consumer claims under 
section 47 B. 
Firstly, the CAT has a dual role as the appeal tribunal from decisions of the 
OFT and as the tribunal in making damages and other monetary awards under 
s. 47A. The problem is that the role of the CAT has been limited. The CAT has 
limited discretion and independence in making judgments on infringements of 
competition law. The CAT has only an appeal function from the OFT or the 
European Commission and no original jurisdiction to find infringements (other than 
some powers in the context of appeals). The CAT's only function is in determining 
entitlement to, and assessing and awarding damages to the consumers represented 
112 See www. which. co. uk/reports_and_campaigns/consumer_rights. 
113 These customers were required sign a document waiving the right to further legal action against JJB 
Sports available at http: // www. which. co. uk/news/ 2008/ 01/ jjb-to-pay-fans-over-football-shirt-rip-off- 
128 985. jsp 
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by the representative body where there is already a finding of an infringement by 
the OFT or the European Commission. In other cases, the plaintiff must bring 
actions in the Chancery Division of the High Courts. 
Secondly, another problem of representative actions is that the consumer 
claims mechanism constrains consumer organizations to act independently as 
regulatory enforcers because only the designated bodies can bring damages actions. 
Allowing consumer claims by only a specified body can discourage 
competition group actions. At present, only `Which? ' are allowed to bring damages 
actions. However, it is not easy to encourage competition actions because it cannot 
bring all damages actions on behalf of consumers who have damage caused by 
anticompetitive conduct. 
For instance, as I already discussed above,. 114 `Which? ' brought a damages 
action on behalf of the overcharged consumers for price fixing of replica England 
and Manchester United football shirts in 2003. However, this case is not considered 
as a success from the point of view of `Which? '. The amount of damages which JJB 
had to pay out to the comparatively few consumers (out of a potential million or so) 
who joined in the action or presented themselves. Furthermore, the payout was only 
a fraction of what the infringers would have had to pay if it had been an 'opt-out' 
action. `Which? ' said that it would not bring another action like this. ' 15 During 
2009 `Which? ' has lobbied the UK government to introduce an `opt-out' consumer 
action. 
It is worth noting that the Civil Justice Council Report stated that: 
"The representative actions under Section 47B of the Competition Act 1998, 
operates on opt-in principles, whereby the consent of each consumer is required 
before that consumer can be a member of the class...... Insofar as the plaintiff and 
class are concerned, there is important limitation. The representative action can 
1 14 See section 6.4.2.2 which introduces this case. 
115 British Institute of International and Comparative Law, "8th Trans-Atlantic Antitrust Dialogue", 
London, 15 May 2008. 
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only be instituted by a specified body as ideological plaintiff and not by a directly- 
affected consumer as representative plaintiff. "116 
Thirdly, it is unclear what remedies could be ordered by any court or CAT on 
behalf of such a body which would have any greater effect than only recompensing 
the particular consumer on behalf of whom the claims is brought. "7 
6.4.2.4 Possible Solution 
Given the role and expertise of the CAT, the possible solution to first 
problem is to allow the CAT to have appropriate discretion and independence in 
making judgments about the infringement of competition law. It has been argued 
that the CAT should not be limited to follow-on actions. For instance, the OFT has 
said that stand-alone actions can in addition to providing redress, provide an 
additional and more immediate corrective mechanism in markets affected by anti- 
competitive conduct. Since they can be brought before competition authorities 
through investigation or in the absence of any investigation at all. Therefore the 
OFT has recommended that to ensure immediate corrective justice, stand-alone 
actions as well as follow on actions should be facilitated. "8 
Therefore, in order to utilise the CAT's expertise in competition issues, the 
CAT should deal with this type of claim without requiring the prior establishment 
of an infringement by the OFT or the European Commission. ' 19 It has been argued 
that a more active role for the CAT would strengthen its position and contribute to 
the development of a stringent line in decisions in competition law. '2° 
116 Civil Justice Council, "Reform of Collective Redress in England and Wales: A Perspective of Need", 
A Research Paper for submission to the Civil Justice Council of England and Wales, 2008, p. 36-37. 
"' Tim Ward and Kassie Smith, "Competition litigation in the UK", 2005, Thomson, p. 280. 
"8 OFT 916, supra note 1, p. 14. 
119 C1. Facenna, "Restructuring UK Competition Courts and Tribunals: A Summary", Comp. L. J. 56 p. 59; " 
Barry J. Rodger, "Private Enforcement and the Enterprise Act : An Exemplary System of Awarding 
Damages, 24 E. C. L. R. 103,2003 p. 107; see Oughton and Lowry, "Textbook on Consumer Law", 2000, 
86. 
120 Christian Miege and Dusseldorf, "Modernization and Enforcement Pluralism-The Role of Private 
Enforcement of Competition Law in the EU and the German Attempts in the 70' Amendment of the 
GwB", Amsterdam Centre for Law and Economics Workshop, 2005, p. 16; Barry J. Rodger, supra note 
119, p. 107. 
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The Civil Justice Report also recommended that representative actions should 
still be able to be brought before the CAT but on a stand-alone as well as a follow- 
on basis. 121 
The possible solution to the second problem (the limitation to designated 
bodies) is to broaden scope of specified bodies or to allow non-designated 
consumer organization in order to promoting consumer interest. The consumer 
claim by non-designated as well as designated consumer organization should be 
allowed if these consumer organizations are non-profit making organization. 
A possible solution to third problem (remedies) is to address specific 
remedies such as injunctive relief. Compensation for damage affects only the 
litigants. However injunctive relief could have the broader effect of stopping 
anticompetitive conduct. Without providing for specific remedy such as injunctive 
relief, it is not easy to ensure effective enforcement. As I already mentioned" 
22 
injunctive relief can be an efficient means of ensuring competitive markets by 
providing private litigants the opportunity to put-an end anticompetitive conduct. 
To encourage competition group actions, it is therefore submitted that it is 
necessary to provide for specific remedy such as injunctive relief. 
6.5 Class Actions in the US 
6.5.1 Overview of Class Actions in the US 
Although there are several different types of class actions in the US, the most 
common form involves a plaintiff bringing damages actions on behalf of not only 
himself (or herself), but also on behalf of a class made up of similarly situated 
individuals. 123 By class actions, individuals can pursue damages, in a 
representational capacity, on behalf of all similarly situated unidentified classes of 
121 Civil Justice Council Report, "Improving Access to Justice through Collective Actions", November 





' See section 6.2.2 which deals with competition group actions in Korea. 
123 Comments of the Section of Antitrust Law and the Section of International Law of the American Bar 
Association in Response to the Request for Public Comment of the Commission of the European 
Communities On Damage Actions for Breaches of EU Antitrust Rules, April, 2006, p. 42-45. 
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persons. 124 
Rule 23 and the various state court mechanisms govern class actions in the 
US. The modern US class action dates from a revision of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure Rules in the mid-1960s. 125 Antitrust class actions have become 
commonplace since 1966 since Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
reversed an opt-in provision to an opt-out provision in 1966.126 As I already 
mentioned, 127 with the opt-out system, the class member is bound by the resolution 
of the class actions unless the class member chooses to opt out of the class. This 
opt-out system allows potentially thousands of plaintiffs to be conscripted into class 
actions unknowingly. 
The attractiveness of the class action in the US is that it enables one or more 
individuals with minimal, yet important, claims to bond together and litigate their 
claims as a strong unified force. 128 The US class action has been described as being 
designed to improve access to the courts while simultaneously promoting efficiency 
by allowing courts and defendants to focus their energies on resolving all similar 
claims in one action. 129 For example, the drafters of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure130 sought to "achieve economies of time, effort, and expense ... 
without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable 
results. " 131 
This creates a greater likelihood that wronged consumers will assert their 
claims, and it is therefore argued that the availability of the class action can act as a 
powerful deterrent against infringements of antitrust law. 132 
124 Edward F. Sherman, supra note 15, p. 134-136 ("Most other. countries view American class actions as 
a Pandora's box that they want to avoid opening. " 
lu Deborah R. Hensler, "Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Action and Other 
Large Scale Litigation", 11 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L., 2001, pp. 179-180; Edward F. Sherman, supra note 
15, pp. 134-136. 
'26 FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
127 See section 6.1.2 which deals with definition and characteristics of opt-out system; See also, 
Edward F. Sherman, supra note 15, p. 146. 
121 D. R. Hensler, supra note 125, p. 182. 
129 See, e. g., Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens and Rochelle Tedesco, "Addressing the Elephant 
Mass of Asbestos Cases: Consolidation Versus Inactive Dockets (Pleural Registries) and Case 
Management Plans that Deter Claims by the Non-Sick", 31 Pepp. L. Rev. 271,2004, p. 280-281 
rdiscussing the history of consolidating asbestos cases to promote efficiency). i30 As I already discussed above, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereafter, FRCP) are rules 
governing civil procedure in US district (federal) courts for civil actions. 
1 D. R Hensler, supra note 125, p. 182. 
132 See Clifford A. Jones, "Exporting Antitrust Courtrooms to the World: Private Enforcement in a 
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6.5.2 Problems Created by the Class actions 
The US class action has proved controversial and the subject of extensive 
criticism. 133 It has been alleged that since its adoption in 1938, Rule 23 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has been confusing, illogical, and procedurally 
deficient. 134 In the following sections I consider the problems of class actions 
from the perspective of both plaintiffs and defendants. 
6.5.2.1 The Plaintiffs Perspective 
From the plaintiff's perspective, there are significant disadvantages to class 
actions. 
Firstly, it has been suggested that the shortcomings of class action are partly 
caused by a tension between procedural fairness and judicial efficiency. 
133 Group 
actions can enhance fairness by increasing access to courts and can enhance 
efficiency by allowing economies of scale. 136 However, these goals of procedural 
fairness and judicial efficiency, often conflict with one another since it is difficult to 
capitalize on the efficiencies generated by the class action without adversely 
affecting the process by which litigants may pursue individual justice in the courts. 
Global Market", 16 LOY. Consumer. L. REV. 409,2004, p. 411 (stating that though class actions amount to 
approximately 20 % of all private actions in the US, they have a deterrent effect because of the potential 
size of the damage awards). 
133 See generally, D. Bruce Hoffman, "To Certify or Not: A Modest Proposal for Evaluating the 
Superiority of a Class Action in the Presence of Government Enforcement", Georgetown Journal of Legal 
Ethics, 2005. 
134 See, e. g., Benjamin Kaplan, "Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I)", 81 Harv. L. Rev. 356,1967, p. 380-386 (describing the confusing 
categorization of class actions under the original rule and conflicting judicial opinions regarding the 
binding force of judgments in class action suits). 
133 "The Paths of Civil Litigation", 113 Harv. L. Rev., 2000, p. 1807-1816. It is an editorial. 
136 P Friedman, D. Gelfand et al., supra note 7, p. 45; See, e. g., Mary J. Davis, Toward the Proper Role 
for Mass Tort Class Actions, 77 Or. L. Rev. 157,169 (1998) ("The class action procedure thus evolved as 
a product of concern for the 'convenient and economical' provision of justice, coupled with the 
substantive concern of affording a meaningful remedy to large numbers of otherwise disenfranchised 
victims of breached obligations. "); Viivi Vanderslice, Comment, "Viability of a Nationwide Fen- 
Phen/Redux Class Action Lawsuit in Light of Amchem v. Windsor", 35 Cal. W. L. Rev. 199,1998, p. 216. 
In this article, Viivi Vanderslice stated that increased access and economic efficiency are among the goals 
of the class action. 
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For instance, efforts to enhance procedural fairness for plaintiff class members 
whose interests may conflict with one another have led courts to insist on 
subclasses, 137 which inherently undermine the efficiency of the class action 
ensured by economies of scale. The US class action has failed to alleviate the 
inefficiencies and may be causing new inefficiencies as the number of class actions 
grows. 
Secondly, class actions can be "fee-generated" which means lawyers can get 
substantial legal fee through class actions. 138 Fee-generation arises from providing 
the prevailing (i. e. winning) plaintiffs' lawyer with an entitlement to fees. 139 Fees 
are calculated in relation to the size of the award, for example as a percentage of 
whole awards. This is called a contingency fee arrangement. Congress fully 
intended to encourage private actions in order to maximize deterrence through 
contingency fees and the one-way cost rules. For Congress's intention to encourage 
private actions, it is worth considering the view that: 
"If an American plaintiff knows that he will not have to bear the costs of any 
attorney's fees, neither his own nor the other party's, there is more of an incentive 
to participate in a lawsuit, more of an opportunity to vindicate his purported legal 
rights, and, indeed, more of an opportunity to gain the help of a lawyer. ""° 
However, critics of the system claim that the high costs associated with class 
actions bear no proportion to the expected benefits for victims. Many class actions 
generate substantial fees for lawyer but produce little, if any, benefit to the victims 
of the antitrust conducts because of contingency fee arrangement and coupon 
settlements (discussed below). '4' It is not plaintiffs but the lawyers, it is said, who 
137 Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U. S. 591,117 S. Ct. 2231, U. S. Pa., 1997. 
138 See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F. R. D. 48 (E. D. Pa. 1983), modified, 751 F. 2d 562 (3d Cir. 
1984). 
19 15 U. S. C. § 15 (2000) 
140 Stephen B. Presser, "How Should The Law of Products Liability Be Harmonized? What Americans 
Can Learn From Europeans", Global Liability Issues, Vol. 2 (Centre for Legal Policy at the Manhattan 
Institute, 2002, p. 5. 
141 Cristina Poncibb, "Regulation and Private Litigation :A Debate Over the European Perspective", 2°d 
Mises Seminar, 2005, p. 21-22; Corinne Bergen, "Generating Extra Wind in the Sails of the EU Antitrust 
Enforcement Boat", Journal of International Business and Law, 2006, p. 223-226; John Pheasant, "Private 
Damages Actions: Response to the Commission's green paper", CLI 5 8(8), August 2006, p. 3; Robert H. 
Lande and Joshua P. Davis, "Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement : An Analysis of Forty Cases", 
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benefit from class actions. 142 The plaintiffs' lawyers receive substantial fees and 
minimize their legal costs. 143 In fact, it is argued that what the US experience over 
the past forty years makes clear is that the combination of contingency fee and the 
lack of a loser pays rule, which means the losing party has to bear not only its own 
but also the costs of the other party, have made it easy for an US lawyer to bring a 
claim, which has encouraged abusive litigation. 144 
Thirdly, class actions may feature `coupon settlements' in which the plaintiffs 
received coupons for products or services rather than cash awards. 145 This coupon 
settlement is a practice that has grown up since the early 1990s. 146 
While plaintiffs' lawyers receive cash fees, often in the millions of dollars 
because of contingency fees and one-way costs, the class action members are 
awarded compensation of limited value, such as coupons. 147 Coupon settlements 
may take the form of a discount certificate on future purchases from defendants. 
For example, in the settlements of Microsoft in Minnesota, the plaintiffs got 
vouchers worth up to $29 to buy new products, while the lawyers received $59.4 
million in fees. 
7 
University of San Francisco Law Review, 2008, p. 882-886. 142 Emil Paulis, "Policy Issues in the Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law", in rPrivate 
Enforcement of EC Competition Laws (ed. by Jürgen Basedow), Kluwer Law, 2007 p. 14; Coffee, 
"Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is not Working", 
42 Md. L. Rev. 1983, p. 215(arguing that the reason the private attorney general mechanism failed to live 
u0 to its promise relates to the incentive structure contained in the attorney -client relationship). Christian Miege, supra note 120, p. 11 '44 John H. Beisner, Charles E. Borden, supra note 8, p. 22. 145 Roger D. Blair and Christine A. Piette, "Coupons and Settlements in Antitrust Class Actions", 20 
Antitrust 32,2005, p. 32-34. 
"6 See generally, Steven B. Hantler and Rebert E. Norten, "Coupon Settlements: The Emperor's Clothes 
of Class Actions", Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, 2005. 
147 See e. g., Ameet Sachdev, "Coupon Awards Reward Whom? Class-Action Settlements that Pay 
Lawyers Millions of Dollars and Give Plaintiffs Coupons that are Sometimes Useless Are Drawing Ire in 
Congress and Some Courts", Chi. Trib., Feb. 29,2004 (discussing a lawsuit against the maker of Cheerios 
cereal that netted lawyers $1.75 million in fees while consumers received coupons for a free box of 
Cheerios, but only if they kept their grocery receipt to prove their previous purchase), 2004 WLNR 
17854235; Marguerite Higgins, "Class Members Get Little in Suits", Wash. Times, July 2,2004 
(discussing a lawsuit against Poland Spring for sales of allegedly impure bottle water netted lawyers 
$1.35 million and consumers coupons for more of the bottled water), 2004 WLNR 811926; Jim Burke, 
"Carnival Settles Lawsuit", Boston Herald, Apr. 1,2001 (class lawyer to receive up to $5 million for 
work in lawsuit alleging inflated port charges while class members will receive coupons worth $25 to $55 
off a future cruise), 2001 WLNR 280506; see also Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens and Leah Lorber, 
"Federal Courts Should Decide Interstate Class Actions: A Call for Federal Class Action Diversity 
Jurisdiction Reform", 37 Harv. J. Legis. 483,2000 (detailing abuse of coupon settlement class action 
suits). 
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Coupon settlements are claimed to be of dubious value to the victims of 
antitrust infringements for the following main reasons. Firstly, the plaintiffs may 
never bother to redeem the coupon. They may not need to purchase products of 
defendants, or they may simply wish to deal with other companies or suppliers' 
products. Secondly, even if they do choose to redeem the coupons, there may be no 
real financial benefit. For instance, in the settlements of Microsoft in Minnesota, the 
plaintiffs got vouchers worth up to $29 to buy new products of the defendant. 
However, they might have been able to buy comparable equipment more cheaply 
from on-line shopping sites. This type of coupon settlements confers no real 
benefits on the plaintiffs. Thirdly, defendants are not forced to disgorge their ill- 
gotten gains when coupons are not redeemed. In such situations, it is difficult to 
justify paying lawyers their full fees in cash, instead of coupon. 
Fourthly, in all civil litigation, the time, expense, and uncertainty of trial 
create incentives for litigants to settle out of court. However, it is argued that there 
is a particular problem with the settlement of class actions because the legitimacy 
and the merits of class action settlements have been rarely scrutinized. Plaintiffs' 
lawyers often confront a conflict between their clients' interests and their own 
interests in getting paid. 148 For the lawyer, the immense costs of litigating a class 
action often mean that it is in their best interest to settle the class's claims. 149 The 
class action often gives rise to what is described as competitive `race to settlement' 
by the plaintiffs' lawyers because if any one of these actions reaches judgment or 
settlement, the remaining ones cannot have compensation. 150 For instance, if 
damages actions in a state court are settled, the same case brought before a federal 
court will be precluded. In other words, a class action before state courts can be a 
bar to federal class action. Because of this `do (quickly) or die situation' each 
148 See, e. g., Bruce L. Hay, "Asymmetric Rewards: Why Class Actions (May) Settle for Too Little", 48 
Hastings L. J. 479,1997, p. 496(proposing a method to alleviate this danger). 
"' Comments of the Section of Antitrust Law and the Section of International Law of the American Bar 
Association in Response to the Request for Public Comment of the Commission of the European 
Communities On Damage Actions for Breaches of EU Antitrust Rules, April, 2006, p. 47-48. 
150 "The Paths of Civil Litigation", 113 Harv. L. Rev., 2000, p. 1812-1813; John C. Coffee, Jr., "Class 
Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action", 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1343,1995, p. 1370; see, John C. 
Coffee, Jr., "Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform", 62 Ind. L. J., 1987, p. 651. (noting 
"that multiple plaintiffs can be pressured into early and cheap settlements if the defendant can create a 
race to settlement because those who hold out for trial will be unable or ineligible to receive punitive 
damages"). 
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plaintiff's lawyer might be more interested in a quick financial gain for themselves 
than the long-term interest of class members. 151 This problem is especially acute 
when different lawyers in different state jurisdictions are representing the same 
class. 
Thus, it has been claimed that the class " action may create a powerful 
incentive for defendants and the lawyers for the class of plaintiffs to collude at the 
expense of class members' interests. Collusion arises when class lawyer's interests 
align more closely with those of the defendant than with those of the member of 
class actions. 152 It is alleged that collusion between the class lawyer and the 
defendants results in inadequate compensation. Defendants can shop for the 
plaintiffs' lawyer who will agree to the most advantageous settlement because the 
plaintiffs' lawyers are more interested in their legal fee rather that plaintiffs' 
compensation. The conflicting interest between plaintiffs and their lawyers can 
jeopardize both class members' ability to have their claims heard and their chances 
of obtaining full compensation for their damage. '53 
Fifthly, class actions may impair the plaintiff's ability to obtain adequate 
compensation for their damage because individual differences among class 
members may lead to unfair treatment of plaintiffs. '54 Class members with more 
serious and complex claims may be simply lumped into the class and not given the 
individualized attention needed to adequate compensation. '55 Whether the claim is 
settled or it goes to judgment, some plaintiffs may receive windfall verdicts while 
other plaintiffs with stronger than average claims may not be proportionately 
151 See GM Fuel Tank Litig., 55 F. 3d 768,788 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Attorneys jockeying for position might 
attempt to cut a deal with the defendants by underselling the plaintiffs' claims relative to other attorneys. "), 
cert. denied, 516 U. S. 824 (1995). 
152 A vast literature and a number of judicial opinions explore the problem of collusion between plaintiffs' 
lawyers and defendants and the adverse effects such collusion can have on plaintiff class members. See, 
e. g., In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F. 3d 768,778 (3d Cir. 
1995) (noting criticism that the settlement class action is a "vehicle for collusive settlements that 
primarily serve the interests of defendants ... and of plaintiffs' counsel"); Susan P. 
Koniak and George M. 
Cohen, "Under Cloak of Settlement", 82 Va. L. Rev. 1051,1996, p. llll("Defendants understand how 
valuable class settlement can be: liability and transaction costs can be minimized and finality achieved. "). ls3 See, e. g., Roger H. Trangsrud, "Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, " U. 111. L. Rev., 1989, p. 
82-84. 
154 Martin v. Milks, 490 U. S. 755,762 (1989) 
115 See The Class Action Fairness Act of 1999: Hearing on S. 353 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. 
Oversight and the Courts of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1.06th Cong. 10 (1999) (testimony of John 
H. Beisner, Esq. ), available at 1999 WL 27320. 
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compensated. For example, Harvard Law Professor W. Kip Viscusi, who studied 
this issue, observed that "large loss claims tend to be under-compensated, and lower 
loss claims tend to be overcompensated. " 56 
Furthermore, the weaknesses in other class members' claims may work to the 
disadvantage of the class as a whole. A class action can aggregate individuals with 
small monetary claims into an effective client whose legal damage is remarkable. 
However, it is unsuccessful at aggregating claims having uniformly weak legal 
merit. It is argued that weak cases may look even worse collectively, and that courts 
find ways not to certify such a class action. 157 
Sixthly, there is the possibility that absent class members may be 
inadequately represented by the class representatives158 because of the opt-out 
system. It is desirable for the class members to receive appropriate notice but there 
is usually no perfect way to notify the on-going legal action. 159 The named 
plaintiffs and the named plaintiffs' lawyers cannot appropriately represent absent 
class members. Absent class members are often unaware of the existence of the 
class action until they receive notice of the action after the presiding court has 
decided the case in favour of the plaintiffs. Thus, class members are highly reliant 
on lawyers they do not even know and are not appropriately represented by the 
named plaintiffs and the named plaintiffs' lawyers. The problem is that the decision 
of the plaintiff's claims can bind the rest of the class members unless those class 
members affirmatively choose to not participate in the litigation. 160 Consequently, 
some class members do not even learn of the proceedings in which they can be 
bound by a decision. 
156 W. Kip Viscusi, "Reforming Products Liability 52", 1991. 
157 See, e. g., John C. Coffee, Jr., "Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform", 62 Ind. L. J. 
625,1987, p. 652-654. 
158 The class representatives are named plaintiffs, and the remainder of the similarly situated plaintiffs are 
absent class members. Typically, only the named plaintiffs and the named plaintiffs' lawyers are actively 
involved in the litigation. 
139 A. Paul Victor and Eva W. Cole, "U. S. Private Antitrust Treble Damages Class Actions", Asia 
International Competition Conference, 2008, p. 242-243. 160 Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Edward F. Sherman, supra note 15, p. 132. 
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6.5.2.2 The Defendant's Perspective 
From the defendant's perspective too, there are significant disadvantages to 
class actions. 
Firstly, there is possibility of abuse of class antitrust actions by attracting 
litigants in very numbers indeed. 161 Class actions provide plaintiffs with incentives 
to bring actions because class actions lower a party's potential cost of losing a legal 
action and increase a party's potential gain of winning. 162 Research indicates that 
the aggregation of claims increases both the likelihood that a defendant will be 
found liable and the size of any damages award that may result. 163 
As far as US class actions are concerned, class actions have flooded the US 
courts since the 1990s. 1M Some certified classes have contained millions or tens of 
millions of class members. ' 65 A survey found that from 1988 to 1998, the number 
of class action filings against Fortune 500 companies increased by 338% in federal 
courts. 166 During that same period, that number has increased by more than 1,000% 
in state courts, reflecting the belief that plaintiffs are more likely to win 
questionable class actions in state courts. 167 The review of US federal court filings 
from 1990-2004 also shows a substantial increase in all areas of civil actions, 
especially complex antitrust litigation. 168 In 2002, for instance, private parties filed 
over 100 antitrust class actions in federal district courts. 169 
161 John Pheasant, "Private Damages Actions", CLI 52 (6), 2006, p. 2. 162 John H. Beisner and Charles E. Borden, supra note 8, p. 25; Franklin M. Fisher, "Economic Analysis 
and Antitrust Damages", 29(3) World Competition 383,2006, p. 391-392. 163 Barry F. McNeil and Beth L. Fancsali, "Mass Torts and Class Actions: Facing Increased Scrutiny", 
167 Federall Rules Decisions(F. RD. ) 483,1996, p. 491; Kenneth S. Bordens and Irwin A. Horowitz, 
"Mass Tort Civil Litigation: The Impact of Procedural Changes on Jury Decisions", 73 Judicature 22, 
1989. at 27 
'" See Federalist Soc'y, "Analysis: Class Action Litigation--A Federalist Society Survey", I Class 
Action Watch, at http: //www. fed-soc. org/Publications/classactionwatch/volumelissue!. htm; Deborah 
Hensler et al., "Preliminary Results of the RAND Study of Class Action Litigation", 1997, p. 15. 165 See, e. g., Block v. McDonalds Corporation, (No. 01-409137, Cook County, Illinois, 2002); Scott v 
Blockbuster Inc., (No. DI 62-535, Jefferson County, Texas, 2001). 
See Federalist Soc'y, supra note 164 ; Deborah Hensler et al., supra note 164, p. 15. 167 See Federalist Soc'y, supra note 164; Deborah Hensler et al., supra note 164, p. 15; See also John 
Beisner and Jessica Davidson Miller, "The Class Action Fairness Act: Cleaning Up the Class Action 
Mess", 6 Class Action Litigation Report 104,2005, p. 108 (noting "the embarrassing state of class action 
litigation in this country and the growth of magnet state courts that rubber stamp anti-consumer class 
action settlements") 
168 See Administratie Office of the US Courts, "Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, " Table 2.2,2004. 
According to this statistics, from 2000 to 20004, antitrust cases rose 33 %. 169 See 2002 Federal Court Statistics, Table 5: Antitrust, 24 Class Action Rep. 16 (2003). 
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There is also the phenomenon of the rise of'claims' firms who run the opt-out 
actions. For instance, there is a class action currently before the courts in the US 
whereby passengers are claiming damages from BA and Virgin as part of the 
litigation brought pursuant to the fuel surcharge price-fixing case. 170 Between 2004 
and 2006 British Airways and Virgin Atlantic. conspired to increase the fuel 
surcharge for flights to and from the US and the UK. Dozens of lawsuits were filed 
across the country seeking damages resulting from this cartel. UK passengers are 
joining in that action, and apparently account for 170,000 of the 211,000 claims for 
refunds processed so far. Following over a year of negotiations, plaintiffs 
negotiated a comprehensive $200 million settlement of the claims of both US 
purchasers and UK purchasers who brought actions before courts. '7' 
However, it is said that there is potential for abuse by lawyers who can 
exploit the leverage they gain from class actions to extract settlements, not 
necessarily solely because of the merits of the underlying claims but because of the 
size of the defendants' potential exposure to an entire class of plaintiffs. 172 The 
potential liability that attaches to class actions is so great173 that it is said that often 
the most sensible solution is to settle as early and cheaply as possible even with 
frivolous or non-meritorious actions. 174 The immense pressure on defendants to 
settle'75 is claimed to frustrate their ability to obtain a judgment on the merits of 
the plaintiffs' claims. Even where an adverse verdict is improbable, "the risk of 
participating in a single trial of all claims and facing a once and for all verdict is 
ordinarily intolerable" to defendants. 176 Settlements in these circumstances are 
"0 International Air Transportation Surcharge Litigation, M-06-01793 CRB, U. S. D. C., Northern District 
of California. 
"' See the website of Hausfeld & Co, available at http: //www. hausfeldllp. com/. 
172 R. H. Lande and J. P. Davis, supra note 141, p. 884-885. 
173 See, e. g., Castano, 84 F. 3d p. 746 ("The risk of facing an all-or-nothing verdict presents too high a risk 
[for defendants], even when the probability of an adverse judgment is low. "). 74 Frivolous or non-meritorious actions can be defined as actions have little benefit to public interests 
such as ensuring competitive economy or enhancing consumer welfare; Clifford A. Jones, supra note 26, 
p. 19; Kati J. Cseres, supra note 18, pp. 8-9. See generally George L. Priest, "What We Know and What 
We Don't Know About Modem Class Actions :A Review of the Eisenberg-Miller Study", Manhattan 
Institute for Policy Research, Civil Justice Report No. 9, February 2005; Charles B. Casper, "The Class 
Action Fairness Act's Impact on Settlement", 20 Antitrust 26,2005, p. 26 ; Christian Miege, supra note 
120, p. 11 
175 Peter H. Schuck, "Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective", 80 Cornell L. Rev. 941, 
1995, p. 958 (noting that the costs and risks of trial induce settlement of more than 95% of all civil claims). 
176 Barry F. McNeil and Beth L. Fancsali, supra note 163, p. 490 
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described as "judicial blackmail". 177 In addition to harming defendants by 
effectively barring their access to a judicial determination on the merits of plaintiffs' 
claims, it is claimed that this blackmail problem also affects consumers, who 
ultimately bear the financial burden of frivolous or unmeritorious actions in the 
form of higher costs for goods and services. Settlements of frivolous or 
unmeritorious actions can cause windfall compensatory awards and approach 
arbitrary punitive damages awards. 178 This trend is fuelled in part by the 
availability of large contingency fees 179 and the introduction of opt-out actions. 180 
Furthermore, when plaintiffs' lawyers pursue frivolous or non-meritorious 
actions it can divert judicial resources such as judges from the meritorious claims. 
Former FTC Chair William Kovacic summarized the prevailing view of the 
antitrust profession as follows: 
"Private rights of action U. S. -style are poison. They over-reached 
dramatically. And we have to use substantial liability standards to push back on 
what we think are hard-wired elements of private rights of action mechanism. "' 
81 
Thus, it is argued that it is necessary, when fostering private enforcement, to 
always have regard to the risk of misuse of class actions and frivolous litigation 
while at the same time aiming at installing a useful and workable system. 182 
Secondly, there is possibility that class actions can have a ruinous effect in 
In See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F. 3d 734,746 (5th Cir. 1996). 
178 See Hon. Paul v. Niemeyer, "Awards for Pain and Suffering: The Irrational Centerpiece of Our Tort 
System", 90 Va. L. Rev. 1401,2004; Victor E. Schwartz and Leah Lorber, "Twisting the Purpose of Pain 
and Suffering Awards: Turning Compensation Into Punishment", 54 S. C. L. Rev. 47,2002. 
"' Christopher Hodges, supra note 52, p. 343 ("One of the most important balancing controls is a rule that 
whoever loses should pay most (but not all) of the winner's legal costs. "); Thomas D. Rowe and Jr., Shift 
Happens, "Pressure on Foreign Attorney-Fee Paradigms from Class Actions", 13 Duke J. Comp. & Intl 
L., 2003, p. 127 ("As others have long recognized, class actions could find barren soil if they were 
transplanted to systems that, like much of the world, maintain bans on contingent fees for plaintiffs' 
lawyers and adhere to the near-universal loser-pays rule on liability for a winning side's attorney fees. "). 
180 See, e. g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2); Benjamin Kaplan, supra note 134, pp. 382-386,393(discussing 
practice of intervention by individual interested parties in actions under former Rule 23, and explaining 
that new opt out provision of 23(c)(2) in 1966 amendments "makes clear that the judgment in any class 
action maintained as such extends to the class (excluding opters-out in (b)(3) cases), whether or not 
favourable to the class.... It is implicit in what has been said that the anomaly of a class action covering 
only the particular parties does not survive under the new rule. "). 
Ian William E. Kovacic, "The Intellectual DNA of Modem U. S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm 
Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix", Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1,2007, p. 62. 
182 Christian Miege, supra note 120, p. 12. 
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the relevant industry. It has been claimed that litigation may be controlled by class 
action lawyers whose objective is to maximize the damages award on behalf of the 
entire class and the fee award for the lawyers. 183 In individual litigation, the 
plaintiff could take into consideration such factors as commercial relationships 
between the plaintiff and the defendant and the probable effects on the industry of a 
ruinous damage award. However, lawyers rarely consider such effects. These 
factors tend not to enter into the analysis when class actions lawyers bring actions. 
A recent report from New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg and U. S. 
Senator Charles Schumer noted that "it has become increasingly clear that, rather 
than being just an incremental cost of doing business, the mere threat of legal action 
can seriously--and sometimes irrevocably--damage a company. " 184 
6.5.3 A Response to the Problems of Class Actions: The Class 
Action Fairness Act 
As I have explained above, the US the class action presents many 
problems. 185 To achieve optimal enforcement through effective class actions, it is 
necessary to consider how to solve these. The key question has been summed up as 
being how to enable public enforcers to check excessive private enforcement 
without sacrificing the prospect of privately initiated class actions, which serve as 
check against deficient public enforcement. 186 There have been many revisions of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to try to prevent excessive private enforcement. 
One of the most important of these is the Class Action Fairness Act (hereafter, 
CAFA) in 2005.187 
187 P. Friedman, D. Gelfand et al., supra note 7, p. 47. 
184 Michael R. Bloomberg and Charles E. Schumer, "Sustaining New York's and the US' Global Financial 
Services Leadership 76", 2007, available at http: //www. senate. gov/-schumer/SchumerWebsitel 
pressroom/special reports/2007/NY_report_fmal. pdf. 
gs See section 6.4.2 which deals with problems of US class actions. 
186 David Resenberg and James P. Sullivan, "Coordinating Private Class Action and Public Agency 
Enforcement of Antitrust Law", Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2006, p. 5. 
187 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-002 (codified at 28 U. S. C. §§ 1332,1453, 
1711-1715 et al. ). The CAFA was signed by President George W. Bush on February 18,2005, with a 
declaration that the Act marked "a critical step toward ending the lawsuit culture in the US. ", Press 
Release, The White House, President Signs Class-Action Fairness Act of 2005 (Feb. 18,2005), available 
at http: // www. whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050218-11. html. 
281 
CAFA was designed to address some of the perceived problems with class 
action in state courts by expanding federal diversity jurisdiction over large and 
interstate class actions brought under state law. 188 CAFA was hailed by its 
proponents as a means of ensuring that cases of national concern get tried in federal 
courts and of protecting defendants from bias in state courts. 189 If class actions are 
brought before federal court, CAFA will preclude litigation of separate class actions 
in state court and minimize costs that may have arisen from parallel proceedings in 
multiple jurisdictions. 
First, CAFA amends the diversity of jurisdiction to allow federal courts to 
hear most class action, including indirect purchaser antitrust actions brought 
entirely under state law. 190 CAFA could be a substantive reconciliation that would 
allow direct and indirect purchaser actions to be fully, intelligently litigated together 
in federal court under a single standard for pre-trial purposes. 19' CAFA allows 
defendants to remove certain indirect purchaser class actions from state to federal 
court, where they can be consolidated with direct -purchaser actions filed in federal 
court. CAFA can ensure that, as a practical matter, state courts will rarely get to 
interpret their own state antitrust laws, particularly in indirect purchaser actions, 
because they are so often brought as class actions. 192 Where a defendant's antitrust 
infringement impacts consumers across the nation, it is probable that indirect 
purchaser class actions - in federal courts under CAFA - will be subject to JMDL193 
"a J. Beisner and J. D. Miller, supra note 167 ; Warren W. Harris and Erin Glenn Busby, "Highlights of 
the Class Action Fairness Act", 72 Def. Couns. J. 228,2005, p. 228-229; Mark D. Whitener, "The 
Changing Face of Class Action Litigation: The Class Action Fairness Act Cover Story-Editor's Note : 
Exporting Antitrust", Antitrust Fall, 2005, p. 7; D. Jarrett Arp, "The Changing Face of Class Action 
Litigation: The Class Action Fairness Act Cover Story Introduction- Be Careful What You Ask For : 
Unintended Consequences and Unfinished Business under the Class Action Fairness Act", Antitrust, Fall 
2005, p. 8-9; Ian Simmons, Charles E. Borden, "The Defence Perspective: The Class Actions Fairness Act 
of 2005 and State Law Antitrust Actions", Antitrust, Fall 2005, p. 19-20; see also generally, "Class 
Actions Fairness Act of 2005 Enacted", Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, 2005. 
189 Harris and Busby, Ibid. ; Press Release, U. S. Chamber of Commerce, Chamber Celebrates Landmark 
Victory in Fight against Lawsuit Abuse (Feb. 17,2005), available at http: // 
www. uschamber. com/press/releases/2005/february/05-33. htm); Institute for Legal Reform, Issues-Class 
Action, at http: // www. instituteforlegalreform. com/issues/ index. php-issues. 
190 See 28 U. S. C. § 1332(d)(2); With regard to overall introduction of changes under CAFA, see 
generally, Gregory G. Wrobel and Michael J. Waters, "Early Returns: Impact of the Class Action Fairness 
Act on Federal Jurisdiction Over State Law Class Actions", 21 Antitrust, Fall 2006. 
191 Charles B. Casper, supra note 174, pp. 28-30. 
192 D. Jarrett Arp, supra note 188, p. 8-9. 
193 Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation is a special body within the US federal court system. It was 
established by Congress in 1968 under 28 U. S. C. § 1407 and has provided for transfer and consolidation 
of multidistrict litigation; See also Andrew I. Gavil, "State Indirect Purchaser Actions: Proposals for 
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consolidation, and will often be transferred away from the state(s) in which they are 
initially filed. Indeed, there is some early evidence that this is occurring. 194 
Second, CAFA addresses coupon settlements in which plaintiffs receive 
coupons or other types of in-kind payments that might not be not fair and 
adequate. 195 Coupon settlements would not be barred, but a party who insists upon 
a coupon settlement would have the burden of demonstrating its fairness and 
adequacy. CAFA requires the parties to notify appropriate state and federal 
agencies before settlements are approved by the court. Furthermore, it limits the 
plaintiffs' lawyer's fees in connection with coupon settlements. Under this 
provision, contingency fees in coupon settlements are to be based on the value of 
coupons actually redeemed, rather than the total value of the coupons awarded. 196 
For instance, if the settlement provided for $5 million in coupons but only 20% of 
class members actually redeemed the coupons, the lawyers' fees would be based on 
a recovery of $1 million, not $5 million. 197 The aim of the legislation in this respect, 
therefore, is to curb the widespread abuses in coupon settlement. 
6.6. Conclusion on the best way forward for Group Actions in 
Korea 
As I already discussed, the role of consumers has been changed from being a 
collateral part of industrial policy to being the final judge of the competition with 
Korea's economic growth. With the changed role of the consumer, there have been 
efforts to encourage private actions to protect consumer interests. 
Reform before the Antitrust Modernization Commission, 2005, p. 23. 
194 See Charles B. Casper, supra note 174, pp. 28-32(citing preliminary data suggesting that during the 
period February 18-August 30,2005, "788 proposed class actions raising claims under state laws were 
commented in or removed to federal district courts, compared to 507 such cases during the same period in 
2004"). 
"s Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2,119 Stat. 4 (2005); D. Jarrett Arp, supra note 
188, p. 9; Charles B. Casper, supra note 174, pp. 27-28. See also Roger D. Blair and Christine A. Piette, 
"Coupons and Settlement in Antitrust Class Actions", 20 Antitrust 32,2005, pp. 33-36; Edward P. 
Henneberry, "Private Enforcement in EC Competition Law: The Green Paper on Damages Actions- The 
Passing-on Defences and Standing for Indirect Purchasers, Representative Organizations and Other 
Groups", Heller Ehrman, LLP, 2006, p. 13. 
196 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2 § 3,114 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified at 28 U. S. C. § 
F97 (discussing lawyers' fees in coupon settlement cases). 
97 J. H. Beisner and J. D. Miller, supra note 167. 
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However, there have, up to the present, been only a few private competition 
actions in Korea. Very often individual (including consumer) damage is too small 
to make it feasible or attractive for the victims to bring actions. Given that 
anticompetitive conduct can result in a great many persons suffering from some 
loss caused by the same anticompetitive practice, some facilitating mechanism such 
as group actions must be considered. It is essential to allow the combination of 
individual loss by way of group actions because group actions can bind all members 
of actions to ensure the members' interests. To protect consumer interests it is 
submitted that user-friendly group actions must be permitted. 
In order to defend consumer interests and develop competition damages 
actions, the KFTC made the provision for of group actions which was adopted on 
January 1 2007 under the Consumer Fundamental Act. 198 However, as I 
discussed above, 199 Korean representative actions have crucial difficulties in 
ensuring the consumer interests because the Consumer Fundamental Act does not 
provide for compensation in the form of damages for anticompetitive practices. It 
recognizes only injunctive relief and does not include monetary claims. It is 
submitted, however, that it is necessary to allow. damages actions in competition 
representative actions in order to ensure public interests such as the consumer 
interest because victims of anticompetitive conduct can obtain compensation only 
through civil damages actions. Therefore, the provisions of the Consumer 
Fundamental Act should be amended to provide for damages actions in the form of 
opt-out representative actions. Procedures of quantification and distribution among 
consumers should be also included in the provision. 
However, the spread of group actions may increase litigation which could 
result in abuse of litigation as it has it in the US. In pursuing the defence of 
consumer interests and development of competition damages actions, it is desirable 
to strike the right balance between encouraging legal actions and preventing abuse 
of litigation because group actions have a tendency to lead to abuse of litigation by 
lowering the costs and raising the benefits to potential plaintiffs. To achieve an 
198 Consumer Fundamental Law 76; See section 6.2.2 which deals with competition group actions in 
Korea. 
199 See section 6.2.2 which deals with competition group actions in Korea. 
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appropriate balance between these two factors, it is necessary to consider the 
practice of group actions in other jurisdictions from which Korea can draw some 
lessons. The US has a long history of class actions practice. However, the US has 
the undesirable side-effects of class actions in the form of abuse of litigation and 
unmanageability caused by opt-out system, contingency fees and one-way cost 
rules because these systems can lower the burdens of plaintiff in bringing damages 
actions. As I discuss above, the mechanism of US class actions has been the subject 
of extensive criticism because of the potential for abuse by class representatives and 
lawyers who can extract settlements. 200 
It is submitted that UK consumer claims as provided for in the competition 
Act 1998 s 47B are more appropriate than US class actions for Korea because they 
can avoid the worse problems of US class actions. In the UK, there are cases that 
Korea can look at for guidance. For instance, there has been the critical consumer 
claim, JJB Sports PLC. 201 It is worth considering this case even if it was not 
considered a success by the Consumer Association, `Which? ' since in it used 
interesting ways of establishing the consumer's right to part of the represented class. 
In this case, a photograph of a person wearing the `relevant' shirt was good 
evidence for anticompetitive damage caused by infringers' price-fixing of the 
football shirt. Given the difficulty of proving anticompetitive practice, it is useful 
point, the Korea might consider similar mechanism to mitigate the burden of proof 
of plaintiffs even if this is to confuse the proof of the anticompetitive practice with 
the issue of whether a particular person was one of the consumers who was injured 
by it. 
Korea, like the UK has an opt-in system and a loser-pays rule which can 
prevent abuse of litigation and ensure manageability of -representative actions by 
involving an organizationally strong association. 202 This opt-in arrangement is 
contrast to opt-out arrangement which can include very large numbers of class- 
members. Korea representative actions and opt-in system can be useful method to 
200 See section 6.5.2.2 which deals with problems created by the class actions from defendant's 
perspective. 
01 Consumers Association v JJB Sports PLC, 1078/7/9/07. 
202 In respect to opt-in system and loser-pay rule in Korea see, section 6.2.2 which deals with competition 
group actions in Korea. 
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avoid US abuse of litigation. The European Commission also proposed an opt-in 
system and representative actions in the White Paper to prevent abuse of 
203 litigation. 
However, it can be argued that opt-in actions are simply not as effective as 
opt-out systems because there is no perfect way to notify every victim of the suit. 
This was clearly demonstrated in the UK by the JJB Sports PLC case which was 
really not very successful because of the limitations of the opt-in system. The case 
showed how difficult it is to bring an opt-in representative action when such small 
amounts of money are in issue and the case is brought so long after the event. Thus, 
it is worth considering opt out system since opt out system can be more effective 
than opt in system by involving many victims without obvious intention to be 
included in actions. 
In Korea, only the designated bodies by law can seek approval from the court 
before bringing a representative action. To balance between encouraging private 
enforcement and avoiding unmanageability, it is desirable to broaden the scope of 
organization. 
Given that group actions are one of the mechanism to ensure the ability of 
private parties to bring actions, these actions should not deprive persons of the right 
to bring an action individually. Group actions must be an alternative mechanism. In 
respect to group actions, therefore, further thought will be needed to ensure 
appropriate rules of group actions. Alongside representative actions, to protect the 
consumer interest, it would be necessary for the empowered consumer body also to 
have power to complain to the KFTC because the KFTC can handle cases quickly 
and with extensive investigation powers without any private resources. 
203 White Paper on Damages actions, supra note 68, section 2.1; Neelie Kroes, " Collective redress in 
Europe : Address at the panel discussion organised by DHIK at the Representation of the Free State of 
Bavaria to the EU', Brussels, 10`x' December, 2008, p. 4. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
This thesis has sought to determine the best way forward for Korea in respect 
of certain major issues about which rules must be adopted if a proper system of 
private damages actions for breach of the competition rules is to flourish. These 
issues are the type of damages to be awarded, the passing on defence, the position 
of indirect purchasers, and group (or class) actions. The first three of these raise 
fundamental questions about what private damages actions are trying to achieve. 
The last raises the difficult matter of how the legal system can enable persons who 
have suffered comparatively little loss relative to the cost of litigation to sue. In 
determining the best way forward for Korea this thesis has looked for comparison at 
three other jurisdictions, the EU, UK, and US, in order to identify whether there are 
policies, practices or procedures which Korea could usefully follow and, just as 
importantly, whether there are those which it should avoid. 
The relevant Korean legislation was set out in Chapter 2. It was explained 
there that the Korean system establishes a public body, the KFTC, to enforce both 
the Competition Law, enacted on April 1,1981 and other relevant legislation, 
including consumer legislation' and that the KFTC has substantially contributed to 
promoting consumer interests through its enforcement of both competition and 
consumer laws. On the other hand, private enforcement, including damages actions, 
has been limited, partly because of the non-litigious nature of Korean legal culture 
and partly because of the lack of strong incentives to litigate in comparison, for 
example, to those in the US, as seen in the preceding Chapters. 
It can be argued that given the fundamentally public nature of the objectives 
of Korean competition law which, as seen in Chapter 1 `are to promote fair and free 
competition, to thereby encourage creative enterprising activities, to protect 
consumers, and to strive for balanced development of the national economy 
The nine other laws include the Omnibus Cartel Repeal Law (1999) and the Consumer Fundamental 
Law (2006), see Chapter 2. 
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consumer welfare'2 it is more suitable that the law is enforced by a public body 
than by private action. Nevertheless US law, which is largely enforced by private 
action, also pursues the public objectives of consumer welfare and efficiency. 
However, the US position has to be seen in the context of a culture of individualism 
and individual rights which is quite different from the nature of Korean cultural and 
societal norms. This does not mean that private damages actions should not be 
encouraged in Korea, as they can play an important role in complementing public 
enforcement by the KFTC, particularly, as explained in this thesis, by providing 
additional deterrence. Also the KFTC, like most other competition authorities 
around the world, lacks the resources to pursue all competition infringements. 
Optimal enforcement, it is submitted, therefore requires private action as a 
complement to public enforcement. 
The differences between public and private enforcement can offer the victims 
the opportunity to balance the advantages and disadvantages of private and public 
enforcement whether by way of a complaint to the competition authorities or 
through the issuing of legal proceedings. A victim could choose the most effective 
action between both complaint and private proceedings although a court might stay 
private proceedings while the public proceedings are going on. However, this is 
subject to the reservation that the most attractive form of private action may be the 
`follow-on' action whereby the victim is able to rely on a previous finding of the 
public enforcer before a court or other tribunal, rather than the `stand-alone' action 
where the victim has to prove the infringement from the beginning. Where this is 
so the resources of the public enforcer are not relieved by the use of private actions 
because public enforcement is still required to trigger the private action. 
Nevertheless, the additional deterrence element remains. 
A vital factor in respect of private enforcement in Korea is that, like the 
public enforcers in other jurisdictions, the KFTC cannot compensate victims for 
losses from anticompetitive conduct. The surcharges (fines) imposed by the KFTC 
go to the public purse, not to those who have suffered loss through the infringement 
2 Korea Competition Law. 
3 See Chapter 2 which deals with stand alone actions for the position on this in Korea. 
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of the competition rules. Only Korean courts can award damages. As already 
noted, 4 and as the KFTC has said itself, the legislative history of competition law 
in Korea shows a predominant concern for consumers. 5 It is therefore important in 
Korea to ensure that the combined system of private and public enforcement brings 
the implementation of competition law closer to consumers by having effective 
remedies to protect their rights under competition law. Both to enhance consumer 
welfare and protect consumer interests there needs to be mutually fruitful 
interaction between private and public enforcement. Although private enforcement 
and public enforcement aim at different aspects of the same phenomenon, both can 
strengthen the impact of competition rules. An effective system of private damages 
actions does not alter the basic goal of the competition rules, which is to safeguard 
the public interest by maintaining undistorted competition. Structured properly, 
however, private actions can positively contribute to optimal enforcement. Thus, 
private enforcement rules and procedures should be clear and predictable and 
should maximise the opportunity for victims to achieve redress without chilling 
genuinely pro-competitive behaviour (Type 2 errors) or giving rise to abuses of 
litigation. 
In the light of these considerations it is submitted that it is right that, as I 
discussed Ch 2,6 for Korea to encourage private enforcement and to have recently 
paid a great deal of attention and effort to private enforcement, particularly actions 
for damages. The KFTC has regarded some reform of the rules governing private 
enforcement as necessary because there is a general recognition that public 
enforcement by the KFTC should be supplemented by private enforcement to a 
greater extent. To foster private rights of action, the KFTC has tried to remove 
obstacles and to create an effective system for fostering successful claims by 
revising the provisions of damages actions in 2004. These provisions enable 
potential plaintiffs to bring damages actions without a prior decision of the KFTC 
i. e. stand-alone actions as well as follow-on actions can now be brought in Korea. 
However, in addition to these changes the encouragement of private actions also 
necessitates providing private parties with economic incentives to bring actions 
4 See Chapter 2 which deals with private competition enforcement of Korea. 
s See 2008 KFTC Annual Report. 
6 See section 2.1 which deals with overview of private competition enforcement in Korea. 
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before the courts rather than through the KFTC. In the absence of strong incentives 
to bring damages actions, it is difficult to encourage private enforcement as an 
effective mechanism to achieve optimal enforcement. Thus, it is necessary to ensure 
the appropriate incentives. 
One of the incentives to be considered concerns the type of damages that 
should be awarded in cases concerning the infringement of the competition rules, as 
discussed in Chapter 3.7 Damages at an appropriate level can be a tool to increase 
private parties' motivation to detect and prosecute illegal activities. 
As far as the type of damages to be awarded is concerned, it is necessary to 
consider whether Korea needs to go beyond merely awarding damages which 
compensate for the losses suffered. Korea could make a private right of action for 
individuals or entities harmed by anticompetitive practices very attractive by 
recognizing exemplary, restitutionary or multiple damages such as treble damages 
in order to encourage private enforcement. For instance, as shown in Chapter 3, 
treble damages in the US have been a strong incentive for plaintiffs to bring 
damages actions. 8 In respect to deciding on the type of damages that should be 
available, the crucial questions are which type of damages provides the appropriate 
level of enforcement and which types of damages are acceptable within the Korean 
legal system. 
If Korea were to adopt exemplary, restitutionary or multiple damages, it 
could encourage private enforcement. However, such damages are inconsistent with 
the principle of compensation for damage which is a fundamental principle of the 
Korean legal system. Korean legal tradition has hitherto avoided exemplary, 
restitutionary or multiple damages because they bear no relation to the actual loss 
and can cause unjust enrichment and multiple liabilities. Instead of recognizing 
these types of damages Korea recognizes the concept of `full compensation' which 
includes lost profits and interest. Korean civil law makes it clear that the damages 
which may be awarded include all monetary awards. It is submitted that through 
full compensation, compensatory damages can provide sufficient incentives to 
See Chapter 3 which deals with the principle of compensation for damages. 
8 See section 3.2.4 which deals with the mandatory treble damages in the US. 
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bring damages action without the introduction of exemplary, restitutionary or 
multiple damages, 
It must be recognised that given the deep-rooted principle of compensation 
for losses suffered as the basis for damages in Korea there is in reality little chance 
of the adoption in Korean competition cases of exemplary, multiple or 
restitutionary damages because they are not related to actual loss and can result in a 
windfall to plaintiffs. However, it is submitted that, as shown in the Conclusions to 
Chapter 3, such an adoption is undesirable as well as unlikely. Chapter 3 explained 
the problems that have arisen in the US as a result of mandatory treble damages 
actions in antitrust cases, such as over-enforcement and abuse of litigation. Korea 
should avoid replicating these. In addition, damages based on anything other than 
the compensatory principle can be objectionable on the basis that it confuses 
compensation with punishment, leads to double liabilities, produces unjustified 
enrichment of the victim and risks over-enforcement. Also, unless some allowance 
is made in respect of leniency applicants, exemplary, multiple or restitutionary 
damages may risk damaging the attractiveness and thus the efficacy of the KFTC's 
leniency programme. 
Given the KFTC's power to impose substantial surcharges (fines)9 and 
criminal sanctions, it is submitted that it is not necessary to adopt exemplary, 
restitutionary or multiple damages in order to ensure deterrence, punishment and 
the disgorgement of illegal gains. 10 Given the substantial surcharges and criminal 
sanctions in Korea and the apprehension'of the abuse of litigation seen in the US, 
damages actions in Korea should continue to be about compensation and must not 
be used to punish companies or force disgorgement of illegal gains. If heavy 
enough, a public sanction such as appropriately calculated surcharges and criminal 
sanctions including prison sentences can create a powerful effect of deterrence, 
punishment and can effect disgorgement of illegal gains into the public purse. In 
respect to the importance of creating the right balance between private and public 
enforcement, if punishment, disgorgement of illegal gains, or deterrence beyond the 
9 As discussed in Chapter 1, in Korea, fines imposed by the KFTC are called asurcharges. 10 Competition Law 57; Byung-Ju Lee, "The Harmonization of Public and Private Enforcement: A 
Korean Perspective", The 5 Seoul International Competition Forum, 2008, p. 3. 
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possibility of having to pay compensation is required, it is more desirable to 
achieve these by the KFTC rather than by private exemplary, restitutionary or 
multiple damages. 
In conclusion it is submitted that there is no justification for the introduction 
in Korea of exemplary, restitutionary or multiple damages. The recovery of actual 
damages can serve as a sufficient incentive to bring damages actions and serve as a 
deterrent to undertakings not to infringe. Appropriate sanctions including heavy 
surcharges and prison sentences can create a powerful effect of deterrence and 
effect disgorgement. 
Turning to the matters discussed in Chapter 4, the passing on defence is 
relevant to the encouragement of private actions because the it is closely related to 
the amount of compensatory damages that can be awarded. As I discussed in 
Chapter 4,11 the passing on defence is important to the issue of the encouragement 
of private enforcement because it can affect a private party's incentives to bring 
actions by influencing on the amount of damages which can be obtained. If the 
passing on defence is permitted, the amount of damages that direct purchasers can 
recover may be decreased, whereas indirect purchasers may be able to get 
compensation for the amount of damage they suffered. However, if the passing on 
defence is not allowed the amount of damages of direct purchasers can recover may 
be greater, but indirect purchasers may not get compensation at all. 
As seen in Chapter 4,12 in the Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery 
Corp case, 13 the US Supreme Court rejected the use of the passing on defence in 
antitrust cases. It prohibited the passing on defence in such cases because of a fear 
that if competition infringers get off too easily, the prospect of liability for private 
damages may not provide an appropriate level of effective deterrence. Thus, by not 
recognizing passing on defence, an antitrust infringer cannot avoid liability to a 
direct purchaser by showing that the direct purchaser suffered no injury because it 
passed on any overcharge to its own customers. 
11 See section 4.1 which deals with overview of the passing on defence. 
12 Section 4.2 deals with the passing on defence in the US. 
13 Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U. S 481 (1968). 
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Given the US attitude to the passing on defence and the tension between 
taking the best action to deter anticompetitive conduct by excluding the passing on 
defence (as was the motive for the Hanover Shoe ruling) and having rules which 
prevent unjust enrichment, the key question is whether Korea needs to follow the 
US approach. This is part of the whole question of whether Korea should consider 
changing its legal system in some respects in order to introduce private enforcement 
rules more like those of the US. 
If Korea were to follow the US attitude to the passing on defence, Korea 
would have to modify its usual approach to competition damages awards because 
only actual damages can be compensated for in Korea. Prohibiting the passing on 
defence would represent a significant exception to the traditional Korean legal 
principle of compensation for actual damages. In considering whether to make such 
an exception, it is necessary to recognize the differences between the Korean legal 
system and US legal system and also to take account of the fundamentally different 
way that the enforcement systems are set up. 
On the one hand, the competition enforcement mechanism in the US is 
primarily through private actions. As discussed in Ch 1,14 the primary objective of 
private enforcement in the US is deterrence not compensation. In order to deter 
antitrust conduct through private enforcement, the US system aims to make private 
enforcement as attractive as possible, both in terms of the potential recovery and the 
speed and ease of the procedure. 15 To make private enforcement attractive, the US 
has adopted such features as treble damages, contingency fees, the one-way cost 
rule and opt-out class actions. However, as seen in Chapters 3-6, these strong 
incentives have caused problems such as abuse of litigation. 
On the other hand, the primary competition enforcement mechanism in Korea 
14 In respect to the objectives of US private enforcement, see section 1.2.3. s Brian Kennelly, "The Defence of "Passing On", Bar European Group Annual Conference", Cyprus, 
2005, p. 9; See, W. van Gerven, "Substantive Remedies for the Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Rules 
before national Courts, in : European Competition Law Annual 2001-Effective Private Enforcement of 
EC Antitrust Law, ed. By Ehermann and Atanasiu, 2003, p. 53-93,74-75. 
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is through a public authority, the KFTC. As discussed in Ch 1,16 the primary 
objective of private enforcement in Korea is therefore compensation of victims, not 
deterrence. To ensure full and just compensation, civil law and competition law 
recognize the actual damages. From the perspective of Korean civil law and 
competition law, the prohibition of the passing on defence is incompatible with the 
principle of compensation for damages. Under the principle of compensation for 
damages, awards of damages should provide compensation for actual loss, which 
would be measured by what the victims would have had in the absence of the 
anticompetitive conduct. If the direct purchaser is allowed to claim the amount of 
the overcharged price without any deductions for passed on overcharge into indirect 
purchasers, he would, in the view of Korean legal principles, be unjustly enriched. 
Thus, direct purchasers who have been able to pass on overcharge to their own 
customers should not be entitled to compensation of that overcharge. 
However, the passed on overcharge may lead to a reduction in sales by the 
direct purchaser as a consequence of him raising the price. It is not desirable for 
defendants to be exempt from liability merely in order to avoid a possible unjust 
enrichment in the direct victim's assets. Thus, it is submitted that passed on damage, 
and the actual enrichment of the victim if the defendant had to compensate him, 
should be treated as cumulative conditions before the defendant can raise the 
passing on defence. Thus Korea should recognise the passing on defence but apply 
stringent controls to ensure that the reduction in repayment to the victim are truly 
warranted. Given that this is done, Korea should not privilege the principle of 
deterrence over that of preventing over-compensation. In a system of enforcement 
which is primarily public in nature deterrence need not out-trump all other 
considerations of justice and fairness. 
In Chapter 5 indirect purchaser were discussed. Indirect purchaser actions are 
important for the encouragement of private enforcement because they involve the 
number of potential plaintiffs such as consumers. Indirect purchaser actions are 
closely related to fair and effective compensation. On the one hand, indirect actions 
are important for ensuring fairness of private enforcement because if indirect 
16 In respect to objective of US private enforcement, see section 1.2.3 which deals with objectives of 
private competition enforcement. 
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purchaser actions are not allowed, many potential plaintiffs (real victims) are not 
able to exercise their rights under competition law. To ensure fairness, any right of 
actions for compensatory damage must be formulated to ensure remedies for 
indirect purchasers such as consumers in order to avoid the danger of significant 
injustice. 17 Even if the defendant succeeds in proving the passing on defence, the 
indirect purchaser may have a good argument in his actions against the infringer. 
On the other hand, as I discussed in Chapter 5, if all indirect purchasers can 
bring damages actions, a number of complications are likely to arise in ascertaining, 
apportioning and distributing the loss resulting from the infringement. To avoid 
these problems and ensure effective enforcement, in Illinois Brick, the US Supreme 
Court denied indirect purchaser actions. '8 However, in the name of efficiency, it is 
submitted that the Illinois Brick decision has substantially impaired fair justice by 
denying compensation to indirect purchasers who are the real victims-19 
The key question is whether Korea should follow the indirect purchaser 
principle established in Illinois Brick to ensure effective competition enforcement. 
Illinois Brick, however, is the corollary of Hanover Shoe: neither the passing on 
defence or indirect purchaser claims are recognised in the US. Not to recognize a 
passing-on defence but still to allow indirect purchaser actions is to permit 
duplicative recoveries. This might provide additional deterrence but even the US 
Supreme Court, with its emphasis on deterrence was not prepared to countenance 
that Although it can be argued that it is desirable to put compensation for damage 
in every indirect purchaser's hand, for the reasons explained in Chapter 5, the 
exclusion of indirect purchaser actions can be destructive of the fundamental 
principles of private competition actions because of three main reasons: it infringes 
the concept of full compensation, fails to protect of consumers' interests directly, 
and does not satisfy the goal of effective and efficient enforcement. 
If indirect purchaser actions are not allowed and direct purchasers from a 
William H. Page, "Policy Choices in Defining the Measure of Antitrust Damages", DAF/COMP/WP3, 
2006 p. 5. 
18 See sction 5.2 which deals with passing on defence in the US. 
19 See sction 5.2.4 which deals with the problems in following the US position on indirect purchaser 
litigation. 
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cartel who raise their prices and passed them on to indirect purchasers get 
compensation for the overcharge from the cartelists, direct purchasers can be 
unjustly enriched at the expense of those indirect purchasers such as consumers. 
Furthermore, to ensure effective and efficient private damage actions, it is 
desirable to provide a remedy for the all victims of the anticompetitive conduct 
because the more indirect purchasers who bring damages actions, the more 
effective the competition system will be and the more relevant it will be to 
consumers. Therefore, it is desirable that under Korean competition law and civil 
law2° that an indirect purchaser who has been passed on an excessive price in 
whole or in part, for example, should be able to recover applying a traditional `but 
for' approach . 
21 As I discussed Ch 5, the only limit should be that those entitled to 
recover must be persons with damage protected by competition law. 22 Therefore, in 
it is submitted that in Korea both direct and indirect purchasers should have the 
right to bring damages actions but the passing-on defence should be recognised. 
Indirect purchasers could include competitors, consumers or other market 
participants. 
It has been seen in Chapters 423 and 524 that the recognition of the passing 
on defence and indirect purchaser actions can involve a measure of complexity. 
However, it is submitted that recognizing the passing on defence and indirect 
purchaser actions in Korea would not lead to insurmountable difficulties in the 
handling of private proceedings. While there are considerable practical difficulties 
in the determination, calculation and distribution of damage between direct and 
indirect purchasers, these problems can be minimized by the use of the modern 
sophisticated econometrics techniques and statistical analyses that have now been 
developed. In any event, practical difficulties should not be allowed in Korea to 
undermine the justice and fairness of the legal system in this regard. 
20 Provision of damages actions under civil law is fundamental to provision of damages actions under 
competition law. 
21 In respect to but for approach, see section 4.3.2.3 which deals the prohibiton of over-compensation in 
Korea. 
22 In respect to antitrust injury doctrine see Chapter 1. 
23 See sections 4.6 which deals with conclusion of passing on defence. 
24 See section 5.6 which deals with conclusion of indirect purchaser actions. 
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Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 3,25 to minimize the difficulties of 
awarding damages it has been provided under Article 57 of the Korea Competition 
Law that in cases where it is difficult to verify the amount of damage the court may 
confirm the substantial amount of damage by virtue of its legal authority. 26 It is 
submitted that to further ameliorate the difficulty of quantification of damage this 
provision should be augmented to include specific rules for allocating recoveries 
between direct and indirect purchasers and to streamline what can admittedly be a 
complicated process. In particular, it is submitted that Korea could consider 
adopting the type of presumption that the EC Commission suggests in the White 
Paper. There it is proposed that there should be a rebuttable presumption that the 
illegal overcharge has been passed on in its entirety. 27 
Korea must also decide whether it needs to take steps to provide for group 
actions, as discussed in Chapter 6. The problem is that many victims of 
anticompetitive infringements, especially individuals with small, losses may be 
discouraged from going to court. Given that anticompetitive conduct can result in a 
great many persons suffering some loss caused by the same anticompetitive practice, 
for the protection of the rights of indirect purchasers such as consumers, it is 
essential to allow the combination of individual losses by way of some type of 
group actions because without group actions there will be few claims for damages. 
Group actions could create a more streamlined procedure through avoiding 
inconsistent and contradictory decision. 
In Korea, as discussed in Chapter 6,28 consumers have played an important 
role in stimulating competition on the market and therefore played an important 
role in Korea's economic growth. To protect consumer interests effectively, the 
KFTC made provision for representative actions in the Consumer Fundamental 
Law of January 1 2007 29 As seen in Chapter 6 , 
30 however, there have up to the 
15 See section 3.2.1 which deals with the principle of compensation for damages in Korea. 
26 It is a reference to the Competition Act 57 which I set out in the Chapter 3. 
27 In respect to the type of presumption that the EC Commission suggests in the White Paper, see 
European Commission, "White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules", Com 
(2008) 165 final at section 2.6; See also section 5.4.2 which deals with desirability of permitting indirect 
purchaser litigation in the EU. 
28 See section 6.2.1 which deals with overview of consumer policy and current situation of group actions 
in Korea. 
29 Consumer Fundamental Law 76; See section 6.2.2 which deals with competition group actions in 
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present been only a few private competition actions in Korea. 
To encourage private enforcement through group actions, it is desirable to 
consider the experience with group actions in other jurisdiction from which Korea 
can draw some lessons. In particular, the US has a long history of class actions 
practice which has played a substantial role in encouraging private enforcement. 
The US class actions have encouraged private enforcement by lowering the costs of, 
and raising the benefits to potential plaintiffs. However, as I discussed in Chapter 6, 
31 Opt-out class actions combined with the lure of treble damages and one-way 
costs rules which depart from the loser-pays rule have led to undesirable effects 
such as abuse of litigation and unmanageability which in turn has created a need for 
safeguards. 32 
It is submitted that UK consumer claims as provided for in the Competition 
Act1998 s 47B are more appropriate than US class actions for Korea because they 
can avoid the worse problems of US class actions. Korea, like the UK, has a 
representative action which can prevent abuse of litigation and ensure 
manageability of consumer claims by involving a strong consumer organization. 
This representative action has opt-in rather than opt-out arrangement. 
However, it can be argued that opt-in actions are not as effective as opt-out 
actions. Opt-out arrangement can usually include a larger number of class members 
because there is often no perfect way to notify every victim of the anticompetitive 
conduct that an action is being brought. This was clearly demonstrated in the UK in 
the s 47B consumer claim JJB Sports PLC 33 which was regarded as an 
unsatisfactory case because of the limited number of consumers who joined in the 
opt-in action. Thus, it is submitted that Korea should make representative actions 
more attractive by adopting an opt-out system which provides for actions which can 
Korea. 
30 See section 6.2.2 which deals with competition group actions in Korea. 
31 See section 6.5.2.2 which deals with problems created by the class actions from defendant's 
perspective. 
Z Wils, "Should Private Antitrust Enforcement Be Encouraged in Europe? " (2003) 26 World 
Competition, P. 482; See generally, Steven B. Hantler, Mark A. Behrens, Lean Lorber, "Is The Crisis in 
the Civil Justice System Real or Imagined? ", Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, 2005. 
33 Football Kit Price Fixing, OFT decision 1 August 2003, [2004] UKCLR 6, JJB Sports plc v OFT 
[2004] CAT 17; JJB Sports plc v OFT [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1318. 
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involve many victims without them having to actively take steps to be included in 
the proceedings. 
Most importantly, at present Korean representative actions have crucial 
problems in ensuring the consumer interest because they do not provide for 
compensation in the form of damages actions. The law provides the only for 
injunctive relief and does not include monetary claims. It is submitted, however, 
that it is necessary to allow compensation for anticompetitive damages in 
representative actions because these actions are the only effective way for 
consumers to be compensated. Therefore, the provisions of the Consumer 
Fundamental Law should be amended to provide for damages actions in the form of 
opt-out representative actions. Procedures of quantification and distribution 
between consumers should be also included in the provision. 
The conclusion of this thesis is that in order to protect the public interests as 
well as private interests, private enforcement should be encouraged in Korea. It is 
necessary to encourage private enforcement for the optimal enforcement of 
competition law because only through damages actions can victims obtain 
compensation for the damage they have suffered. However, it is also desirable 
because private enforcement can support and complement public enforcement thus 
advancing the public interest in the rigorous enforcement of competition law for the 
purpose of achieving consumer welfare and efficiency. 
In order to encourage private enforcement it is necessary to eliminate 
psychological barriers to litigation which certainly have a role in limiting the use of 
private enforcement in Korea. Given that damages actions have had a crucial role in 
the enforcement of US antitrust law it is useful for Korea to take some time to 
understand the US legal system which has many effective mechanisms relevant to 
the damages actions to antitrust damages actions. 34 However, despite these 
effective mechanisms, the way that the right of private action has worked in 
practice in the US has been subject to widespread and substantial criticism because 
3" As well as those discussed in this thesis, see e. g. notice pleading, as in Bell Atlantic Corp. V. Twombly, 
127 S. Ct. 1955(2007), and summary judgments as in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 34 411 U. S. 
792,93 S. Ct. 1817,817,36 L. Ed. 2d 668(1973). 
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the US system has lacked safeguards against abusive litigation and the other 
problems that have arisen from such a plaintiff-friendly system. There is little to 
prevent plaintiffs from using these powerful procedures to obtain unwarranted 
benefits35 and there are extraordinary opportunities for abuse that can ultimately 
overwhelm the benefits in the U. S. system. 
In considering the creation of a system best-suited for enforcing competition 
law in Korea, therefore, it is necessary to ask whether competition litigation as 
practised in the US is the best example to use or whether this competition import 
requires a more careful inspection. The U. S. experience suggests that fostering 
private enforcement must always have regard to the risk of misused and frivolous 
litigation because the result of abusive litigation can be that businesses avoid or 
abandon pro-competitive innovative practices, which is detrimental to consumer 
welfare and efficiency. 36 
Furthermore, it is desirable to consider how transplanted procedures and rules 
from the US would actually work in Korea. It is necessary to consider the 
difference of legal culture and tradition between the US and Korea because business 
activities are based on a trust and honour in Korea. 
In respect of the achievement of optimal enforcement through private and 
public enforcement, it must be remembered that the Korean legal system has 
features which distinguish it from the legal systems in the other jurisdictions 
discussed in this thesis. Given the difference of its culture from that of the US, even 
if Korea adopted mechanisms from the US, the undesirable aspects of the US 
system would not necessarily be replicated in Korea. Some of the problems of the 
present US system could be prevented by the maintenance of long-standing Korean 
legal principles based on Korea legal culture and tradition. These legal mechanisms, 
such as the loser pays rule and compensation for actual damage, can help to protect 
35 John H. Beisner, Charles E. Borden, "Expending Private Cause of Action: Lessons from the US 
Litigation Experience", presented at The Trans-Atlantic Challenge: Diverging approaches to regulatory 
and legal reform in the Untied States and Europe, Brussel, 2005, P. 21. 
36 Richard A. Posner, "Antitrust Law", An Economic Perspective 35 (1976) ("The burgeoning of the 
private antitrust action has induced enormous, and I think justified concern about the overexpansion of the 
antitrust laws and their increasing use to retard rather than promote competition"); see also Frank H. 
Easterbrook, The Limits ofAntitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1,5 (1984) (asserting the "inhospitality tradition of 
antitrust" is a costly feature of antitrust enforcement because it tends to deter innovative market practices). 
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Korea against the litigation abuse that has plagued the US legal system. Thus, any 
moves to US-style antitrust damages actions should take into account any 
drawbacks or costs associated with having special procedural rules in competition 
cases and should be approached with extreme caution. The system for private 
damages actions in competition cases in Korea should aim to promote a 
`competition culture' rather than a US-style `litigation culture'. This thesis comes 
out strongly in favour of facilitating private competition enforcement in Korea but 
submits that when Korea adopts legal ideas from other jurisdictions, it is necessary 
to avoid the negative aspects experienced, particularly, those which have occurred 
in the US. Thus, the legal framework for more effective competition damages 
actions should be based on a genuinely Korean approach, with balanced measures 
rooted in Korea legal culture and tradition. 
Therefore, it is more desirable to ensure that Korean private enforcement 
rules and procedures are clear, predictable and perceived as striking an equitable 
balance between the interests of plaintiffs and defendants than to follow the US 
legal system. To eliminate psychological barriers, for example, it is desirable to 
adopt opt-out representative actions which can lower cost and raise benefit of 
consumer claims but not to adopt opt-out class actions mounted by claims lawyers. 
In order to encourage efficient and effective competition enforcement, Korea 
should also reconsider the role of the KFTC because actions for damages and 
enforcement by public authorities are necessarily interrelated. For instance, as 
shown in the US, follow-on actions can help private parties to bring damages 
actions by ameliorating the burden of proof. 37 Stronger law enforcement by the 
KFTC has been hindered and limited because of its limited investigative powers 
under the current competition law. To launch effective investigations against 
anticompetitive activities, the government should review the possibility of 
providing the KFTC with judicial powers like those of Public Prosecutor's Office. 
In Korea, only Public Prosecutor's Office has the power of investigation without 
any pre-notice. Thus, for effective and efficient public enforcement, it is desirable 
the KFTC has this investigative power, especially for cartel. 
37 See section 1.3.1.4 which deals with stand-alone and follow-on actions. 
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Any changes to procedures and practices in private damages actions in Korea, 
should be mindful that, unlike the US, the primary mechanism for enforcing the 
competition rules in Korea is through public enforcement. Korea should not 
abandon its concepts of compensatory damages, fairness and the avoidance of 
unjust' enrichment in order to use private actions as the primary deterrence 
mechanism. Private actions should be encouraged as a complement and as the only 
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